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Abstract 
This thesis offers a contribution to Irish historiography with a study of Ireland’s 
diplomatic and friendship relations with the Soviet Union in the ‘short Soviet twentieth-
century’. To date no such study has been produced. The study has as its central focus 
developments surrounding the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between the 
two states in 1973, and considers aspects of how those relations evolved down to 1980. 
To provide an understanding of the legacy of relations prior to formalisation of relations, 
the study commences with a survey of the principal diplomatic contacts from 1919 to 
1972, including those that took place in America between representatives of the nascent 
Irish republic and Soviet Russia during the revolutionary period of 1919-21, contacts 
between the Irish Free State and the Soviet Union at the League of Nations in the mid-
1930s, and between the Republic of Ireland and the Soviet Union at the United Nations 
from 1955 to 1972. It proceeds to examine in more detail events surrounding the 
establishment of formal diplomatic relations in 1973, and experiences during the first 
six years at the Irish embassy to Moscow, and at the Soviet embassy to Dublin. To gain 
insights from a wider societal perspective with oral and private archival evidence, an 
account of the Ireland-U.S.S.R. Society – a unique friendship organisation located at a 
conjunction of informational, cultural, academic, trade union and tourist affairs in Irish-
Soviet relations – is next presented. The final two areas of study draw upon archival 
records of the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs for the years 1974-80, which have 
only recently been made available at the National Archives of Ireland.  Drawing in the 
main on the central registry series of files containing political reports sent to Dublin by 
Ireland’s first ambassador to Moscow, Dr Edward Brennan, the penultimate focus is 
upon the ‘island of Ireland’ elements of those reports. Lastly, the thesis discusses 
Ireland’s second relationship with the Soviet Union, as mediated through European 
Political Cooperation (E.P.C.), a parallel framework of the European Economic 
Community. This discussion is principally facilitated by the records of Ireland’s 
involvement in a confidential subgroup of E.P.C. – the Eastern Europe Working Group 
– which was dedicated to an ongoing compilation of studies of the Soviet Union and its 
fellow member states of COMECON.  
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Introduction 
 
This study investigates aspects of Irish-Soviet diplomatic and friendship relations after 
1919, with a particular focus upon developments surrounding the establishment of 
formal diplomatic relations between the Republic of Ireland and the Soviet Union in the 
1970s. Chapter one is a survey of the principal diplomatic interconnections from 1919 
to 1972, including those that took place in America between representatives of the 
nascent Irish republic (as proclaimed by the first dáil in 1918) and Soviet Russia during 
the years of 1919-21. It examines diplomatic contacts, including the involvement of 
President Eamon de Valera of the Irish Free State and the foreign minister of the 
U.S.S.R., Maxim Litvinov, at the League of Nations in 1934; and a series of interactions 
at the United Nations – after the Republic of Ireland finally gained membership in 1955 
– up until 1972, including those initiated by external affairs ministers Frank Aiken and 
Dr Patrick Hillery. Chapter two proceeds to examine in more detail the events 
surrounding the establishment of formal diplomatic relations in 1973, and the 
developments at the new embassies in Dublin and Moscow until 1980. To gain insights 
from a wider societal perspective, an account of the five Irish-Soviet friendship 
organisations that were active in Ireland during ‘short Soviet twentieth-century’, 1 
especially the Ireland-U.S.S.R. Society and the Northern Ireland Soviet Friendship 
Society, are presented in chapter three.  The final two chapters are largely based upon 
newly-available records of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Dublin (D.F.A.), at the 
National Archives of Ireland (N.A.I.). Chapter four, drawing on the central register 
series of files containing political reports (P.R.s) sent to Dublin by Ireland’s first 
ambassador to Moscow, Dr Edward Brennan, focuses upon the ‘island of Ireland’ 
elements of his reports for the years 1974-80. The chapter discusses the ambassador’s 
accounts of the Soviet media’s coverage of the Troubles in Northern Ireland, and of the 
Soviet Union’s view of the theory and practice of the rise of Eurocommunism in 
western Europe – including the input from Irish communists.  Chapter five investigates 
Ireland’s second relationship with the Soviet Union, that which took place through 
European Political Cooperation (E.P.C.), a parallel foreign policy framework of the 
European Economic Community (E.E.C.). This final chapter is principally facilitated by 
                                                          
1
 This phrase is adapted from the title of Eric Hobsbawm, Age of extremes: the short twentieth-century, 
1914-1991 (London, 2002), p. ix. 
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the records of Ireland’s involvement in what was a confidential subgroup of E.P.C., the 
Eastern Europe Working Group (E.E.W.G.). To bring its findings towards a close, the 
chapter looks at the implications of the Supreme Court of Ireland’s decision in relation 
to the Single European Act of 1987 for the conduct from 1974 of Irish foreign policy 
within E.P.C., with regard to the Soviet Union.  
It should be noted at this stage that the study period’s end date of 1980 was 
chosen for three reasons: first, it coincides with the end of Ambassador Brennan’s six-
year period in office in Moscow and with that of the first Soviet ambassador to Ireland, 
Anatoli Stepanovich Kaplin;
2
 second, Irish state archival sources for the decade 
preceding the demise of the Soviet Union are not available for research at this time; and 
finally, it permits consideration of the thesis to present, in so far as possible, its 
evidence from the zeitgeist and sources of the 1970s – when the Soviet Union was in a 
commanding position on the world stage. At that time, with a multi-national population 
in excess of 260 million people living in fifteen republics, the Soviet Union’s landmass 
extended east from central Europe to the Pacific Ocean and south from the Arctic Ocean 
to the deserts of central Asia, making it by far the largest state on earth. Based upon an 
industrialised economy (with an active space programme) and inspired by an official 
policy of Marxism-Leninism, the Soviet socialist system boasted that it provided full 
employment, medical care, comprehensive education, housing and cultural provisions 
for its diverse peoples. The Soviet Union was the most powerful member of the socialist 
group of countries of eastern and central Europe, Cuba and parts of Asia, from where it 
assisted Vietnam to finally expel American forces in 1975. Furthermore, and despite its 
deep ideological rift with the Peoples’ Republic of China, the Soviet Union also sought 
to give leadership to not just to the world communist movement, but also to Third 
World and former colonial countries, both through the U.N. and by the provision of 
direct economic and military aid, in opposition to the power and influence of the United 
States of America (U.S.) and other western powers.   
The thesis has arisen from the writer’s long interest in Irish-Soviet relations 
since visiting the Soviet Union as part of a youth group in 1976. As a result he keenly 
followed the twists and turns of developments concerning the Soviet Union, and since 
the demise of the U.S.S.R. in 1991, he has harboured an ambition to compile an 
                                                          
2
 Ambassador Kaplin died in office, Aug. 1979. 
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historical account of the unique relationships and connections that existed between the 
two states and their citizens. This ambition has been advanced in recent years by the 
fulfilment of a B.A. programme at the National University of Ireland, Maynooth 
(N.U.I.M.), and the completion of a minor thesis with a strong Irish-Soviet theme. That 
thesis, a part-biography of a prominent political personality in the subject area, Michael 
O’Riordan, has since been adapted for a general readership and published as a 
monograph.
3
  Since then the writer has made a number of PowerPoint presentations of 
various aspects of Irish-Soviet relations at seminars at N.U.I.M. and other Irish 
universities, and has recently had a journal article, ‘An account of the Ireland-U.S.S.R. 
Society, 1966-92’, accepted by Saothar, the annual publication of the Irish Labour 
History Society, for its next issue, Vol. 38, due to appear before end of November 2013. 
The thesis does not claim to be a study in the round of Irish-Soviet affairs, as it 
is chiefly a study from the Irish side in the relationship. However, the writer has made 
efforts to engage with the Russian language by completing three modules at N.U.I., 
Maynooth, entitled ‘Russian for academic purposes, learning to understand historical 
source materials.’ 4  These modules were of an introductory nature, but sufficient 
proficiency was achieved by the writer to equip him to provide some short translations 
for the thesis, and to gain an appreciation of Russian language items from original 
Soviet sources attached by Ambassador Brennan to some of his reports from Moscow to 
Iveagh House, Dublin, headquarters of the D.F.A. Also, for a view from the Soviet side 
access has been gained to a considerable number of translations from the Soviet press 
that were forwarded to the D.F.A. by Ambassador Brennan. Furthermore, publications 
in English, including the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia, and from Novosti Press, a copy 
of Soviet Jews: our motherland is the U.S.S.R. (1976), have proved to be insightful 
sources, with the latter on the issue of emigration rights for Soviet Jewry, of 
considerable assistance in discussing the concerns of Irish-Jewish groups in the 1970s. 
The writer had also provided some short translations from the Irish language for 
the thesis, aided by Irish language modules that were part of his B.A. programme at 
N.U.I.M. In particular, an appreciation on the death of Lev Sedin, a Russian journalist 
with Novoe Vremya (New Times) who had made a very favourable impression in Dublin 
                                                          
3
 Michael Quinn, The making of an Irish communist leader: the life and times of Michael O’Riordan, 
1938-47 (Dublin, 2011). 
4
 N.U.I., Maynooth language modules no. HY682, 2010-1.  
4 
 
with his portrayal of Soviet life in the 1960s, was written in Irish (see p. 131). Also, the 
thesis has engaged to a lesser extent with other western languages, principally French, 
Spanish and Italian.
5
 
 
Existing Irish-Soviet historiography   
While some valuable contributions to various aspects of the relationship 
between the two states are found scattered across Irish general histories and 
international relations studies of the twentieth-century, the topic has not yet been the 
subject of a published monograph. Notably, Dermot Keogh has engaged with aspects of 
the topic in his publications, including his Twentieth-century Ireland (1994), and more 
recently in his contribution to A new history of Ireland, where he included a mention of 
the establishment of diplomatic relations.
6
  The lack of overall attention by Irish 
historians has been partially filled in 2012 with the publication of Diarmaid Ferriter’s 
Ambiguous republic, which has the same central timeframe as this study, the 1970s. 
Leaving aside the absence in the book’s index of ‘Soviet Union’, ‘U.S.S.R.’, or ‘Russia’ 
(the key references for this subject area), Ferriter’s section on foreign affairs recounts 
the establishment of diplomatic relations and the accreditation to Moscow of Dr 
Brennan, and to Dublin of Anatoli Kaplin.
7
 But of most interest to this study is 
Ferriter’s analysis of the impact of E.E.C. involvement upon Irish foreign policy, and 
his high regard for ‘Europhile’ Garret FitzGerald,8 as foreign affairs minister. While 
Ferriter does allow for a ‘degree of ambivalence’ in this area and the primacy of 
Ireland’s pursuit of ‘as much [Regional Development] funding as possible’,9 he raises 
no substantial issues concerning Ireland’s participation in E.P.C. at that time. The 
present study will suggest that in fact questions do arise in that respect.  
International relations textbooks and journals have been kinder in terms of 
coverage of Irish-Soviet affairs, even if again there is no published monograph, and 
with references also dispersed across the discipline. Perhaps the most valuable item in 
                                                          
5
 It should noted that diacriticals have been included throughout the thesis in the use of Irish and other 
western language words, but not for Russian words. 
6
 Dermot Keogh, ‘Ireland 1972-84’ in J.R. Hill (ed.) A new history of Ireland, vii: Ireland, 1921-84, p. 
366.  
7
 Diarmaid Ferriter, Ambiguous republic: Ireland in the 1970s (London, 2012), p. 428. 
8
 Ibid, p. 387. 
9
 Ibid, p. 391. 
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this area is Ó Corcora and Hill’s 1982 article that provides an insightful background to 
the present study for an understanding of a political science approach to Irish-Soviet 
affairs.
10
 This thesis shares some of that article’s conclusions, including those 
concerning the early decades where the initial common denominator of anti-imperialism 
quickly gave way to Irish antipathy towards communism and the course of development 
of the Soviet Union. The thesis also endorses the article’s findings that the emergence of 
a measure of trade and secularisation in Irish society in the 1970s led to the political 
feasibility of the establishment of diplomatic relations.
11
  However, this study adds to Ó 
Corcora and Hill’s findings by bringing forward new evidence from archival and oral 
sources not available in the 1980s. This new evidence relates to the manner in which 
opposition to establishing Irish-Soviet diplomatic relations within the successive Fianna 
Fáil and Fíne Gael-Labour governments of the early 1970s was eventually overcome; 
how the British government made influential representations to postpone and influence 
the establishment of Irish-Soviet diplomatic relations; and how the Ireland-U.S.S.R. 
Society enjoyed considerable success in building broad societal contacts between the 
two countries – significantly in excess of the ‘informational role’ allowed by Ó Corcora 
and Hill.
12
   
Patrick Keatinge’s general work, from his seminal publication, A place among 
the nations: issues of Irish foreign policy (1978), through to his most recent foreword in 
Tonra et al, Irish foreign policy (2012) has been an ever-present guide throughout this 
thesis. His ‘realist’ observations have illuminated many issues, from his revelation, that 
even during Frank Aiken’s ‘golden era’ of independent action at the United Nations, 
Ireland sided with the United States three times more often than as against it,
13
  to his 
articulation as to why a state would support a policy that appeared to run counter to its 
stated values. An example of the latter development occurred within European Political 
Cooperation in 1974,
14
 when Irish foreign affairs officials agonised over ethical 
implications surrounding – but ultimately supported – the commissioning of legally-
questionable studies of west European communist parties. Keatinge described this 
phenomenon: ‘But the expression of a value is one thing in the form of a statement of 
                                                          
10
 Mícheál Ó Corcora, and Ronald J. Hill, ‘The Soviet Union in Irish foreign policy’ in International 
Affairs, liix, no. 2 (spring, 1982), pp 254-70. 
11
 Ibid., pp 269-70. 
12
 Ibid., p. 258-9. 
13
 Patrick Keatinge, A place among the nations (Dublin, 1978), p. 76.  
14
 As discussed in chapter five. 
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principle; in the form of policy leading to government action it is something yet 
again.’15 
Also ever-to-hand has been the work of retired diplomat, author, and 
distinguished commentator on Irish diplomatic affairs Noel Dorr, who joined the Irish 
foreign service in 1960, and whose career included a close involvement in the country’s 
relations with the Soviet Union during the 1970s. His Ireland at the United Nations 
(2010), which covers the period 1955-1972 – from Frank Aiken’s leadership as Ireland 
broke ranks with the U.S. veto on the representation of China at the U.N. in the late 
1950s (i.e. the Soviet-sponsored proposal that the People’s Republic should replace 
Taiwan) through to Dr Patrick Hillery’s attempt to seek a U.N. peacekeeping force for 
Northern Ireland – provides valuable background for chapter one. Mindful of one of the 
aims of chapter one – to get a sense of Irish diplomats’ understanding of their Soviet 
counterparts’ actions in relation to Ireland – the thesis notes that Dorr criticises aspects 
of the Soviet Union’s support for Dr Hillery’s request to the U.N. for a peacekeeping 
force. Dorr states: ‘Dr Hillery...could be forgiven if he swallowed hard at the terms in 
which that support was expressed by the Soviet Union’.16 But this thesis finds that the 
Soviet Union’s support for Dr Hillery was both soundly based and of real benefit to 
Ireland’s attempt to bring international pressure to bear on the British government in 
relation to unionist hegemony at Stormont. For chapter five, Dorr’s article in Ben Tonra, 
et al, in Irish foreign policy has been instructive for an understanding of E.P.C. and its 
relationship to the mainstream institutions of the E.E.C. during the 1970s. However, the 
thesis will discuss the implications of Dorr’s assertion that the Single European Act 
(which included the elevation of E.P.C. to treaty status in 1986) retrospectively codified 
Irish foreign policy coordination practices within E.P.C. in the 1970s, as they applied to 
the Soviet Union.
17
 
Among the unpublished theses accessed during the research, two principally 
relate to trade connections: Mícheál Ó Corcora’s, ‘Irish-Soviet trade relations and 
policy’,18 and Caroline Mannion’s ‘Irish-Soviet trade’.19 Trade relations are only briefly 
engaged by this project, principally in chapter four’s consideration of U.S. requests to 
                                                          
15
 Keatinge, A place among the nations, p. 176. 
16
 Noel Dorr, Ireland at the U.N.: memories of the early years (Dublin, 2010), p. 221. 
17
 See Noel Dorr, ‘Ireland in an independent world: foreign policy since 1973’, in Ben Tonra, et al., Irish 
foreign policy, p. 59.  
18
 Mícheál G. Ó Corcora, Irish-Soviet trade relations and policy (M. Litt. thesis, T.C.D., 1980). 
19
 Mannion, Caroline M., ‘Irish-Soviet trade’ (M. Sc. [Econ.], T.C.D., 1986). 
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Ireland to boycott the Moscow Olympic Games of 1980. That request prompted the 
Department of Foreign Affairs to take stock of the increase in Irish-Soviet trade since 
diplomatic relations had been established six years previously. Also, in chapter five, 
where Ireland’s involvement in the internal debate within E.P.C. on economic rivalries 
between the E.E.C. and COMECON is discussed, Ó Corcora’s finding – that the 
interactions of political and economic factors were a determinant in trade relations – and 
Mannion’s conclusion – that by 1986 the E.E.C. had achieved a decisive advantage over 
COMECON – were found to be especially useful. In this regard, the thesis brings 
forward new archival evidence to evaluate Ireland’s contribution to an E.E.C. economic 
strategy, described in 1976 by a senior COMECON commentator as pitting ‘the united 
economic strength of the E.E.C. against individual countries of COMECON with the 
aim of receiving corresponding economic and political advantage’. 20  The third 
unpublished thesis consulted was Sarah Davis’s informative study on the details of the 
Soviet Union’s holdup, until 1955, of Ireland’s application for membership of the 
U.N.
21
 While this thesis is in general accord with Davis’s conclusion that the Soviet 
Union acted to block Irish membership in response to similar actions by the U.S. in 
relation to states with friendly relations with the Soviets, it does bring forward new 
evidence from Polish and Irish communist sources that adds to the debate. Indeed, this 
new evidence offers elements of both criticism and support of the Soviet Union’s stance 
on this issue. 
Memoirs and autobiographies play a significant supporting role in the thesis, 
including those of Garret FitzGerald,
22
  Andrei Gromyko (despite the fact that Gromyko 
failed to mention Ireland in his memoir),
23
 Nikita Khrushchev,
24
 and Conor Cruise 
O’Brien.25 With the exception of Khrushchev (whose memoirs provide insights into 
Irish-Soviet connections at the U.N, including his ‘shoe-banging’ incident in 1960), the 
other three authors were primary actors in Irish-Soviet affairs in the 1970s. However, as 
O’Brien played a number of roles - a diplomat in the 1950s and 1960s, a member of the 
                                                          
20
 Professor V. Iskra of the Polish United Workers’ Party, as cited by Ambassador Brennan in his political 
report, 61/76, 14 June 1976, in (N.A.I., D.F.A., 2006/131/238). 
21
 Sarah Davis, ‘The Soviet veto of Ireland’s application for membership of the United Nations, 1946-55’ 
(M.A. thesis, N.U.I., Maynooth, 2001) 
22
 Garret FitzGerald , All in a life:  an autobiography (Dublin, 1991). 
23
Andrei Gromyko,  Memories: from Stalin to Gorbachev (London, 1989). 
24
 Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, Khrushchev remembers: the last testament, ed.  Strobe Talbott (Boston, 
1974). 
25
 Conor Cruise O’Brien, Memoir: my life and themes (Dublin, 1988). 
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cabinet that agreed to diplomatic relations, and a caustic chronicler of the events and 
people in matters relating to the Soviet Union (which includes attitudes of Irish and U.N. 
officials towards the Soviets), his memoir is unique. It also, ironically, contains a caveat 
about memoirs that O’Brien credited to Professor T.W. Moody, which this thesis has 
striven to observe: 
...be particularly distrustful of memoirs. Memoirs are written in the main for 
purposes of self-justification before posterity. The historian should use them, but 
with the greatest caution. He should always greatly prefer to them papers 
written...for the eyes of a limited number of associates, and without any thought 
of posterity.
26
 
Consequently, it is to a consideration of such papers that we must now turn. 
 
Archival Sources  
The timing for this research project has been fortuitous as it has been the 
beneficiary of the 1986 National Archives Act, which provides for release after thirty 
years of state documents to researchers. This has been especially relevant to the 500-
plus political reports from Moscow, and a series of files relating to the thirty-six 
meetings of the Eastern Europe Working Group during the period 1974-80. To this 
writer’s knowledge, these source materials have not previously been drawn on by 
historians or academic researchers. Such has been the importance of these sources for 
the study, that key details of their contents have been captured and analysed in summary 
form, and attached to the study as Appendix one and Appendix two. In particular, the 
appendices’ summaries have assisted the writer to determine a number of key questions. 
For example, from Appendix one: why was it that only twenty-four out of the total of 
519 surviving political reports sent by Ambassador Brennan to Dublin  related to Soviet 
interest in Ireland?  
With further regard to archival sources – both from the Irish department of 
foreign affairs and private sources – the thesis has been conscious of Arthur Marwick’s 
observations in this area (2001). In his taxonomy of primary sources he ranks such 
sources first among his list of thirteen.
27
   Nevertheless, the thesis has again striven to 
                                                          
26
 Ibid. p. 122. 
27
 See Arthur Marwick, The new nature of history: knowledge, evidence, language (London 2001), pp 
165-6. 
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take heed of Marwick’s warnings of the need for awareness of the ‘accuracy and 
honesty’ of the sources’ authors, and of the possible tendency towards ‘a fetishism of 
documents’.28 Indeed, so also is it aware of advice from no less an authority than Joseph 
Stalin, when he chided Soviet historians as they set about writing a communist party 
history in 1931. George Enteen recorded Stalin’s words: 
‘Who, except the hopeless bureaucrats, can rely on written documents alone?’ he 
[Stalin] asked in his famous letter to Proletarskaja Revoljutsija, the leading 
journal in the field. ‘Who, besides archive rats, does not understand that a party 
and its leaders must be tested primarily by their deeds, and not only by their 
declarations?’29 
Enteen goes on to make the logical point that historians can only gain an 
understanding of the deeds of men and women through a consideration of reliable 
sources. Nevertheless, a further observation from Marwick, that historians can 
comprehend the ‘dreadful fallibility’ of official sources, chimes with this study’s sense 
of the need for an awareness, for example, that political reports from the ambassador to 
Moscow had to be assessed in the context of their impact upon Irish government 
thinking. While Ambassador Brennan’s reports are attention-grabbing today in their 
own right as an intellectual and political exercise, this study has also striven to identify 
those reports that best vindicate the value and validity of their initial function – to 
inform and advise the government of the day.  This link between political reports and 
actual government policy is one of the key questions for this study. One example 
highlights such a link: how far did Ambassador Brennan’s reports, on Soviet media 
coverage of the Irish ‘torture’ case against Britain before the Court of Human Rights at 
Strasbourg in 1977, inform Foreign Minister Garret FitzGerald’s subsequent policy 
statements on the issue to domestic and international audiences? In the same vein, a 
second question arising from Dr Brennan’s reports is: how far did the ambassador’s 
reports on the Soviet media’s coverage of the conflict in Northern Ireland correspond to 
the complaint made by Dr FitzGerald to his Soviet counterpart, Andrei Gromyko, in 
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September 1973 concerning the portrayal of the Provisional I.R.A. as a left-wing 
socialist group with which the Soviet people might sympathise?  
 The British National Archives at Kew have also been accessed in this study, 
where the files of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (F.C.O.) provided an 
important stimulus to an enquiry into another important facet of Irish-Soviet relations, 
as indentified by Marcus Wheeler, ‘the sensitive triangle of relations between Ireland, 
Russia, and Britain.’30 In particular, these files have provided valuable evidence to raise 
two particular questions: to what extent did British government representations to the 
Irish authorities have the effect of postponing the establishment of formal Irish-Soviet 
diplomatic relations from 1971 to 1973; and after relations were established, what was 
the extent and nature of cooperation in relation to the Soviet Union between Irish 
ministers and diplomats with their British counterparts?  
The archives of the Communist Party of Ireland (C.P.I.), handed over to the 
Dublin City Library and Archive, Pearse Street during the course of this thesis 
preparation, is a newly-available mine of information for Irish communist comment and 
materials. Evidence of the role of this small but strongly pro-Soviet party in Irish-Soviet 
affairs, has been found in this archive, as indeed it has also been found in Irish state 
archives. Accordingly, these resources have been explored for insights into questions 
including: the attitude of Irish communists to the Soviet Union’s holdup of Irish 
membership of the United Nations from 1946 until 1955; the attitude of Irish diplomats 
towards the C.P.I. as it featured in the Soviet media, and its relationship with the larger 
communist parties of the member states of the E.E.C.?  
 
Oral sources  
This study has been concerned to engage with a comprehensive range of 
interviewees so as to reflect as much as possible the totality of the relationships in Irish-
Soviet diplomatic and friendship matters in the 1970s. In this regard the timing for this 
project has been fortuitous. Some of the Irish men and women, and their children, who 
had been to the fore in Irish-Soviet affairs, are still living. Interviews have been held 
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with over thirty people who engaged with the Soviet Union in various areas including 
diplomacy, politics, organised friendship, culture, academia, sports, trade, or the 
Russian language. Eleven interviewees stand out as primary actors in Irish-Soviet 
affairs: the first ambassador to Moscow, the late Dr Brennan; his son, Barry Brennan; 
Reginald McHugh of Córas Tráchtála (C.T.T., the Irish export board), Ireland’s first 
commercial attaché to the Soviet Union; Noel Dorr, the above mentioned former 
diplomat and now author; Professor Barra Boydell, whose father, Professor Brian 
Boydell, was instrumental in inviting the great Soviet composer, Dmitri Shostakovich, 
to visit Ireland; Angela McQuillan, the last secretary of the Ireland-U.S.S.R. Society; 
John P. Swift, son of the founding chairman of the Ireland-U.S.S.R. Society, John Swift; 
Sean Edwards, son of the founding secretary of the Ireland-U.S.S.R. Society, Frank 
Edwards; Barry Bruton, son of the secretary of the Northern Ireland Soviet Friendship 
Society, Bill Bruton; and Tom Redmond and Eddie Glackin, who were members of the 
national executive of the C.P.I. in the 1970s.  
Each of the twenty-three interviewees whose testimony is cited in this present 
thesis has confirmed, by means of a signed consent form, his or her agreement to allow 
this writer to use the contents of his notes of the interviews with them, and to attribute 
same to them. The only exception to this is former ambassador Brennan who died in 
2012. Dr Brennan had exchanged emails with the writer at an early stage in the thesis 
project (2010). In his five-page email Dr Brennan indicated his approval of consent by 
stating that just one detail of information was to be treated as confidential. Even though 
testimony from the ten un-cited interviewees has not been included – because their 
testimony was of a general nature or confined to information on sources, and because 
their testimony referred to events after 1980 – the writer has included their names in the 
bibliography.    
With reference to the value of oral information, the writer notes the felicitous 
assessment by Arthur Marwick of the value of such sources for historical study. He 
judged them to be ‘absolutely invaluable’, but made the accompanying caveat: 
Naturally it takes great skill and a mastery of whatever other knowledge is 
available to make effective use of what is inherently (given the fallibility of 
human error) a highly problematic source.
31
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Therefore the study has sought to incorporate supplementary evidence from 
interviewees – a number of whom generously made available to this writer valuable 
manuscript items from their private collections – and from other primary and secondary 
sources. Most notably, this applies to chapter three, where much of the oral information 
was supplied by Angela McQuillan and John P. Swift. Both interviewees made 
available their extensive archival materials of the society, and Swift further provided a 
copy of his own biography of his father.
32
 Dr Brennan also made available a copy of his 
conference paper on the role of ideology in Soviet foreign policy, which he delivered at 
a Royal Irish Academy conference in 1982, after he had been redeployed as ambassador 
to Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Yugoslavia.
33
 Aspects of that paper also 
inform this thesis.  
Finally, traces of oral and societal recollections of Irish-Soviet connections of 
the 1970s are occasionally to be encountered in Irish media, including that aired on a 
recent R.T.É. 1 Sunday morning radio programme, Miriam Meets. Presented by 
broadcaster, Miriam O'Callaghan, the programme hosts partners ‘connected through 
love, life or family ties’, and in December 2012 it featured members of the band Planxty, 
including Andy Irvine and Donal Lunny.
34
 Irvine and Lunny had played together prior 
to the establishment of Planxty in 1971. Asked by O’Callaghan where they first played, 
Lunny recalled they had been invited by a leading supporter of the Ireland-U.S.S.R. 
Society, Seán Mac Réamoinn,
35
 to play a short set of tunes at the society’s annual 
gathering. The dual significance of the exchange is that it indicates that in the 1970s a 
prominent broadcaster and progressive young musicians were involved in a broad social 
scene that included the promotion of Irish-Soviet friendship; and that the opportunity to 
capture the details from the men and women involved in that and other more formal 
aspects of Irish-Soviet relations is fast receding.  
Newspapers  
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Contemporary newspapers, principally the Irish Times, play an important role in 
buttressing other sources throughout this thesis. Marwick considers these sources as 
‘very rich for attitudes, assumptions, mentalities, and values’, while warning they are 
not to ‘illustrate predetermined generalisations...but to illuminate the past.’36 And that 
indeed accords with the study’s experience, for even as it attests to the Irish Times’ 
excellence as a source of record, its reports were invariably formulated (with notable 
exceptions) to combine news with varying degrees of anti-Soviet bias. One example 
from the 1970s is indicative: when the formal agreement between the Ireland-U.S.S.R. 
Society and the U.S.S.R.-Ireland Society was signed in Liberty Hall in front of a 
substantial number of people, the newspaper’s report prominently included details of a 
picket mounted outside the hall by a group of protesters concerned about emigration 
rights for Soviet Jewry, without any attempt to balance the protestors’ claims against the 
Soviet Union’s position on the issue.37  
Access to Soviet press coverage has been largely gained through extracts from 
and attachments to the Irish ambassador’s reports from Moscow to Dublin. On the 
credit side, this method of access has the benefit of the ambassador’s accurate 
translation of pertinent Soviet commentary on the topics considered by this study.  
Ambassador Brennan had good Russian language skills, as indicated by him to this 
writer in an exchange of emails.
38
 On the debit side, this access is restricted to the 
ambassador’s selections from Pravda, etc., which he chose to best support the various 
topics and theses contained in his reports. Nevertheless, the study has been struck by the 
reliability of these selections as a valid expression of the Soviet press. To highlight but 
one example: based upon a July 1975 issue of Literaturnaya Gazeta, the ambassador 
advised Dublin that Official Sinn Féin was gaining favourable mention and recognition 
in Soviet circles – a report that is supported by the findings of Hanley and Millar in their 
recent study of the Official I.R.A.
39
  
It is hoped that this thesis will make a contribution to, and help raise the profile 
of, the field of Irish-Soviet studies within Irish historiography. Accordingly, having 
                                                          
36
 See Marwick, The new nature of history, p. 168. 
37
 Irish Times, 24 Mar. 1976. This issue is addressed in chapter three. 
38
 Email interview with former ambassador Dr Edward (Ned) Brennan (4 May 2010). 
39
 See Brian Hanley and Scott Millar, The lost revolution: the story of the Official I.R.A. and the Workers’ 
Party (Dublin, 2009), p. 334. This issue is also addressed in chapter four. 
 
 
14 
 
presented its account of the factors and processes that led to the establishment of 
diplomatic relations in 1973, it concludes by highlighting six overriding themes and 
questions that it will strive to address: how did the sensitive triangle of Irish-Soviet-
British interests effect the establishment of Irish-Soviet diplomatic relations; what was 
the impact of Irish membership of the E.E.C. upon Irish-Soviet relations; what kind of a 
reception did the new Soviet ambassador receive in Dublin, as against his Irish 
counterpart in Moscow; how successful were efforts to promote Irish-Soviet friendship 
in the 1970s, a decade of détente when anti-Sovietism and anti-communism were 
noticeably reduced; and what was the role of Irish communism in Irish-Soviet affairs? 
But to begin, the thesis must enquire: what characterised the intermittent diplomatic 
engagements between the two states that took place in the decades before and during the 
Cold War, from the 1919 to 1972?  
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CHAPTER ONE 
Irish-Soviet diplomatic affairs, 1919-72 
Introduction 
This introductory chapter examines a number of key interconnections in Irish-Soviet 
diplomatic affairs that began in the revolutionary period of both countries in 1919, and 
which continued intermittently through to the eve of the establishment of formal 
diplomatic relations between the Republic of Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (the U.S.S.R., or the Soviet Union) in 1973. The chapter is ordered under 
three periods where the business of Irish-Soviet diplomatic relations was largely 
conducted. The first period began in 1919 and encompassed a Dublin-New York-
Moscow network in which connections between representatives of the embryonic states 
of the Irish Republic (as proclaimed by the first Dáil Éireann that comprised successful 
Sinn Féin candidates at the 1918 parliamentary elections to Westminster, which was 
assembled in Dublin as an alternative parliament) and of the Russian Soviet Federative 
Socialist Republic (the R.S.F.S.R., or Soviet Russia – which arose out of the Bolshevik 
October 1917 revolution). Those contacts began warmly in the United States of 
America (U.S.), only to be terminated in Moscow in 1921.  The second period is 
confined to 1934, and is centred on developments at the League of Nations, Geneva. 
There, President Eamon de Valera of the Irish Free State (the twenty-six county state 
that came into being in 1922 following the acceptance by the first Dáil Éireann of the 
Anglo-Irish Agreement) spoke and voted in favour of the admittance of the Soviet 
Union into membership of the League. And, the third period, from 1955 to 1972, 
examines contacts at the United Nations Organisation (U.N.), New York, where the 
Republic of Ireland – after it had endured a decade-long wait due to Cold War rivalries 
to secure membership of the world body – and the Soviet Union engaged in a number of 
standout interactions. The issues covered in this period include the Representation of 
China debate, 1957-71 (whereby Ireland offered some support to Soviet-sponsored 
efforts to have the Peoples’ Republic of China replace the government of Taiwan at the 
U.N.); interactions in 1960 between Frederick Boland, Irish president of the U.N. 
general assembly, and the Soviet premier, Nikita Khrushchev; Irish-Soviet involvement 
16 
 
in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1958-68; and lastly, the Republic of Ireland’s 
attempts in 1969, with Soviet support, to secure a pe 
ace-keeping force for Northern Ireland. The chapter’s principal aim is to comment in 
some depth upon the complex nature of those key interconnections with a view to 
providing a backdrop to the thesis’s central focus of enquiry, the 1970s.   
Historiography  
In contrast to the general dearth of existing history writing on Irish-Soviet diplomatic 
contacts, the first subject period, which for the greater part was conducted in the U.S., 
has been relatively well covered by historians. Aspects of the relations are to be found 
in a publication by a principal actor and source for the events, Dr Patrick McCartan,
1
 
and in publications by authors C. Desmond Greaves,
2
 David Fitzpatrick,
3
 Emmet 
O’Connor,4 Marcus Wheeler,5 and Stephen White.6 However, their work is added to by 
this thesis with extra information from an authoritative Soviet source,
7
 some American 
history publications, and from Irish state archival sources authored by Dr McCartan 
during his visit to Soviet Russia in 1921.
8
  In particular the chapter provides insights 
into the personalities and roles of the Soviet representatives in their dealings with their 
Irish counterparts, reveals how realpolitik regarding early Soviet trade with Britain took 
precedence over mutual Irish-Soviet anti-imperialism, and assesses the above mentioned 
political reports provided by Dr McCartan to Dáil Éireann of his visit to the Soviet 
capital.  
The account for the second subject period concerning the League of Nations is 
centred upon de Valera’s recognition of the potential for Soviet membership to 
strengthen collective security in mid-1930s Europe, and is also further informed by Irish 
state archival sources. Archival sources also predominate to bring additional evidence to 
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the events surrounding the de Valera-approved loan, secured by some czarist jewels, 
which was given to the Soviet representatives in New York in 1920. This saga, covered 
to varying extents by the above named historians and more recently in a journal article 
by Barry Whelan,
9
 is further informed by new evidence from state files that reveal how 
Irish-Soviet diplomatic negotiations in London in 1949 finally brought the saga to an 
ultimate, if mistrustful, conclusion.   
But it is the third subject period of Irish-Soviet contacts at the U.N. that 
commands the greater part of this chapter, where publications by Noel Dorr,
10
 Dermot 
Keogh,
11
 Stephen Collins,
12
 and Conor Cruise O’Brien,13 are most relevant. Again a 
selection of documents from Irish state archives, together with various memoirs and 
biographies, 
14
 journal articles,
15
 and a series of ‘tracking’ articles from the Irish Times 
are employed to add to those authors’ contributions. Furthermore, some new evidence is 
brought forward from the archive of the Communist Party of Ireland (C.P.I.), a small 
but significant party that commanded a place in Irish-Soviet relations owing to its 
membership of the world communist movement and its close links with the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union (C.P.S.U.).    
Revolutionary contacts, 1919-22 
The protracted delay until 1973 to enact formal diplomatic relations between Ireland 
and the Soviet Union was in contrast to the determination of representatives of the first 
Dáil Éireann and Soviet Russia to do so during the years 1919-1921, in America. There 
the Irish and Soviet representatives engaged in a warm, but brief, diplomatic/ 
revolutionary affair. The Irish representatives were led by Eamon de Valera, president 
of the dáil, and three others of its elected members: Dr Patrick McCartan, Harry Boland, 
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and Liam Mellows. Dr McCartan, from Carrickmore, County Tyrone, who had been 
elected to the dáil for King's County Tullamore, was also a member of the Irish 
Republican Brotherhood (I.R.B., the clandestine and militaristic republican movement 
that had been founded in the mid-nineteenth century). McCartan’s presence in America 
complemented an earlier and hidden task, as recounted by C. Desmond Greaves: ‘the 
I.R.B. had despatched McCartan on his way to Russia’ following the Bolsheviks’ 
declaration in March 1917 in favour of a British withdrawal from Ireland in the hope of 
securing military assistance for the coming struggle.
16
 Harry Boland was from Marino, 
Dublin. Boland too had been active in the I.R.B., and the Gaelic Athletic Association 
(G.A.A.). He had fought in the 1916 Rising, and had been elected to the dáil for South 
Roscommon. Diarmaid Ferriter describes Boland’s role: ‘Dev’s valet, shepherd and 
manager...he and Dev made the ideal team as Boland got to people’s hearts and Dev to 
their heads.’ 17  Making up the quartet of dáil envoys was Liam Mellows, T.D. for 
Galway East. The youngest and, at 5 ft. 3 ins., the slightest in frame of the mission, 
Mellows was considered as ‘jaunty’ and ‘fresh as paint’ by his colleagues. 18  He 
described himself as ‘de Valera’s John the Baptist’ for his role in scouting ahead of ‘the 
chief’s’ cavalcade to innumerable destinations throughout America galvanising local 
groups and booking venues.
19
 Accordingly, the de Valera mission to the U.S. was two-
fold: to seek recognition for the Irish Republic from the U.S. government, and to raise 
funds for the national independence struggle.  
            Their assignment, however, soon took on an added dimension when they 
discovered in the American zeitgeist that the cause of Soviet Russia commanded 
considerable interest and support among political activists. Contacts with Soviet 
representatives were established as the Irish made their rounds. Like the Irish, the 
Soviets were in America seeking recognition and trade connections, and an informal 
Soviet bureau was established in New York. From 1919 this was headed by Ludwig 
Martens. He was born into a German-Russian family, the owners of a steel mill in 
Kursk, Russia. Despite being a ‘son of a bourgeois’, Martens became a trusted 
Bolshevik figure. This arose from his involvement in Marxist circles at the St. 
Petersburg Technological Institute, which resulted in his imprisonment by the czarist 
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authorities for three years and subsequent exile abroad, including to America. There he 
became involved in business circles, while at the same time continuing with his political 
activities.
20
 Upon the outbreak of the Russian revolution he returned to his homeland, 
but in furtherance of the Bolsheviks’ plans for Soviet Russia he was redeployed in 
March 1919 to New York to continue his work at the Soviet bureau.
21
               
              Alongside Martens was Santeri Nuorteva (originally named as Alexander 
Nyberg),
22
 the son of a Finnish-Swedish telegraph officer and a Russian-Jewish mother. 
He had been a schoolteacher and a member of the Finnish Diet. Under threat of prison 
for criticising the imperial government, he was forced to leave for the United States 
with his family in 1911.  He became active in Finnish-Russian and left-wing politics in 
the U.S., and later an officer at the Soviet bureau.  Martens and Nuorteva established 
commercial contacts with big American firms, such as Henry Ford, J.P. Morgan Jr. and 
Frank A. Vanderlip. Soviet Russia urgently needed quantities of machinery, railway 
goods, clothing, chemicals, etc. to help kick-start Soviet plans for the development of a 
modern industrialised society. In exchange, the Soviet bureau, with a staff of thirty-five, 
offered gold and raw materials to American firms, many of whom were prepared to 
ignore an official U.S. government embargo and its non-recognition of the young Soviet 
state.  To fund initial deals the embassy/bureau ‘publicised Soviet official willingness to 
deposit $200 million in gold in European and American banks’.23  
            Martens and Dr McCartan formed a close collaboration that McCartan later 
described as being based upon ‘that sense of brotherhood which a common experience 
endured for a common purpose can alone induce’. 24  While carefully avoiding any 
endorsement of Bolshevism, Dr McCartan held that British intervention in the Russian 
civil war justified wide-ranging cooperation between the Irish and the Soviets in their 
common anti-imperialist struggles. The terms of this willingness to cooperate with the 
Soviets is supported by Emmet O’Connor’s assessment of Irish domestic support:  
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The Bolsheviks were very popular in Ireland in the immediate aftermath of the 
October revolution, more perhaps for their opposition to the First World War 
and support for national self-determination than anything else.
25
  
Increasingly, in Irish-American circles the cause for recognition of the Irish republic 
and support for Soviet Russia would become intertwined and a source of division. As 
recorded by C. Desmond Greaves, at an Irish Women’s Council meeting held in the 
Hotel McAlpin, New York, debate centred on international support for Ireland, where 
Liam Mellows publicly expressed his view of Irish-Soviet cooperation: ‘Russia has 
given more encouragement to the Irish Republic than America had’.26  
              However, linkage with the Bolsheviks meant that opponents of the Irish 
Republic were emboldened with a propaganda advantage. Sensational allegations 
emanating from England and Switzerland that the Bolsheviks had sent millions of 
dollars to Sinn Féin, and that de Valera was in collusion or cooperation with them, 
obliged the Irish to issue ongoing denials. The following extract from the New York 
Times, carried under the headline ‘DE VALERA MAKES DENIAL’, illustrates the 
nature of the exchanges: 
The idea is to try to injure the Irish cause by playing on prejudice. The purpose 
is that of the old cry of German gold or Bolshevist gold. I [de Valera] have 
specifically denied, time and time again, that our organisation has not received a 
mark or a rouble and I call on those who make the charges to substantiate 
them.
27
 
Furthermore, U.S. politicians felt increasingly threatened by the Bolsheviks’ accession 
to power in Russia. Alexander Mitchell Palmer had been appointed attorney general by 
President Wilson in 1917 to combat fears that communist agents were attempting to 
overthrow the American government. Palmer recruited John Edgar Hoover (later the 
long-serving and powerful head of the Federal Bureau of Investigation) as his special 
assistant. The Espionage Act (1917) was employed to arrest over 10,000 suspects in 
swoops in twenty-three cities, termed the ‘Palmer raids’,  on 7 November 1919 – the 
second anniversary of the October revolution. Included in the swoop was James Larkin, 
the Irish trade union leader.  
              Despite these pressures, by April 1920 a level of trust had been established 
between the Irish and Russian representatives, to the point where the Bolsheviks 
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confided to the Irish that their bureau’s financial situation was in a difficult state. They 
had been a particular target of Palmer raids and required an injection of funds to the 
extent of $20,000. Martens produced a cardboard box with a sixteen-carat diamond 
pendant and three sapphire and ruby brooches, saying that they formed part of the 
Russian crown jewels and were worth $25,500. The czar’s possessions had been 
confiscated and were now deemed to be the state property of Soviet Russia, to be used 
to assist in its promotion.  The Irishmen agreed to accept the jewels as a pledge for a 
loan, provided that the transaction was formalised. They were given a copy of the 
valuation certificate and Martens signed a receipt for the money on behalf of the 
Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.), ‘to be repaid on demand and 
return of security rendered’.28  
              But it was not just money that was being negotiated by the revolutionaries. Dr 
McCartan had actively entered into official talks with the Soviet representatives in New 
York, and he and Nuorteva together finalised a draft treaty of mutual recognition. The 
draft pledged the two governments to promote recognition for each other by the nations 
of the world, and that the official representative from the Irish republic would be 
empowered to represent the interests of the Roman Catholic church in Soviet Russia.  It 
detailed procedures and privileges for trade and exploitation of the natural resources of 
Russia, and obliged the Irish to help facilitate the sanitary and medical relief of the 
people of Russia.
29
 To this brief summary of the draft treaty can be added Marcus 
Wheeler’s observation: ‘and finally – and perhaps most remarkable – [it included] an 
agreement to set up, with other nations interested in bringing to an end “imperialistic 
exploitation”, a form of a rival League of Nations’. 30  McCartan later recorded de 
Valera’s ambiguous reaction that showed ‘surprise at but no enthusiasm for the 
treaty…and it seemed as if he got more… than he really wanted’.31  De Valera initially 
refused to give McCartan credentials to conclude the treaty, as he felt that subsequent 
publicity could have a negative effect on efforts to secure U.S. recognition for the Irish 
Republic. Once de Valera finally accepted that official U.S. recognition of the Irish 
republic was not going to happen, he agreed to issue McCartan with the necessary 
credentials to travel to Moscow to ratify the treaty. Before he did so, however, he 
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proposed that McCartan’s mission to Moscow should be enhanced, and that proper Dáil 
Éireann procedures should be enacted to legitimise the initiative. In March 1920 he 
wrote to Arthur Griffith, the acting president of the dáil during de Valera’s absence in 
America, as follows: 
Dr. McCartan might be considered by you as a delegate from our government to 
Russia to ask for official recognition...I think he should be accompanied by at 
least two others – one representative of organised labour, for example [Cathal] 
O’Shannon, [Thomas] Johnson, or [William] O’Brien, and one representative of 
industry and trade.
32
  
With these recommendations to Arthur Griffith, it can be seen that de Valera was 
thinking ahead for Irish-Soviet trade relations, but also, as the leader of the nationalist 
movement of Sinn Féin, de Valera recognised that the presence of additional leaders 
with left-wing convictions would strengthen Dr McCartan’s revolutionary credentials in 
the Soviet capital. Three months later (June 1920) the dáil ratified the mission to 
Moscow by its adoption, on the proposal of Arthur Griffith, of the following motion: 
‘That the ministry be authorised to dispatch a diplomatic mission to the government of 
the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic with a view to establishing diplomatic 
relations.’33     
It is of interest to note at this stage a recent journal article on this topic by 
historian Barry Whelan (2013). While Whelan’s article is to be welcomed for bringing 
this subject matter to the fore, the basis of the article’s criticism of the propriety of de 
Valera’s actions, and of the legitimacy of pro-Soviet sentiments in Ireland during the 
revolutionary years, is questionable. Whelan is critical of de Valera’s granting of the 
republican loan to Martens and Nuorteva, stating that in doing so the president had 
exceeded his authority, and: 
accorded de jure recognition of the Bolshevik state without the prior approval of 
the dáil…the deal encouraged the Bolsheviks to forge closer ties, something that 
would have been completely abhorrent in the eyes of the influential Catholic 
hierarchy and the majority of Irish public opinion.’34  
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Firstly (as Whelan’s article concedes), President de Valera had been granted by the dáil 
powers of trusteeship over funds collected in America, and was therefore in a position 
to make a gesture of financial solidarity to a fellow anti-imperialist entity; and secondly, 
as set out above, McCartan’s mission to establish relations with Soviet Russia was 
ratified by the dáil. Furthermore, the driving force behind the first dáil was not the 
Catholic hierarchy, but rather the revolutionary enthusiasm of its elected members. As 
mentioned above, and as will be discussed further in chapter three, many in the ranks of 
the republican and labour movements were favourably disposed towards the ideals and 
expectations of the Russian revolution.  
In the event Dr McCartan travelled directly from the U.S. to Soviet Russia – 
without left-wing or business colleagues – and arrived in Moscow on 14 February 1921. 
According to McCartan’s own account of the visit, his arrival coincided with the 
attendance in the Soviet capital of Roddy Connolly – the twenty-year-old son of the 
1916 Easter Rising leader, James Connolly – at the third Comintern congress as an Irish 
communist representative.
35
  While the presence of Roddy Connolly indicated that the 
Comintern was willing to assist the embryonic Irish communist movement with political 
support, McCartan was soon informed that Soviet state officials were having second 
thoughts about ratifying the draft Irish-Soviet treaty. Following the defeat of British 
interventionist forces on the side of the White Russians, official Soviet government 
attitudes towards Britain had pragmatically changed. Anxious to normalise relations 
with industrialised powers to gain access to repairs for their war-torn economy, they 
were in the process of negotiating an Anglo-Soviet trade agreement. McCartan was first 
received by Santeri Nuorteva, with whom he had drawn up the draft treaty in the U.S. 
less than a year previously. Nuorteva, now a senior official with the Commissariat of 
Foreign Affairs (Narkomindel), confirmed that negotiations were under way with the 
British, and that the Irish-Soviet position would have to ‘begin in the new [sic] and not 
on the basis of the proposed treaty.’36  
On 17 February McCartan had a second meeting, this time with Commissar G.V. 
Chicherin.  Chicherin received McCartan politely, but quizzed him closely on the 
possibility that President de Valera would accept home rule status for Ireland, on the 
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Ulster question, and on reports that Irish republicans were hostile to communism. 
Chicherin also enquired after the current status of the Irish Citizen Army, which had 
been set up in November 1913 as a workers’ defence force and had been commanded by 
James Connolly prior to the 1916 rising.
37
 It may have been the case that Chicherin was 
cross checking with McCartan the kind of information that Roddy Connolly had 
supplied to the Comintern.
38
   In the event Chicherin invited McCartan to remain in 
Moscow, pending the outcome of the discussions with the British. Nonetheless, it came 
as no surprise when a month later an Anglo-Soviet trade agreement was signed. 
Desmond Greaves summed up McCartan’s dilemma: ‘he was told frankly by Chicherin 
that the Russians did not propose to jeopardise their relations with Britain for the sake 
of a republic the Irish did not seem sure about themselves.’39 Whatever lay behind 
Soviet thinking, Dr McCartan tried to salvage something from his visit and he spent the 
last few weeks in Moscow attempting to arrange for direct trade between Ireland and 
Russia, ‘in accordance with the terms of the English agreement.’ 40  But by June 
McCartan realised that he was wasting his time and he departed for home, empty-
handed. 
Among the last acts between Ireland and Russia in the revolutionary period was 
a gesture of Irish generosity to help alleviate the effects of famine and displacement that 
had arisen from the First World War and the Russian civil war. The details were 
succinctly recorded in a dáil report, signed by S. Ghabháin Uí Dhubhthaigh (George 
Gavan Duffy),
41
 and dated April 1922 – just two months before the outbreak of civil 
war in Ireland: 
A sum of £1,000 has been contributed, through the Saor an Leanbh [Save the 
Children] committee, towards the Irish effort for relief of the famine victims in 
Russia; this effort is attached to Dr. Nansen's admirable organisation in South 
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Russia; unfortunately upwards of six million lives were lost before help 
arrived.
42
 
What is notable here is that the money was not sent directly to the Soviet government, 
but rather through the offices of Fridtjof Nansen, the League of Nations’ first high 
commissioner for refugees.
43
 The decision to route the money through the League 
indicated the desire of the emerging Irish Free State government to be associated with 
the world body,   and also one of distancing itself from Soviet Russia.   
Before commenting upon Dr McCartan’s final act as Ireland’s representative to 
Soviet Russia, a short note on the fate of his two Bolshevik contacts in New York, 
following their return to Soviet Russia, is required for the Irish-Soviet record. The 
Palmer raids took their toll on American left wing and pro-Soviet circles, and foreigners 
were especially targeted for arrest and deportation. By late 1920 the Soviet bureau was 
closed, and Santeri Nuorteva got out just in time to avoid Palmer’s men. He went 
through Canada to England, where he was jailed for a time, and eventually deported to 
Soviet Russia. There he was soon appointed to a high administrative position in the 
Narkomindel, as mentioned above. However, suspicions rose about his possible role as 
a British agent and he was jailed for almost one year. His arrest occurred while Dr 
McCartan was in Moscow, who recorded that ‘he was thrown into prison on suspicion 
of being a British agent.’44 He seems to have overcome this setback, and after being 
released he again gained an important position – this time in the government of the 
Soviet Karelian Republic. His life ended in a Leningrad hospital in 1929, in unexplained 
circumstances, according to U.S. researcher, Auvo Kostiainen.
45
 However, according to 
Emmet O’Connor, in a more recent work, Nuorteva was arrested ‘as a British spy and 
executed’. 46  (As O’Connor failed to provide a source for this contention, further 
academic research – beyond the scope of this thesis – is required.) As for Ludwig 
Martens, he was deported from the U.S. on 22 January 1921, accompanied by ‘his wife 
                                                          
42
 Dáil Éireann foreign affairs report, 26 Apr. 1922, in D.I.F.P. (No. 277, N.A.I., D.F.A., E.S. box 1, 13), 
pp 1, at (http://www.difp.ie/docs/Volume1/1922/277.htm)  (11 Jan. 2013). 
43
 For details of Nansen’s humanitarian work, see Martyn Housden, The League of Nations and the 
organisation of peace (Harlow, 2012), pp, 5, 7,16 and 62-66. 
44
 ‘Memorandum by Patrick McCartan on hopes of recognition of the Irish Republic from the U.S.S.R.’, 
June 1921, in D.I.F.P. (No. 88, N.A.I., E.S.,32, 228), at (http://www.difp.ie/docs/Volume1/1921/88.htm) 
(13 Jan 2013), pp1-6.  
45
 This section has been informed by Auvo Kostiainen, Santeri Nuorteva and the origins of Soviet-
American relations, available at Genealogical Society of Finland 
(http://www.genealogia.fi/emi/art/article252e.htm) (12 Oct. 2013) 
46
 O’Connor, Reds and the green, p. 47. 
26 
 
and two children and forty-six men and women from the Soviet bureau’. 47  After 
returning to Russia in 1921, he became a senior figure as a central planner in the 
industrialisation of the Soviet Union, and a specialist on the theory and production of 
diesel engines.  He died in 1948, and in recognition of his contribution to the 
development of the Soviet state, he was buried in Novodevichy cemetery in Moscow, a 
burial ground reserved for outstanding figures in Soviet society.
48
 
To complete this opening account of Irish-Soviet diplomatic contacts, a note is 
required on the return from Moscow in late 1921 of Dr McCartan. Alone among those 
representatives who had served with de Valera in the mission to the U.S., McCartan 
gave his support to the Anglo-Irish treaty. Despite this support, he refused to take any 
kind of a job with the Free State government and tried to mediate in the civil war. Of 
more relevance for this study, however, was his final duty as the Irish representative to 
Russia: he submitted a memorandum on his impressions of the nascent Soviet Union. 
Displaying a strong sense of political scepticism and ideological opposition (perhaps 
influenced, to some extent, by the Soviets’ refusal to grant recognition to the Irish 
Republic), the following extracts best sum up his attitude to the new Soviet order: 
Though it is claimed that the present government is dictatorship of the 
proletariat it is nothing of the kind. It is a dictatorship of the Communist Party 
which represents less than one per cent of the population of Russia; and 
dictatorship of the Communist Party means in reality dictatorship of about half a 
dozen leaders of the Communist Party.
49
 
And for McCartan’s interpretation of early Soviet attitudes towards Ireland: 
There is some interest in Ireland on the part of those one meets, but the 
revolution in Ireland was a national one and hence it was concluded had little or 
nothing in common with communism or the 'world revolution'…There was some 
admiration for the fighting qualities of Irishmen but they were not communists 
and Irishmen everywhere are reactionaries, that is, they are not usually 
socialists… As a rule they [the Irish] are Catholics, and God and the churches 
are the opponents of communists. 'Religion is the opiate of the workers'…the 
government of Russia would recognize the Republic of Ireland any day if they 
could do so without injuring Russia itself.
50
 
                                                          
47
 New York Times, 23 Jan. 1921 
48
 Evgenev and Shapik, ‘Ludwig Martens’, p. 502. 
49
 ‘Memorandum by Patrick McCartan on conditions in Russia’, [1921, n.d., but after June] in D.I.F.P. 
(No. 89, N.A.I., D.F.A., E.S. box 14, 96), pp 1, 3-4, at (http://www.difp.ie/docs/Volume1/1921/89.htm)  
(11 Jan. 2013) 
50
 Ibid. 
27 
 
With those words from a disappointed emissary, the first period of Irish-Soviet 
diplomatic contacts was brought to an end. 
Contacts at the League of Nations, 1934  
When the Irish Free State was established in 1922 the formation of diplomatic relations 
with individual foreign states was not a priority. By 1930, relations with only five states 
had been formalised: Britain, the U.S., the Holy See, France and Germany.
51
 Evidence 
of a fleeting effort to propose diplomatic and trade relations with the Soviet Union in 
1929 was put forward by Fianna Fáil, shortly after the party entered the dáil.
52
 In the 
same year a ten-strong delegation from the Dublin Trades Union and Labour Council 
made the journey to Moscow to coincide with the twelfth anniversary celebrations of 
the October Revolution, and on their return home made a favourable progress report on 
Soviet successes.
53
   Some efforts to open trade relations were made, including a 
proposal that arose from talks between Irish and Soviet officials in 1929 at Geneva to 
send a Soviet trade commissioner to Dublin to purchase ‘horses for military and other 
purposes, hides and skins, wool and herrings’. 54   This came to nought under the 
Cumann na nGael administration, and with growing levels of anti-communism and anti-
Sovietism in an increasingly Catholic dominated Ireland, the question of relations with 
the Soviet Union ceased to arise. 
When Fianna Fáil and de Valera came to power in 1932, their election coincided 
with the Irish Free State’s presidency of the League of Nations. Heretofore, de Valera’s 
regard for the League’s willingness to act as an effective instrument for world peace had 
been ‘marked by a qualified pessimism’. 55  However, in power De Valera was 
determined to assert the state’s independent attitude and avoid following bloc voting 
with the British Commonwealth countries. This concern specifically arose in relation to 
an upcoming vote on the admission of the U.S.S.R. to the League in Geneva in 
September, 1934.  De Valera first turned down an invitation from the British delegation 
to attend a general meeting of Commonwealth delegates to discuss Soviet admission, as 
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confirmed by the young Irish diplomat, Frederick Boland:
56
 ‘the president [de Valera] 
decided that nobody from his delegation should go’.57   More important, however, was 
the context and objective of the Soviet Union’s application to join the League at this 
stage: Adolph Hitler’s accession to power in Germany in the previous year had raised 
the prospects of a European war, and the resultant decision of the Soviet Union to seek a 
form of collective security – in line with the aims of the League. De Valera, as the 
leader of a small nation, shared the Soviets’ desire for stability in Europe, and defying 
domestic opposition from Cumann na nGael and church indignation (while making 
clear his opposition to Soviet domestic policies, especially on the curtailment of 
religion), he supported Soviet admission: 
Why? Because it is obvious that anyone who has the interest of the League at 
heart, and looks upon the league as an instrument for the preservation of world 
peace, must desire to see in the league a nation of the importance of Russia. Her 
territory is two, perhaps three, times the size of the rest of Europe; she has a 
population, I believe, of some one hundred and sixty-five millions. Is it not 
obvious, a priori, that there must be a strong feeling on the part of everybody 
who wishes well of the League in favour of having such a nation participate in 
the League’s work?58 
The Soviet representative present at Geneva was the People's Commissar of Foreign 
Affairs, Maxim Litvinov. He was the ‘indefatigable advocate’ of the new Soviet policy 
of collective security which sought to ‘enmesh expansionist Germany in a web of 
multilateral guarantees and, failing this, the creation of an alliance system to contain 
Hitler’s wild ambitions.’59 Theodore Draper, when writing on the American communist 
movement, recorded that de Valera met with Litvinov in Geneva. Sadly, Draper’s 
account of the statesmen’s conversation was confined to a less lofty issue than 
collective security: de Valera asked that the loan of $20,000, which he had extended to 
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the Soviets in 1920, be repaid in return for the Czarist jewels – a request to which he 
‘received no response’.60  Nevertheless, de Valera’s vote, and his contribution towards 
expanding the possibility for collective security, added to Ireland’s international 
reputation, as was confirmed by a letter from Frederick Boland, with de Valera in 
Geneva. Boland wrote to the assistant secretary in the department of external affairs:  
The curious thing is that the speech seems to have pleased everybody, both those 
who are in favour of Russia’s entry into the League and those who are against it; 
and a great many people here are loud in their praises of the tact and delicacy 
with which the president publicly discussed the question of Russia’s entry into 
the League at a moment at which the private, hotel-bedroom conversations on 
the subject were at a peculiarly difficult and delicate stage.
61
 
However, there was to be a significant qualifying factor with Irish support for ongoing 
Soviet membership of the League. This became evident when the Irish permanent 
delegate to the League was instructed on the orders of the government to ‘immediately’ 
implement a démarche with Secretary-General Joseph Avenol against the allocation of 
duties in the area of social policy to Marcel Rosenberg, the Soviet Union’s appointee as 
under secretary-general of the League.
62
 This Irish initiative was made on the basis of ‘a 
fundamental conflict of principles and ideals [which] separates the Soviet Union from 
Christian states.’63 The Irish move was informed by communications from Cardinal 
Secretary of State Pacelli at the Vatican, who feared that the Soviet appointee would be 
given charge of the League’s health committee and the formulation of policies on birth 
control.
64
 In the aftermath of the Irish and other countries’ representations, when Marcel 
Rosenberg took up his post at the League’s secretariat, the Irish permanent delegate 
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reported that Rosenberg was ‘allocated no duties of a direct nature...he is known in the 
lobbies as the under secretary-general without portfolio.’65  
Resolution of the Irish-Soviet $20,000 loan, 1949  
As mentioned above, Eamon de Valera got no response from Maxim Litvinov when he 
raised the Republic’s outstanding $20,000 loan to Soviet Russia. However, when the 
matter was raised publicly in Ireland by Dr Patrick McCartan, de Valera could not 
ignore the matter.   McCartan resurfaced in Irish public life, when he contested the 1945 
presidential election as an independent, left-republican candidate, and secured a 
respectable 19.6% share of the vote.
66
 He subsequently became a founder member of 
Clann na Poblachta and contested the 1948 general election in the Cork city 
constituency. During the election campaign, Fianna Fáil’s Seán MacEntee attempted to 
embarrass the leader of Clann na Poblachta, Seán MacBride, by accusing him of being 
associated in 1931 with the Friends of Soviet Russia organisation. This prompted 
McCartan to respond with a letter to the newspapers revealing the details of the Soviet 
loan and jewels and asked of MacEntee and de Valera: ‘if that money were ever repaid 
by Soviet Russia, and if not where are the jewels of which their colleagues had 
custody?’67 He then went further to reveal that de Valera had sent him to Russia in 1921 
and claimed therefore ‘I would have as much ground for implying that de Valera was a 
communist in 1920 as MacEntee has for suggesting Mr MacBride was one in 1931.’68 
This caused an immediate political kerfuffle, and de Valera was obliged to confirm in 
an election speech delivered in Youghal on 17 January that ‘the jewels are still safe in 
government keeping awaiting redemption.’69 In fact the jewels had been passed into the 
custody of the state by the Boland family in 1938, (after de Valera had become 
taoiseach, in keeping with Harry Boland’s instructions to his mother in 1921) along 
with the original paperwork signed by Ludwig Martens in New York in 1920.
70
 In the 
event Fianna Fáil lost the general election and de Valera was replaced by Taoiseach 
John A. Costello’s inter-party government.   
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 The new government’s finance minister, Patrick McGilligan, eschewing any 
responsibility to consult with the Soviet Union, informed the dáil that he proposed to 
have the jewels valued and disposed of for the benefit of the exchequer. He sent them 
for public auction in London where Christie’s valued them at £1,600 – significantly 
below the $20,000 loan. Initially, government ministers and officials, debated whether 
to have Christie’s sell them ‘without disclosure of their origin or of the Irish 
government’s interest in them’,71 or by public auction to avoid domestic public criticism 
following a private sale. However, on the recommendation of the minister for external 
affairs, Seán MacBride, the government finally decided on 16 March 1949 that the 
Soviets should be given an opportunity to redeem the pledge.
72
 Whether this decision 
was made on the basis of an obligation to the Soviets or because of the substantial loss 
likely to accrue to the state from a sale through Christie’s, is not recorded in the files. 
Nevertheless, as the decision to contact the Soviets was not made until after receiving 
Christie’s valuation it would appear that MacBride’s recommendation to his fellow 
ministers was made all the easier to accept on a purely financial basis.  
The diplomatic channel chosen to contact the Soviets was the Soviet embassy in 
Britain. Irish ambassador to Britain (high commissioner for Ireland), John W. Dulanty, 
duly wrote in March to the Soviet ambassador, Georgi Nikolaevich Zaroubin, 
requesting payment of $20,000 (without interest), in exchange for the pledged jewels. 
Under some pressure from Dublin to expedite a response from the Soviets, Dulanty 
made a number of written approaches and unscheduled visits to the Soviet embassy, 
without receiving a definitive response. No doubt the request put the Soviets’ state 
records system to a significant test and while the Irish were in a position to supply 
copies of receipts, etc. signed by Ludwig Martens, the reported death of Martens in 
October of the previous year may have presented a verification dilemma. Also, the 
Soviet authorities had to consider the integrity of the jewels being offered: how could 
they be reasonably sure they were those handed over by Martens in April 1920?  
Meanwhile, the Irish government decided to bring the matter to a head and under 
instruction from Seán MacBride, Dulanty wrote to Ambassador  Zaroubin insisting on a 
response and stating that if the payment of $20,000 was not received ‘by, say, 15 
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August [1949]’ the jewels would be disposed of.73  This ultimatum brought a swift reply 
in the form of a succinct letter from Zaroubin to Dulanty, stating: 
I acknowledge receipt of your letter in respect of $20,000 received in 1920 by 
Mr L. K. Martenson [sic], the representative of the R.S.F.S.R. in the U.S.A. on 
the security of some jewels. Although this transaction has not been done in the 
proper way the Soviet government recognises this sum as its loan and is ready to 
deposit it on account of the Irish government.
74
  
The transaction was completed in London on 13 September 1949 when Ambassador 
Zaroubin called to the premises of the Irish embassy with a cheque for $20,000 drawn 
on the Moscow Narodny Bank, London, and the jewels were handed over to him by 
Dulanty.
75
 An indication of the level of suspicion and caution of Irish diplomats towards 
their Soviet counterparts during the transaction can be gauged from the extra care taken 
by Dulanty on the morning of the handover of the jewels: he had insured them in the 
amount of £5,000, against ‘all risks’, in respect of the period of 10 a.m. and 6 p.m. at a 
cost of £1.5s.0d., with the Eagle Star Company.
76
  In this way the thirty-year saga of the 
Irish republican loan to Soviet Russia, entered into in a shared sense of anti-imperialist 
cooperation, was brought to an end. 
 
Gaining membership of the United Nations  
Ireland’s support for Soviet admission to the League of Nations was not 
reciprocated when it came to the launch of the League’s successor, the United Nations 
Organisation (U.N.). Irish membership was delayed at the Soviet Union’s insistence – 
as one of the permanent members of the powerful Security Council – on the ostensible 
basis that Ireland had remained neutral in the Second World War and had not 
established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.
77
 Ireland’s application did have 
the support of Britain and the U.S. in 1946, but it was only after some soul-searching 
that the British government decided to adopt this position. The foreign secretary, Ernest 
Bevin, wrote to Prime Minister Clement Atlee to express his outright opposition: ‘my 
reason is because I fear that as soon as she [Ireland] became a member of the U.N. she 
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would immediately raise the question of the partition of Ireland.’78 The new Labour 
government was taking a decidedly unionist view in relation to Ireland and was keen 
not to upset the sensibilities of the government at Stormont. Atlee at first supported 
Bevin’s view but by July it was the Dominions Office’s pragmatic view of the balance 
of forces at the U.N. that held sway in London. And the value of that decision was soon 
evidenced by the reception afforded to the British ambassador to Ireland, Sir John 
Maffey, when he informed de Valera of Britain’s support at the U.N.: Maffey reported 
to London that the taoiseach pointedly avoided any Irish linkage between partition and 
U.N. membership.
79
   
It is interesting to note the support from the People’s Republic of Poland in 1946, 
when its ambassador to the U.S. and delegate to the Security Council, Dr Oskar Ryszard 
Lange, ‘the renowned economist and Marxist scholar’, explained that ‘the people of 
Poland have always throughout the whole history of the nineteenth and twentieth-
centuries had a great sympathy and deep feeling with the people of Ireland’. 80  
Furthermore, in 1947 Poland’s ambassador to Britain, Jerzy Michalowski, responded to 
an approach from the Irish high commissioner in London, J.W. Dulanty, by attempting 
to persuade the then Soviet delegate to the U.N., Andrei Gromyko, to lift the objection.  
Gromyko refused, telling the Pole that the Irish failure to establish diplomatic relations 
with the Soviet Union ‘was in the nature of an affront to their [Soviet] dignity’.81  
Irish membership was vetoed several times by the Soviet Union, much to 
Taoiseach de Valera’s frustration.  De Valera was so personally committed to the 
importance of an active foreign affairs role for Ireland that he combined both the roles 
of taoiseach and external affairs minister for many years (1932-48). He gave 
considerable vent to his diplomatic frustration in a revealing newspaper interview in 
August, 1947. He stated that the latest application had been made because of his 
government’s desire that Ireland play her full part in securing international cooperation 
and world peace. He described the reasons offered by the Russians to block this 
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ambition as ‘obviously pretence’, and on Irish neutrality in the Second World War he 
castigated the Soviets: 
If Russia, which attacked Finland, Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, can be regarded 
as qualifying as a peace-loving nation, it is difficult to see how a nation which 
kept the peace and scrupulously fulfilled all its obligations as a member of the 
League of Nations can rightly be regarded as not qualifying – but then...we have 
no diplomatic relations with Russia...
82
 
If de Valera hoped to influence the Soviets with such an undiplomatic outburst, 
it is likely that Soviet diplomats would have been less than impressed by his reference 
to military actions which the Soviets believed were necessary to improve the Red 
Army’s defences against the expected onslaught from Nazi Germany. Even so, there 
was no excusing the following contribution offered by Soviet foreign minister, Andrei 
Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky,
83
 who shortly after de Valera’s interview told the general 
assembly on 17 November 1947: 
We affirm that it is impossible to recognise as peace-loving such states as 
Ireland and Portugal which supported fascism in its struggle against peace and 
peace-loving people, and against the U.N., and which are even now maintaining 
particularly friendly relationships with Franco’s Spain, the last offshoot of 
fascism in Europe.
84
 
Vyshinsky’s ill-informed remarks – erroneously coupling de Valera’s Ireland 
with Antonio Salazar’s authoritarian and right-wing regime in Portugal – displayed a 
lack of knowledge of Irish neutrality. Had he consulted with Irish communists he would 
have been informed that not only had the Communist Party in Northern Ireland actively 
supported the Allied war effort, but that communists in the twenty-six counties had 
supported a policy of principled neutrality:  
For all imaginable reasons, immediate and historical, there was no possible 
choice except neutrality; all that happened during the war and the role of British 
imperialism in Ireland since, confirms that neutrality was Ireland’s manifestation 
of anti-imperialism...’85  
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More recently, when commenting on Minister Alan Shatter’s apology and 
pardon in the dáil to those Irish soldiers who deserted the Irish army and fought in 
British forces, Diarmaid Ferriter has criticised the minister’s characterisation in 2012 of 
Irish wartime neutrality in the context of the Holocaust as ‘a principle of moral 
bankruptcy’.  Ferriter put the case for a deeper understanding of the period: 
But the important point is that the desire that existed in the 1930s and 1940s was 
that a state that had experienced a war of independence – against an imperial 
Britain with an often shameful record of misrule and oppression of the Irish – 
and a civil war less than twenty years prior to the Second World War, was 
determined to implement as independent a foreign policy as possible.
86
 
More fundamentally, however, both de Valera and Vyshinsky were being less 
than candid about the Soviet (and, by extension, that of the U.S.) policy of blocking 
Irish membership. Both failed to acknowledge the realpolitik that lay behind the Soviet 
veto: Cold War expectations that Ireland would support American positions at the world 
body. This position was more openly stated in this period by a communist 
representative of the Ireland-U.S.S.R. Friendship Society in an address to an annual 
conference of the Scotland-U.S.S.R. society: 
For my part I want to see my country enrolled as a member of the United 
Nations and playing its part in the promotion of world peace and friendship. 
However, the fact cannot be glossed over that the Ireland of today bears no 
resemblance to its great revolutionary past [i.e. during the life of the first dáil, 
when talks were ongoing between Irish and Soviet representatives].
87
  
Ireland was not the only nation caught up in this East-West impasse, on which 
former Irish diplomat at the U.N., Noel Dorr, notes pertinent comments from political 
scientist, Inis Claude: 
The Soviet Union acted to prevent the admission of non-communist candidates 
unless its own protégés were simultaneously accepted; it aimed not to exclude 
western countries but to secure admission for both groups...the United States 
was willing to have both groups rejected, to keep Soviet candidates out.
88
 
This analysis is also broadly supported by Sarah Davis in her thesis on this subject. 
While she is not as critical of the U.S. as Claude’s above assessment, and is rightly 
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critical of the Soviets’ ill-informed position on Irish neutrality, Davis does include in 
her conclusion that ‘the Soviet Union had no particular grievance against Ireland...[and 
that] by 1949 the Soviet Union decided to be practical about the issue...This led to the 
Soviet “package-deal” proposals.’89 Accordingly, when Ireland was finally admitted in 
1955 it was as a result of its inclusion among a balanced ‘package deal’ of fifteen states 
agreed at the Security Council.
90
               
 Upon entry, the first head of mission to the U.N., Frederick Boland, was 
instrumental in drawing up a set of Irish policy positions.
91
 Minister for External Affairs 
Liam Cosgrave enunciated Ireland’s policy position, which became known as 
‘Cosgrave’s three principles’:  
1. Scrupulous fidelity to the principles of the U.N. charter. 
2. The adoption of an independent line on all issues of foreign policy and 
non-association with any blocs. 
3. To do whatever we can to preserve the Christian civilisation of which we 
are a part and with that end in view to support whenever possible those 
powers principally responsible for the defence of the free world in their 
resistance to the spread of communist power and influence.
92
 
 
Because of the baldness of Ireland’s anti-communist and anti-Soviet positions, 
any meaningful implementation of ‘an independent line’ and ‘non-association with any 
bloc’, presented future Irish governments and diplomatic staff with very real obstacles. 
This soon became manifest with the return to power of Fianna Fáil, which was 
determined to  enact more  proactive policy positions at the world forum than its more 
cautious predecessors. 
 
Representation of China votes, 1957-71 
When Frank Aiken took up the external affairs brief after the 1957 general 
election, he was determined to pursue a more independent line than his predecessor, 
Liam Cosgrave. Aiken, while not ‘out’ during the 1916 Easter Rising, had shared a long 
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comradeship with de Valera throughout the revolutionary years as chief of staff of the 
I.R.A. Thereafter he was a founding member of Fianna Fáil, and a versatile government 
minister in a succession of de Valera’s cabinets.93 Upon his arrival into the headquarters 
of the Department of External Affairs (located at Iveagh House, Dublin), Aiken was 
immediately advised by Dr Conor Cruise O’Brien, the counsellor in charge of the Irish 
delegation at the U.N., that the best test for an independent stance was that topic which 
had become a ‘hardy annual’: the debate and vote on the representation of China.  
At that time the Republic of China (Taiwan), Chiang Kai Shek’s nationalist 
stronghold on the island of Taiwan, was recognised by the U.N. as a member state, and 
indeed was one of the five permanent members of the Security Council. In contradiction 
to this stood the claim of the People’s Republic of China (mainland China) – 
consolidated since 1949 throughout mainland China – to replace Taiwan and to 
represent a single China. Taiwan was maintained politically and militarily by the U.S., 
and each year the Americans used their influence over other states to ensure that a 
majority would not vote in favour of a change in Chinese representation. The Soviet 
Union led the campaign for recognition for the People’s Republic, and indeed withdrew 
temporarily from the U.N. in January 1950 when the Security Council voted down its 
proposal to replace Taiwan with mainland China. However, the issue continued to 
present itself as a test of wills at the commencement of annual assembly sessions.  
Included in those who supported the U.S. in the year prior to Aiken’s arrival, 
was Ireland’s external affairs minister, Liam Cosgrave. In doing so he cited mainland 
China’s support for North Korea against U.N. forces in the Korean war (in the absence 
of the U.S.S.R. at the Security Council, the U.S. was able to assemble a military 
expedition under the flag of the U.N. to counter the North’s invasion of South Korea). 
But at the same time Cosgrave laid down something of a marker for member states for 
the future, saying: ‘... [we must sometime] decide whether we are going to leave the de 
facto government of over 500 million people without representation in the U.N., or 
whether we should compromise on the matter’.94  
                                                          
93
 See Ronan Fanning, ‘Francis Thomas (‘Frank’) Aiken (1898-1983)’ in D.I.B., at 
(http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a0761&searchClicked=clicked&quickadvsearch=y
es) (23 Apr. 2013) 
94
 Liam Cosgrave address to U.N. general assembly, 1956, as cited by Dorr, Ireland at the United 
Nations, p. 114. 
38 
 
At the twelfth session of the assembly (1957), in his address Aiken chose 
another stance: ‘like many here we have no sympathy with the Peking government...no 
country has a greater horror of despotism, aggression and religious persecution than 
Ireland’, but he argued that merely refusing to discuss the issue of representation would 
not improve the situation in either Korea or China itself; and asserted: 
Our aims should be to win acceptance of the principles of the charter [of the 
U.N.] in China and to secure self-determination for the people of Korea. The 
belief of my delegation is that, in the present circumstances, progress can best be 
made to these ends by having a full and open discussion on the question of the 
representation of China in this assembly.
95
 
With these words Aiken was echoing de Valera’s principle – regarding collective 
security and the obligations of all states, big and small, to one another – as set out at the 
League of Nations on the question of the Soviet Union’s entry in 1934. Aiken then 
followed through on the courage of his convictions and voted in favour of the proposal 
from India to place the matter onto the session’s agenda. Despite the Irish contribution, 
the majority of member states maintained their predictable voting practice, and the 
motion was defeated.  
Ireland’s vote brought something of a firestorm of invective from conservative 
and religious quarters. Even before Aiken cast his vote and after the Irish had given the 
U.S. delegation advance notice of its voting intentions, the Irish consul general in New 
York was subjected to a call from the archbishop of New York, Francis Cardinal 
Spellman.  Dr. O’Brien recorded the detail, including: 
His eminence wished to know whether it was true that Mr Aiken was ‘going to 
vote for Red China’...His eminence wanted to make his own position clear. ‘Tell 
Aiken’, he told the consul general, ‘that if he votes for Red China, we’ll raise the 
devil.’96  
True to his threat, the ‘devil’s wrath’ in Irish America stretched from Spellman’s own 
diocesan paper, the Catholic News, to the Brooklyn Tablet and across the Atlantic to the 
Irish Catholic hierarchy (especially the outspoken bishop of Galway, Dr Michael 
Browne), the Maynooth Mission to China, the Irish Catholic, and on to Fíne Gael, 
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which ‘joined with gusto in attacking the minister for his policy’.97 But Aiken, well 
seasoned to such brickbats from his revolutionary past and possessed of ‘gritty integrity, 
conviction and stubbornness’,98 continued to vote in similar fashion for some years. In 
this he could count on the support of his lodestar: Eamon de Valera. Furthermore, 
Aiken’s leadership emboldened Irish diplomats to stand up to church remonstrations, as 
was recorded by Frederick Boland’s account of a luncheon that Boland had attended in 
Cardinal Spellman’s palace. There, with Spellman accompanied by some colleague 
bishops, Boland firmly explained that Aiken’s policy on the China vote had been agreed 
by the government and endorsed by majority vote in Dail Éireann.
99
  
Even after he was elected president of Ireland in June 1959, de Valera sent 
diplomatic rebuffs to opponents of Aiken’s policy on the China vote. This was 
encapsulated in the president’s response to a letter sent to him at Áras an Úachtaráin by 
the ambassador from Taiwan to the Holy See, Dr. Chéou-Kang Sié. Dr. Sié had 
previously met de Valera in Rome, and the ambassador now chose to use the Holy See 
network in an attempt to maintain Irish support for Taiwan.  Advance news of the 
contents of Dr. Sié’s letter was sent to the Department of Foreign Affairs by Leo T. 
McCauley, Irish ambassador to the Holy See, in a letter that read:  
The purpose of his [Dr. Sié’s] visit was to say that he thought of writing a letter 
to President de Valera and he wanted to know if I would be willing to forward it. 
He explained that his letter would urge that Ireland should adopt a more 
benevolent attitude towards China in the assembly of the U.N...I tried to explain 
the minister’s policy in regard to... admittance of communist China...The 
ambassador however did  not enter into any argument about the matter...All he 
said was that countries like France or England had trade interests in China which 
influenced their policy, but we, having a slight economic tie, could act more 
independently, and therefore more benevolently.
100
 
Upon receipt of Dr. Sié’s letter, President de Valera consulted with the taoiseach’s 
office and instructed his secretary to write a polite but short note to instruct Dr Sié upon 
the correct diplomatic procedure. The note simply stated: ‘I am to bring to your 
Excellency’s notice, article 29, 4, 1(0) of the constitution of Ireland which prescribes 
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that the executive power of the state in...its external relations shall be exercised by or on 
the authority of the government.’101  
However, at the same time as voting with the Soviet Union to discuss 
representation for China in the 1950s, Frank Aiken was able to deflect some of the 
resultant vitriol by launching a trenchant criticism of China’s intervention into Tibet and 
the expulsion of the Dalai Lama. He chose to begin that criticism at home, as was 
captured by the Irish Times:  
The minister for external affairs, Mr Aiken, speaking yesterday at the County 
Louth Fianna Fáil convention, held in Dundalk, declared that the most recent 
case of cruel injustice being inflicted by a powerful country against a weaker 
neighbour in the aggression against Tibet. This unprovoked aggression has 
shocked the conscience of the world, particularly that of small nations like our 
own, which know the evils of foreign rule.
102
  
And the minister then went on to the U.N. where he confounded his detractors by 
joining with the Federation of Malay in successfully submitting a resolution to the 
general assembly that called upon the People’s Republic to respect the human, cultural, 
and political rights of the Tibetan people.  Furthermore, Aiken repositioned himself in 
an even more pragmatic way when the focus of the China debate was switched by the 
U.S. in 1961. Because of the sheer weight of extra independent membership, the 
Americans now dropped their objections to a discussion on the issue, and replaced it 
with a contention that U.N. rules required a two-thirds majority in the assembly for such 
an important issue.
103
 This procedural tactic, raising the bar above the simple majority 
line, effectively bought the U.S. many more years of fending off the substantial 
proposal of replacing one China with the other. Aiken then amended his strategy to one 
of finding a mechanism to accommodate the two Chinas that would include some level 
of representation for Taiwan at the U.N. This he regarded as an ‘important issue’ and 
Ireland’s vote was thereafter cast with that of the U.S. The debate rumbled on until 1971 
when support for the American tactics was overwhelmed by the increasing membership 
from Third World nations. The U.N.’s member states then voted in sufficient numbers 
(including the vote of Aiken’s successor at external affairs, Dr Patrick Hillery) to enable 
the People’s Republic to take over the China seat.   
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Nikita Khrushchev - the Irish connection, 1960 
Early evidence of Ireland’s promotion to a managerial role at the U.N., with 
direct connections to the Soviet Union, came in 1960 at the fifteenth session of the 
general assembly by means of the election of its president. According to the memoirs of 
Nikita Khrushchev, who was leading the Soviet delegation, two candidates were in the 
running for the post: Jiri Nosek of Czechoslovakia, supported by the Soviet Union and 
the socialist group of countries, and Frederick Boland of Ireland.
104
 As a young 
diplomat Boland had been involved in the writing of de Valera’s speech to the League 
of Nations indicating Irish support for Soviet membership in 1934.
105
 But now Boland’s 
candidature attracted the support of the U.S. and western countries, and he was duly 
elected president.  
For some background understanding of U.S. support for Boland’s candidature it 
is useful to note the caustic but revealing remarks from Conor Cruise O’Brien’s 
memoirs. O’Brien had served with Boland and Aiken at the U.N. and recorded his 
recollections of the intricacies among the Irish delegation at the U.N., and their 
individual relationships with the Americans.  O’Brien makes plain that the U.S. 
‘dominated all aspects of the workings of the U.N.’, and that the positions of influence 
at the world body were ‘in practice in the gift of the Americans.’106 He then went on to 
state that Boland was in ‘the best books of the Americans’, and: 
Freddie Boland at this time was already aiming at acquiring the presidency of 
the general assembly [of the U.N.], a position not attainable by anyone but a 
discreet but understanding supporter of American policy on all important 
matters... [He] genuinely believed that the U.S. was the leader of the free world, 
and deserved the unflinching support of all the other countries within the free 
world.
107
 
While O’Brien’s recollections must be viewed in the light of his ‘old rivalry’ with 
Boland,
108
 they do offer one insider’s view of the requirements within the realpolitik of 
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the U.N. that a candidate for high office would be expected to possess in order to attract 
U.S. support. 
In any event, the Soviets hadn’t expected ‘their man’ Nosek to win the vote, and 
Khrushchev soon came to regard Boland as a capable and fair administrator. This latter 
point was later confirmed by a Soviet diplomat at the U.N., Valerian Alexandrovich 
Zorin, who was instructed by Khrushchev to speak to Boland immediately after the 
Soviet leader’s departure from New York. Zorin expressed Khrushchev’s regret for not 
having been able to say good-bye to Boland, and to inform him that ‘he [Khrushchev] 
was well satisfied with the objectivity of the chair and hoped it would continue.’109 
Khrushchev later recorded a revealing insight into his and the Soviet foreign ministry’s 
attitudes towards the Irish at this time:  
In fact, our sympathies were always with the Irish when they were fighting the 
British after World War I. Andrei Andreyevich [Gromyko] encouraged me to get 
to know the new speaker of the general assembly and to exchange opinions with 
him. As I recall he was a representative of the Irish intelligentsia, some sort of a 
professor. He made a good impression on me.
110
 
It was during the session of the general assembly of 12 October 1960, that 
Khrushchev engaged in his shoe-banging episode at his desk. The precise details of the 
actual events of the session remain in some dispute. For the purposes of this study, the 
author has chosen to draw from Khrushchev’s own recollection of occasion, not to offer 
it as a definitive record, but rather to present something of Khrushchev’s motives and 
President Boland’s handling of the heated exchanges. Khrushchev indicated that the 
Soviet Union would submit a proposal to the assembly calling for an end to colonialism, 
and he became especially upset by the response to his proposal from the Filipino 
delegate, Francisco A. Delago.  In his contribution Delago asserted that the peoples of 
Eastern Europe had been colonised by the Soviet Union. Incensed, Khrushchev 
requested that he be allowed to make a point of order.  Boland agreed, but requested 
speakers to avoid making attacks on fellow member countries. However, Khrushchev 
proceeded to accuse Delago of behaving like a sycophant of America and said ‘you’d 
better watch out or we’ll show you Kuzma’s mother’. When Delago returned to the 
podium he asked ‘who is Kuzma’s mother’, which provoked gales of laughter from the 
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Soviet delegation.
111
  Yet, it was later in the session that Khrushchev resorted to shoe-
banging on his desk, this time in protest at the contribution from the representative of 
Spain, foreign minister Fernando Maria Castiella. Khrushchev’s memoir records that his 
actions were motivated by a promise he had made to Dolores ‘La Passionara’ Ibarruri – 
the communist hero of Republican Spain during the civil war who was then living in 
exile in Moscow – that he would find a way of letting the Francoists know what he 
thought of them at the U.N.
112
 Khrushchev’s form of protest provoked President Boland, 
who pounded his gavel until he broke it. Boland then adjourned the session. 
Nevertheless, diplomatic obligations and goodwill ensured that some days later 
Khrushchev and Boland could chuckle together about the incident, and Boland received 
a crate of Russian wine from the Soviet leader with his compliments.
113
  
More pertinent for this study is Frederick Boland’s own report of his presidency 
of the assembly session. This comprised a four-page letter sent by Boland to Con 
Cremin in Dublin, just days after the events, a copy of which was forwarded to 
Taoiseach de Valera. It commenced with something of an understatement: ‘as you will 
have gathered from news reports, the presidency has turned out to be a very tough 
assignment’, and it revealed Boland’s role to have been all the more ‘burdensome’ 
because of the Soviets’ refusal to deal with Secretary-General Hammarskjold. 114  
Boland indicated that the Soviet delegation was at loggerheads with the secretary-
general because of Hammarskjold’s handling of the U.N.’s involvement in the Congo, 
and that this mood was further inflamed by their discovery and interception of an 
American U2 spy plane in U.S.S.R. airspace in May of the same year. Therefore, 
Boland reported, ‘I had to have many more direct dealings with K. [Khrushchev] and 
his merry men than would otherwise have been the case’. Even so, Boland described 
Khrushchev as ‘a complete enigma’ and continued: 
He is the personification of elemental violence. Moreover, like Hitler, he is 
power-drunk and a doctrinaire. These dangerous qualities are tempered in his 
case, however, by an extraordinarily sharp intelligence, a keen sense of humour 
and, I would say, a good deal of plain humanity...Incidentally, I am completely 
convinced of Khrushchev’s sincerity on the question of complete and general 
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disarmament...and that without such disarmament there will be war in a few 
years. I believe moreover that he dreads the prospect. 
That Boland chose to inform Dublin that the Soviet leader was akin to Hitler, is surely 
representative of those primary sources discussed in the introduction to the thesis that 
were recommended by Professor Moody to Conor Cruise O’Brien: ‘papers written...for 
the eyes of a limited number of associates, and without any thought of posterity.’115 
Leaving aside the incongruity of comparing Khrushchev to the fuehrer of German 
fascism that brought such death and destruction to the Soviet peoples, Boland’s 
assessment of the ‘power-drunk’ Khrushchev can only have sent a powerful and 
deprecatory message to his audience of senior government ministers and external affairs 
officials. Yet, on the other hand Boland could expound on Khrushchev’s commitment to 
disarmament and alarm at the prospect of war, and of the humane aspects of his 
personality.  
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1958-68  
Chief among early Irish initiatives at the U.N. was a move to halt the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons by means of an international treaty. This required the ‘nuclear club’ 
countries (the U.S., U.S.S.R., Britain and France) to undertake not to provide nuclear 
weapons or the information for their production to other states; and in turn for non-
nuclear states to undertake not to make them or obtain them from nuclear powers. Aiken 
first raised the concept of non-proliferation in the general debate at the start of the 
thirteenth general assembly in September, 1958.  Aiken set out the essence of the issues 
at stake: 
How to hold our destructive powers in check, how to avoid destruction and 
anarchy while we evolve the perfect art of living in peace...the question for all of 
us is, in short, how to preserve a pax atomica while we build a pax mundi...it is 
therefore in the interests of the existing members of the so-called nuclear club as 
well as in all our interests that it should be restricted to its present 
membership.
116
 
Ireland’s resolution was accepted at the assembly by thirty-seven votes to none, 
but with forty-four abstentions. The Soviet Union and fellow socialist states of Eastern 
Europe supported the proposal, and while the U.S. and NATO members demurred, no 
state voted against the measure. When Ireland returned to the issue at the fourteenth 
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session of the general assembly, Aiken’s resolution was again carried without a vote 
being cast against it. However, this time the Soviet Union and the U.S. had switched 
sides, to abstain. This arose because in the meantime the Soviets had brought forward a 
much more ambitious proposal of general and complete disarmament to the U.N. Their 
proposal, in the context of the continuing Cold War was: ‘widely seen at the time as a 
somewhat cynical propaganda gesture.’ 117  Undeterred, Aiken stubbornly pursued 
approval from nation members for a commitment to a more modest but practical 
measure to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. Irish persistence won out when in 
December 1961 the general assembly adopted – without either objections or abstentions 
from any member-state – its resolution entitled ‘Prevention of the wider dissemination 
of nuclear weapons’.118 This unanimous verdict was a crucial breakthrough. It did take 
the major powers another seven years to negotiate the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(N.P.T.), but when it was opened for simultaneous ratification by individual member 
states in Washington, London and Moscow in July 1968, the Soviet government invited 
Aiken to sign Ireland’s endorsement, in Moscow. Dorr neatly sums up the dénouement 
to this practical peace measure: 
At a dinner on the following day he [Aiken] presented Ireland’s formal 
instrument of ratification to the Soviet foreign minister, Andrei Gromyko. As a 
result, Ireland became the first country to ratify the new treaty – just as it had 
been the first to raise the issue in the United Nations ten years before.
119
 
Evgeny Chossudovsky was even more generous to the Soviet Union on their 
gesture to Aiken: ‘and it was not just diplomatic politeness but a sense of respect and 
indebtedness that prompted the government of the U.S.S.R. to issue an invitation...at a 
time when no diplomatic relations [existed].’120 Further, a front-page account from the 
Irish Times’ correspondent in Moscow, Wesley Boyd, provides historical insights on the 
occasion: first, Aiken revealed to Boyd that following the outcome of the first vote at 
the U.N. ten years previously that was supported by the Soviets, he had told the 
delegation: ‘if we ever get this through I’ll go to Moscow to sign the treaty...I didn’t 
think it would take so long.’ 121  Second, on the question of formal Irish-Soviet 
diplomatic relations, the newspaper speculated that ‘real progress towards disarmament, 
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if it can be achieved, cannot but advance closer relationships’.122 However, it would be 
a mistake to conclude that Aiken’s four-day stay in Moscow indicated closeness in 
Irish-Soviet relations in the 1960s at the U.N. or an imminent establishment of 
diplomatic links. Indeed, it seems Aiken did not see the need to exchange missions with 
the Soviets. He could circumvent domestic Irish anti-communist attitudes by conducting 
such business in the relative seclusion of the halls and corridors at the U.N. 
headquarters in New York. Finally, it is useful to conclude here on the legacy of 
Aiken’s overall relationship with the Soviet Union at the U.N., as is demonstrated by 
Patrick Keatinge in his study of the voting record on Cold War-related topics: ‘Ireland 
voted with the United States at least three times as often as against her’.123 
Irish attempts to secure a U.N. peacekeeping force for Northern Ireland, with 
Soviet help, 1969 
Frank Aiken’s successor as external affairs minister was Dr Patrick J. Hillery. Like 
Taoiseach Jack Lynch, Dr Hillery was of the new, post-revolutionary generation of 
Fianna Fáil government ministers. A medical doctor by profession, he successfully 
entered politics in the 1951 general election as the running mate of Eamon de Valera in 
the Clare constituency.
124
 He thereafter served in a number of ministries, principally in 
education, where he was regarded as an effective moderniser. He was appointed to the 
Department of External Affairs after the general election in July 1969, at a time when 
the movement for civil rights in Northern Ireland was encountering increasingly violent 
reactions from loyalist organisations, along with ineffective and often partisan policing 
by the Royal Ulster Constabulary (R.U.C.) and the Ulster Special Constabulary (B-
Specials). By early August conditions had become so seriously destabilised that some 
nationalist areas were at imminent risk from loyalist rioters. As refugees fled south 
across the border, Prime Minister Harold Wilson supported the Stormont government 
by deploying British troops to the streets of Belfast and Derry. 
With tensions mounting on both sides of the border, the Dublin government’s 
anxiety became focused on a potentially explosive event: the much enlarged Apprentice 
Boys’ parade in Derry city set for 12 August, where expected band numbers were to rise 
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to seventy – up from seventeen for the previous year. Dr Hillery was dispatched to 
London to meet the foreign secretary, Michael Stewart, from whom he received a frosty 
reception. When the Irish minister proceeded to warn of the prospects for serious 
violence, unless the parade was either banned or curtailed to its usual size, he was 
informed by the foreign minister: ‘I must say to you that there is a limit to which we can 
discuss with outsiders – even our nearest neighbours, this internal matter.’125 When the 
Apprentice Boys’ parade duly descended into the ‘Battle of the Bogside’ and extensive 
violence erupted across Northern Ireland, Taoiseach Jack Lynch made a televised 
address to the country. In the course of his address he indicated that as far as his 
government was concerned the R.U.C. and British troops were not acting in a 
professional or impartial manner. Therefore, he informed the country:  
The Irish government have, therefore, requested the British government to apply 
immediately to the U.N. for the urgent dispatch of a peace-keeping force to the 
six counties of Northern Ireland and have instructed the Irish permanent 
representative to the U.N. to inform the secretary-general of this request.
126
  
Unsurprisingly, the British government dismissed the Irish request on the basis 
that internal security issues were purely an internal matter, thereby leaving the Irish 
government with little choice other than to bring the proposal to the U.N. themselves.  
The government decided to send this request to the powerful Security Council, and Dr 
Hillery flew to New York to present Ireland’s case. Apart from the urgency and 
integrity of its proposal, the Irish cause was aided by a deal of goodwill generated by 
the country’s impressive track record at the U.N. over the past fourteen years, especially 
on its contribution in the vital areas of arms control and peace-keeping. Yet, the task 
facing Dr Hillery and the Irish mission presented a mighty challenge for four daunting 
procedural reasons. First, article 2.7 of the U.N.’s charter prohibited it from interfering 
in essential domestic matters; second, for the issue to appear on the Security Council’s 
agenda – a process known in U.N. parlance as  ‘inscription’ – it had to first garner nine 
positive votes from its fifteen members at a preliminary meeting; third, if the proposing 
state was not currently a member of the council it would not be heard at this first stage; 
and lastly, Britain – as a permanent member of the Security Council – enjoyed the right 
of veto on any matter that made its way on to the council’s agenda.  
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In 1969, in addition to Britain’s fellow permanent members (U.S., Soviet Union, 
France, and Republic of China), the ten elected members representing the U.N.’s 
regional areas were: two west European states, Finland and Spain; two Latin American 
countries, Colombia and Paraguay; five from Africa and Asia, Nigeria, Zambia, Senegal, 
Nepal and Pakistan; and one country from eastern Europe, the People’s Republic of 
Hungary.
127
 Consideration of the Irish request was set by the council’s president, Jaimie 
de Pinies of Spain, for 20 August, and a flurry of consultation between representatives 
and their governments ensued. Dr Hillery made representations to individual council 
members and, as expected of the president, soundings were conducted between de 
Pinies and his fellow representatives.  De Pinies, an experienced representative at the 
U.N. for Franco’s Spain (his Irish-Spanish sympathies may have been influenced by 
Spain’s time-honoured dispute with Britain over Gibraltar), 128  proved helpful with 
suggestions on the content of the Irish application.  But having completed his soundings 
de Pinies indicated that the Irish could count only on seven votes – two short of the 
required number. Of these seven, he considered China, Colombia, Pakistan, Paraguay 
and Spain were most likely to support Ireland, and with the Soviet Union and Hungary 
‘reticent...but he thought that they too would do so’.129 However, Dr Hillery’s view of 
the communist states’ intentions was a more optimistic one. Mindful of his ministerial 
experience at home, he colourfully recalled his first impressions on his contacts with the 
Soviets: 
He later remarked to John McColgan [Hillery’s private secretary] that his 
experience as minister for education had served him well in dealing with the 
Soviets: ‘once you have dealt with the Irish bishops, the Russians are a 
doddle.’130  
In some contrast, Dr Hillery’s soundings revealed that the U.S. was firmly of the view 
that the matter was an internal one for Britain, and also that France and Finland would 
not be in support of the Irish. Having learned bitter lessons over Katanga and Biafra, 
African countries were thought to be wary of situations connected to possible secessions 
(i.e. that Northern Ireland might secede from the United Kingdom).  And, finally, it was 
felt that Nepal’s vote was too unpredictable to call. So, Dr Hillery and his team had a 
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decision to make: would they push for a vote, and risk a fall at the very first hurdle of 
the agenda stage? 
One possible alternative emerged from Dr Hillery’s consultations with 
Secretary-General U Thant: the appointment of a U.N. special representative to 
Northern Ireland. In the run up to these events the Irish permanent representative to the 
U.N., Con Cremin, had been keeping Secretary General U Thant updated: ‘It was our 
practice, and corresponded to his [U-Thant’s] desire, to keep him informed of events in 
relation to the North’.131 U Thant may have felt a certain obligation to assist Ireland: 
back in 1962 he had approached Frederick Boland, then Ireland’s permanent 
representative to the U.N., to seek ‘our help in keeping him informed as well as our 
advice’, in his efforts to be re-elected as secretary general of the U.N.132 In the event U 
Thant was now favourably disposed towards the Irish cause, and had even identified 
some prominent western personalities for selection as possible U.N. representatives to 
Northern Ireland.
133
 But this option was dismissed as a complete non-runner by the 
British representative to the U.N., Lord Caradon. Nevertheless, Caradon, formerly Sir 
Hugh Foot and a brother of the future British Labour party leader Michael Foot, may 
have had some personal sympathy for the Irish stemming from his father’s political 
views. The Foots’ father, Isaac Foot, had been a prominent member of the Liberal Party 
and a supporter of Home Rule for Ireland, as was later advised by Michael Foot to the 
Irish ambassador to Britain, Eamon Kennedy. Indeed, Michael Foot told Kennedy that 
his father named him Michael in honour of Michael Davitt of the Irish Land League.
134
  
 As negotiations continued, the Irish were offered a compromise. This emerged 
as an amalgam of the diplomatic manoeuvrings between de Pinies, the Finnish and 
Zambian ambassadors, and Lord Caradon.  The compromise entailed Dr Hillery being 
allowed to make a statement of his case before the Security Council, which would allow 
him to vent Ireland’s cause before the world body on live television. This was then to be 
followed by a rebuttal from Lord Caradon, after which the meeting would be adjourned 
without an adoption of the agenda. Consequently, and based upon the arithmetic of their 
                                                          
131
 Cremin, ‘Northern Ireland at the United Nations, p. 67. 
132
 Frederick Boland to Con Cremin, 11 Sept. 1962, in ‘Personal correspondence with Mr. F.H. Boland’ 
(N.A.I., D.F.A., 10/P.S. 35/1). 
133
 Cremin, ‘Northern Ireland at the United Nations’, p. 68. They were Dr Ralph Bunche of the U.N.; 
Lester Pearson, former prime minister of Canada; and Earl Warren, a former U.S. chief justice. 
134
 Ambassador Eamon Kennedy to D.F.A., 5 Feb. 1981, in Political situation in U.K. (N.A.I., D.F.A., 
2011/39/169). 
50 
 
soundings, Dr Hillery and his team opted for this diplomatic choreography. They then 
carefully set about drafting a speech to combine an appeal for ‘an Irish domestic 
audience...with the “theology” of Irish nationalism by situating the whole problem of 
Northern Ireland against the background of the partition of Ireland in 1920-1’, together 
with an exposé of the discriminatory structure of  Northern Ireland in the 1960s.
135
   
The meeting on 20 August unfolded according to the above scenario, but with a 
striking exception: immediately after Dr Hillery had made his lengthy address the 
representative of the Soviet Union, Vladimir Zakharov, made the sole intervention in 
support of adopting the agenda with the Irish proposal. The two authoritative published 
sources accessed by this study, Con Cremin and Noel Dorr (both of whom were 
participants on the Irish team), present somewhat differing accounts of the Soviet 
intervention. Cremin’s memoir, written in 1980, simply recounted that Zahkarov: 
‘spoke to support adoption of the agenda’.136 Dorr presented the following extracts from 
Zakharov’s speech:  
By the fact that the right to form a government ... belongs to one religious 
community, the Protestants ... to put an end to the persecution [of civil rights 
activists] ... [the British government must] see to it that the necessary conditions 
are created for the solution of problems in conformity with the wishes of the 
people of Northern Ireland.
137
 
 Dorr gave his assessment of the Soviet representative’s contribution by stating that it: 
...at least had the merit of supporting the request that the issue be put formally 
on the agenda. Dr Hillery no doubt welcomed support from any source, but he 
could be forgiven if he swallowed hard at terms in which that support was 
expressed by the Soviet Union...
138
 
While Dorr did not expand on his objection to the terms of the Soviet support (this is 
discussed further below), in one respect his interpretation is clear – the Irish diplomats 
were not entirely comfortable about the Soviets championing their cause. They viewed 
it as a double-edged sword: one that guaranteed a level of support, but because of East-
West rivalries, such support inclined other states to look beyond the merits of the Irish 
case to their own interests with western powers.  
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In the event, and in spite of the Soviet intervention, the pre-arranged scenario 
got back on track. Lord Caradon articulated his government’s position that the principle 
of non-discussion of a member state’s internal affairs was at stake, but he did advise the 
council that London had recently agreed a reform programme with the regime in 
Stormont (in the form of a joint statement at Downing Street on 19 August). The 
Zambian representative then proposed an adjournment, without adoption of the agenda.  
After a total of one hour and fourteen minutes of deliberations the delegations dispersed.  
Dr Hillery’s efforts won broad support. The Irish Times quoted U.N. observers: 
‘[They] regarded the episode as a considerable triumph for Ireland in that she had an 
opportunity to present her case, at the same time avoiding a negative vote’, and 
‘admiration too at how the British handled the mechanics of the U.N.’ 139  Irish 
communists were also supportive, as recorded in their weekly newssheet:  
The presentation of Ireland’s case at the U.N. has helped to internationalise not 
only the situation in the North, it has also raised the question of the relations 
between this country and Britain, and our international allies. The U.S. delegate 
on the Security Council was remarkable for his silence, in contrast to the 
U.S.S.R. delegate who supported the Irish case. Desmond Mullan of the Irish 
Independent had this to say: ‘Ireland, which was thought to have friends among 
other countries...ironically would have had to depend on the communist vote if it 
came to that.’140 
However, the Irish quest for a U.N. peace-keeping force was not yet finished. 
Under pressure from the course of events at home and a Fianna Fáil cabinet anxious (to 
use a phrase then associated with – if not actually used – by Taoiseach Jack Lynch) not 
to ‘stand idly by’ in relation to assaults on nationalist neighbourhoods, Permanent 
Representative Cremin informed U Thant that Ireland wished to place the matter before 
the forthcoming twenty-fourth regular session of the general assembly in September. 
Again the Irish were obliged to go through an agenda-agreeing procedure, this time 
before a general committee that comprised representatives of twenty-five countries: 
Liberia (chair), Barbados, Chile, China, Denmark, France, Luxembourg, Malawi, 
Mongolia, Nigeria, Panama, U.S.S.R., U.S., four unnamed Asian states, Pakistan, 
Poland, Greece, Mauretania, Congo, Brazil, and Ecuador.   An international diplomatic 
campaign was mounted by the Department of External Affairs. Urgent letters were sent 
to all embassies to seek support from those listed with an accreditation with Ireland, and 
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others in a position to make representations on the country’s behalf.141 Con Cremin 
lobbied the delegations of the twenty-five members assembled in New York, and wrote 
to advise Dublin of his findings.
142
 His report commenced: ‘Outlook generally 
encouraging, we must see how far Britain is prepared to go in fighting inscription’ [in 
the parlance of the U.N., the process of having an item added to the agenda was known 
as ‘inscription’],  and Cremin continued with summary remarks on each of his meetings. 
The following is his account of the meeting with the Soviet delegation:  
U.S.S.R., a.m., 8 Sep. (per Dr Issraelyan, no. four in the mission, and later per 
ambassador Mendelevich, no. two). Will vote for inscription. Latter noted that 
[the Irish explanatory] memorandum calls for attention to human rights aspect 
and remarked that it was on these grounds that the U.S.S.R. explained in the 
Security Council her intention to vote for inscription.
143
  
These notes were significant in that they indicated the terms of Soviet support were 
confined to the issue of civil rights, and did not extend into the theology of Irish 
constitutional issues referenced in Dr Hillery’s August speech. This approach was also 
the one most likely to attract the widest support at the U.N., especially among the non-
aligned member states (as indicated above in relation to African states). The report of 
Cremin’s lobbying of Ambassador William B. Buffum of the U.S. mission is also 
revealing and worth quoting. It indicated that Cremin was candid with the ambassador 
about his lobbying progress, that the Americans had formed the view that the British 
were determined to quash the Irish measure, and (crucially) that the Americans were 
thinking along East-West lines. The report, written in an abbreviated style, stated: ‘U.S., 
amb. Buffum, noon 12 Sep.: long - one hr, no commitment. Brits pulled out all the stops. 
Buffum of the view that given the Russian attitude, we certainly could count on 
Mongolia and Poland.’144  
The general committee finally met on 17 September to decide upon the inscription 
of the Irish request. This time, Dr Hillery was careful to confine his speech to the denial 
of human rights and to highlight precedents for U.N. action in similar situations, 
including South Africa. He stated, in part: ‘it is now recognised by many, including the 
U.K. government, that a large part of the population of the North of Ireland was being 
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denied human rights and fundamental freedoms’ 145 , and pointing to the Sharpville 
incident,
146
 he asserted that those articles of the U.N. charter that enshrine a state’s right 
of control over its domestic jurisdiction, must also be read in the light of articles 55 and 
56 under which all member states had pledged to promote ‘universal respect for and 
observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction to race, 
sex, language or religion’.147 Lord Caradon’s response began: ‘[We are] duty bound not 
to flout the principle of domestic jurisdiction, the agreed basis of international law on 
which the U.N. rests’. 148  He continued to claim that British troops were warmly 
welcomed on the streets of Belfast and Derry, and that the British government had 
‘strongly promoted urgent reforms [on Stormont] ... [and Caradon warned] ‘that a 
political discussion in the U.N. might inflame controversy and might prejudice the 
salutary work being done’... [and he appealed] to the Irish representative in the genuine 
interests of the people of Northern Ireland to withdraw his request.’149 But before Dr 
Hillery responded to this appeal, the Soviet Union intervened, and the record read:  
Mr Malik, U.S.S.R, supported the request of the Irish delegation. As facts 
showed, it was the policy of the U.K. authorities to maintain inequality in 
Northern Ireland, the result of which was the division of the country along 
religious lines. The right to form a government was restricted to one religious 
community; the civil rights of the minority were suppressed. The U.K. 
government must put an end to the persecution of those seeking to end 
discrimination so that a solution could be found in accordance with the wishes of 
the people of Northern Ireland.
150
 
Lord Caradon soon returned to the fray to aver:   
[He] objected to calumnies contained in the statement by the Soviet representative. 
He [Malik] had implied that there was a deliberate attempt to maintain inequality in 
Northern Ireland; the reverse was the case. The right to form a government was not 
restricted to one community; the people of Northern Ireland had the right to elect 
their representatives on the basis of full adult suffrage, a circumstance with which 
the Soviet representative was no doubt unfamiliar. Faults and failures in the 
observance of civil rights admittedly existed and were being investigated; the U.K. 
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was seeking to remedy them and to guarantee full civil rights to all the people of 
Northern Ireland.
151
 
In this exchange appears to lie the nub of Dorr’s reservations concerning the basis of 
Soviet support at the August meeting:  that, de jure, the electorate of the North could 
vote in a non-Unionist government, thus giving Caradon a chance to expound upon the 
fairness of British democracy in Northern Ireland. While Caradon was technically 
correct (and turning a blind eye to the unionist-controlled malpractice of 
gerrymandering), the de facto political structures and culture ensured that representation 
at the Stormont parliament and at local authority level reflected and perpetuated a 
divided and unequal society in Northern Ireland. As the general meeting proceeded, the 
Soviet representative Malik simply responded to Caradon: ‘if the situation was as the 
U.K. representative described it, it was difficult to understand why the Irish government 
had proposed the inclusion of the item and why it sent its foreign minister to the 
U.N.’152 The U.S. representative, finding herself in an ‘unhappy dilemma’, said she 
wished to hear the Irish response to Caradon’s appeal to withdraw his request. 153 
Likewise, the meeting’s chair, Angie Brooks of Liberia, pressed Dr Hillery for a reply, 
for which the record read:  
He accepted the spirit in which the U.K. representative had made his appeal. His 
government, far from wishing to inflame the situation, had been concerned about it 
long before the U.K., which persisted in taking a legalistic approach to the problem. 
The U.K. representative assumed that the long overdue reforms now being pressed 
would be put into effect; he himself would like to be sure the necessary action 
would be taken. Before he could accede to the U.K.’s appeal he wished to reflect 
further on how the withdrawal of his request for inclusion of the item would affect 
the prospects for the early introduction of the promised reforms and improvements 
in North of Ireland.
154
 
The meeting then closed on a proposal from Nigeria that deliberations should be 
suspended for the future discretion of the chairman. However, when the twenty-fourth 
general assembly closed in December, the matter had not been raised again.   
It is not the purpose of this study to second guess whether Dr Hillery took the 
wrong option in agreeing to ponder upon Lord Caradon’s appeal, rather than forcing a 
vote for his motion to have a peace-keeping force for Northern Ireland discussed on the 
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floor of the general assembly. The alternative was to take on the might of western 
dominance at the U.N. This would have involved forging an alliance of unaligned and 
socialist states, in which the Soviet Union would have played a prominent role.  John 
Walsh, Hillery’s official biographer, asserts that initial indications of majority support 
for Ireland on the committee began to evaporate on the morning of the general meeting, 
and that Dr Hillery’s decision represented: 
A fine example of deliberate political prevarication; he had no intention of 
withdrawing the issue  from the U.N. himself but was willing to see it deferred, 
so that it would be held over the British government as a potential source of 
political leverage in the future.
155
 
And Walsh further contends that Dr Hillery’s moderate approach was privately 
rewarded by a general, but vague, assurance from Lord Caradon that the British 
government would for the future speak to Irish ministers about Northern Ireland.
156
 
However, it was to be some years before British and Irish ministers combined to 
cooperate (the Sunningdale Agreement was not brought forward until December 1973), 
and in the interregnum Northern Ireland further descended into the tragedy of the 
Troubles. Suffice it to say here that it was the same city of Derry, the site of the 
Apprentice Boys’ parade that had triggered Dr Hillery’s dispatch to the U.N. in 1969, 
which was to become the scene of Bloody Sunday killings of twenty-six civilians in 
January, 1972. The Bloody Sunday deaths, at the hands of British army paratroopers, 
took place during a civil rights march – the impact of which is discussed further in 
chapter two. Rather than deliver a more representative government for Northern Ireland, 
Britain chose to prorogue Stormont and implement direct political and military rule 
from London.  In the aftermath of Bloody Sunday Dr Hillery was again dispatched to 
New York where he held a press conference at Kennedy airport. Present there was Sean 
Cronin of the Irish Times, and his subsequent report – evoking a wry sense of déjà vu – 
was headlined: ‘Ireland seeking any available help may turn to East – Hillery.’157 Dr 
Hillery told the conference that if Ireland received no help from the West it might have 
to look elsewhere. He claimed that the situation had totally changed after the Derry 
killings. However, having knocked on the U.N. door twice before, whatever prospects 
were there in 1969 did not re-emerge three years later. There was no going back for Dr 
Hillery from his decision to opt for a promise of British reforms to Stormont in return 
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for a withdrawal of his diplomatic campaign for U.N. assistance – an initiative that had 
attracted Soviet support.  
Conclusion 
Relations between Irish and Soviet representatives began warmly in the revolutionary 
period of 1919-21, as was demonstrated by the draft treaty of recognition, and the Irish 
republican loan deal to their cash-strapped Soviet counterparts. Yet even as the two 
sides united in a sense of anti-imperialism, constraining factors on the Irish side were 
evident. In the first instance de Valera and his delegation represented an emerging 
national democratic republic, in contrast to the Bolsheviks who represented a state 
attempting to create the world’s first socialist entity.  With the exception of the left-
leaning Liam Mellows, the Irish were not supportive of the labour or socialist 
movements in their own country. Nevertheless, de Valera did recognise the potential of 
the Russian revolution’s promise for self-determination for small countries, and the 
prospect that Soviet Russia might in the future influence developments throughout 
Europe along on those lines.  
It can be seen from citations employed in the chapter from Patrick McCartan’s 
With de Valera in America (1932) that McCartan had not been happy with de Valera’s 
cautious handling of the pursuit of an agreement with the Soviets. However, these 
complaints must be seen in the light of McCartan’s subsequent distancing of himself 
from de Valera, commencing with his support for the Anglo-Irish treaty. Evidence of de 
Valera’s bona fides for having the draft treaty confirmed in Moscow is supported by his 
recommendation to Arthur Griffith that McCartan’s mission to Moscow should be 
strengthened with two further representatives.  
 The Soviets’ refusal to ratify the Irish-Soviet agreement with McCartan was a 
salutary illustration that when the national interests of the Soviet state were considered 
to be at stake (i.e. that Soviet recognition of the first dáil might jeopardise the Anglo-
Soviet trade deal), the state’s interests took priority over political considerations. 
Greaves’ assessment that the Soviets were not willing to risk their fledgling trade pact 
with Britain to help repair the economy after the civil war for ‘the sake of a republic the 
Irish did not seem sure about themselves’, 158  remains insightful. Yet, it can be 
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concluded – even had McCartan persuaded Commissar Chicherin that the dáil would 
not settle with the British for anything less than a thirty-two county republic – that 
McCartan would not have received anything other than the same firm refusal.   
The thirty-year saga of the Russian jewels represents something of a metaphor 
for Irish-Soviet relations up to 1949.  Upon their arrival in Ireland the jewels, held in 
custody by the Boland family until 1938, represented a reflection of the Irish civil war 
divide. When the jewels were transferred to Taoiseach de Valera, their custody in 
government buildings became a state secret, reflecting the reluctance of the post-
revolutionary Irish political elite to engage with the Soviet Union. It was only in the 
heat of political battle that McCartan brought the matter into the open, tellingly, in 
reaction to an anti-communist smear against his party leader, Seán MacBride. The 
manner in which the matter was resolved suggests, in a diplomatic sense, a questionable 
manoeuvre by the Irish government. The approach made to the Soviet Union to honour 
its pledge in 1949 only came after it became clear that an auction of the jewels would 
not recover the original loan amount.   In this way the saga of the Irish republican loan 
to Soviet Russia was brought to an end, in a Cold War context, in the manner of a debt 
collection exercise – in contrast to the revolutionary atmosphere when the loan was 
extended as an act of solidarity between two embryonic and anti-imperialist states.  
 Eamon de Valera’s early recognition that Soviet Russia held out some prospect 
for the position of small nations was carried forward into the League of Nations. De 
Valera rose to the occasion in Geneva to support Soviet entry into the League. The 
reaction to his astutely crafted speech, which balanced his concerns about Soviet 
religious policies with the U.S.S.R.’s right to join the League, helped sway the decision 
in the Soviets’ favour. At the same time, de Valera supported moves at the League to 
restrict Soviet influence over its technical bodies, thereby showing that Ireland would 
not be neutral when it came to matters of social policies that clashed with the teachings 
of the Catholic church.  Nevertheless, de Valera’s fortitude – against a domestic 
backdrop of the rise of the church’s influence as manifested by the Eucharistic Congress 
of 1932 – indicated that Ireland could support the Soviet Union’s intentions to stiffen 
the League’s resolve for the maintenance of peace in Europe.  
 Evidence presented in relation to the delay in Ireland gaining membership of the 
U.N. until 1955 indicates a number of shades of ‘historical grey’ in a topic sometimes 
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narrowly presented as the powerful Soviet Union vetoing an independent Ireland from 
playing its part on the international stage. Yet, it is the historical greys that reveal more 
of the complexities and contradictions that were at play. These included Polish 
communist attempts to have the Soviets make an exception for Irish membership, while 
at the same time an Irish communist representative took the opposite view when 
addressing a conference of the Scotland-U.S.S.R. society. However, the main feature of 
the holdup of Irish membership was revealed in the manner of its resolution – Ireland 
was included in the Soviet-sponsored ‘package deal’, which was designed to accept into 
membership of the U.N. states that could be expected to support in equal measure either 
the U.S. or the Soviet Union at the world body.   
 Frank Aiken’s handling of the representation of China votes issue stands out as 
an application of a ‘de Valerist’ approach to independent Irish foreign policy 
formulation at the U.N. Aiken took a principled stand to favour membership of a world 
forum for an outcast communist power (the People’s Republic of China was still a close 
ally of the Soviet Union in 1959), in spite of the resultant ire of establishment forces in 
the U.S. and at home. However, it was Aiken’s effectiveness as a promoter for workable 
disarmament measures at the U.N. that was a particular highlight in Irish-Soviet 
relations. Aiken’s invitation to come to Moscow in 1968 – the first for an Irish 
government minister – for the signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, was an 
expression of Soviet acknowledgement of Aiken’s diplomatic skills and commitment to 
world peace.  
Dr Patrick Hillery’s quest for a U.N. peacekeeping force for Northern Ireland 
exposed the sensitive triangle of Irish-British-Soviet relations to an international 
audience. Given Britain’s membership of the Security Council, and its ability to rely on 
U.S. support, the odds were always stacked against the Irish request. Nevertheless, as a 
tactic to internationalise the pressure on Britain regarding the North, it certainly was 
effective.  Soviet support for the Irish, not based upon a demand that Britain bring about 
constitutional change but rather one confined to a civil rights solution, brought pressure 
to bear on the British. This was shown by the defensive response of Lord Caradon to 
Ambassador Malik’s contribution before the general committee on the question of the 
lack of Catholic political influence in Northern Ireland. However, as Britain elevated the 
matter onto an East-West basis, Soviet support then became a two-edged sword for the 
Irish as the influence of the major western powers was decisive. Nonetheless, in terms 
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of the advancement of Irish-Soviet relations, the affair had the value of showing that the 
two sides could cooperate. As John Walsh’s biography of Dr Hillery indicates, the Irish 
foreign minister had experienced a positive relationship with the Soviets at the U.N., an 
experience that can only have added to other objective factors that made it possible and 
desirable for Dr Hillery to bring forward a proposal to his government to establish 
formal diplomatic relations in 1971. Therefore, it is to those objective factors and 
proposal that this study must now proceed. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
The establishment and practice of Irish-Soviet diplomatic relations, 1971-80 
...meets the spirit of the times and the interests of both states’ peoples.1
 
 Izvestia, 19 Oct. 1973
 
Introduction 
This chapter’s aim is to examine diplomatic and political developments, together with 
the roles of the principal personalities in those events, which took place shortly before, 
during and for the next seven years after the establishment of formal diplomatic 
relations between the Republic of Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 
1973. The principal aspects include: the arrival into Dublin in 1970 of a representative 
of Tass, the central Soviet news agency, whose presence prompted Irish and British 
government officials to reconsider existing travel restrictions upon Soviet officials; the 
agreement in principle of the Fianna Fáil government in 1971 to establish relations, and 
the subsequent suspension of that decision by Taoiseach Jack Lynch; the 
cultural/diplomatic visit to Dublin of the great Soviet composer, Dmitri Shostakovich, 
in 1972; the debate among the cabinet ministers of the 1973-7 National Coalition 
government on the proposal of Foreign Minister Garret FitzGerald to activate 
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union; and discussions between Garret FitzGerald 
and Andrei Gromyko to agree the details for the establishment of diplomatic missions to 
Moscow and Dublin. 
 The account of developments at the Irish embassy to Moscow up to 1980 
commences with a profile of Dr Edward Brennan. Drawn in part from the author’s 
interviews with Dr Brennan and his then teenage son Barry, the account focuses upon 
the procurement of the embassy building from Soviet authorities; the role of the 
ambassador and his staff, including Irish diplomatic and trade officials and Soviet 
supplied personnel; the ambassador’s relationship with his E.E.C. and U.S. diplomatic 
counterparts; and security concerns at the embassy. Based upon an interview conducted 
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with the first Córas Tráchtála (C.T.T., the Irish Export Board) officer assigned to 
Moscow, details of the Irish trade mission at the embassy are provided next. Garret 
FitzGerald’s high profile visit as foreign minister to the Soviet Union in 1976 – which 
included meetings with senior Soviet government and trade ministers – forms the 
central plank of this section of the chapter.  The account then discusses the outstanding 
issue of his tenure in Moscow that Dr Brennan identified for this study: events 
surrounding the 1980 Moscow Summer Olympic Games in the aftermath of the Soviet 
intervention into Afghanistan. 
 The account of the new Soviet embassy to Dublin contains a profile of its head 
of mission, Ambassador Anatoli Kaplin. This is partly informed by an interview with Dr 
Sarah Smyth of Trinity College Dublin, who provided English language lessons to the 
ambassador’s wife, Madame Gali Kaplin.  The procurement of the Soviet ambassadorial 
premises (at Orwell Road and Ailesbury Road, Dublin) is discussed, as is a number of 
planning objections to improvements at the Orwell Road facility that were raised by 
certain city councillors. The award of an International Lenin Prize to former minister for 
external affairs and international peace activist, Seán MacBride, in 1977 is considered in 
some detail, and finally, the reactions in Ireland to the death in office of Ambassador 
Kaplin in 1979 are recalled to assess the impact made by the Soviet Union’s first 
diplomatic mission to Ireland. 
As the establishment of Irish-Soviet relations have not yet been the subject of a 
monograph, and as the subject has been but touched upon in general Irish histories and 
international relations studies, the chapter is largely reliant upon primary sources. These 
principally comprise: dedicated files on the topic from the Irish Department of Foreign 
Affairs (D.F.A.), now available at the National Archives of Ireland; and – reflecting the 
British government’s robust input into the establishment of Irish-Soviet diplomatic 
relations – selected items from the files of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
(F.C.O.), now available at the National Archives (T.N.A.), Kew. These latter materials 
contain substantial amounts of two-way correspondence between British ambassadors to 
Dublin and Moscow and their superiors in London; internal F.C.O. analyses of events 
and comments on political and diplomatic personalities in Ireland; reports on articles in 
the Soviet press on Ireland; and details of correspondence between Prime Minister 
Edward Heath and Taoiseach Jack Lynch.  
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 Oral sources play a prominent part in providing evidence throughout the chapter. 
In addition to those mentioned above, interviewees include Professor Emeritus Barra 
Boydell, son of Professor Brian Boydell who initiated the visit of Dmitri Shostakovich 
to Ireland; John P. Swift, son of John Swift, the founding chairman of the Ireland-
U.S.S.R. Society; and Reginald J. McHugh, Ireland’s first commercial attaché to the 
Soviet Union. 
 Memoirs and autobiographies are also utilised, and in addition to those 
mentioned above they include those of Sir John Peck, the British ambassador to 
Dublin;
2
 Andrei Gromyko’s, Memories: from Stalin to Gorbachev,3 and Professor Brian 
Boydell's unpublished memoirs. To inform profiles of various government cabinet 
ministers, entries in the Dictionary of Irish biography, Conor Cruise O’Brien’s, Memoir: 
my life and themes (1988), and Noel Browne’s, Against the tide (1987) have been 
consulted. 
Arrival of Tass representative, Ustimenko, into Dublin  
The arrival of Yuri Vladimirovich Ustimenko,  a thirty-four year-old 
correspondent of Telegrafnoye Agentstvo Sovetskovo Soyuza (TASS), the Soviet state 
news agency, in Dublin in September 1970, and his subsequent immersion into 
prominent Irish social circles, personified an early indicator  that moves were afoot in 
Irish-Soviet relations. While British security authorities recorded the passport spelling 
of his surname as ‘Oustimenko’4, he was known to his wide circle of contacts and 
friends in Ireland as Yuri Ustimenko. Described as ‘an urbane, polite man with a ready 
smile and barely-accented English’,5 he and his wife and one child lived at Belvedere, 
Harbour Road, Dalkey. 
6
 The then British ambassador to Ireland, Sir John Peck, advised 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (F.C.O.) in London that Ustimenko ‘is now 
widely referred to as the K.G.B. man or the spy, and the fact that he appears to do none 
of the things expected of a correspondent has virtually destroyed his cover.’7  Whatever 
about the validity of such an observation, Ustimenko certainly led a most public life. He 
soon became known to a wide cross-section of activists ranging from left-wingers (he 
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was ‘pally’ with George Jeffares of the Communist Party of Ireland (C.P.I.), a polyglot 
and then the party’s leading theoretician on international affairs), 8  to many in the 
mainstream media and political parties, and he and his wife frequently held social 
gatherings in their home. Both Charles J. Haughey of Fianna Fáil and author Tim Pat 
Coogan were said to have been on good social terms with Ustimenko, as was Nell 
McCafferty,
9
 the prominent feminist and journalist. He made a guest appearance on 
R.T.É.’s Late late show,10 and was in some demand as a speaker around the country, as 
is shown by his featured address to the Dundalk Debating Society, ‘Russia today’ in 
January 1971.
11
 His journalistic skills cannot be doubted, either, as can be attested to by 
a reading of his insightful and witty article ‘Christmas and no Christmas’ in a December 
1972 edition of the Irish Times.
12
 To this can be added a more analytical piece 
published in the Soviet paper Za Rubezhom (Abroad), in May, 1973, which was picked 
up by the research department of the British embassy in Moscow. Its contents are 
reported to have included: an explanation for the Provisional I.R.A.’s support from the 
ordinary people of the Republic because ‘the idea of reunification is so widely popular’; 
dissatisfaction that E.E.C. membership had not solved economic problems; appeals for 
commercial reforms to include ‘broader contacts with the third world and the socialist 
states’; and  speculation that the newly-elected ‘Cosgrave coalition government will 
inevitably encounter great difficulties...because of differences between Fíne Gael and 
Labourites’.13 
Ustimenko’s significance, however, extended beyond his writing talents and 
success as a one-man Soviet charm offensive with the Irish public:  it lay in the manner 
and extent to which the Irish authorities chose to apply travel restrictions upon this 
Soviet journalist.   The sensitivity and complexity surrounding this decision arose 
against the background of the common travel area that enabled visa-free movement of 
citizens between the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland. The British government feared that the arrival of Soviet officials in 
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Ireland could compromise British national security. This fear was succinctly expressed 
by an official at the British embassy in Moscow in a letter to the F.C.O. in 1973:  
There is in fact (at least under the arrangements as I last knew them) no 
automatic physical check on documents between Dublin and London, and ... a 
Russian in a Harris tweed suit and polished shoes with an ounce of confidence 
could probably get away without being spotted.
14
  
But the British official in Moscow was two years behind the cut and thrust of 
events, for Ambassador Peck had been keeping a very close eye on Ustimenko. He had 
alerted London about the Russian’s arrival, and while allowing that ‘Ustimenko has so 
far given no cause for complaint’ he urged: ‘keep a careful look out in the B.B.C. 
international press summaries for any items put out in Moscow in the newspapers and 
radio attributed to Ustimenko.’15  It seems that Peck saw an opportunity to take the 
uncertain diplomatic status of  Ustimenko, and resolve it on the basis of a security risk – 
in order to gain a British advantage in what Professor Marcus Wheeler of Queen’s 
University, Belfast, described as ‘the sensitive triangle of relations between Ireland, 
Russia and Britain’.16  The ambassador had been making representations to the Irish 
government to have travel restrictions placed on the Tass correspondent, while at the 
same time thinking ahead to the prospects for security controls on possible future Soviet 
personnel in Ireland. Peck, who had graduated from Oxford as a classicist, commenced 
his career at the foreign office as one of Prime Minister Winston Churchill's wartime 
private secretaries. He was, however, to be better remembered by his peers for his role 
in the early 1950s as a key organiser in the establishment of British security structures – 
specifically the inoffensively named Information Research Department (I.R.D.) – to 
confront Soviet international influence in the early stages of the Cold War.
17
 Peck 
appears to have been in contact with a senior official at the D.F.A., Ronan (first name 
not supplied), passing on to Ronan pertinent I.R.D. intelligence reports on the Soviets. 
Peck was able to advise the F.C.O. of the state of play on this issue in the D.F.A., where 
some officials were thought to be in favour of expanding trade with the Soviet Union, 
while: 
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...others including Ronan himself give higher priorities to dangers...indeed 
Ronan expressed his appreciation for the I.R.D. material and referred to various 
elements in Irish society which...would be susceptible to Russian propaganda. 
The matter has not yet gone to ministers for decision.
18
 
 
Consequently, Peck was both well informed and well placed in Dublin in 1971 
to make a decisive intervention regarding Ustimenko’s travel arrangements, as 
encapsulated in the following extract from his communication to London: 
Irish have at last reacted... McCann [another D.F.A. official] has informed me: 
(1) They feel unable to impose any restrictions on Ustimenko in Ireland itself. 
(2) They are prepared to ask him for forty-eight hours’ notice of intention to 
leave Ireland, including point of departure. This would include crossing into 
Northern Ireland. 
(3) They will have to give a reason and propose to say that they are acting at our 
request. 
(4) Before acting they wish to be sure that this is acceptable to us. 
I do not think we shall persuade the Irish government to adopt any other course. 
May I say this is acceptable?
19
 
 
Ambassador Peck duly received instructions to so proceed, with the proviso that 
he also convey Britain’s serious concerns regarding security problems. An internal 
F.C.O. memorandum expressed considerable satisfaction at the outcome. While 
regretting that restrictions would not be imposed on Ustimenko in Ireland itself, it noted 
that the main objective of eliminating the travel loophole from ‘Southern Ireland’ to 
Britain had been achieved. Also, as the Irish were now ‘associating themselves with our 
security precautions...this could provide a useful precedent should the establishment of 
relations between Dublin and Moscow [ever come about]’.20 Ustimenko was to confirm 
the application of these Irish-British restrictions on him at a luncheon hosted in his 
honour by the Publicity Club of Ireland in 1973, prior to his departure to Moscow to 
take up another posting. When asked if a future Soviet embassy would become a 
backdoor into Britain he responded: ‘whenever I wish to go from Dublin to Britain, I 
have to apply for a visa in advance and notify the British authorities...I have to tell them 
where I will be going, what route I will follow and where I will be spending the night.’21  
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Despite the enhanced diplomatic restrictions, Ustimenko was greatly impressed 
by his experiences among the Irish people during his three-year stay. He went on to 
publish a 205-page Russian language paperback Get to know Ireland in 1978.
22
  This 
publication, which had a print run of 80,000 copies, is a frank account of Ustimenko’s 
views on the events and people that impacted on him. In line with the sentiment 
expressed by Conor Cruise O’Brien in the New Statesman, ‘Irishness is not primarily a 
question of birth or blood or language; it is the condition of being involved in the Irish 
situation and usually of being mauled by it’,23 the following extract from Ustimenko’s 
book, which he included in his letter to the Irish Times in 1981, sums up his feelings of 
his time in Ireland: 
Together with the people of Ireland I had gone through their pain and joy, failure 
and successes. Obviously, I cannot be a neutral observer, and I won’t judge if 
this is good or bad...Ireland leaves no one indifferent. And when you come to 
know her well you will love her from the bottom of your heart.
24
      
 
Fianna Fáil government agrees in principle to diplomatic relations 
 
It was during Ustimenko’s tenure in Ireland, in November 1971, that Dr Hillery 
submitted a memorandum to cabinet to propose the establishment of diplomatic 
relations with the Soviet Union. His memorandum indicated that the minister had 
consulted his cabinet colleagues, stating: 
The ministers for finance [George Colley] and industry and commerce [Patrick 
Lawlor] are in agreement… the department of taoiseach [Jack Lynch] has no 
observation to offer…the minister for justice [Desmond O’Malley] does not 
wish to oppose the proposals if the minister for external affairs feels they are of 
value but has considerable misgivings on security grounds… the department for 
defence [Jerry Cronin] is opposed on security even with personnel involved 
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under surveillance…the minister of agriculture [Jim Gibbons] is agreeable if 
undertakings on levels of agriculture purchases are requested.
25
  
With no record of the Taoiseach Jack Lynch expressing his view on the matter 
(in line with his reputed reputation for very cautious approaches to decision making) 
and only the minister with responsibility for military intelligence, Jerry Cronin, 
definitely opposed, the government decision on the proposal was confirmed and 
detailed in the cabinet minutes:  
1. The establishment of a diplomatic mission in Moscow... of an ambassador and 
one or more other diplomatic officers. 
2. The acceptance of a diplomatic mission of the Soviet Union in Dublin 
comprising a head of mission of ambassador rank or other such rank as the 
Soviet authorities may wish and such other staff as may be agreed upon in 
negotiations.
26
 
 
The decision thus taken, the government and some units of the Fianna Fáil 
organisation met public manifestations of traditional anti-communist criticisms head on. 
A supportive resolution arrived into government buildings, ‘passed by majority vote’ at 
the Galway East Ward cumann [branch], and read: ‘That we should establish diplomatic 
relations with the Soviet Union or any country prepared to hold out the hand of 
friendship, but with no conditions attached.’27 However, most approaches and comment 
to government were decidedly negative. The March 1972 editorial of the Irish Catholic, 
attempting to lead a broad campaign of opposition on religious grounds, proclaimed: 
However we in this country may differ among ourselves, the vast majority of us 
lay claim to be Christians and to have the welfare of Christianity at heart. There 
is nothing natural about a decision to cousin a regime that is blatantly, 
unashamedly and militantly atheistic.
28
   
A self-proclaimed Fianna Fáil supporter, a Mrs Kelly of Dublin 7, wrote to 
President de Valera:  
As is well known at present the economic and political future of our country is 
being destroyed by the help of the Irish Communist party, North and South. So 
why give them cover for further subversive activities. Surely you cannot forget 
what happened to Hungary and Czechoslovakia a few short years ago?
29
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She was sent, by return of post, a forthright reply from the taoiseach’s secretary:   
We have had talks with the U.S.S.R. and other Iron Curtain countries, which led 
to trade agreements that were to our advantage... we are usually urged to 
consider opening relations but never did so but we have not ruled out the 
possibility…as you know the pope has received high ranking Soviet ministers 
‘in brotherhood’ at the Vatican.30   
This reference to Vatican-Soviet dialogue is an allusion to audiences held between Pope 
Paul VI and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in 1966, and President Nikolai 
Podgorny in 1967. They discussed world peace issues, principally the war in Vietnam, 
and Vatican concerns for religious life and the functioning of the Catholic church in the 
Soviet Union.
31
 Gromyko was later to detail in his memoirs that he had eight meetings 
with successive heads of the Roman Catholic Church: once with John XXIII in 1963 
and three with Paul VI, and he wrote ‘the initiative for these meetings came in every 
instance from the Vatican.’32    
Despite its stonewalling against such traditionalist anti-communist and religious 
representations, Jack Lynch’s government did stall the process – not owing to domestic 
objections – but because of representations from the British government. An 
examination of extracts from the F.C.O.’s records reveals that in January 1972 the 
F.C.O. was well informed of the very latest developments in Dublin’s ongoing contacts 
with the Soviets. A communication from a British embassy official in Dublin, K.C. 
Thom, to a colleague in the F.C.O. began with an Irish Press report of Aeroflot’s plans 
to operate fortnightly flights from Dublin to Leningrad, and continued with what 
appears to have been a clarification by an official in the Irish department of foreign 
affairs on recent media speculation on the state of play between Irish and Soviet 
officials on the exchange of embassies.
33
 Thom’s communication stated that the Irish: 
‘are prepared to allow six Russian diplomats in Dublin but the Russians have asked for 
a much higher figure; this disagreement alone was preventing the exchange of 
embassies’.34 Thom  further advised that recent reports in the Irish Independent and 
Herald claiming that the Soviets’ request for staffing level had far outweighed the strict 
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necessities of diplomatic activity,  had ‘originated in an indiscretion by Mr [Brian] 
Lenihan.’35  
British anxieties were immediately heightened by the expected arrival into 
Dublin on 28 February of a high level Soviet trade delegation and parallel talks on 
diplomatic relations. This prompted an urgent letter from the foreign secretary, Sir Alec 
Douglas-Home, to Ambassador Peck.
36
  Douglas-Home urged Peck to impress upon the 
Irish ‘in view of the common travel area, that they have some responsibility towards us 
in this matter’, and detailed for him a number of selling points.37 But before discussing 
these points, this study must point to the events in Derry city of 31 January 1972 – 
Bloody Sunday – whose impact would extend to Irish-Soviet discussions. It could be 
assumed Irish-Soviet trade talks were the least of the worries of senior British ministers 
and officials in the fallout from the killing of thirteen civil rights marchers by British 
Army paratroopers. Not only had they to contend with the national and international 
outcry, but Ambassador Peck and his staff had to cope with a three-day siege and 
eventual burning of the British embassy at Merrion Square on 2 February.  Nevertheless, 
Ambassador Peck was able to set aside the burning of the embassy and damp down 
pervasive anti-British sentiments in Dublin at official level. Journalist and author, 
Raymond Smith, later described Peck’s performance: ‘(he) emerged as a diplomat of the 
highest standing when the next morning he sought to cool the situation, separating 
overall Anglo-Irish relations and the friendship between Irish and British peoples from 
the terrible incidents in Derry.’38  Peck went on to publish an autobiography, Dublin  
from Downing Street, and perhaps mindful of Bloody Sunday and the burning of the 
embassy, he prominently featured a quotation from Shakespeare’s Othello: ‘To mourn a 
mischief that is past and gone/ Is the next day to draw new mischief on.’ 39 
Disappointingly for the purposes of this study, his autobiography does not make any 
Ireland-related references to the Soviet Union. However, he did allow his diplomatic 
mask to slip a little with a recollection of the time he accompanied Winston Churchill to 
the Potsdam conference in 1945 – at a time British-Soviet relations were at their 
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warmest. With a telling remark towards the Soviet leadership, Peck wrote: ‘I shook 
hands with Stalin – cold and clammy like a fish on a slab’.40 
To return to Douglas-Home’s communication of February 1972, Peck had to 
respond to his foreign minister’s selling points, which he considered to be too narrowly 
focused on British fears and interests. They included: the Russians would attempt to use 
Dublin as a replacement centre for the expulsion of 105 Soviet embassy ‘intelligence 
agents’ from London in September of the previous year; implications for the common 
travel area – similar to those discussed regarding Ustimenko; and ‘the obvious point’ 
that ‘following the Londonderry shootings...it would suit the Soviet book very well to 
give the situation a stir’.41 Replying the same day, Peck did not hesitate to counsel his 
minister: 
I will speak as instructed but I must point out that throughout the whole 
communication, the emphasis is heavily upon the Soviet threat to British 
interests...the Irish government are in present circumstances unwilling and 
indeed unable to take any action merely to please us, and any suggestion that we 
can expect help of as of right now decreases the chances of cooperation.
42
 
He suggested an alternative focus that arguments should coincide with common 
Irish and British self interests. He headlined the threat posed by the Official I.R.A., 
‘which is penetrated and supported by international communists’ and went on to 
propose that the prime minister send a secret and personal message to Taoiseach 
Lynch.
43
 Peck’s telegram and suggestions found favour with Prime Minister Edward 
(Ted) Heath. As a result he was forwarded a draft of Heath’s message to Lynch. It 
began most diplomatically: ‘I gather... you are discussing... the possible establishment 
of diplomatic relations... with the Soviet Union. This of course is a problem for you and 
not for us: but after some reflection I thought it could be helpful to let you know 
something of our experience.’44 Heath’s draft proceeded to focus upon and to decry the 
‘persistence and sheer weight’ of Soviet operations against his country, and laid 
particular emphasis upon a suggestion that his government’s recent expulsion of Soviet 
officials was related to Soviet plans for sabotage and subversion that fitted in with the 
aims of the Official I.R.A. For evidence of these aims he quoted from a Soviet journal, 
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New Times: ‘the overthrow of reactionary governments in the north and south of the 
country’, and confided that a recent Soviet defector had revealed that K.G.B. officers 
had discussed with the general secretary of the Communist Party of Ireland (C.P.I.), 
Michael O’Riordan, a request for arms for the Official I.R.A. 45  (O’Riordan’s arms 
request was based upon an approach from Official I.R.A. members in 1969 to procure 
guns as a means of self-defence for vulnerable Catholic communities in Belfast that 
were then subjected to organised Loyalist attacks, with the Royal Ulster Constabulary’s 
(R.U.C.) connivance.)
46
  
The prime minister’s draft proceeded to concede that he and the taoiseach had 
‘problems in common, which we are seeking to solve’ but warned that the Soviets 
would work to aggravate such differences. Prime Minister Heath’s draft did not directly 
ask the taoiseach to reverse his government’s plan to proceed to an exchange of 
embassies, but the message was clear: in the prevailing circumstances it should be 
suspended and the Irish should accept his offer of ‘assistance to your people in the 
technical fields’.47  Ambassador Peck was advised that the prime minister’s message 
was to be telegrammed as soon as possible, and the signed original would arrive by 
diplomatic bag on 2 March in expectation of Peck’s meeting with Mr Lynch. He was 
further instructed to bring with him another message to the taoiseach, concerning the 
report of a commission established by the British government to enquire into 
contentious interrogation practices employed by the R.U.C. in Northern Ireland in the 
early 1970s – the Parker report. (This report found that the R.U.C. utilised five 
techniques: wall-standing, hooding, subjection to noise, deprivation of sleep, and 
deprivation of food and drink. The report concluded that the practices were ‘secret, 
illegal, not morally justifiable’.)48 It appears that the British government’s tactics were 
to demonstrate some evidence of its willingness to crack down on repressive security 
tactics within Northern Ireland, while at the same time requesting the Irish government 
to forestall its plans to implement diplomatic relations with the Soviets. In the event, the 
Irish government was less than impressed with the Parker report – it subsequently took 
the British to task at the European Commission on Human Rights at Strasbourg (as is 
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discussed in more detail in chapter four) – but for whatever reason Taoiseach Lynch did 
put the issue of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in abeyance.  
These developments were soon made public by the London Daily Express, 
which reported that the ‘British ambassador to Ireland, Sir John Peck, had  “warned”  
the taoiseach that free travel between the two countries would be revoked if a Soviet 
embassy was opened here’.49 In the dáil, Labour party members Dr John O’Connell and 
Barry Desmond, suspecting that the government had acceded to British representations, 
questioned Brian Lenihan (in place of the absent Dr Hillery).  Lenihan refused to be 
drawn and simply stated it would ‘not be appropriate to discuss publicly the 
establishment of diplomatic relations with a particular country’. 50   But informed 
members of the diplomatic press corps were not so coy in articulating the government’s 
position. In July Dennis Kennedy, diplomatic correspondent of the Irish Times, 
reminded his readers that it had been expected that the embassies would be established 
before the end of the year, but the ever-cautious taoiseach had recently decided against 
that event. Nevertheless, Kennedy confidently asserted ‘it remains likely that there will 
be an embassy and also Irish ambassadors will be accredited to, though not resident in, 
other east European capitals.’51 The accuracy of Kennedy’s information is borne out by 
the following extract from a D.F.A. memorandum: 
...trade negotiations had been opened in Moscow in October 1970 at which time 
the U.S.S.R. delegation made it clear that it would be necessary for it to have a 
full diplomatic office in Dublin if a trade agreement were concluded…The 
Soviet government was therefore also informed in July 1972 that the Irish 
government was ready to discuss further questions of diplomatic relations in 
parallel with the resumed talks, in the expectation of a satisfactory trade 
agreement, the government’s mind was moving in the direction of an exchange 
of diplomatic missions.
52
  
However, despite the fact that the talks were successfully concluded with the 
initialling of the text of the trade agreement, the Soviet delegation again had to remind 
their Irish counterparts that the Soviet signature was conditional on the establishment of 
diplomatic relations. At this point the negotiations were broken off by the Irish side 
because: 
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the minister for justice could not, in the circumstances of that time provide 
adequate personnel for guard and surveillance duties and implementation of the 
government’s decision was, therefore, deferred in the hope that the position 
might improve in some months.
53
  
This seemed to have been a curious position for the Irish to adopt at that stage in 
negotiations, given that they had been aware of the Soviets’ requirement for over two 
years, and that it was at their own invitation that talks were resumed. That interval 
would have provided sufficient time to organise security personnel and to provide 
access to Russian language skills. It seems that the Irish side had come to terms with the 
fact, as all west European countries had already done, that an embassy at Dublin could 
give rise to certain security problems and that these would have to be monitored and 
managed. This is borne out by the balanced and realistic appreciation that a Soviet 
embassy in itself would not be a threat to Irish security, as is indicated by the following 
extract:  
Internally it might be that a Soviet embassy in Dublin could afford cover for 
contacts between Soviet intelligence services and subversive groups in the state. 
Indications are however that initiative in these matters comes from Irish sources 
and that subversion against the state is not an objective of Soviet policy.
54
  
It also seems reasonable to suggest that as a close neighbour of Britain – a 
leading member of NATO and still a substantial world power – it did behove Irish 
negotiators to offer the British some reassurance on their concerns on the common 
travel area issue. In this regard Irish negotiators formulated a two-fold solution: to 
minimise the personnel numbers at the Dublin embassy, and to place restrictions on 
travel rights for all members of its staff, diplomatic or otherwise, in line with the 
‘Ustimenko restrictions’ of April 1971 of which Ambassador Peck was fully aware. The 
Soviets had come to accept these restrictions, as was later indicated to London by an 
official of the British embassy in Moscow when he was informed by a senior official in 
the Soviet ministry of foreign affairs: ‘everybody knew that only the Irish had a right to 
travel from Dublin to Britain without visas and that any Russians travelling would be 
required to seek visas’.55 All that remained was for the Irish to finalise negotiations with 
the Soviets on embassy numbers, and face down British representations concerning so-
called ‘mutual’ security fears.   
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The visit to Dublin of composer Dmitri Shostakovich 
While the Irish hesitated over establishing official relations, the Soviets didn’t 
take umbrage and Dublin was soon to receive a visit from a senior and respected figure 
among the highest ranks of Soviet culture: Dmitri Dmitriyevich Shostakovich. In spite 
of East-West ideological barriers, Shostakovich’s acclaimed oeuvre of fifteen 
symphonies and numerous operas, ballets, concertos, quartets, together with thirty-six 
film scores, had earned world-renowned status for the sixty-six-year-old artist. From his 
youth, he had worked and lived at the centre of Soviet musical and political life. In 1937 
he wrote an arrangement of the Internationale (the anthem of the world communist 
movement) for symphonic orchestra.
56
  He did have to survive some artistic suspicion 
during the Stalinist period, but as he had become a fully-accepted notable in Soviet 
society and a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (C.P.S.U.), his visit 
took on the semblance of a semi-official occasion. As the principal composer of the 
Soviet era, Shostakovich’s visit to Dublin in July 1972 was a clear signal of the 
warming relations between the two states. He had come at the invitation of Professor 
A.J. McConnell, provost of T.C.D., to accept an honorary doctorate in Music (Mus. D.), 
which was conferred with due pomp at a ceremony on Thursday, 6 July. The provost’s 
invitation resulted from the suggestion of the professor of music at T.C.D., Professor 
Brian Boydell, himself a composer of note.
57
  
Boydell considered himself to be a musical ‘kindred spirit’ of Shostakovich’s,  
and an admirer of  the Russian’s ability to express deep emotion in a modern way that 
was accessible to wider musical audiences.
58
 Boydell’s initiative followed the results of 
an informal poll taken among attendees at the then popular annual Dublin Festival of 
Twentieth-Century Music. The poll asked attendees to nominate their favourite 
composer of the twentieth-century, and Shostakovich duly emerged as their 
preference.
59
  Shostakovich’s visiting party included Irina Antonovna Supinskaya, his 
third wife, and an official from the Soviet embassy in London, Taval Nicholsevich 
Filatov. Dr Ronald Hill of the Political Science Department at T.C.D. provided 
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translation and logistical support throughout the visit.  The visit commenced the 
previous day with a concert, presented by the English Language Institute, in Saint 
Patrick’s Cathedral. The New Irish Chamber Orchestra (N.I.C.O.), conducted by André 
Prieur, performed Vivaldi’s Four Seasons, Britten’s Serenade for Tenor, Horn and 
Strings and Shostakovich’s own Chamber Symphony in C Minor (Opus 110).60 Boydell 
records Shostakovich’s appreciation and response at the end of the performance: ‘the 
composer took his bow and mingled among the members of the orchestra congratulating 
them individually’.61  Present at the concert was Charles Acton (1914-99), prominent 
music critic for the Irish Times. Commending the performance and the occasion, Acton 
wrote:  
The N.I.C.O. and André Prieur, their conductor, gave it an absorbed and wholly 
convincing performance. The presence among us of one of the greatest of living 
composers lifted the whole concert onto a different plane.
62
    
Nevertheless, when Acton wrote an appreciation at the time of Shostakovich’s death 
three years later, he expressed a criticism of the conduct of the visit. Lamenting the lack 
of access to the composer for music critics to query him on his music and his 
relationship with the Soviet communist system, Acton complained: ‘it was however sad 
that Trinity [T.C.D.] kept him so cloistered in its privacy and would not permit any 
musical journalist here to interview him.’63        
The diplomatic significance of the visit was most pronounced on its third day at 
Áras an Úachtaráin, where Shostakovich and his party were received by Eamon de 
Valera, then approaching his final year as president of Ireland. It had been over fifty 
years since de Valera as president of the first dáil had first met representatives of Soviet 
Russia in America, and had sent Dr McCartan to Moscow in an attempt to establish 
early diplomatic relations; within scarcely fourteen months of this courtesy visit by the 
Soviet Union’s most acclaimed composer, official relations were finally to be enacted. 
There was to be a coincidental symmetry between de Valera’s death and the official 
opening of the Soviet embassy to Dublin. This was graphically depicted by a newspaper 
photograph of the new Soviet ambassador lowering the Soviet flag in the grounds of the 
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embassy – the opening ceremonies had just been completed when news of the death of 
the former Irish president came through.
64
 
Shostakovich’s meeting with de Valera was not his final Irish engagement, 
however, for on Saturday 8 July he accepted an invitation to the family home of 
Professor Boydell, at Bailey, Dublin where he was to engage in a tête-à-tête with his 
host. There he and his party were treated to an informal meal of fresh fish from the pier 
of nearby Howth, after which Boydell succeeded in having a two-hour, composer-to-
composer session in his music room with his principal guest.
65
 Professor Boydell 
happily complied with Shostakovich’s expressed desire to hear some contemporary 
Irish works and to discuss attitudes to composition. Boydell then proceeded to enquire 
about ‘the real position of composers in the Soviet Union’, candidly stating that he 
understood composers in the Soviet Union were discouraged from experimenting with 
new techniques, and asking: ‘how then can Russian music develop along with the 
evolution of its counterpart in the rest of Europe?’ Shostakovich’s reply was equally 
frank: 
You are misinformed. Of course we are encouraged to experiment and explore 
new ideas; but not to inflict our experiments on the public. We discuss our new 
ideas among ourselves in the Union of Composers.
66
 
Professor  Boydell summed up his impressions from the encounter:  
I would say that Shostakovich has been brought up in the Soviet ideals of Lenin, 
just as a sincere Irish Catholic who has been nurtured with his religion as part of 
unquestioned faith. Then, in the Irish context, along comes a bishop whose 
actions and teachings seem to contradict his fundamental beliefs so strongly held 
for a lifetime. In Russia, the errant bishop was Stalin, whose actions didn’t seem 
to follow the idealism of the faith in which Shostakovich had been nurtured.
67
    
After the croquet match and the intimate exchanges of the music room had 
drawn to a conclusion, all sat outside together to enjoy the Howth sunshine before the 
Boydells were presented with the Russians’ parting gifts. Chief of these was an 
autographed score and recording of Shostakovich’s Symphony no. 13. This seems to 
have been a symbolic present from the composer, for this symphony is themed upon 
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poems by Soviet poet, Yevgeny Aleksandrovich Yevtushenko, and chiefly includes a 
commemoration of the massacre by the German Nazis of thousands of Jews during their 
occupation of the Soviet Union in 1941 at a ravine outside of Kiev, Babi Yar (as will be 
discussed further in chapter three).
68
 While the symphony is critical of aspects of Soviet 
society – principally lingering anti-Semitism – it is at the same time supportive of the 
Soviet system and its ability to overcome such failings. Therefore, Shostakovich’s 
message to his Irish colleagues suggested that he, as a leading Soviet artist, continued 
not just to develop his musical forms but also to maintain a socially critical role within a 
socialist order. Boydell described the encounter as ‘an unforgettable day’,69 and the visit 
lingered long in Shostakovich’s appreciation also, as  was expressed in the following 
letter received two years later (and after diplomatic relations had been established) by 
the finance department of T.C.D.:  
25 September 1974, Moscow 
Dear gentleman treasurer,   
On 20 September 1974, I transferred via the department of the  
Moscow National Bank in London (order № 185974.102)  
in the address of your college 100 English pounds sterling.  
Let the money be my modest contribution to  
the expenditure on construction costs of student dormitories. 
 With very good wishes, 
  Signature [in Russian, legible, but a little shaky] 
  Dmitri Shostakovich
70
 
 
Within a year of this letter and donation, Shostakovich had died. While, in his 
own words he made but a ‘modest contribution’ to T.C.D.’s student accommodation 
fund, the diplomatic effect of his timely visit added to the pressing domestic and 
international demands for the establishment of official relations to enable Soviet and 
Irish artists to engage with one another on a more regular basis.  
Establishing diplomatic relations 
When Liam Cosgrave was elected taoiseach after the 1973 general election, Dr Garret 
FitzGerald, who had been Fíne Gael’s opposition spokesman on finance in the previous 
dáil, expected the taoiseach to appoint him minister for finance. But as Dr FitzGerald 
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was regarded as the leading figure in the social democratic wing of the right-of-centre 
Fíne Gael party, the traditionalist Cosgrave passed over FitzGerald in favour of Ritchie 
Ryan, a more conservative figure. In the event, finance’s loss was to be Irish-Soviet 
gain, for the appointment of Dr FitzGerald to the Department of Foreign Affairs (D.F.A.) 
ensured that the new minister would be keenly aware of the Soviet Union. While never 
on the socialist left of Irish politics, when he was a young journalist FitzGerald had 
written on the Soviet economy. In 1949 he had contributed to a British journal, News 
Review, an analysis of Aeroflot, the Soviet airline. Applying skills from his job as a 
young executive with Aer Lingus, he calculated that with 250 aircraft and 8,000-9,000 
seats Aeroflot represented the world’s largest civilian fleet, pointedly surmising that the 
Soviet air force could well have been of the same magnitude.
71
      
Two days after his appointment Dr FitzGerald attended his first meeting of 
E.E.C. foreign ministers on foreign policy coordination. Owing to the worldwide range 
of topics under discussion, including issues relating to the recognition of North Vietnam, 
he immediately formed the view that membership of the E.E.C. now required Ireland to 
radically upgrade its foreign policy functions ‘on the basis of our own information and 
our own assessments’ and that: ‘This could not be done credibly without an extension of 
our representation abroad, in particular by establishing diplomatic relations with the 
Soviet Union.’72 Apart from Ireland, at this time only a handful of states among the 
world community of nations, including Portugal (which remained under the influence of 
the ideas of the authoritarian and anti-communist rule of António de Oliveria Salazar 
[who had died in 1970] until 1974) and the Vatican, had not established official 
relations with the Soviets. FitzGerald regarded this delay as a reflection of how Irish 
politicians had allowed ingrained anti-communism to ‘irrationally’ determine their 
foreign policy.  
Securing cabinet approval 
Dr FitzGerald’s autobiography simply states that he proposed to the government 
on 7 May the opening of an embassy in Moscow, along with embassies in ‘Luxembourg 
and possibly Vienna and Oslo – and at a later date, perhaps, in east Africa, Brazil and 
China – without any difficulty’. 73  However, this is far from the full story, as is 
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evidenced by a draft of the cabinet minutes of 29 June.  This confirms he did indeed 
secure approval for relations with the Soviet Union, but only after a ‘for-or-against’ 
debate took place at the cabinet table, as follows:  
Following consideration of a memorandum dated the 22 June 1973, submitted 
by the minister for foreign affairs [Dr FitzGerald], and a [contrary] 
memorandum dated the 27 June, 1973, submitted by the minister for defence 
Paddy Donegan,74  concerning the opening of diplomatic relations with the 
Soviet Union. The decision of the previous government that a diplomatic 
mission would be established in Moscow and a diplomatic mission from the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics accepted in Dublin [in handwriting] ‘was 
confirmed’ and the minister for foreign affairs was authorised to indicate to the 
foreign minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that the modalities of 
implementing the decision might be discussed by the ministers in September 
next.
75
 
Dr FitzGerald’s memorandum set out to achieve four fundamental objectives: 
first, to ensure that the government would not be vulnerable to anti-communist political 
attack by Fianna Fáil; second, to highlight trade opportunities for Ireland; third, to stress 
E.E.C./diplomatic imperatives; and finally, to list assurances to allay perceived security 
fears relating to a Soviet embassy. His memorandum articulated at length the previous 
Fianna Fáil government’s decision of 21 December 1971 to establish relations. It quoted 
the minister for industry and commerce, Justin Keating (Labour) and the minister for 
agriculture and fisheries, Mark Clinton (Fíne Gael) that relations would lead to ‘an 
immediate and marked improvement in the level and balance of trade’.76 It noted that 
Ireland was almost alone among the countries of the world and alone among the nine 
E.E.C. members in not having relations with the Soviets and that this would ‘place 
Ireland in an inferior and parochial position vis-à-vis our European partners’; and it 
highlighted that Ireland was at odds with the Paris summit of 1972, which had 
expressed a general desire for détente and cooperation in Europe. It continued by 
highlighting the upcoming Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe (C.S.C.E.) to 
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be held in July in Helsinki - where any Irish attempt to promote détente without 
proceeding to establish relations would be viewed as ‘meaningless’.77 Finally, it set 
down some parameters on the nature and extent of the diplomatic missions for the 
embassies at both Moscow and Dublin to be discussed and negotiated with the Soviet 
government. The details for Moscow were scant by comparison with those envisioned 
for Dublin. For the Irish mission to the Soviet Union ‘an ambassador and one or more 
diplomatic officers and such supporting staff as may be necessary’ would be required, 
but for the Soviet embassy at Dublin numbers were to be restricted to ‘approximately’ 
twenty-two in total, including an ambassador and not more than five diplomatic 
officials.
78
  
Defence Minister Donegan’s memorandum, while conceding the value of trade 
and political opportunities, considered that the burden of security issues outweighed the 
benefits in favour of diplomatic relations, and concluded with a recommendation that 
the ‘authority to discuss and negotiate … should not be accorded by the government.’79  
It referred to the stated insistence by the leader of a Soviet trade delegation to Dublin in 
early 1972 that the completion of a trade agreement would be conditional on the 
establishment of diplomatic relations. Donegan suggested that because of the relatively 
low levels of trade involved, the Soviets – for ulterior motives – were principally 
interested in establishing an embassy itself rather than increasing trade. Taking Dr 
FitzGerald’s proposed maximum staff complement of twenty-two for the Soviet 
embassy, Donegan estimated that  by allowing for spouses that figure would increase to 
forty-four, of which thirty would be involved in ‘covert intelligence activities which are 
to be expected’. 80  He then proceeded to detail his fears: espionage and indirect 
subversion of the Irish defence forces; scientific and technical espionage; political 
espionage; economic espionage and third-country espionage. Finally, the minister 
asserted that the state did not have adequate resources in counter-intelligence to monitor 
all members of the embassy and assess information gathered. 
No mention is recorded in either memorandum of the ministers’ personal views 
with regard to the ‘elephant-in-the-room’: deeply entrenched anti-communist and anti-
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Soviet attitudes in Irish society. Dr FitzGerald’s view was that it was now ‘irrational’ to 
allow anti-communism to determine foreign policy, and in his memorandum he 
specifically stated that ministers Clinton,
81
 and Keating ‘have no objection to this 
proposal’. In Justin Keating, Dr FitzGerald could count on solid support from the 
Labour minister with whom he had enjoyed good personal relations from the time 
Keating entered the dáil in 1969.
82
 More telling for this study was Keating’s active 
membership in the 1940s of T.C.D.’s communist student group, the Promethean Society. 
He was listed as the first speaker in a notice for the society’s First Lenin School series 
with a paper entitled The  foundations of Leninism.
83
  The notice specifically requested 
members to ‘please read the work’, and his paper’s title appears to refer to a series of 
lectures of the same designation that had been delivered by Stalin at the Sverdlov 
University in 1924.
84
 Keating signed, as chairman, the minutes of the society’s February 
1949 meetings,
85
  and he was listed as a member of the Irish Workers’ Party (I.W.P.) as 
late as 1965.’86 However, he was anxious to move on, as Noel Browne rather caustically 
put it in his autobiography: ‘Justin, having sown his political wild oats in the 
Communist Party, now wished to “repent” and find his way into the Labour party.’87 
Notwithstanding such observations on the evolution of Keating’s political career in the 
labour movement, the combination of his responsibilities as minister for industry and 
commerce and his familiarity with the Soviet Union suggested that his backing for Dr 
FitzGerald’s proposal was solid. 
Dr FitzGerald also stated in his memorandum that the ministers for justice and 
finance, Ritchie Ryan and Patrick Cooney 
88
 – both Fíne Gael – ‘will make their views 
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known at the government meeting.’89 While this does not confirm that he had secured 
their support in advance, it seems to be an indication that they were not strongly against 
the measure. Yet Ryan had baggage to shed: in the 1972 dáil debate on Fianna Fáil’s 
intention to establish diplomatic relations, he as Fíne Gael foreign affairs spokesman 
deplored ‘the suggestion… that mother Ireland should suckle the Russian bear as a 
contribution to world détente.
90 
As minister for justice with responsibility for the gardaí 
and security issues at the embassy, Cooney’s support would undermine Donegan’s 
security-focused position.  
Of the remaining cabinet members, four were Labour party ministers, Dr 
O’Brien, Michael O’Leary, James Tully and the tánaiste, Brendan Corish. 
Unfortunately, Dr O’Brien fails to mention this debate in his 1988 autobiography.91 But 
as discussed above, Dr O’Brien – more than anyone else in the cabinet – had firsthand 
experience of the Soviet Union, directly with Soviet diplomats at the U.N. While this 
study is conscious of O’Brien’s political drift towards more conservative political 
positions, he might be expected to have an understanding of the practical need for 
Ireland to have relations with a major world power. Further, on an intellectual level his 
familiarity with the Russian language would at least be to the back of his mind. He and 
the poet, Máire MacEntee, had taken classes in the Russian language in the school run 
by White Russians in the County Louth village of Collon in the 1950s,
92
  and was still 
using Russian (in part) when writing home from the Congo (where he had been the 
U.N.’s special representative in the breakaway province of Katanga in 1961): ‘The only 
other sources of any significance available to me for the period of my stay in Katanga 
are the letters – written, mainly for security reasons, in Gaelic sprinkled with Russian – 
which I sent to Máire MacEntee, now my wife’.93 
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Brendan Corish’s support, as tánaiste and leader of the Labour Party, would 
have had a strong influence on Labour ministers. Corish, a T.D. for the Wexford 
constituency from 1945 and leader of the party from 1960, had held ministerial offices 
in the two inter-party governments of 1948-51 and 1954-7. He had described himself as 
‘a Catholic first, an Irishman second and a socialist third’ and is recorded as a probable 
member of the Knights of Columbanus, the Catholic secret society whose membership 
was confined to men of influence in Irish society.
94
 Nevertheless, under his leadership 
Labour responded to the left-wing mood of the 1960s, as reflected in the catchphrase 
‘sound man Brendan: no coalition’ (referring to his initial refusal to countenance an 
alliance with Fíne Gael), and the prophesy contained in his address to the party’s annual 
conference in 1967 that ‘the seventies shall be socialist’.95 As this more radical stance 
did not bring immediate electoral rewards for Labour in the 1969 general elections, he 
pragmatically turned the party towards coalition and into government with Fíne Gael. It 
seems unlikely that he opposed Dr FitzGerald’s pragmatic reasoning. His colleague 
James Tully, minister for local government and T.D. for the Meath constituency, was 
considered to have been one of the most conservative Labour T.D.s in the dáil, and was 
sceptical of the left-wing trend in the party in the 1960s. At the annual conference of the 
party in 1970 he is said to have derided some of those on the left as being ‘commies’ 
and ‘smart-alecs. . . with sweat dripping on to their schoolbooks who talk about the 
workers of this country’.96 However, as a trade union organiser (with the Federation of 
Rural Workers) and long-time Labour man it seems unlikely he would not have 
followed his leader’s lead. In some contrast, however, there is clear evidence that the 
remaining Labour minister, Michael O’Leary, minister for labour and then a rising star 
in the Labour party, was supportive of the proposal to establish relations with the Soviet 
Union.  He had made his views on the matter known in a dáil debate on foreign affairs 
in 1972:   
What danger does this [relations with the Soviet Union] hold? What temptation 
is there? What approval would it entail of the social system in the Soviet Union? 
Having diplomatic relations with a country does not convey that one approves of 
the social system of the country involved. Nobody would suggest that the Soviet 
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Union's record in freedom operations is to be admired. Let us not forget 
Budapest or Czechoslovakia. That does not get away from the fact that the 
Soviet Union is a great world power with every bit as much legitimacy to be 
regarded as a world power as the U.S. It does not turn us all into young pioneer 
communists to suggest that we should have diplomatic relations with the Soviet 
Union…It is ludicrous that we should be entering the E.E.C. without having 
such diplomatic relations, when every other country in the E.E.C. has diplomatic 
relations with eastern European countries.
97
  
O’Leary was regarded as eager to become an equal of his fellow ministers.98 
After all, this new administration was widely touted as a ‘government of all the talents’ 
with ministers FitzGerald, O’Brien and Keating, in particular, considered as intellectual 
luminaries of international experience and reputation.  Not for them to keep Ireland in a 
diplomatic backwoods! Even so, there remained outstanding the crucial position of 
Taoiseach Liam Cosgrave.  He personified the traditional roots of Fíne Gael, being the 
son of W.T. Cosgrave, the first president of the executive council of the Irish Free State 
from 1922 to 1932. The Cosgraves were often associated with the most conservative 
and anti-communist elements in the party. As discussed in chapter one, Cosgrave had 
demonstrated his commitment to anti-communism by enshrining it in his three 
principles before the United Nations. Later, he was to demonstrate more subtlety by 
shifting somewhat to the centre in support of the ‘just society’ initiative within his party, 
sponsored by Declan Costello. Cosgrave said in his address to the 1964 Fíne Gael árd 
fheis:  
It is a well-known maxim that for a party to secure and retain public support it 
should be slightly left of centre.  This does not mean any doctrinaire socialistic 
approach to the problem of our time. I believe we must be ever alive to the need 
for seeking new approaches and new means to solve our problems…In this way 
we can still forever the haunting spectre of a Tory ghost which is at times 
attributed to some who make up the party but is in fact unrepresentative of the 
vast majority.
99
      
On the other hand, Cosgrave could act unpredictably. A year after his cabinet 
agreed to establish relations with the U.S.S.R., he was to demonstrate in a bizarre 
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manner how he could ignore the majority decision of his own cabinet. He crossed the 
floor of the dáil to join with the opposition in a ‘free vote’ to defeat his own 
government’s bill on the control of the importation, sale and manufacture of 
contraceptives for married couples only – a modest attempt to open up access to birth 
control devices.
100
  His fellow Dún Laoghaire constituency T.D., Barry Desmond, said 
of Cosgrave’s views on this matter: ‘Liam accepted without question the pope’s 
teaching on issues such as contraception and divorce’. 101  However, it appears that 
Cosgrave’s dedication to rigid Catholic values on family planning was to prove stronger 
than any lingering antipathy to connections with the atheistic Soviet Union. Dr 
FitzGerald was presenting him with a low-key, long expected, and as described by 
Marcus Wheeler ‘a logical and non-controversial tidying up operation on the 
international scene’. 102   Finally, faced with a coalition of pro-business and E.E.C. 
attitudes, with the political realities of cross-party support around his cabinet table, the 
lack of any coherent public outcry, and Fianna Fáil’s previous commitment in principle, 
it appears that Cosgrave chose to join his fellow conservative and Christian Democrat 
leaders throughout Europe and accept Soviet diplomatic relations. In the end the 
decision was made without any undue fuss by the cabinet on 29 June in its council 
chamber at a meeting of just one hour twenty minutes duration, and with only eleven of 
the fifteen ministers present.
103
 Either by accident or design, the absentees included 
Justin Keating and Ritchie Ryan – two ministers that this study has identified as being 
to the fore on either side of the debate. In this way, the long delayed crossing of the 
Irish-Soviet Rubicon proved to be plain sailing. 
The required arrangements and protocols took place in swift succession. Dr 
FitzGerald went to his meeting with Andrei Gromyko at Helsinki and said on Irish radio 
that the two had agreed to settle the details of the embassies at the U.N. in the 
autumn;
104
 and E.E.C. ambassadors in Copenhagen were also informed by the Irish 
Ambassador Waldron.
105
 Communist protocols were also attended to when a delegation 
from the C.P.I., comprising Michael O’Riordan, and Andy Barr and Betty Sinclair of 
Belfast, was received by officials of the C.P.S.U., including a candidate member of the 
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politburo.
106
 An official communiqué on the latter meeting was published in the Soviet 
‘central press’ detailing the conviction that diplomatic relations would lead to mutually 
advantageous commercial, economic and cultural cooperation. It went on to reveal that 
the discussion included the struggle for a democratic solution to the Northern Ireland 
question; concerns about Irish membership of the E.E.C; and the need for ‘further 
strengthening of connections between the communist parties of the two states.
107
 All 
that now remained was for Dr FitzGerald to proceed to Helsinki (and later to New 
York) to negotiate and finalise the modalities with Andrei Gromyko.  
Gromyko was often negatively referred to in western circles as ‘Mr Nyet’ (No) 
for his steadfast refusal to accede to western diplomatic approaches, and for his 
allegedly staid personality. The Soviet foreign minister first came to prominence as 
ambassador to the U.S. in 1943. He participated in the subsequent Allied wartime 
conferences at Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta, where he was regarded as ‘one of the rising 
stars of the foreign commissariat’.108 This brought him into close contact with Joseph 
Stalin, and he observed the Soviet leader’s style of negotiating with western leaders at 
close quarters. No doubt he absorbed the kind of advice that Stalin offered to Andrija 
Hebrang, a Yugoslav communist leader, when they met in 1945 for consultations on 
post-war plans for Europe:  
In relation to bourgeois politicians you have to be careful. They are...very 
touchy and vindictive. You have to keep a handle on your emotions; if emotions 
lead – you lose. Lenin did not think it would be possible to ally with one wing of 
the bourgeoisie and fight with the other. But we managed it; we are not led by 
emotion but by reason, analysis and calculation.
109
  
Further, Ambassador Brennan had commented in a political report to the Department of 
Foreign Affairs on Gromyko’s ability, as described to him by a West German diplomat: 
‘Never once throughout the various discussions did he seek the aid of any 
documentation, even on the most detailed points. He did it all right out of his head.’110  
Nevertheless, Dr Fitzgerald – no slouch himself when it came to calculation or 
analysis – seems to have had no difficulty in coming to terms with the Soviet minister. 
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The outcome of their negotiations for the number of Soviet citizens to be employed at 
the embassy to Dublin was later reported to the dáil by Dr FitzGerald, as follows: 
The position is that there are five diplomatic officers amongst the seventeen [the 
agreed total number]. That is, I think, no more than Nigeria has, or Japan and 
less than Australia. The remaining staff is engaged on other activities in the 
embassy, as is normal in embassies where there are diplomatic staff, secretarial 
staff, chauffeurs and so on.
111
 
 The British authorities had been advised much earlier on these and other restrictions. 
They had come to accept that the exchange of embassies was now all but a fait accompli, 
and concentrated their representations on security matters, with an active interest from 
10 Downing Street.
112
 Later F.C.O. correspondence indicated that so effective was the 
line of communication established between K. C. Thom at the British embassy in 
Dublin and Brendan Nolan in the Irish D.F.A. that the British could conclude: ‘the 
arrangements agreed between the Irish and Russians...do not appear to conflict with our 
own interests... [regarding travel] we think that the Irish have dealt very fairly with our 
interests.’113 At the same time, London was keen to continue to get the maximum from 
the helpful Irish official: ‘you should point out to Nolan that it should be made clear to 
the Russians that the two days prior notification [on travel of Soviet officials to Britain] 
should be two working days...and say to Nolan...[that it would be desirable] if the Irish 
could agree to liaise with our security authorities before giving a visa to a Soviet 
national.’114  
The final piece in the diplomatic jigsaw was slotted into place on 29 September 
1973 when FitzGerald and Gromyko signed and issued a joint communiqué at the 
United Nations in New York confirming agreement to exchange diplomatic missions, 
and announced that the ambassadors were expected to be in place in Dublin and 
Moscow by early 1974.
115
 The announcement caused a brief flurry in the Irish 
newspapers, the most prominent being a front page report in the Sunday Independent 
that characterised it as ‘an historic diplomatic agreement’.116 However, Wheeler has 
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argued that the accord ‘excited little notice; it has long been expected’.117 Wheeler 
further pointed to Dr FitzGerald’s failure to mention specifically Ireland’s newest 
diplomatic partner when he addressed a gathering of American academics two days 
after signing the communiqué. He reported FitzGerald as only making an oblique 
reference, as he stated Ireland stood at ‘what can be seen as the opening of a new cycle 
in our foreign relations’.118  This coyness is in some contrast to an extensive article 
carried in Izvestia, released by the presidium of the supreme soviet of the U.S.S.R., on 
19 October. The following extracts distil the thrust of the Soviet establishment’s view of 
its latest diplomatic associate: 
The government of Ireland, making its foreign-political positions more active, is 
displaying...considerable interest in cooperation with the socialist countries, 
and, ...[their] stable markets.   Ireland had joined all international treaties on the 
limitation of the arms race...it comes out against the disgraceful system of 
apartheid and racist regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia, and for the abolition 
of colonialism... for the strengthening of the U. N. The establishment of 
diplomatic relations...and mutually advantageous trade, economic and cultural 
cooperation...between them meet the spirit of the times and the interests of both 
states’ peoples.119 
So, with all parties finally content with arrangements it was over to the Irish and Soviet 
diplomatic corps to locate and commission their new embassies.  
 
The Irish embassy to Moscow 
A selection process within the D.F.A. chose as Ireland’s first ambassador to the Soviet 
Union a forty-eight year old career diplomat, Dr Edward (Ned) J. Brennan (1926-
2012).
120
 Brennan’s father had been an active member of the I.R.B. throughout the War 
of Independence, and his premature death in 1926 left his widow, Nora, to raise two 
young children and to run the family grocery shop on Dorset Street, Dublin. The young 
Edward, also born in 1926, attended the nearby all-Irish secondary school run by the 
Christian Brothers, Coláiste Mhuire, on Parnell Square, and he subsequently graduated 
from U.C.D. with a degree in law. In his teens he had met a Russian refugee through the 
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Red Cross in Dublin who encouraged in him an interest in the Russian language and 
literature.
121
 Knowledge of languages and law proved to be a winning combination for 
Brennan, and when he achieved a top-ranking outcome at the civil service entrance 
examination he was rewarded with a highly prized appointment to the diplomatic 
service in 1949. His first posting was to the Irish consulate at Chicago, where he met 
and married Marie Therese Lally, a third generation Irish-American. He also found time 
to study and achieve a doctorate in philosophy from the University of Chicago, under 
the supervision of the international relations theorist, Hans Morgenthau.  Further 
diplomatic appointments and promotions were to follow: to the Federal Republic of 
Germany at Hamburg in 1962; to London in 1967; and to Brussels in 1968 where he 
served, first as counsellor, and then as minister plenipotentiary at Ireland’s mission to 
the E.E.C.
122
 A measure both of Dr Brennan’s diplomatic standing on the eve of his 
departure to Moscow, and of the importance accorded to Dr Brennan’s appointment, can 
be gauged from the press conference held at Iveagh House, the headquarters of the 
Department of Foreign Affairs, to officially announce his appointment:  it was revealed 
that he had ‘played an important part in Ireland’s E.E.C. entry negotiations, being 
involved in the detailed work of drafting the accession treaty and documents’; and that 
he was introduced to the press by both Dr. FitzGerald and Taoiseach Liam Cosgrave.
123
  
  Despite the efforts of the first secretary, James Sharkey, to prepare the way for 
the new ambassador in Moscow, when Dr Brennan, his wife and three of their children 
arrived an embassy building had not yet been identified by the Soviet authorities.  The 
embassy contingent operated out of rooms at the Hotel National, in the centre of 
Moscow at the intersection of Mokhovaya and Tverskaya streets overlooking the 
Kremlin, for eight months. This temporary accommodation was arranged by the Soviet 
tourist agency, Intourist. None of the premises shown to the ambassador and his wife 
were considered suitable by them, and it was only when Ambassador Brennan ‘told our 
hosts that we would not therefore be establishing an embassy’,124 that a five-storey 
building at Grokholski Pereoluk 5, near a main thoroughfare of Prospect Mir, was made 
available. This was arranged by the Office of Services to the Diplomatic Corps at the 
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., commonly known from its Russian 
abbreviation, the U.P.D.K. In contrast to the Soviet embassy premises and residency in 
Dublin, which had been bought outright, the Irish embassy in Moscow was leased from 
the U.P.D.K. 
125
 Embassy buildings in 1970s Moscow tended to be clustered around 
various parts of the city, depending upon the size and status of each country. The Irish 
were settled next door to another building that was soon to house the Portuguese 
embassy, the last of the western European countries to arrive. While the building was 
considered adequate for the requirements of the Irish, both for embassy business and as 
a residence for the ambassador and family,
126
 it required considerable refurbishment. 
Architectural and project management expertise was provided by the O.P.W., the Irish 
state’s Office of Public Works. By 1975 the embassy consisted of the ambassador, first 
and third secretaries, an administrative attaché, two Irish secretaries, a commercial 
attaché, and some locally-supplied staff.   
  The Irish, however, were not without willing advisors in the setting up of their 
ambassadorial home in Moscow. Various items of correspondence from this period, 
between the British embassies to Dublin and Moscow and the F.C.O. in London, 
indicate that the Irish both sought and received the benefit of British expertise. The 
following extract from an internal F.C.O. memorandum makes Irish requests and British 
motivations clear from the outset: 
1. The Irish government will soon be setting up an embassy in Moscow. 
We have in various matters tried to be as helpful and forthcoming as we 
can to the Irish in the hope that cooperation will be of benefit both to 
ourselves and to the Irish.  
2. We have recently been asked by the Irish embassy in London for advice 
on the more practical problems of life in Moscow. We should like to 
show the Irish a copy of our Moscow post report with perhaps a copy of 
the wives guide. We did something similar for the Spaniards before they 
set up an embassy in Moscow.
127
 
 
  Sir John Peck’s replacement at the British embassy in Dublin, Sir Arthur 
Galsworthy, requested that the Irish be given details of a property services agency 
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familiar with the ‘bread and butter problems of building and maintenance work in 
Moscow’. Details of such a company, based at Croydon, England, were duly dispatched 
to Noel de Chenu, a senior architect with the Irish O.P.W.
128
 Galsworthy’s request was 
also careful to state that ‘there are no security implications, in the present request at 
least’.129 Galsworthy further advised London that Brendan Nolan (‘the nearest thing to a 
planner in the Irish D.F.A.... he is cooperative’) had taken charge of the Moscow 
operation, and he wanted to meet someone in the British embassy for a briefing.
130
 As it 
transpired, any fears that Galsworthy and his F.C.O. colleagues may have had around 
the new Irish embassy in Moscow were to come to nought: a close relationship was to 
develop between Ambassador Brennan and the Dublin-born British ambassador to 
Moscow, Sir Terence W. Garvey. This was confirmed in 1975 by Ambassador Brennan 
when he wrote to Dublin to advise of Ambassador Garvey’s impending retirement, 
stating: ‘both he and his wife, Rosemary, were very kind to us here during the difficult 
months of setting up the embassy and they were very well disposed towards Ireland.’131 
Dr Brennan proceeded to record that the Garveys were to retire to Dadreen, County 
Mayo,
132
 and he suggested to the D.F.A. that it draw upon former Ambassador Garvey’s 
expertise on the Soviet Union ‘within the framework of the new international relations 
committee which has been set up under the auspices of the Royal Irish Academy (R.I.A.) 
in Dublin.’ 133  Accordingly, it can be seen that close organisational, social and 
international relations bonds were established between the two embassies from the 
outset. 
 Nevertheless, British supportive advice only went so far. Local tradesmen were 
supplied through the U.P.D.K, as were the front hall receptionist and the ambassador’s 
chauffeur. It was a diplomatic requirement that the Irish tricolour be flown on the 
embassy car – a Mercedes – owned by the Irish government. The ambassador, however, 
was allowed recruit his own butler and cook, and a Spanish couple attended to these 
needs. Ambassador Brennan presented his credentials to President Nikolai Viktorovich 
                                                          
128
 Cook to Thom, 29 Oct. 1973 (T.N.A., F.C.O. 87/183 WLE3/303/1) and Galsworthy to F.C.O., 23 Oct. 
1973 (T.N.A., F.C.O. 87/183/1, WLE3/303/1). Galsworthy succeeded Sir John Peck in July 1973. 
129
 Galsworthy to F.C.O., 23 Oct. 1973 (T.N.A., F.C.O. 87/183/1, WLE3/303/1). 
130
 Galsworthy to F.C.O., 5 Nov. 1973 (T.N.A., F.C.O. 87/183/1, WLE3/303/1). 
131
 Ambassador Brennan to P.J. Keating, 22 Dec. 1975 in Correspondence from Moscow, 1976-80 
(N.A.I., D.F.A., 2008/79/1476).  
132
 The Garveys lived in their retirement home at Dadreen until their deaths:  Terence (1986) and 
Rosemary (2011). See Rosemary Garvey obituary, Irish Times, 20 Aug. 2011.  
133
 Brennan to Keating, 22 Dec. 1975 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 2008/79/1476). 
92 
 
Podgorny, head of state and chairman of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet, on 25 
June 1974.
134
 The ambassador recalled that the Soviets first wanted him to present his 
credentials to a deputy president, but he refused ‘as this was our first embassy’.135 Soon, 
the circuit of embassy receptions and close contacts with staff in other western 
embassies became established routine. St. Patrick’s Day was integrated onto the 
extensive list of national day celebrations that were honoured by the Soviet ministry of 
foreign affairs.  
Ambassador Brennan’s son recalls that his father, because he was a Russian 
speaker and scholar, won a special respect from Soviet diplomats, drivers and other 
service personnel. It was further noted that he was an avid reader of the leading Soviet 
newspapers. (As will be discussed in chapter four, there was a utilitarian purpose for Dr 
Brennan’s attention to the Soviet media: his compilation of political reports for Dublin.) 
Ambassador Brennan’s son also recalled that the Irish were thought to be subject to and 
suspicious of ongoing surveillance, in common with all western embassies. 
Consequently, all Irish staff and family members were forbidden to develop close 
relations with Soviet citizens. It was the view of embassy staff that the clustering of 
embassies assisted Soviet security services in their monitoring duties. Despite this, 
leeway was shown to the Brennan children who developed friendships with 
neighbouring children.
136
  
 Finally, Barry Brennan’s recollections of his family’s time in Moscow included 
his father’s friendship with and high regard for the ‘number two’ at the U.S. embassy, 
Jack F. Matlock.
137
 Like Dr Brennan, Matlock was a Russian scholar and a keen 
observer of Soviet society.  
Irish trade mission at Moscow 
The Moscow embassy also housed the Irish trade mission to the Soviet Union, which 
was represented by Reginald ‘Reggie’ J. McHugh of Córas Tráchtála (C.T.T., the Irish 
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export board).
138
 Born in 1945 and educated by the Christian Brothers in Athy, County 
Kildare, McHugh graduated with a degree in engineering from U.C.D. in 1967. After 
gaining three years’ experience in the engineering trade in England and Ireland, he 
began his employment with C.T.T. in 1970.  He was first posted to C.T.T.’s Vienna 
office. Vienna was then the business gateway and a centre for links to COMECON, the 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance established in 1949 to promote cooperation 
between the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. For the next four years until 
he took up the Moscow position, McHugh travelled into many of these states learning 
the unique skills of promoting Irish exports to a myriad of centralised state purchasing 
institutions. One of the abiding recollections of his apprenticeship was how he struggled 
with the logistical difficulties: paperwork and customs clearance at airports, poor hotels, 
internal travel, currency purchase, and especially with his sense of insecurity relating to 
officialdom in these countries.  
Prior to accepting the Moscow job, he was careful to ensure that he had secured 
diplomatic accreditation, which meant not just swifter passage through airports, but 
more importantly that he would be afforded a status of ‘credibility with business 
organisations, and protection from the vagaries of the Soviet legal system’. McHugh 
was allocated a double apartment in a complex dedicated to diplomatic staffs for 
himself and his wife, their two young children, and an au pair. Diplomatic status also 
qualified McHugh for a private car, a Zhiguli (better known in Ireland as a a Lada), and 
access to diplomatic shops where he could purchase a selection of products with special 
coupons purchased from a foreign trade bank with western currencies. He first attended 
full-time Russian classes in a London language school for two and a half months – ‘not 
sufficient time to become anywhere near fluent’, he felt.  
McHugh was supplied secretarial support by the U.P.D.K. but his first secretary, 
who had previously been assigned to Ambassador Brennan, proved not suitable and she 
was replaced by an ‘excellent’ woman, Elena Schidlovskaya. Schidlovskaya spoke good 
English and travelled with him to business meetings for translation purposes. McHugh 
soon discovered the useful English language business directory, Information Moscow, 
which was produced bi-annually to provide members of the foreign diplomatic and 
commercial corps with comprehensive listings of services and contact details. (He 
                                                          
138
 This following section is informed by, and all quotations cited are taken from the author’s interviews 
with Reginald ‘Reggie’ J. McHugh of Drogheda (3 Nov. 2010 and 14 Aug. 2013). 
94 
 
kindly loaned his souvenir copy to this writer).  McHugh found telephone calls to be 
slow, especially to Ireland. The embassy had telex machines, and the use of a 
diplomatic bag that was dispatched each Friday through Scandinavian Airlines flights 
out of Moscow. These services were considered by McHugh and colleagues to be secure, 
but it was generally believed among western missions to Moscow that U.P.D.K. staff 
members were passing on information to Soviet security forces. However, McHugh 
later qualified this impression when he met his former secretary in Moscow, after the 
ending of the Soviet Union in 1991. Madam Schidlovskaya assured McHugh that she 
had not informed any Soviet authority of the affairs of the Irish embassy, and McHugh 
was convinced by that assertion.   
            HcHugh’s Soviet counterparts were at the Irish desk in the ministry of foreign 
trade, and he recalls that his chief contact there was Vladimir Checklin. But Irish export 
orders were secured at another level, from various foreign trade organisations, which 
had the responsibility for placing orders with western companies on behalf of Soviet 
enterprises. McHugh recalled two examples: he facilitated Donnelly Mirrors of Naas, 
County Kildare, to supply a range of mirrors for Soviet motor manufacturers through 
the offices of Avtopromimport, importers of ‘automotive equipment’;139 and Janelle of 
Finglas, Dublin, to supply a consignment of raincoats to Soviet retail outlets through 
Raznoexport, importers of ‘light industrial and consumer goods.’140 However, McHugh 
discovered that such import companies could be a barrier to developing new business 
opportunities, and he enjoyed some success in developing direct contacts with 
manufacturers and retailers and linking them with Irish exporters. An important part of 
the process was for him to meet representatives of Irish companies at Moscow airport, 
assist them with clearance, and accompany them to Soviet customers and importers.  
McHugh further indicated in the interviews that Irish commercial representatives 
cooperated in a degree of economic intelligence gathering and sharing with their 
counterparts from the E.E.C. They met in secure rooms, often in the British or West 
German embassies on a monthly basis. They shared and discussed information, 
compiled aggregate reports, and having submitted them for approval to their 
ambassadors, the reports were sent to Brussels. McHugh recalled that Ambassador 
Brennan took these meetings very seriously, which McHugh felt was largely prompted 
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by Brennan’s involvement in Irish entry talks to the E.E.C. Chairmanship of meetings 
was rotated in line with the E.E.C. presidency. During the Irish presidency in 1975, 
McHugh facilitated the group’s compilation of a study on the Soviet merchant marine.  
To his dismay, McHugh recalled that when reading an issue of the Economist (which he 
received through the post by subscription), he discovered that it contained ‘verbatim’ 
some of the information on Soviet ports that he had included in the above confidential 
report.  Little wonder, then, that he told this writer that Brussels was ‘like a sieve’.  
McHugh also recalled the travel restrictions placed upon all foreign diplomats in 
the U.S.S.R. Diplomats were obliged, if they wished to travel outside of the Moscow 
oblast (c. 100 kilometre radius), to officially inform the ministry of foreign affairs in 
writing in advance of their travel plans. Diplomats’ cars also displayed a unique foreign 
car registration code, which in the case of Ireland was number thirty-seven.
141
 
Reggie McHugh headed up the trade mission for three years, until July 1977. 
With regard to his relationship with the ambassador, he felt that Dr Brennan was a 
‘talented and capable ambassador, but sometimes had poor people skills’. This may 
have reflected a degree of demarcation tension between the roles of diplomatic and 
trade mission staffs. In this regard it is revealing to note the following reply from 
Ambassador Brennan to this writer’s query on the trade mission in his embassy: ‘the 
Córas Tráchtála officer worked independently of me’.142  
Finally, McHugh recalled that one of the striking events of his tenure in Moscow 
was the occasion on which Ambassador Brennan led an Irish delegation of officials in 
1974 from the departments of foreign affairs and industry and commerce (including 
Reggie McHugh) to inform the Soviet foreign trade ministry that Ireland could no 
longer implement the 1973 Irish-Soviet trade agreement, which had taken so many 
years to negotiate. This had arisen from the E.E.C.’s Common Commercial Policy 
(C.C.P.) that obliged member states to renounce, by 1975, agreements with third-party 
countries in favour of E.E.C.-approved agreements. McHugh recalled that a senior 
Soviet ministry official, Manzhulo, reacted angrily to being so informed, and retorted: 
‘you Irish are more Catholic than the pope’. However, effective diplomacy found a way 
around this impasse, as indicated by former Ambassador Brennan: 
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as it was smoothed over by the end of 1974 by an exchange of aide-mémoires, 
which provided that the ‘most favoured nation’ [M.F.N.] clauses of the trade 
agreement, which were in fact the most important part, would remain in force.
143
  
The ambassador’s assertion is supported by Míchéal Ó Corcora’s thesis, which affirms: 
‘reciprocal M.F.N. treatment remained as effective after 1975 as it had been when 
embodied in the 1973 agreement’. 144  Furthermore, a replacement agreement within 
E.E.C. rules was signed during a visit by Dr FitzGerald to Moscow in 1976. 
Accordingly, it is to that week-long visit – perhaps the foremost public and diplomatic 
event in Irish-Soviet relations during the subject period – that this study now turns. 
Garret FitzGerald’s visit to the Soviet Union, 1976 
Preparations for Garret FitzGerald’s official visit to the Soviet Union in 1976 – 
the first by an Irish foreign minister – began in earnest at a meeting between the 
minister and Ambassador Kaplin in the Stephen’s Green Club, Dublin. Noel Dorr, then 
the assistant secretary of the D.F.A., accompanied his minister and recorded details of 
the meeting.
145
  Among the items discussed were headline meetings with President 
Podgorny, Foreign Minister Gromyko (for the third time in three years) and officials at 
the Soviet ministry of foreign trade. It also emerged that the itinerary would comprise a 
round trip of the cities of Moscow-Tbilisi-Leningrad-Moscow, and that a joint 
communiqué would be issued at the end of the visit. 
The record of a follow-up meeting between Ambassador Kaplin and Noel Dorr 
indicated the aims of the two sides for the visit. Dr FitzGerald’s priority was to achieve 
a commitment to rectify the trade imbalance between the two countries, which had 
favoured the Soviets ever since formal relations had been established. He also wished to 
broach the subject of a number of human rights cases in the Soviet Union, which had 
been brought to his attention by members of the Irish public. For the Soviet side, Dorr’s 
account indicated they wished to raise the matter of Comecon/E.E.C. trade relations – 
the contentious issue of the relationship between the economic cooperation body of the 
Soviet Union and its socialist allies in eastern Europe, with the E.E.C. (This matter is 
discussed in more detail in chapter five of this study). The Soviets also wished to arrive 
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at a joint understanding of the status of détente in Europe, to include a mention of 
mutual ‘cooperation on the principles of peaceful coexistence of states with different 
social systems.’146 The term ‘principles of peaceful coexistence’ was a formulation of 
the Soviets’ view of détente, as is also discussed in some detail in chapter five. Suffice 
it to say here that under the Irish presidency in June of the previous year, representatives 
of member states of the E.E.C. had agreed that each member would avoid inclusion of 
that term when formulating future bilateral communiqués with the Soviet Union. On 
this note, when the embassy in Moscow was updated on the details of the visit and the 
communiqué, Ambassador Brennan was advised by D.F.A. headquarters:  
We will, of course, have to watch for particular formulations or phrases which 
might constitute a ‘trap’ in that we might unknowingly accept something with a 
particular significance which we did not intend.
147
 
The two sides entered into a back-and-forth process between the Soviet foreign ministry, 
the D.F.A., and Ambassador Brennan to agree the communiqué. The Soviet first draft 
was closely considered, and many counter proposals were put forward by the Irish.
148
 
The Irish were determined that mention of the trade imbalance and of a Soviet 
commitment to rectify same would be written into the communiqué. However, 
Ambassador Brennan counselled a more practical course on this topic: ‘A consideration 
not to be lost sight of is that our aim is not to get the Soviets to confess their sins in 
public but to get some sort of assurance which can be invoked for the future, e.g. at a 
cooperation committee meeting.’ 149  With regard to a joint understanding on the 
international political climate, the D.F.A. indicated its aversion not only to the term 
‘peaceful coexistence’ but also for a preference for the term ‘relaxation of international 
tension’ in place of ‘détente’. And on the question of Comecon/E.E.C. relations, the 
Irish decided to adopt a cautious approach: ‘so as not to undermine community [E.E.C.] 
competence and negotiation stance, we should simply listen to what the other side has to 
say [with the] communiqué reflecting this.’150  
Alongside the behind-the-scenes negotiations, Irish commitment to a successful 
and high profile visit was indicated by the makeup of Dr FitzGerald’s visiting party.  
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The minister was joined by his wife, Joan (in spite of her aversion to air travel);
151
 Paul 
Keating, secretary of the D.F.A., and assistant secretaries Dorr and Heaslip; and a 
contingent of journalists from the national newspapers and R.T.É.  Trade interest in the 
visit was augmented by a letter to Dr FitzGerald from Pat Rabbitte of the I.T.G.W.U.’s 
national fishermen’s branch. Rabbitte enclosed a three-page proposal from his union’s 
research department to develop fish exports to the Soviet Union, which the report 
claimed would ‘help remedy the trade imbalance between our two countries and at the 
same time contribute to the development of the fishing industry in Ireland.’152 On the 
day of Dr FitzGerald’s departure, the Irish Times editorialised the visit as: ‘a sign both 
of Ireland’s enlarged horizons in terms of trade and foreign policy generally and a new 
reality which has replaced old inhibitions and postures.’ The same newspaper included a 
pullout four-page supplement, featuring articles and images of Soviet life, the state of 
play on trade relations, and an account from Mikhail Kuzin, chairman of the U.S.S.R.-
Ireland Society, on his society’s work to promote cultural connections between the two 
states. The supplement also featured an alluring article by journalist Maeve Binchy on a 
brief love affair that she had recently experienced in the Soviet Union. Entitled ‘A 
romantic interlude in Leningrad’, the article gave an early indication of a talent that was 
soon to lead to her career as Ireland’s best-selling novelist.153 
When the Irish party arrived in Moscow they were greeted by Deputy Foreign 
Minister Kamskov, and a delegation that included the trade official with responsibility 
for Irish trade, Vladimir Checklin.   The scene was captured in a front page photo in the 
Irish Press of Dr and Mrs FitzGerald in winter wear, beneath the headline ‘warm 
welcome in Moscow snow’.154 Dr FitzGerald later described in his memoir (1991) his 
discussions with President Podgorny and Gromyko as ‘fairly stilted and formal’,155 but 
the Irish Times reported at the time that the Podgorny meeting was ‘a long session 
mainly on Northern Ireland’.156 FitzGerald detailed Dublin’s view on the North, and the 
president raised the possibility of concluding an air agreement for reciprocal landing 
rights for Aeroflot and Aer Lingus, and a joint cultural agreement. Of his discussions 
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with the foreign minister, Dr FitzGerald detected that ‘behind the rhetoric’ Gromyko 
revealed the Soviets’ unhappiness with the Arab countries (in the aftermath of the Yom 
Kippur war of 1973) and their ‘unqualified support for Israel’s right to exist’. And again 
Gromyko could not resist another barb about the English: ‘I see that Joyce and Yeats 
and Shaw are all Irishmen. Why do you allow the English to steal your great writers?’157 
In the vein of such exchanges and in the context of Dr FitzGerald articulating Ireland’s 
foreign policy position for Gromyko, the following insight which Noel Dorr shared with 
this author is appropriate to record at this point. Mr Dorr recalled Gromyko’s caustic 
understanding of what FitzGerald had said: ‘you are not aligned, but not aligned with 
the non-aligned!’158 Finally, Dr FitzGerald recalled that at the end of the meeting he 
handed over a list of human rights cases to Gromyko.  FitzGerald does not include 
details of cases involved, but he noted Gromyko’s reaction: ‘He accepted them without 
demur – or commitment.’159  
 Of central importance to the visit were the trade talks, and the signing of the 
agreement between the government of Ireland and the government of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics on the development of economic, industrial, scientific and 
technological co-operation in Moscow on 16 December. The respective delegations 
were led by Dr FitzGerald and acting Soviet foreign trade minister Kuzmin. According 
to typed notes relating to the discussions, the opening exchanges were candid and 
businesslike. The Irish minister made it plain that he was ‘frankly disappointed at 
growth of exports to the Soviet Union’ and that for the current year they would only 
amount to £1 million of worldwide Irish exports totalling £800-900 million.
160
 In 
response Minister Kuzmin began by quoting a Russian maxim ‘nobody can sell produce 
not available, nobody can buy produce not needed’, and while saying that his side ‘did 
not bear grudges’, he indicated that ‘abrogation’ of the 1973 agreement by Ireland had 
disturbed activities.
161
 Nevertheless, he concurred with Dr FitzGerald that the new 
cooperation agreement offered the possibility of improvement, saying: 
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We on the Soviet side would like to assure you that we have a strong desire to 
find new ways to cooperate with Ireland; but what is required are active efforts 
on both sides and a painstaking search for our mutual interests.
162
 
As an indication of his bona fides, Mr Kuzmin stated he was immediately willing to 
purchase 10,000 tons of Irish beef, subject to terms on price and finance. To conclude, 
Dr FitzGerald expressed his belief that Ireland had a range of suitable products for 
export, and ‘that if trade expands it is easier to defend a policy of relationships with the 
Soviet Union.’163   
The Soviets provided a special plane for the trip to Georgia where the Irish party 
enjoyed the scenery, meeting the Georgian people, and the state’s architecture. But it 
was on the onward flight from Tbilisi to Leningrad that a minor embarrassing incident 
occurred. As the plane crossed the Caucus the visitors were much taken by the views 
from the Sea of Azov to the Caspian. The interpreter, noting their interest, lent them a 
map. Dr FitzGerald recorded that one of his officials, conscious that the airline map was 
an accurate one (as opposed to the commonly held belief that most Soviet maps were 
inaccurate for security reasons), ‘slipped the map quietly into his briefcase’.164 In the 
event the interpreter was attentive and insisted upon its return. Surprisingly, in 
recounting the incident Dr FitzGerald failed to include any sense of disapproval or 
regret at his official’s undiplomatic action. 
In Leningrad the Irish ministerial party enjoyed the city’s cultural treasures with 
a night at the Kirov Ballet and a morning at the Hermitage in the Winter Palace, 
followed by a visit of respect to Piskarevskoye cemetery where half a million victims of 
the Nazi siege of the city from 1941 to 1944 lay buried in mass graves. On the final 
night of the visit Dr FitzGerald succeeded in impressing and charming his hosts at a 
reception given in his honour by the Leningrad City Soviet. In his after dinner speech he 
recalled that Peter the Great had been a great planner, and while noting that the 
departure time of the last train from Leningrad to Moscow at 23:55 was the same as in 
1914, the Soviets had succeeded in reducing its travel time by five-and-a- half hours. 
But if Dr FitzGerald was charming to his hosts, he employed an amount of sarcasm in 
his memoir by describing the Leningrad soviet as ‘presumably descended in apostolic 
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succession from the body that had launched the Bolshevik Revolution’165 and concluded 
his impressions of Soviet leadership and its ‘ruling elite’ in strident terms: 
We were put off by the rigidity of what seemed to be a hereditary caste system 
that had grown up as a result of the way in which untrammelled power had 
corrupted their society…the contempt that they spoke of ‘the common working 
people’ and it seemed as if the attitudes of the rulers of Tsarist Russia had been 
transferred to their successors two generations later.
166
  
Notwithstanding Dr FitzGerald’s personal observations published at a time when 
the Soviet Union was in the process of being dismantled, he had summed up the import 
of the occasion before his departure from the Soviet Union by informing the press that 
‘the visit had completed the process of normalisation of relations between Ireland and 
the Soviet Union’ and that the principal task now remaining was a commercial one of 
building upon the cooperation agreement. He was also careful to give his political 
assessment of the visit, and its relationship to Ireland’s membership of the E.E.C.: 
Ireland had to play her part in developing E.E.C. contacts with the Soviet Union, 
and...it was important that she make her own contribution to the formation of 
E.E.C. policy and not be entirely dependent upon the views and information of 
other member states.
167
 
In this context the minister briefed a meeting of E.E.C. ambassadors in Moscow 
before his departure for home,
168
 and following his return to Dublin there is evidence 
from British F.C.O. files that E.E.C. missions in Dublin were also briefed on the details 
of the Irish visit. A communication from the British embassy in Dublin states that an 
Irish official ‘covered the same ground as his minister did in the Moscow briefing’.169 
These briefings must be viewed in the context of a framework for ongoing political 
cooperation among member states of the E.E.C. (as is discussed in chapter five), and 
that Britain held the presidency of the E.E.C. for the first six months of 1977. The same 
item of communication stated that Dr FitzGerald had also given a more detailed account 
to John Hickman, a counsellor at the British diplomatic service, the ‘most interesting 
parts’ being:  
FitzGerald was struck by Gromyko’s relative flexibility on the Middle East...his 
comment on Palestinian participation in the [forthcoming international] 
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conference. On southern Africa...Gromyko explicitly recognised [that] the white 
population were indigenous and had a right to stay. This applied not only to 
South Africa but also to the whites in Rhodesia and Namibia.
170
 
It is the Irish-Soviet communiqué, released simultaneously in Moscow and Dublin on 
20 December, which stands on the record as the official reflection of the visit and of a 
closely considered expression of state relations as they stood on that date.  As is often 
the case in such documents, the communiqué confirmed that the talks had taken place in 
a ‘friendly atmosphere and in a spirit of mutual understanding’. But the integrity of the 
commitment to ‘continue to improve and expand the relations’ was given substance by 
the ratification during the visit of an agreement on economic, industrial, scientific and 
technological cooperation, which included the provision for an intergovernmental Irish-
U.S.S.R. joint commission to monitor trade achievements. Accordingly, from an Irish 
perspective, the commitment by the two sides to achieve a ‘better balance and structure 
of trade’ accorded with Dr FitzGerald’s main goal for the talks. Also, there were no 
references to Soviet ‘traps’ in relation to concepts of peaceful coexistence, or any 
mention of COMECON/E.E.C. relations. Finally, it is in highlighting those aspects of 
international affairs where the two states had cooperated in the past at the U.N. – 
principally in pursuit of world peace and disarmament – and in its resolve to oppose 
colonialism and apartheid in South Africa, that the communiqué resonated most 
eloquently.  
Finally, the official visit served to prompt Michael O’Riordan of the C.P.I. to 
write his booklet on Irish-Soviet relations.
171
 Having traced the revolutionary links 
between the Russian revolution and Irish independence, the booklet focused upon 
Soviet successes in uniting the different nationalities and ethnic groups of the U.S.S.R. 
O’Riordan contrasted this development with the disharmony of Northern Ireland, which 
continued to suffer from ‘years of British imperialist policies of “divide and rule”’.172 
Confident that the seeds of proletarian solidarity sown in poisonous times had survived, 
O’Riordan declared they were now ‘beginning to bloom into roses of Irish-Soviet 
friendship’. 173  The author was also sufficiently impressed by the symbolism of a 
separate Irish-Soviet friendship event in 1976 in Moscow – the celebration by the 
U.S.S.R.-Ireland Society of the sixtieth anniversary of the 1916 Easter  Rising –  to 
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assert that the commemoration ‘would have undoubtedly pleased Lenin and thrilled 
[James] Connolly.’174 
Moscow Summer Olympic Games  
          When asked to nominate the most memorable events in his mission to Moscow, 
former Ambassador Brennan replied: ‘The 1980 Summer Olympic Games were about 
the only stand-out issue.’175 The issue arose as a result of the military intervention in 
Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in support of the Democratic Republic in December 
1979. The Soviet action – which Eric Hobsbawm described as ‘military support for a 
friendly government in Afghanistan against American-backed and Pakistan-supplied 
guerrillas’176 – elicited an immediate U.S. response. As a retaliatory tactic, President 
Carter decided that unless Soviet forces were withdrawn within a month he would call 
for a worldwide boycott of the Olympic Games due to commence in Moscow in July 
1980. Accordingly, a battle of wills between the world’s two superpowers ensued, in 
which the International Olympic Committee (then under the chairmanship of Irishman, 
Lord Michael Killanin) and the countries of the world – both their governments and 
their national Olympic movements – were obliged to respond.  
The Irish government’s reaction was to officially condemn the Soviet action as 
an unjustifiable violation of the U.N. charter. Strong expressions of concern and 
disapproval were sent directly to the Soviet embassy in Dublin (where Ambassador 
Alexey Efremovich Nesterenko was to replace the late Ambassador Kaplin in February 
1980), and made jointly with fellow member states of the E.E.C. to the Soviet 
government. Immediately thereafter the Irish government came under sustained U.S. 
pressure to join in President Carter’s campaign. The first U.S. approach came in the 
form of a telegram that was erroneously directed to the president of Ireland, rather than 
the government. The telegram advised that President Carter had informed the United 
States Olympic Committee that he could not support American participation in Moscow, 
and concluded with the hope: ‘that you will urge your own Olympic committee to take 
similar action.’ 177  This was followed by a series of approaches from the U.S. 
ambassador to Ireland, William V. Shannon, to various government ministers, 
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commencing with Foreign Minister Brian Lenihan. The ambassador requested, in 
addition to support for the Olympic boycott, that Ireland take ‘certain steps’ to join in 
U.S. economic sanctions against the Soviet Union, including: 
Computer firms would not make up for shortfall due to the American ban; the 
proposed arrangement with Aeroflot at Shannon Airport might be 
postponed...and also the question of dairy products.
178
 
Minister Lenihan gave no commitment on any of these matters, and he advised 
Ambassador Shannon that his department would have to give consideration to legal and 
E.E.C. implications involved. In spite of Shannon’s suggestions, the day after that 
meeting, Noel McMahon, secretary of the department of tourism and transport, and 
Sergei Pavlov of the Soviet ministry of aviation, signed an air transport agreement 
between Ireland and the U.S.S.R. at Iveagh House, headquarters of the D.F.A. in 
Dublin.
179
 Undaunted, one week later Ambassador Shannon continued with his 
lobbying of the government at a meeting with Taoiseach Charles Haughey.  
The Irish government did not rush to accommodate the Americans, but instead 
took careful stock of the general international situation, western reactions, Irish interests, 
and – in particular – the current status of Irish-Soviet relations. Evidence for this is 
contained in a four-page document drawn up at senior level in the D.F.A., entitled 
‘Afghanistan crisis – suggested Irish reaction’. To begin, the document attempted to 
make sense of the Soviet action:  
It seems likely that [the Soviets] invaded Afghanistan because they believed that 
the situation there, where it has long been involved indirectly, was getting out of 
control, as it always has feared serious instability in a state on its borders. This 
does not justify the invasion but, if true, it means that the Soviet Union did not 
simply cynically decide to abandon détente policies but rather felt obliged to risk 
damaging detente because of its security needs.
180
  
And while the document conceded the difficulty of comprehending Soviet motives, it 
continued: 
It is not unfair to say privately that the Soviets may have felt that they were 
gaining little from détente...in view of certain American and western policies 
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over the past year or two to delay in ratifying Salt II [talks that had begun in 
1969 between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to restrict strategic armaments]; 
decision to modernise NATO weapons in Europe, etc.
181
    
Commenting that President Carter was anxious to act as a ‘tough-minded’ leader in his 
re-election year (he was being challenged by the Republican Party’s nominee for the 
1980 presidential election, Ronald Reagan), and that the U.S. was supported by ‘Prime 
Minister Thatcher’s disposal to take a hawk-like view of the Soviet Union’, the 
document was more anxious to take account of reactions from fellow E.E.C. 
governments. Set against the dichotomy of Ireland’s membership of the E.E.C. and its 
non-membership of NATO (the alliance formed by western countries thirty years earlier 
to specifically combat Soviet influence), the document grappled with the prospect of 
joining in a western campaign against the Soviet Union. That prospect was summed up 
as follows: 
The logic of our past attitude in even more difficult times (Second World War 
neutrality; decision to stay out of NATO) would suggest that we should now 
take a position distinct from that of our partners who are in NATO. But the 
difficulty is how to reconcile this with our general commitment to foreign policy 
coordination within the Nine,
182
 and our wish not to accentuate our differences 
from partners with whom we have many, and growing, interests in common.
183
 
At the same time, while a number of Ireland’s E.E.C. partners shared the U.S. /U.K. 
analysis, the document noted that some were apprehensive about the use of sport as a 
tactic in East-West political confrontations, and many were fearful that the gains of 
détente would be lost in a return to the Cold War. Yet, in the end the document 
predicted western powers would come out publicly with the U.S. for fear the Soviet 
Union would attempt to exploit divisions within western ranks. Finally, the document is 
notable for its inclusion of some element of a balance between condemnations of the 
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and lack of condemnations of similar actions 
undertaken by western powers within the past generation:   
The Vietnam War, Suez [where British, French and Israeli forces intervened to 
oppose Egypt’s nationalisation of the Suez canal in 1956]; France in the Central 
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African Republic in 1979; the U.S. in Cuba at the Bay of Pigs, etc., which we 
[Ireland] did not feel obliged to condemn openly or retaliate against.
184
  
In its consideration of the up-to-date position of Irish-Soviet relations, the 
department’s assessment began in the following East-West terms: 
It [support for the U.S.-led campaign] may force us to choose between offending 
the Soviet Union by taking action with consequent damage to our interests 
(which are recent and vulnerable); or losing goodwill in the U.S. where our basic 
interests and shared values are much greater.
185
 
The principal focus of the assessment was on trade developments. The efficaciousness 
of the economic cooperation agreement signed by Dr FitzGerald in Moscow in 1976 
was cited for the subsequent growth in trade, and by the holding of three annual 
meetings of the oversight joint Irish-Soviet commission.
186
 An earlier report from the 
department’s economic division showed that the Soviets were supplying six percent of 
Ireland’s oil needs. Imported by Tedcastle’s of Dún Laoghaire, the oil was forwarded to 
two essential public utilities, the Electricity Supply Board (E.S.B.) and Córas Iompar 
Éireann (C.I.É.). The Soviet Union was judged a ‘reliable source of supply not subject 
to political upheavals and not under the control of American and other multinational 
companies.’187 The report pointed out that in the summer of 1978 British and Italian 
railways had been forced to cut services for energy supply reasons, while C.I.É. had not. 
The report concluded: ‘To sum up, Soviet oil provides an extra margin for manoeuvre, 
and if at all avoidable its supply should not be put at risk.’188  However, in terms of both 
rectifying the Irish-Soviet trade imbalance and for an indication of how trade interests 
were making some impact upon Irish political calculations, a note forwarded from the 
managing director of Bord Bainne (the Irish dairy export board) to the D.F.A. was 
perhaps the most telling. It indicated that Bord Bainne had in the last few days secured 
orders for an additional 10,000 tons of butter for sale to the Soviet Union. Therefore, the 
managing director was moved to: 
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Express the wish that no political action would be taken here (in light of the 
invasion of Afghanistan)...the total value (including E.E.C. restitution payments) 
of the sale to the economy will be of the order of £20 million.
189
   
Based upon such analyses, the D.F.A.’s advice to the taoiseach, immediately after his 
meeting with the U.S. Ambassador Shannon on 30 January, was to continue to 
prevaricate in the face of early American pressure. In a letter to the taoiseach’s deputy 
secretary, the department supplied details of its reports and analyses, and advised the 
taoiseach not to reply to President Carter (i.e. to the above mentioned telegram to 
President Hillery) at this time, but rather that it was now in the country’s interest ‘to 
temporise’.190  
From the outset, Lord Killinan gave the lead to the international Olympic 
movement, stating that athletes must not be obstructed from attending the Games ‘by 
political, racial or religious discrimination.’191 The Olympic Council of Ireland (O.C.I.) 
determined that it would send a team to Moscow, a position that had widespread public 
support. This was confirmed when sixty-eight per cent of respondents to a Lansdowne 
Market Research poll believed that Irish athletes should participate.
192
  Even when on 
16 May the government finally gave in to American pressure and issued a statement 
stating it ‘strongly advised’ that an Irish team should not to be sent, the O.C.I. did not 
waver from its decision.  After government funding and big business sponsorship were 
withdrawn from the team, alternative funding was sourced from ‘hundreds of 
individuals, small businesses, and voluntary groups...the I.T.G.W.U. [contributed] a 
cheque for £5,000.’193  
Meantime, on the diplomatic front in Moscow – and before the government 
issued its final decision on 16 May – Ambassador Brennan decided on his own initiative 
without prior sanction from the D.F.A. to join in a western boycott of a high profile 
Soviet public holiday celebration. For the purposes of this study, he frankly admitted: 
‘Because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, I made a mistake in deciding off my 
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own bat not to attend the May Day parade.’194 This development was reflected in a 
newspaper article headed ‘Ireland joins boycott’ which read: ‘Dr Brennan said his 
absence from the parade was due to an international decision, but would not say 
whether it was connected with moves to boycott the Moscow Olympics’.195 That report 
is supported by a copy telex from the ambassador to Dublin, which recorded Dr 
Brennan’s attendance at the meetings of fellow E.E.C. ambassadors: ‘I said I would 
follow whatever consensus developed among the Nine’.196 In the course of events the 
ambassador’s indiscretion was overtaken within a fortnight by the government’s 
decision to ask the O.C.I. to boycott the Games.  
 Despite the government’s advice, Ireland’s team proceeded to the Moscow 
Games, and joined over 6,000 athletes from eighty-one national teams in the Soviet 
capital. Despite the call of many western governments to support the boycott, only 
athletes from the U.S., West Germany and Japan were absent from western countries.
197
 
Nevertheless, when President Leonid Brezhnev opened the Games before a crowd of 
100,000 in the Lenin Stadium, several teams from the West were represented in the 
ceremony not by their athletes but by flag bearers carrying name-banners and Olympic 
flags. The Irish athletes were also absent, and chef de mission Ken Ryan carried his 
team’s standards – ‘not specifically in protest against events in Afghanistan, but as part 
of a campaign to take nationalism out of the Olympics.’198 This development was in 
keeping with the thinking of Lord Killanin who had held talks with both Presidents 
Brezhnev and Carter in an attempted to defuse the boycott by downplaying the role of 
national emblems. Telexes to the D.F.A. revealed little of Killanin’s meeting with 
Brezhnev other than to record that observers ‘were certain’ proposals to denationalise 
the Games were discussed.
199
  After Killanin’s meeting with Carter, a telex reported that 
when Killanin asked for the boycott call to be lifted, ‘the American president, who had 
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been smiling up until then, suddenly changed his expression and simply replied ‘no’.200  
In a memoir (1986), Killanin briefly referred to the Moscow Games and asserted: ‘in 
my opinion flags are essentially political emblems which divide rather than unite.’201  
Two final observations on the Moscow Games issue highlight unique aspects of 
Irish involvement. First, there was a minor, but distinguishing, diplomatic point of 
difference between the Irish mission and all its E.E.C. counterparts. While Ambassador 
Brennan and his staff did not attend the Games, he remained at his post in Moscow 
throughout, while all other E.E.C. missions were absent from their embassies.  And 
lastly, the above mentioned fear of the managing director of Bord Bainne that Irish 
political action could jeopardise new butter exports to the Soviet Union proved 
unfounded. Trade figures returns showed Irish exports to the Soviet Union for 1980 
reached a record high of £24 million, and for the first year exceeded the value of 
imports that totalled £23.5 million.
202
 To that official record can be added evidence 
supplied to this writer by Ludmila Snigireva, then a young interpreter for Sovincentr, a 
department of the Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.S.R., whose duties included 
facilitating athletes and officials with registration procedures, and communications 
between athletes and cooks in the Souyz Hotel. When asked if she could recall any Irish 
involvement, Madame Snigireva replied: 
I remember that there was Irish butter in our restaurants, where Olympic 
participants were eating. They enjoyed Baileys [Irish Cream liqueur], and Irish 
whiskey; and our cooks were amazed with the quality of meat they were cooking, 
saying that the meat was Irish.
203
   
She also recalled that one of the barmen in the Souyz Hotel created a popular new hot 
drink at that time by adding Irish Baileys to coffees instead of milk.     
The Soviet embassy to Dublin 
When the first Soviet ambassador to Ireland, Anatoli Stepanovich Kaplin, 
arrived in Dublin in August 1974, 75 Ailesbury Road, Ballsbridge, became his new 
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home.
204
 The property was acquired for approximately £100,000 from businessman 
Dermot Ryan, and was located in the heart of Dublin’s ‘embassy land’.205 This reflected 
the prestige the Soviet state intended for their new mission to Ireland. Together with the 
new embassy building to be developed at 184-186 Orwell Road, Rathgar, the Soviets 
had arrived and set up home in some style, in keeping with their world superpower 
status.  The agreed maximum number of Soviet citizens at the embassy was seventeen, 
and as it was Soviet policy to employ only their own citizens, this figure included staff 
involved in housekeeping duties.  Kaplin, then fifty-four years old, had trained at the 
Gorky Institute to become an historian before he fought for two years as a Red Army 
soldier on the Moscow and other fronts during the ‘Great Patriotic War’ (the Soviet 
designation for the ‘Second World War’). Prior to the end of the war he was assigned to 
a school of diplomacy in Moscow and served in the diplomatic service, principally in 
Scandinavia, until his appointment to Ireland. He was a published author in the Soviet 
Union; his best known work being a study of Lenin’s diplomatic policies after the 
Bolshevik revolution.  This is said to have achieved a print run of 100,000 copies. John 
Horgan, editor of the Education Times, who met Kaplin in Moscow immediately after 
his appointment had been announced in Pravda, provided a short profile of the new 
ambassador: 
He is a tall man of almost military carriage. His demeanour is as impassive as 
that of any copy-book diplomat, but in private conversation his sense of humour 
is quickly and naturally displayed...it is difficult to avoid the impression that the 
ambassador would make an excellent poker player...perhaps this is why he has 
been chosen.
206
 
His wife, Gali, had been an eye-surgeon and gave up her career to join in her 
husband’s diplomatic role. 207  They had two adult children, neither of whom 
accompanied their parents to Ireland.  
Political scientist Ronald Hill, who had been involved in organising 
Shostakovich’s visit to Dublin two years previously, was also a frequent contributor to 
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the Irish media on matters relating to the Soviet Union. In a feature article in the Irish 
Times concerning the establishment of formal diplomatic relations, Hill predicted the 
short-term strategy of the Soviet embassy in Dublin: 
These Soviet diplomats will quickly size up the Irish scene, set up contacts with 
business, trade and cultural organisations and before you know where we are, 
Soviet exports to Ireland could be booming.
208
  
Yet, the embassy was careful to reach out to an inclusive and egalitarian cross-
section of Irish society. This was shown by journalist Christina Murphy’s report on the 
party hosted by the embassy to celebrate the fifty-seventh anniversary of the ‘Great 
October Revolution’ in the Burlington Hotel, Dublin, entitled: ‘Left, middle and right 
mingle at Soviet ambassador’s reception’.209 Therein she recounted the guest list, which 
read as a virtual ‘who’s who’ of Irish society: Lord Killanin, head of the Irish Olympic 
Council; the chief justice, William Fitzgerald; the ceann comhairle, Sean Tracey; the 
tánaiste, Brendan Corish; the papal nuncio, Gaetano Alibrandi; the leader of the 
Opposition and Fianna Fáil, Jack Lynch; Roddy Connolly, son of James who had met 
Lenin in Moscow in Petrograd in 1920,
210
 and – as discussed in chapter one – Dr Pat 
McCartan in Moscow in 1921; Charles J. Haughey (‘sipping vodka’);211 John Swift and 
Frank Edwards of the Ireland-U.S.S.R. Society, proudly sporting Lenin centenary 
medals; prominent trade unionist and communist Andy Barr; 
212
 trade unionist militant 
Matt Merrigan; 
213
 and an unnamed importer of Russian oil, who informed the journalist: 
‘one seventh of our consumption comes from here’. 214  There was no mention of 
Michael O’Riordan of the C.P.I., but Peadar O’Donnell, 215 now in his eighty-second 
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year and a direct link to the Comintern of the 1920-30s looked on at them all – guests, 
ministers and diplomats with ‘satisfaction and a twinkle in his eye’ and declared ‘“but 
I’m looking at it all with a bit of a giggle in my heart.”’216 
Like their Irish counterparts in Moscow, the Soviet staff had initially to reside in 
hotels, but they had immediate use of the former Irish Management Institute 
headquarters and grounds on the Orwell Road. This site of over five acres was 
purchased for a reported sum of ‘in excess of £520,000’.217 The change of ownership 
was reflected by the entry for 184 Orwell Road in the 1974 edition of Thom’s Dublin 
Street Directories.
218
  The building proved inadequate for the needs of the embassy and 
within two years Dublin Corporation had received an application for demolition of the 
existing building and planning permission for an administration space and chancery, a 
block of eighteen flats and a services centre with a cinema and library – at an estimated 
total cost ‘in the region of £1.4m’.219 This application was to attract considerable media 
interest and planning appeals. It also served to provide a means for objectors to magnify 
fears about the nature and levels of staffing, as had been hinted at in Ronald Hill’s 
above mentioned Irish Times article: 
We should encourage the Russians to maintain a small staff... it is likely to prove 
difficult to restrict the size…they normally insist on bringing employees …right 
down to charwomen and chauffeurs…full-time trade official, a cultural 
secretary…an observer of the Irish scene… a K.G.B. man to keep his eye on 
other diplomats and who knows what else?
220
 
But even before the application for the proposed complex could be considered, 
three local residents had lodged specific objections in relation to the building of a 
perimeter wall around the embassy.  This led to media comparisons between the 
‘Orwell Road Wall’ and the Berlin Wall.221 However, the objectors themselves were 
taken to task by a letter writer to the Irish Times who invited them to lodge objections to 
the 7 ft. 10 in. wall being built around an itinerant settlement by the corporation in 
Rathfarnham, to appease objections from local residents.
222
 Embassy officials met with 
their Orwell Road neighbours to assuage their concerns but there was no dialogue with 
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a minority of city councillors who sought in vain throughout the latter part of 1976 to 
block the building of the new embassy complex. The most prominent was the 
independent councillor Sean Loftus,
223
 who claimed that ‘this embassy would be used to 
further the philosophical concept of Russian imperialism.’ A number of solicitors 
representing religious objectors, the Irish Council of European Freedom and the Irish-
Czechoslovakia Society, were also vocal at the public hearings.
224
 In contrast, Socialist 
Labour Party Councillor Billy Keegan gave support, saying ‘the Russians should be 
congratulated on the fine plan before them’,225 and Senator Ruairi Quinn, an architect 
by training and later leader of the Labour Party, said to his colleagues: 
They must look on the application according to the planning criteria. The 
Russians had been very helpful and cooperative and it was wrong to be making 
remarks which might affect our good diplomatic relations with them.
226
  
Councillors from Fianna Fáil and Fíne Gael generally kept a low profile on the issue.  
The fears of a large complex being erected were not borne out by the annual rateable 
valuation of the property, which remained unchanged at £59.25 from its purchase year 
of 1973 to 1985.
227
   In the event all objections were overruled and the complex was 
completed.  
In May 1977 Ambassador Kaplin was able to present to the internationally 
prominent Irish figure and former minister for external affairs, Seán MacBride, a letter 
confirming that he was to be awarded one of the most prestigious awards of the Soviet 
Union – the International Lenin Peace Prize. Kaplin indicated that the prize committee 
was honouring MacBride for his ‘outstanding merits in the struggle for maintaining and 
strengthening peace’.228 Already a Nobel peace prize-winner, in accepting the Lenin 
prize MacBride became the first member of an exclusive club of public figures to have 
been awarded both peace prizes. This club now includes Nelson Mandela of South 
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Africa, the last recipient of the Lenin prize.
229
 However, MacBride was not the only 
other Irish recipient of a Lenin prize. That distinction had already been bestowed upon 
John Desmond Bernal in 1953. Bernal had combined a brilliant career as professor of 
physics at Birkbeck College, London, with a life-long commitment to Marxism and 
support for the Soviet Union.
230
 
 Kaplin informed MacBride that he had been nominated for the prize by a 
number of international groups, including African groups. MacBride had served as the 
United Nations commissioner for Namibia during 1973-6, when the U.N. was 
attempting to end the occupation of that country by South Africa. The Soviet Union also 
had particular interest in African affairs in the 1970s, supporting liberation movements 
and new states emerging from Portuguese colonialism, whose leaderships were taking 
non-capitalist paths to national development. The relevance of these developments is 
illustrated by two of MacBride’s co-recipients of the Lenin prize in that year: Presidents 
Machel of Mozambique and Neto of Angola.
231
 During his tenure in Namibia, 
MacBride had worked closely with its U.N.-recognised liberation movement, the South 
West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO). Kim Wallis, in History Ireland, recounts 
how MacBride’s principled stand in Namibia led to opposition from U.S. and other 
interests at the U.N.: 
At the beginning of 1976 he incurred severe criticism from the U.S. and the 
secretary-general [of the U.N., Kurt Waldheim of Austria] for saying that if 
SWAPO invited Cuban forces [which had come to the aid of Angola when it 
was invaded by the South African army in 1975] into Namibia to help them 
liberate their country, he did not think the U.N. would do anything about it. 
From this moment he faced real opposition amongst colleagues in the U.N. and 
the U.S.
232
  
There were some Irish expressions of disquiet at the award, as was expressed in Ronan 
Keane’s biographical essay on MacBride: ‘the award to him of the Lenin Peace Prize in 
1977 by the Soviet Union was greeted with less general enthusiasm; it was seen by 
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some as a dubious honour for an advocate of human rights.’233 No doubt the author was 
referring to issues relating to Soviet dissidents. Whatever about such reservations, 
MacBride’s acceptance of the prize must be assessed in the light of his wider 
perceptions of Soviet policies, particularly in relation to disarmament.  This he had 
articulated in his acceptance speech for the Nobel prize in 1974:  
The socialist countries do not have a profit-motivated industrial-military 
complex...disarmament means an automatic switch from increased arms 
production to increase in production for industrial development...This, no doubt, 
accounts for the more sincere and far-reaching approach of the Soviet Union to 
general and complete disarmament than that of the western powers.
234
 
When the Lenin prize was presented to MacBride by Nikolai Blokhin, chairman of the 
committee on International Lenin prizes, a correspondent of the Irish Socialist was 
present to record the proceedings.  Blokhin praised MacBride’s courage and consistency 
for international peace and his earlier struggle for Irish national independence. In his 
response, MacBride: 
` Referred to that struggle... recalled that it was Lenin who had described the 1916 
Easter Rising as the first tremor of the world upheaval that was to lead to the 
demolition of colonialism and the establishment of socialism in vast areas of the 
world.
235
  
MacBride also used the occasion to urge that resources then being spent on arms 
research and production be redirected to solving the problem of declining energy 
sources by their replacement with new sources such as sun, wind and tide. Prionsias 
Mac Aonghusa, a member of the Irish Peace Group, and assistant to MacBride during 
his term as U.N. commissioner in Namibia, pointed out that as minister for external 
affairs in 1949 it was Seán MacBride who had ensured that Ireland retained its 
neutrality despite great pressure to join NATO.
 236
  However, Mac Aonghusa may have 
been somewhat kind to MacBride concerning the latter’s actions on NATO when he had 
been minister for external affairs. Elizabeth Keane records that MacBride also made 
approaches to the U.S. ‘about abandoning neutrality and joining NATO in exchange for 
American support for ending partition.’237 Yet, it must be appreciated that MacBride’s 
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later international experiences engendered in him empathy for Soviet state and people. 
He articulated his view in an essay for an Ireland-U.S.S.R. Society publication, as is 
exemplified by the following extract: 
It takes time to understand the character and reaction of Russian people. They 
are somewhat cautious in their contacts with foreigners until you get to know 
them. Many attempts have been made to use them and often to misquote them. 
Never forget that twenty million Russians were killed during the course of the 
last war. There is no family that has not suffered...
238
 
When the fifty-nine year-old Ambassador Kaplin died in office in August 1979 
while holidaying in Moscow, the reaction in Ireland to the news reflected a palpable 
sense of warmth for ‘one of the best-known members of the diplomatic corps since his 
arrival five years earlier.’ 239  Garret FitzGerald’s memoir provides an insight into 
Kaplin’s professional demeanour from their discussions on the formalities of planning 
the official visit to the Soviet Union in 1976. FitzGerald recalled his expectation that 
Kaplin would be taken aback at his knowledge of Aeroflot flight times from Moscow to 
Tbilisi, from Tbilisi to Leningrad, and of the last train from Leningrad back to Moscow. 
FitzGerald wrote: ‘Diplomats are trained not to show any emotion, including surprise. 
He [Kaplin] did not bat an eyelid, but noted down my suggestions.’240    Yet it was said 
by others that his outer reserve belied a humorous and sociable personality, exemplified 
by enthusiastic holiday ventures to the south-west of Ireland (which Ambassador Kaplin 
and his wife, Gali, claimed to be the equal of Russia’s best scenery), attendance at 
Croke Park games, and the granting of an interview for a school newspaper produced by 
the Christian Brothers’ school in Carrick-on-Suir. However, his warmest friendships 
with Irish citizens seem to have been reserved for members of the Ireland-U.S.S.R. 
society, especially its chairman John Swift. Swift received from the embassy a bottle of 
the best Soviet brandy every birthday, and Kaplin was an occasional customer of a son 
of Swift’s, Grosvenor, who ran a chip shop in Ranelagh in the 1970s. 241  Kaplin 
presided over the foundation of the embassy, steered it safely past the planning 
obstacles and political protests, and skilfully fulfilled both his diplomatic duties and 
established societal relationships. At the same time his mission was challenged by 
various issues and campaigners concerned about Soviet dissidents. To these he 
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responded with staunch defence of his government’s position, most notably by his 
reported refusal to accept a petition on such an issue containing the signatures of 100 
members of the oireachtas. The petition was brought to his residence by 300 protestors, 
who were led by members of Amnesty International, Ben Briscoe T.D. of Fíne Gael, 
and Robert Bradford, a Unionist M.P. for Belfast.
242
   
Some personal details of the ambassador and his wife, which were given to this 
writer by Dr Sarah Smyth of the Department of Russian and Slavonic Studies at 
T.C.D.,
243
 reveal that the Kaplins had complicated backgrounds.  Kaplin’s family 
background was one of the ‘old believers’ in the Volga River city of Gorky (now 
reverted to its pre-1917 name, Nizhny Novgorod).  ‘Old believers’ were descendants of 
dissenters who in the seventeenth-century had rejected liturgical reforms introduced by 
the Orthodox Church. They were then banished to remoter parts of Russia, became 
associated with the merchant class during the intervening centuries, and were 
accordingly regarded with some suspicion during the opening decades in the building 
up of the Soviet Union. Gorky was also a ‘closed city’, decreed out-of-bounds to 
foreigners in an effort to preserve the security of Soviet military establishments.
244
 Also, 
Gali Kaplin’s parents were ‘taken’ during the Stalinist period of the 1930s, a fact that 
she believed restricted her own career thereafter.
245
 This study cannot confirm the 
accuracy of these details.  However, as they have been supplied on good authority, they 
are included here to indicate that beyond the diplomatic correctness of even the highest 
Soviet officials, some Irish citizens became aware of the complexities and 
contradictions within Soviet society.  
Ambassador Kaplin’s death in office resulted in three official expressions of 
Irish sympathy: President Hillery to the Soviet government, Taoiseach Lynch to Mrs 
Kaplin, and foreign affairs minister, Michael O’Kennedy, to his opposite number, 
Andrei Gromyko. Further condolences were presented to Mrs Kaplin by Garret and 
Joan FitzGerald (Garret had then become leader of Fíne Gael), expressing their ‘shock 
and distress at the news by the untimely death of her husband, whose friendship they 
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had enjoyed since they both arrived here five years ago’.246 Trade unionists, too, marked 
his death with a telegram of condolence and a public statement from the I.T.G.W.U., in 
whose Liberty Hall Kaplin had attended a number of meetings. Kaplin, their telegram 
read, ‘was a true friend of the Irish people and helped to build an awareness of the many 
features which Ireland and the Soviet Union have in common’. 247  An article of 
appreciation was also contained in the pages of the Irish Socialist, the C.P.I.’s monthly 
newspaper. To underline the late Soviet ambassador’s uniqueness among the diplomatic 
corps to Ireland, the article’s closing words read:  ‘appropriately enough his last public 
appearance prior to returning to the Soviet Union for a holiday and medical treatment 
was at the unveiling of the statue of “Big Jim” Larkin [on O’Connell Street, Dublin] by 
President Hillery. He was the sole diplomat present.’248 To close this account of the 
public reactions to Ambassador Kaplin’s death it is fitting to include in full the text of 
the handwritten letter (in English) sent privately by his widow, Gali Kaplina, in 
response to the taoiseach’s letter of sympathy: 
Dear taoiseach, Mrs Lynch, I appreciate deeply your sympathies to me and my 
family in connection with the passing of my husband. I shall keep in my heart 
forever the memory about years spent in Ireland.
249
 
Conclusion 
The positive reception to the immersion of Tass representative Ustimenko into Irish 
society from 1970 was a clear indication that his arrival was timely.  His range of 
acquaintances across the political spectrum, and his ability to access the print and 
broadcasting media to present his portrayal of 1970s’ Soviet life, spoke eloquently of an 
atmosphere of increasing tolerance in Irish society for the possibility of establishing 
formal diplomatic relations between the two states. That prospect was recognised by the 
British embassy, and Ambassador Peck quickly seized the initiative with the Irish 
authorities to lobby for the imposition of travel restrictions on Ustimenko. Such was the 
effectiveness of Ambassador Peck’s diplomatic skills – despite widespread anti-British 
feelings in the country in the aftermath of Bloody Sunday and the burning of the British 
embassy – that he could build upon his ‘Ustimenko’ representations to exploit Irish 
security fears to the extent of postponing official diplomatic relations. While Dr Hillery 
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had laid much of the groundwork by finalising trade talks and securing agreement in 
principle from his Fianna Fáil cabinet in 1971, the establishment of relations was 
postponed at Peck’s behest. The government was prepared to face down latent domestic 
anti-communism – as typified by Taoiseach Jack Lynch’s reply to Mrs Kelly’s anti-
Soviet objections – but crossing the Rubicon to formalise Irish-Soviet relations after so 
many decades required a further act of decisiveness. Nevertheless, British security-
centred representations proved but a temporary restraint against the confluence of trade, 
political, E.E.C. membership and cultural pressures for the enactment of diplomatic 
relations. The visit by Dmitri Shostakovich chimed with the desire of influential music 
aficionados and academics for closer Irish-Soviet cultural exchanges.  
Within a short few weeks of his appointment Garret FitzGerald determined that 
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union were a priority. The foreign minister 
marshalled the support of other key ministers to steer the decision through the cabinet 
so effectively that in the end it seems he only had to contend with token resistance from 
Minister Donegan. Unspoken anti-communist bogies counted for little when faced with 
the promise of new markets for an expanding Irish economy. Crucially, Dr FitzGerald 
could remind the cabinet that Ireland’s fellow members of the E.E.C. had extensive 
experience of accommodating Soviet missions. In this way the decision was made from 
a position of strength. It was a reflection of the maturity of the Irish state and its 
institutions, and the self-confidence of the collective of politicians around the cabinet 
table, conservatives and social democrats together. Moreover, the coalition government 
had nothing to fear from Fianna Fáil: the latter prepared the diplomatic ground, but had 
lacked the resolve to see it through. And to complete the process, Garret FitzGerald 
displayed sufficient dexterity in agreeing with Andrei Gromyko staffing levels for the 
Soviet embassy in Dublin that met the needs not just of the Soviet Union, but also the 
security concerns of both the Irish and British authorities. 
In its selection of the country’s ambassador to the Soviet Union, it is difficult to 
conceive that the government could have chosen an appointee better equipped than 
Ambassador Brennan to implement policies espoused by Dr FitzGerald. With expertise 
in the Russian language, diplomatic and philosophical training in the U.S., and 
experience in negotiating Ireland’s accession to the E.E.C., Ireland’s first mission to 
Moscow was in safe hands. Any suggestions that Ireland’s non-membership of NATO 
would lead to a role distinctly out of step with western policies was dispelled by Dr 
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Brennan’s closeness to the British ambassador, Sir Terence Garvey, and his friendship 
with Jack Matlock of the U.S. embassy.    
The principal outcome of Dr FitzGerald’s official visit to the U.S.S.R. in 1976 
was the ratification of the new commercial cooperation agreement. But beyond trade 
matters two fundamental factors in Irish-Soviet relations emerged during Dr 
FitzGerald’s week in the Soviet Union: first, the Irish were implacably opposed to 
concessions to Soviet requests to associate with Soviet analyses of détente, as was 
evidenced by the omission of such terminology in the agreed communiqué; and second, 
the Irish indicated that while the country’s policies were independent, they would be 
exercised in the context of the government’s commitment to E.E.C. involvement and 
institutions. Soviet frustration at this twin track approach was tellingly exposed by Noel 
Dorr’s recollection of Gromyko’s ‘you are not aligned, but not aligned with the non-
aligned!’ quip. Furthermore, this study’s account of FitzGerald’s visit has revealed the 
importance of the E.E.C.  in Ireland’s relations with the Soviet Union. This was 
signalled publicly by Dr FitzGerald’s meeting with the E.E.C. group of ambassadors in 
Moscow, and privately by the briefing from the Irish minister and his officials of 
representatives of the E.E.C. and Britain in the aftermath of the visit.  
Ronald Hill’s prediction that the Soviet mission to Dublin would be focused and 
organised was borne out under Ambassador Kaplin’s competent leadership. To begin, 
and in keeping with the status of Soviet power, only the best would do for Soviet 
ambassadorial properties: high-profile for the ambassador’s residence on Ailesbury 
Road; more modest, functional and self-contained for the embassy complex itself on 
Orwell Road. The 1974 Burlington Hotel reception was a diplomatic success – no doubt 
the attendance of so many notables from Irish society was a tribute to a combination of 
curiosity and an Irish welcome for the exotic new arrivals, together with a sense of pride 
for the veteran supporters of the Soviet Union. However, the diplomatic honeymoon 
soon gave way to politically-driven planning objections and human rights issues from a 
mix of independent/conservative councillors and activists determined to seize publicity 
for their various causes. But by 1980 such had been the increase in trade and the regard 
for the Soviet mission to Dublin (as witnessed by the respectful reaction to Ambassador 
Kaplin’s death) that the department was careful to take ample time to evaluate Irish 
interests with the Soviet Union before giving a considered response to the entreaties of 
the Americans to boycott the Games and disrupt new Irish-Soviet business in response 
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to the Soviet intervention into Afghanistan. The decision to ratify the Aeroflot-Shannon 
deal in spite of Ambassador Shannon’s suggestion to the contrary, and the D.F.A.’s 
reminder to Taoiseach Haughey that western powers had been guilty of military 
adventures of their own, showed that within six years of the establishment of relations 
some serious regard had to be afforded to ties with the Soviet Union. When the 
government did eventually accede to President Carter’s official request to ask the I.O.C. 
not to send a team to Moscow, it did not result in a Soviet cancellation of trade with 
Ireland. That the Irish team participated in the Games with public approval, and unlike 
his E.E.C. colleagues that Ambassador Brennan was at his post in Moscow (albeit at a 
remove from the Games),  may well have contributed to the context within which the 
Soviets decided to treat its Olympian guests to premium Irish beef and alcoholic 
refreshments.  
Finally, this chapter concludes with a note of a missing feature in Ireland’s first 
mission to Moscow – any meaningful involvement in cultural contacts. This lacuna was 
brought to the attention of this writer by Ambassador Brennan, who stated candidly: 
‘cultural links were barely non-existent and not a big area of work. Soviet cultural 
organisations did not make use of the embassy to engage with Ireland’.250 Accordingly, 
the study now advances to its account of an Irish society which was dedicated to the 
promotion of Irish-Soviet cultural relations, the Ireland-U.S.S.R. Society.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
An account of Irish-Soviet friendship organisations, with a principal focus on the 
Ireland-U.S.S.R. Society, founded in 1966 
Introduction 
Five Irish-Soviet friendship organisations were active in Ireland during the ‘short Soviet 
twentieth-century’ years of 1917-91:1 first, the Irish Friends of Soviet Russia (I.F.S.R.), 
established in 1928 in Dublin, which remained active until the mid-1930s; second, a 
Belfast branch of the Friends of Soviet Russia, which was still active in 1937; third, the 
Northern Ireland Soviet Friendship Society, founded in Belfast in the aftermath of the 
Second World War and which continued until the mid-1970s; fourth, the Ireland-
U.S.S.R. Friendship Society, established in Dublin in December 1945, which continued 
in operation until the fifth society, the Ireland-U.S.S.R. Society, emerged in Dublin in 
1966 – without ‘Friendship’ in its title, to indicate that the society had started anew. 
Following the establishment of formal Irish-Soviet diplomatic relations in 1974, that 
society increased in membership and influence, and continued in operation until the 
Soviet Union’s demise in 1991. 
The chapter begins with an account of the pre-Second World War organisations 
in Dublin and Belfast by adding to existing information from Emmet O’Connor’s Reds 
and the green (2004) with newly-sourced primary documents from the Public Record 
Office of Northern Ireland (P.R.O.N.I.) concerning the activities of the Belfast branch 
of Friends of Soviet Russia during the 1930s. Also, contemporary newspaper reports, 
and Communist Party of Ireland (C.P.I.) sources, including its Outline history (1975) 
and the party’s website, are employed. 
Staying north of the border, the chapter will next present the first scholarly 
account of the Northern Ireland Soviet Friendship Society. That society sprang from 
public support in Belfast for the Allied war effort, and the Red Army’s role in the allies’ 
victory over Nazi Germany. The account is largely based upon oral evidence of a 
surviving member, Barry Bruton, who is also the son of the society’s long-serving 
                                                          
1
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1914-1991 (London, 2002), p. ix. 
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secretary, Bill Bruton.  The account will also feature two booklets published upon the 
return of separate delegations of Belfast-based trade unionists and teachers who 
travelled to the Soviet Union in the 1950s.  
However, it is the post-Second World War societies south of the border that 
command the greater attention of the chapter. Again, as these societies have not 
previously been the subject of an historical study, this writer has contacted surviving 
society members and the immediate family of deceased members. This section opens 
with a brief biography of Margaret ‘Daisy’ McMackin whose membership of the three 
Dublin-based societies spanned five decades, and was complemented by her work as a 
Russian language lecturer at Trinity College Dublin (T.C.D.).  and with some details of 
its founding officers in 1966. The society’s relationship with its counterpart society in 
the Soviet Union – the U.S.S.R.-Ireland Society – will be looked at, as will the Irish 
society’s relationship with the Soviet embassy to Dublin. The prominent public figures, 
who visited the Soviet Union at the society’s invitation, will be a particular focus. Also 
of prominence is the chapter’s discussion on two Jewish organisations in Dublin that 
campaigned against the Soviet Union’s policy on emigration rights for Soviet Jewry, 
whose activities included picketing of events organised by the Ireland-U.S.S.R. Society. 
It should be noted that this chapter extends beyond the 1980 end date of the 
other chapters in this thesis. It does so by continuing with its account of the U.S.S.R.-
Ireland Society until mid-1992, six months after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In 
contrast to the other chapters whose Irish archival sources are largely restricted by the 
state’s thirty years’ rule, this chapter’s end date has been determined by its access to 
primary sources for the final years of the society. Those sources principally comprise 
interviews with the society’s surviving officers and members, and access to 
comprehensive archival materials of the society in their care. Accordingly, the chapter is 
in a position to give an account of the society’s last years, when its membership, 
leadership and programme evolved in response to the perestroika and glasnost period, 
and beyond that to the collapse of the U.S.S.R.  
Irish Friends of Soviet Russia  
Enthusiasm for the Russian revolution in Ireland was demonstrated by the attendance of 
10,000 people at a rally in and around the Mansion House, Dublin on 4 February 1918. 
Such was the revolutionary atmosphere of the rally that thousands remained in the 
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vicinity of Dawson Street to bear witness to the city’s acclamation for the revolution. 
Resolutions lauding its promise of an end to war, self-determination for small countries, 
and social progress were eagerly adopted.
2
  
Ten years later the Irish Friends of Soviet Russia (I.F.S.R.) was established 
when the spirit of the Mansion House rally remained alive among some activists in 
republican and labour movement circles, and at a time when anti-Soviet and anti-
communist attitudes had not yet been embedded in Irish society. The organisation was 
founded in 1928 by ‘Big’ Jim Larkin, trade union leader and then the most prominent 
communist in Ireland, and Charlotte Despard,
3
 at the Tivoli Theatre, Dublin, following 
a lantern slide show depicting advances being made in Soviet Russia. In January 1930 
about 250 people attended the society’s congress in Banba Hall, Dublin, of whom 
approximately one hundred signed up as members, and a committee dominated by 
republicans was selected. Despite the Irish government’s refusal to issue passports to 
five trade unionists to attend the 1931 May Day celebrations in Moscow,
4
 two other 
delegations visited Russia in this period. Among those who travelled was Mick 
Fitzpatrick, a trade unionist and member of the I.R.A. army council, and he was co-
opted by the comintern onto the presidium of the newly established International 
Friends of Soviet Russia.
5
  On their return the I.F.S.R. organised a series of public 
meetings around the country to present firsthand accounts of the participants’ 
experiences. The reports centred on advances for the status of Soviet women, and 
workers’ control in factories, as speakers applauded the popular sense of determination 
and sacrifice being displayed by Soviet citizens to achieve the targets of the state’s Five 
Year plan. Dismissing reports of problems arising from rapid industrialisation and 
collectivisation of agriculture as anti-Soviet propaganda, the accounts from these 
experienced and respected Irish visitors helped promote the view expressed by Helena 
Molony of the Irish Women Workers’ Union in An Phoblacht of 1 February 1930: ‘the 
Soviet regime had more popular support than the Free State’.6 The largest group that 
secured visas to visit the Soviet Union consisted of eight trade unionists and republicans, 
including Hanna Sheehy-Skeffington, then the assistant editor of An Phoblacht, and 
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 O’Connor, Reds and the green, p. 15. 
3
 Ibid., p. 132, 136, 141. Despard (1844-1939), born into an Anglo-Irish family, was a prominent 
suffragist and member of Cumann na mBan. She was a patron of the James Connolly Workers’ Club, also 
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4
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5
 Ibid, 128. 
6
 Ibid, p. 170. 
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Charlotte Despard. Their tour took them to Leningrad, Moscow, Rostov on the Don, and 
Baku on the Caspian Sea, where they visited factories, collectives, state farms, schools, 
courts and prisons.
7
 Their visit commanded some mainstream media attention, and 
Sheehy-Skeffington was reported to have been: 
specially struck by the attention given to children and by the various welfare 
schemes...and by the absolute and perfect equality enjoyed by the women of 
Russia, where every post is freely open to them and where they are given every 
opportunity for development.
8
 
This coverage was more than balanced by a hostile report that was featured in the same 
issue of the Irish Independent column immediately above the I.F.S.R. article. It was 
headlined: ‘More light on Russia – Scarcity of food – “Astonishing”, says English 
visitor’.  Credited to R. R. Hyde of the Industrial Welfare Conference at Oxford, it 
reported on conditions that he witnessed in Leningrad: 
...a dull and drab city. There were no stocks in the shops, and the people were 
ill-clad and wore worn-out shoes. Yet the girls were plump and cheerful... 
people queuing up for clothing and food...factories were working hard for the 
export trade but in the main the machinery was out of date.
9
 
Such seemingly contradictory reports on Soviet living conditions in 1930, and the way 
they were presented to the Irish public, are early examples of what was to become a 
common feature of the Irish media. But the I.F.S.R. was adamant that its version of 
Soviet efforts to build up a socialist society in a vast country that had been amongst the 
most backward in Europe was accurate, and it protested against negative coverage in 
Irish Independent.
10
  
It was against this background of support for communism among sections of the 
working class and republican movement that Irish Catholic bishops set about an 
offensive against communism. Buoyed by the success of the church’s centenary 
celebrations of Catholic emancipation in 1929, and by the highlighting of Pope Pius 
XI’s denunciation of reports of religious repression in Russia by Armagh’s Cardinal 
MacRory, the gloves were now off for Soviet friendship and Irish communism. The 
situation was made all the more precarious for Soviet friendship when in 1932 Jim 
Larkin withdrew from participation in communist politics and related activities, 
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although Larkin ‘remained a lifelong champion of the Soviet Union and Stalin’s 
leadership.’11 By 1933 conditions on the ground in Dublin had taken an unpleasant turn. 
The Great Strand Street premises of the Revolutionary Workers’ Group (a forerunner 
body of the Communist Party of Ireland) were attacked by a hymn-singing crowd. 
Members and I.R.A. supporters kept the attackers at bay for two days, until ‘reinforced 
by Blueshirt and criminal elements, watched from a distance by the Garda Síochána’,12 
the building was gutted as its defenders managed to escape over adjacent rooftops. The 
attackers then proceed to the home of Charlotte Despard at 63 Eccles Street, which also 
functioned as the headquarters of the I.F.S.R.
13
 However, owing to the efforts of a large 
crowd of defenders, damage there was confined to broken windows. While the I.F.S.R. 
was still active in 1934, it appears that in such increasingly difficult circumstances its 
activities petered out.  
Belfast branch of Friends of Soviet Russia 
Soviet friendship activities were sufficiently established in Belfast city by 1933 for 
organisers to have secured premises on the top floor of Esperanto Hall at 5 Rosemary 
Street.  From there a circular was issued to organisations in the city to seek affiliations 
and memberships, and to advise that lectures were being conducted each Thursday 
evening. The circular was issued in the name of the Belfast branch of Friends of Soviet 
Russia.
14
 It is noteworthy that ‘Irish’ was not included in the title, a factor which may 
well have assisted in the branch’s ability to attract support from both Protestant and 
Catholic communities. The Irish News reported that the branch’s objects were ‘to foster 
friendly relations between the people of the Soviet Union and the workers of this 
country, and to give the true facts of what is actually taking place in the Soviet 
Union’.15  
The same issue of the Irish News went on to say that the Belfast Trades Council 
had considered a motion, proposed by a Mr R. Dorman, to affiliate to the Friends of 
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Soviet Russia. Lamenting that the motion was only defeated by eighteen votes to 
sixteen, the newspaper editorialised: ‘A majority of only two [votes] is a most 
unsatisfactory answer to this impudent attempt to foster communism in our midst’.16 
But it is a report from the inspector general’s office of the R.U.C., in 1937, marked 
‘secret’, that provides the clearest evidence of the branch’s ability to attract considerable 
support in the city.
17
  The report recorded that the branch’s meeting held on 3 November 
in the Co-Operative Hall, Frederick Street, had attracted an attendance of 600 persons. 
For a fee of 2s for balcony seats and 1s for the arena, attendees viewed a screening of a 
film, Youth, which showed Stalin and his staff in Red Square, Moscow, reviewing youth 
and physical culture displays, and a play,  entitled ‘Russia 1917-37’, was also staged. 
Betty Sinclair
18
  appealed to all present to join the Friends, as did a Mr. McQuoid for 
the Left Book Club.
19
 The meeting concluded with a film on the Spanish civil war, They 
shall not pass.  
No records of activities by the branch of Friends of Soviet Russia during the 
Second World War have come to light, but the fortunes of the Communist Party of 
Northern Ireland (C.P.N.I.) are of relevance for that period. Initially, C.P.N.I. members 
were subjected to harassment by the authorities (leading members were imprisoned, and 
the party’s premises in east Belfast were wrecked in an R.U.C. raid),20 but popular pro-
Soviet sentiment, as displayed by the numbers in attendance at the above discussed 
meeting in Co-Operative Hall, was to rise even higher during the course of the war.
21
 
C.P.N.I. members threw themselves into the war effort against fascism, and after Nazi 
Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union the party campaigned for the opening of a 
second front in Europe. Committees were formed in the Harland and Wolff shipyards 
and Shorts aerospace factory to help maximise naval and aircraft production. Party 
meetings attracted thousands of people, and its membership increased to 1,000. At 
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elections to the Stormont parliament, held immediately after the end of the war, 
communist candidates attracted impressive support. In the east Belfast Bloomfield 
constituency, W.H. McCullough tallied 5,802 votes, and Betty Sinclair scored 4,130 
votes in the Cromac constituency.
22
 While no communist candidate was elected, and 
party membership declined sharply in the early post-war period, these developments 
were to feed into the relaunch of a Soviet friendship organisation in Belfast, the 
Northern Ireland Soviet Friendship Society, in or around 1950. 
Northern Ireland Soviet Friendship Society 
The following account is based upon interviews with Barry Bruton, a surviving society 
member and son of William ‘Bill’ Bruton (1909-2006), the secretary of the society from 
approximately 1957 to the mid-1970s.
23
  Originally from Essex, Bill Bruton had worked 
as a young seaman, and subsequently as a farm worker in Australia, before he settled in 
Belfast in 1935. Like many trade unionists in wartime Belfast, Bruton joined the 
C.P.N.I. In 1957 he was excused from party work to concentrate on the Soviet society. 
Other active members of the society at this time included Bruton’s wife, Annie (she had 
run the C.P.’s bookshop in Church Lane from the Second World War years to the mid-
1950s), John Warren, Sam Justice, Alan Gordon (a housepainter and trade unionist), 
Lance Noakes of the C.P.N.I. (who used to sell copies of Soviet Weekly in Shorts 
Aerospace company). The society met in a Belfast city centre hotel, the International, 
before it acquired rented premises in the late 1950s. These comprised two rooms on the 
top floor of 4 Alfred Street, off May Street, Belfast. The society attracted considerable 
support from citizens of all backgrounds in the city, principally among teachers, 
intellectuals, trade unionists and the wider circles and contacts of the C.P. who were 
interested in the cultural, engineering and scientific achievements of the Soviet Union. 
This awareness was heightened by launch of the Sputnik programme in 1957 and the 
first spaceflight by Yuri Gagarin in 1961 – of which the technical accomplishments 
involved were not lost on an engineering city such as Belfast.  
The period from the 1950s through to the early 1970s was to become the 
highpoint for the society. Its premises at Alfred Street functioned as a part-time cinema, 
with seating for up to forty people. The portable projector was Soviet supplied, and a 
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range of educational films on Soviet life was shown. Russian language classes were 
delivered by William Moles, headmaster at Grosvenor High School, east Belfast, also 
with the aid of materials supplied from the Soviet Union. Barry Bruton further recalls 
from his own school days in the city’s Beechfield Primary School that the headmaster, 
Dan McCall, went around the classrooms telling the pupils of his impressions of his 
visit to the Soviet Union in the 1950s. The society provided a welcoming service to 
crews of visiting Soviet ships into Belfast harbour by organising tours of the Belfast 
area. Chess tournaments were organised for the Soviet seamen against a local Christian 
Brothers’ social club. A number of Soviet captains returned the hospitality by hosting 
society members on board. Soviet ambassadors and diplomats to Britain paid visits to 
the city, and a supportive Unionist member of Belfast City Council arranged for 
receptions at City Hall. A first secretary at the Soviet embassy to London
 
,
24
 who 
became friendly with Bill Bruton, was later appointed head of the British and Irish 
section in Friendship House, Moscow. He then became a contact person for Northern 
Irish visitors to the Soviet Union in the 1980s.  
Unfortunately, Barry Bruton was unable to provide this study with the society’s 
surviving materials (see below footnote no. 27, page 126, regarding possible future 
access). Nevertheless two society publications from the early 1950s, available at Marx 
Memorial Library, London, have been consulted.  The booklets were produced to record 
the impressions of two visits by some members and supporters to the Soviet Union, and 
the following are brief details extrapolated by this writer. The first, What we saw in 
Soviet Russia: seven Belfast men give their impressions, stated in its preface that the 
seven were trade unionists ‘of widely varying shades of beliefs on politics’, and led by 
their chairman, W.J. Alexander, they contributed articles to the booklet, as follows: 
John Warren (a fitter with the company, T.A.B.), ‘The Soviet trade unions’; Alexander 
McCormick, ‘The collective farm’; Edward A. Menzies (a newsagent on Templemore 
Avenue; he and his wife Sadie were the parents of the prominent C.P. member and civil 
rights activist from the 1960s, Edwina Stewart), ‘Education and mother and child care’; 
Joseph Quayle (sheet metal worker), ‘The textile industry’; and David Scott (non-party, 
militant trade unionist), ‘Engineering industry and its workers.’ J. Samuel Justice also 
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contributed to the publication.
25
 The second booklet, Northern Ireland teachers and 
education in Russia: impressions of Soviet education by Northern Ireland teachers, 
contained four articles: S. B. Wynburne (a lecturer at Stranmillis Teacher Training 
College, Belfast), ‘Teachers and pupils’; J. D. Stewart (a prominent Belfast journalist 
and humanist), ‘U.S.S.R. – 1932-55’; A. Woodrow, ‘Education in a primary school in 
U.S.S.R.’; and Frank Edwards (a Dublin-based teacher who was later to become the 
central activist in the southern society) ‘Children on holiday.’26 All articles, drawing 
upon the authors’ personal experiences as active trade unionists and teachers, gave 
favourable impressions of advances made by the Soviets in industry and education.  
Owing to the increase of bombings and sectarian killings from the late 1960s, it 
became increasingly difficult to organise public meetings and events in parts of Belfast 
city. The society’s Alfred Street premises, alongside a nationalist area, were considered 
especially vulnerable. This proved all too true when, in 1976, they fell victim to a bomb 
attack by the Provisional I.R.A. on the next-door car parts business run by the renowned 
international car rally driver, Paddy Hopkirk. The resultant fire spread to number four, 
but some records of the society were rescued by Barry Bruton, and remain in his 
possession.
27
  While the society was not formally wound up, it effectively ceased to 
function after the loss of its premises.  
Finally, on the question of the northern society’s relationship with its 
counterpart in the south, Barry Bruton had some salient recollections. The northern 
society was independent and separate. This was partly due to diplomatic protocols, 
which obliged the society to conduct travel arrangements, etc. to the Soviet Union 
through the Soviet embassy to London.  Yet the two societies cooperated in their 
common cause, which principally took the form of arranging for transfers over the 
border for ongoing visits from officials and tourists from the Soviet Union. At the same 
time, however, Bruton mentioned his father’s view that there was a certain amount of 
uneasiness in Belfast that the society in the south received the greater level of attention 
from Friendship House in Moscow (headquarters of the Union of Soviet Societies for 
Friendly and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries), especially after the Soviet 
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embassy was opened in Dublin in 1974. However, before considering that period, the 
thesis must recommence its account of Soviet friendship in Dublin by beginning in 
1945.  
 
The Ireland-U.S.S.R. Friendship Society (1945-66) 
The Ireland-U.S.S.R. Friendship Society was established on 6 December 1945 at a 
meeting attended by about sixty people. Its aims were to promote friendship and 
understanding between the two countries’ peoples; to press for the establishment of 
diplomatic and trade relations; acquaint the Irish people with the Soviet system; and ‘to 
combat all falsehoods designed to misrepresent the peaceful aims of the Soviet 
Union’.28 The officers elected – all women – were: president, Helena M. Early; joint 
secretaries, Hilda Verlin (also known as Hilda E. Allberry) of 37 Fitzwilliam Square, 
and Margaret ‘Daisy’ McMackin; and treasurer, Anne Peache. The committee of eight 
persons included two stalwart communists, Sean ‘Johnny’ Nolan who ran the party 
bookshop, and R.N. ‘Robin’ Tweedy, an engineer whose professional interest in turf 
technology had taken him to the Soviet Union in 1935.
29
  
 Further details of the founding meeting were provided in a communication to the 
archbishop of Dublin, John Charles McQuaid, by a member of the clergy. A catalogue 
summary of the contents of the communication, available at the Dublin Diocesan 
Archives (D.D.A.), is instructive of the anti-communist stance of the Catholic church in 
the city at that time, and of the clergy’s ability to enlist members of the garda to act on 
its wishes. The catalogue summary reads: 
Handwritten letter to + [Archbishop] McQuaid from Fr Denis McGrath. Refers 
to a meeting in a newspaper cutting regarding the formation of the Irish-Soviet 
Society [sic] in Dublin. The meeting took place in Hynes Restaurant, Dame 
Street. The proprietor is Mr Hess, a Swiss convert. A sergeant in the guards gave 
him a flier announcing the meeting. He visited Mr Hess and asked him not to 
allow the meeting to take place as it was a communist meeting. He agreed but 
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the group ignored his protests and carried on. He will not allow them use his 
restaurant again.
30
 
 Details of what was perhaps the society’s first public meeting, held in January 
1946 in the Mansion House, Dublin, are contained in a handbill headed ‘8,000 miles 
through Russia – a travel talk by Major A.J. Hooper’.31 Hooper, a former British Army 
officer, was advertised as an expert on the Red Army, and his talk was illustrated by 
images taken by cameraman J. Allen Cash before the war,
32
 of Leningrad, Kharkov, 
Rostov, the Caucasus, Tiflis, Armenia, Yalta, Odessa and Kiev. The handbill promised 
an insight into conditions in the Soviet Union in 1946: ‘since some of these cities have 
been destroyed by the Germans, these pictures are now historic.’33 A second meeting 
was held later in the year, again in the Mansion House, to host another British speaker, 
Dr Hewlett Johnson, the dean of Canterbury. It was billed as: ‘What I saw in Soviet 
Russia’. Reverend Johnson was known as ‘the red dean of Canterbury’ for his espousal 
of Christian-Marxist dialogue, and pro-Soviet convictions.
34
  The meeting was attended 
by a large gathering. However, it was interrupted by a small number of protestors, said 
to be students. The Irish Times report included the following: 
While the dean was speaking, some young men in the balcony stood up and 
flung two Nazi German flags over the rails.... shouts of “up Franco” and “down 
with Jews” were heard, as the stewards battled to keep back the crowds.35  
It is perhaps significant that after the ensuing disturbance and confusion, proceedings 
were taken by the garda against two stewards who were alleged to have assaulted a 
protester. The charge was heard before a judge and jury. The stewards were convicted 
and sentenced to three months’ hard labour, or an alternative payment of a fine and 
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compensation totalling ninety-five pounds.
36
 That the main speakers at both events were 
British suggests that the Irish society was looking to the British-Soviet society for ideas, 
and this is supported by the existence of a copy of the latter’s constitution in the C.P.I. 
archive from that time.
37
 
The friendship society chose a more discreet affair for a 1947 event, as is 
revealed by a report in a department of external affairs file.
38
  The report details that Dr 
Kostal, the chargé d’affaires of Czechoslovakia to Ireland, had called to the Department 
of External Affairs to inform that he had received an invitation from the Ireland-
U.S.S.R. Friendship Society to speak on the subject of cultural relations between 
Czechoslovakia and Russia. Dr Kostal was concerned that while it would be awkward 
for him not to accept the invitation because of the close ties between his country and the 
Soviet Union, he did not wish to accept definitely without consulting the Irish 
authorities.  The approach was reported to the taoiseach, Eamon de Valera, who in turn 
consulted the minister for justice, Gerry Boland. Gerry Boland was a brother of Harry 
Boland who, as discussed in chapter one, had been in contact with Soviet officials in 
New York in 1920 and brought the czarist jewels to Ireland. Gerry Boland, too, had 
engaged with the Soviet Union: in 1926, before Fianna Fáil entered the dáil, de Valera 
had sent him to the Soviet Union, as a ‘political chaperone’ to an I.R.A. delegation, 
which was seeking Soviet weapons. They met there with J.V. Stalin, but returned home 
empty-handed.
39
 Now, with de Valera and Boland in government, Dr Kostal was 
instructed, as follows: 
... while the department would not make any objection to his accepting the 
invitation, he should bear in mind that his usefulness as representative of 
Czechoslovakia would be impaired if he came to be regarded by the Irish people 
as a communist or fellow-traveller; also that the group inviting him to address 
them might be inclined to exploit him in order to enhance the prestige of their 
organisation.
40
  
Dr Kostal responded with thanks and assurances that he would endeavour to discourage 
publicity for the meeting. This diplomatic exchange serves to show the de Valera 
government’s negative attitudes not just towards the friendship society but also towards 
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the emerging new communist states of central Europe, at the earliest stages of the Cold 
War. Furthermore, it may suggest that the Czech diplomat was less than eager to be 
centre stage at the pro-Soviet meeting – perhaps reflecting the non-communist position 
of the then minister for foreign affairs, Jan Masaryk, in the coalition government 
established in Czechoslovakia immediately after the end of the Second World War.
41
        
Thereafter, the activities of the friendship society were mainly confined to 
meetings and lectures on a small basis, and to showings of Soviet films, including in the 
1950s Maxim Gorky‘s Childhood and The mother ‘in small rooms…while outside the 
building the political police took careful note of everyone who attended such films.’42 
Frank Edwards, who, as noted above had previously been involved in the Belfast 
teachers’ visit to the Soviet Union, organised these film shows and utilised a Soviet 
supplied projector and films, often in the premises of the Irish Workers’ Party at 37 
Pembroke Lane, Dublin.
43
 The society published a booklet, Approach pattern: an Irish 
traveller's impressions of the Soviet Union (1951), recounting Hilda Allberry’s 
experiences of her visit in the autumn of 1950. She went as part of a delegation of 
sixteen women, the rest being academics, workers and housewives from Scotland and 
England, who were invited by the Soviet Women’s Anti-Fascist Committee in Moscow. 
They were invited to ‘enable a group of ordinary women from the West to see for 
themselves what life was like...and to report truthfully of their findings on returning 
home.’44 The booklet’s cover was designed by artist Harry Kernoff,45 and a no-holds-
barred preface by Sean O'Casey gave a succinct account of the playwright’s view of the 
Soviet Union, his reaction to impressions of Allberry’s visit, and his angst for the new 
elite in 1950s Ireland:  
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Look at the Soviet Union and you will see the mightiest achievement made 
by man since social life began to grope its way into life tens of thousands of 
years ago...don’t believe what is said about the U.S.S.R. by the timid clergy and 
by those who have a nice bit in the bank. See and hear for yourself, and this 
pamphlet will give you a first glimpse of a great land where poverty and 
uncertainty for the future have been abolished.
46
  
The booklet also advertised the society’s postal address as 37 Fitzwilliam Square, 
Dublin, and its annual subscription, to include a monthly newsletter, of 3s.   
In the early 1960s, a particular highlight for the society was a number of visits 
by Lev Sedin, a popular Russian journalist, with the Soviet international magazine, 
Novoe Vremya (New Times). He was fondly remembered by members and friends of 
the society for the manner in which he impressed his Dublin audiences at meetings as he 
presented accounts of Soviet life, earning for himself the description ‘a worthy if 
unofficial ambassador’. 47  This affection was recalled by Art O’Beoláin, a former 
assistant secretary in the Irish department of social welfare, and a Russian scholar: 
I liked Lev from the first day I met him. Anytime he came to Ireland in the 
1960s, and he came quite a few times, he came to dinner with us and our mutual 
friends, among whom were Nora [Harkin], Bobby [Edwards] and Frank 
[Edwards], and without doubt we went with them to meet Lev and to the 
occasions the society organised in his honour. I would always give a book to 
Lev, and he also gave me books. When he published, along with Viktor 
Matveyev, a small book about this country [entitled, The many shades of green], 
he gave me a copy, and wrote a greeting inside for me.
48
  
Sedin’s death in 1980 was also marked by an obituary by Sean Nolan in the Irish 
Socialist, the monthly newspaper of the C.P.I. Nolan recalled that Sedin had toured 
Donegal with the veteran republican socialist and writer, Peadar O’Donnell, and that 
Sedin had been on the boards of two academic journals in his homeland, On Philosophy 
and Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, in the 1960s.
49
 However, despite these and 
other occasional information meetings on Soviet life, the work of the Ireland-U.S.S.R. 
Friendship Society only operated on a spasmodic basis from the late 1940s to the mid-
1960s.  
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Brief account of the life of Margaret ‘Daisy’ McMackin   
To close off on these accounts of the forerunner societies and to give a deeper insight 
into the life of an activist in Irish-Soviet affairs, this section of the study concludes with 
a consideration of a woman who participated in the activities of both the 1928 and 1946 
societies in Dublin, and to a lesser extent with the society formed in 1966: Margaret 
‘Daisy’ McMackin/Maighréad Nic Mhaicín.50  This account is aided by an interview 
with McMackin’s daughter, Mairéad Breslin Kelly.51 John McMackin was a member of 
the Royal Irish Constabulary in Dungloe, County Donegal, when Daisy, his third 
daughter of a family of nine children, was born in 1899. McMackin moved his family to 
Belfast, where Daisy excelled academically at the Dominican Sisters’ secondary school 
on the Falls Road. With the aid of scholarships she graduated from Queen’s University, 
Belfast with first class honours in French and Celtic in 1919, and in 1928 achieved a 
M.A. in Celtic. She also spent a year at the Sorbonne, Paris. She shared a house in 
Dublin at 21, Dawson Street in the mid-1920s with a group of intellectual republican 
women. Todd Andrews, then a leading I.R.A. figure and visitor to 21 Dawson Street, 
recalled of McMackin: ‘a woman of exceptional intelligence…petite, with striking red 
hair and a beautiful speaking voice’.52 She went to the Soviet Union with the I.F.S.R. in 
1932 and later returned there in 1935 to work as a translator with the Co-operative 
Publishers for Foreign Workers in Moscow. While there she met and married Patrick 
Breslin from Dublin, but returned home, alone, in 1937 after she became pregnant and 
before he fell foul of the N.K.V.D., the Soviet state police.
53
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McMackin gave birth to a daughter, Mairéad, in Belfast, but then returned to 
Dublin where she had many republican and communist friends and acquaintances. 
McMackin had previously secured an apartment on the third-floor of 59 Grafton Street. 
This apartment continued as her home and a place of welcome for a succession of 
political and academic visitors from many parts of Ireland and abroad. As a single 
parent, she set about utilising her language skills to earn a living and the following 
advert was a regular feature in the classified columns of the Irish Times: ‘Margaret 
McMackin, M.A., 59 Grafton Street - university, intermediate, and civil service grinds - 
Irish, Latin, French, English, mathematics’.54 She also organised and delivered courses 
in Russian at Trinity College, Dublin (T.C.D.) from 1942 to 1969, initially on a bi-
weekly, extramural basis. This initiative attracted media attention, as per the following 
account: 
Her thirty pupils comprise men and women, old and young...doing extremely 
well...the chief difficulty is in learning the alphabet...letters resemble English but 
mean something quite different... it is easier for Irish people to learn Russian for 
it bears a closer resemblance to Irish than most European languages.
55
 
Her courses progressed to the main body of Russian classical literature and works of 
Soviet writers, and several students achieved the Advanced Certificate of the Institute of 
Linguistics, London, for interpreters. She became a full-time lecturer at T.C.D. and was 
a co-founder of the Russian Department in 1962.
56
 She also translated works from 
Russian to Irish, including: An Silín-Ghort [The Cherry orchard] 1935, (Anton Chekov): 
and, with Fr Gearóid Ó Nualláin, Scéalta ón Rúisis [Stories from Russia] 1955, (Leo 
Tolstoi, Ivan Turgenev and Alexander Pushkin), which were published by An Gúm, the 
Irish state publisher of educational works in the Irish language.
57
 Revealing of the 
prevailing anti-communist attitudes of the 1950s, none of her translations for An Gúm 
related to Russian literature of the Soviet era. Also of interest was McMackin’s 
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contention that scholars of Irish had an advantage over their monoglot, English-
speaking colleagues.
58
 
Despite her husband’s fate (she suspected, but never knew for sure how he 
died)
59
 McMackin remained loyal to and supportive of the Soviet Union. She authored 
an account of the high standard and ease-of-access to cinema in Russia;
60
 she was an 
active correspondent on behalf of the Soviet friendship society,
61
 and she lectured on the 
theme of the Soviet educational system to the Irish Women’s Social and Progressive 
League
62
 - a feminist organisation established by Hanna Sheehy-Skeffington in 1937.
63
 
McMackin kept pictures of both Lenin and Stalin in her apartment. She approved of the 
Soviet intervention into Hungary in 1956 and when an anti-Soviet episode would blow 
up in the media around a human rights issue, McMackin would simply say: ‘they have 
blotted their copy book again – I wish they wouldn’t do that.’64 She made her apartment 
available in the 1950s for early meetings of the embryonic Irish Workers’ League until 
it secured premises at Pembroke Road, as was confirmed by the then League activist, 
Sam Nolan, who attended such meetings in McMackin’s apartment.65   In 1960 she 
visited the Soviet Union as part of a four-person delegation from Irish universities that 
included Martín Ó Cadhain, the prominent republican, author and academic who was 
then a member of staff at the Department of Modern Irish at T.C.D.
66
   
At the same time, and beyond her relationship with her fellow members in the 
society and the communist movement, she became a magnet for various Russian people, 
mostly White Russians, who ended up in Dublin. These included a group of Russian 
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refugees, many of whom had first lived in exile in the eastern Chinese city of Harbin 
from the 1920s until after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1947, 
and arrived as Red Cross refugees in Ireland in the 1950s and 60s. They took up 
residency at the Irish Red Cross’s refuge homes, Naomh Aindreas, opposite the Royal 
Dublin Society (R.D.S.), Dublin and later at The Haven, Clonliffe Avenue, Dublin.  
McMackin acted as an interpreter at a formal meeting between the chairman of the Irish 
Red Cross and the Russians regarding their living conditions at Naomh Aindreas.
67
 
When the refugees moved to The Haven, McMackin brought her daughter there to 
attend Russian Orthodox masses and to speak Russian. Her other émigré acquaintances 
included ‘Aunt’ Judith Izakovich from Grozny, Chechen Republic, who came to Ireland 
as a governess to Raymond McGrath and his family,
68
  and two elderly Russian ladies 
of independent means, Madam Elizabeth Sluchevskya, who lived in a flat on Eccles 
Street, and Maria (surname not available).
69
 She brought many of these Russian émigrés 
and Russianists from T.C.D. together in her apartment every year to celebrate Pushkin’s 
birthday (6 June) with copious poetry renditions and toasts.  
Accordingly, it can be seen that this brief account of McMackin’s life serves to 
introduce to this study the complexities of Irish-Soviet-Russianist groups and 
personalities that coexisted and mixed in Dublin city, of which organised Irish-Soviet 
friendship was a part. 
The Ireland-U.S.S.R. Society, established 1966 
It took until the more favourable social and political atmosphere of the mid-1960s for a 
viable and openly active organisation to be launched in Dublin. In adopting the title of 
the Ireland-U.S.S.R. Society / Aontas na bPoblacht Soibheadhach Soisialach, it 
maintained a similar but shorter title to that of its predecessor – ‘Friendship’ was only 
removed to indicate that the organisation had started anew. In its founding constitution 
of fourteen articles, the society simply declared its object was to be ‘the promotion of 
understanding and friendship between Ireland and the U.S.S.R.’, and set its annual 
subscription for members at ‘ten shillings minimum’.70  The society’s foundation year 
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coincided with a number of favourable factors: the fiftieth anniversary of the 1916 
Easter Rising, which highlighted the socialist role and politics of James Connolly; the 
U.S. civil rights movement and its attendant folk music culture; the success and 
romance of the Cuban revolution; and growing opposition to the Vietnam war – 
dynamics seen by many as inspirational for radical change in Ireland. Other 
complementary developments at play were the impact of Seán Lemass’s economic 
policies, which had the effect of increased employment levels. Also, there was a 
noticeable reduction in the stridency of Catholic teaching and practice in the state, 
which arose from the modernising influence of the papacy of John XXIII and the second 
Vatican council of 1962 to 1965.  While the council’s most ‘important achievements’ 
were confined to ecumenical policies of redefining the church as the ‘whole people of 
God’ and ‘reaching out’ to other faiths,71 secularists and radicals also benefited from the 
increasingly tolerant atmosphere. Cardinal William Conway, archbishop of Armagh 
from 1963, spoke of ‘a certain sense of spring in the air through the church and, if I 
mistake not, in Ireland also’.72  And Sean Lemass’s economic dictum of the 1960s that 
the rising tide would lift all boats was also about to apply to the promoters of Irish-
Soviet friendship. 
This domestic milieu dovetailed with a lessening of Cold War tensions in east- 
west relations as the promotion of international peace, increasing trade and détente 
augured well for a more relaxed atmosphere in international relations.  Within the 
Soviet Union, this more favourable climate enabled the Union of Soviet Societies for 
Friendly and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries to renew its mission. This 
organisation had originally been established after the 1917 revolution, and had 
headquarters at Friendship House on Kalinin Prospect, Moscow, close to the Kremlin. 
Friendship House, built in 1894 in the lavish style of a Spanish castle for then 
prominent Russian industrialist Arseny Morozov, had been chosen by the new Soviet 
state to symbolise its intentions to foster friendship associations internationally.
73
  An 
indication of its status in 1972 was that its president, Madame Nina Popova, was then a 
member of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union.
74
 Her organisation was charged 
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with the task of stimulating among Soviet citizens an interest in other countries and 
establishing organised relations between them and their counterparts abroad. In this way 
the contacts were to be less political, more diplomatic, based upon forming connections 
between societal organisations on a mutually respectful basis. The following extract 
from an entry in the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia gives an indication of the reach and 
scope of the Union: 
In 1975 the union maintained contact with 7,500 organisations and with public 
figures, scientists, and cultural workers in 134 countries. In all, 108 societies, 
associations, and institutes of friendship with the U.S.S.R. were functioning on 
all continents of the world.
75
 
Included in those 108 societies was the U.S.S.R.-Ireland Society – whose relationship 
with Ireland will be discussed later in the chapter.  
The founding members of the Ireland-U.S.S.R. Society were: John Swift, 
chairman; Frank Edwards, secretary; Nora Harkin, Bobbie Edwards, Brendan Scott, and 
George Lawlor.
76
 Swift and Edwards were two tried and trusted communists who had 
served long apprenticeships through the bitter anti-communism of the earlier decades. 
While Swift, a self-described ‘Marxian socialist’ and member of the Labour Party from 
1927, never joined any communist party in Ireland he was ‘on friendly terms with 
leading C.P.I. members, such as Michael O’Riordan and Johnny Nolan in Dublin, and 
Andy Barr and Betty Sinclair in Belfast.’77 At the inauguration of the society, John 
Swift, then seventy years-of-age, was the father figure of the Labour movement. He had 
served as secretary of the Irish Bakers’, Confectioners’ and Allied Workers’ 
Amalgamated Union, and as office holder both with the Irish Trade Union Congress 
(1946) and the International Federation of Food and Allied Workers' Associations. His 
standing as a senior figure in the Labour movement was evidenced in 1973 when he was 
inaugurated as the founding president of the Irish Labour History Society.
78
 A multi-
linguist, in 1938 he had undertaken a six weeks’ mission to cities in Europe and the 
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Soviet Union to examine bakery products and production techniques, and also to 
conduct a study of Soviet trade unions. Thereafter he was convinced that: 
Soviet trade unions penetrate every aspect of social life from the production 
stages in the enterprise committees…only a mass organisation can do that and a 
very developed form of democracy brings large numbers into making decisions 
and carrying them out.
79
 
Throughout his twenty years as both chairman and later as honorary president of the 
society he placed particular emphasis on the promotion of mutual awareness and 
contacts between Irish and Soviet trade unions. Even before the society was launched 
Swift had led a visit in 1963 by a delegation from his Bakers’ Union to a Moscow 
bakery plant, at the invitation of the Russian Food Workers’ Union. This was the first 
visit by an Irish trade union delegation to the Soviet Union since the 1929 visit of the 
Dublin Trades Council to Moscow.
80
 Swift’s 1963 visit was also in contrast to the 
pilgrimage organised by the Bakers’ Union to Rome to mark the Holy Year of 1950, 
which Swift regarded as ‘extraordinarily insensitive to non-Catholic members.’ 81  
Accordingly, a return visit by Muscovite bakers to the Irish Bakers’ Union headquarters 
in 1967 heralded a new era of acceptance for labour delegations from the Soviet Union. 
The Muscovites proceeded upon a tour to Cork and Limerick, where they were warmly 
received by fellow bakers and municipal dignitaries.
82
 
Frank Edwards was a member of the Irish Workers’ Party (the forerunner of the 
Communist Party of Ireland), although in his position of secretary to the society he 
deliberately played down his party membership. Because of his experience with the 
‘Friendship’ society founded in 1946, he was determined to keep the activities of the 
new society separate from the party.
83
 Born in 1907, Edwards was brought up in 
Waterford city where he helped found in the 1930s a local group of the Irish Republican 
Congress, the new amalgam of disaffected I.R.A. left republicans and labour movement 
activists.
84
 It was at this time he had his first encounter with Irish-Soviet friendship 
when Hanna Sheehy-Skeffington gave an inspiring account of her visit to the Soviet 
Union at a meeting in Waterford.
85
  Edwards began his teaching career in the local 
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Christian Brothers School, Mount Sion, but was dismissed by church authorities when 
he refused to sign an undertaking to terminate his membership of the Republican 
Congress.
86
 He fought for the Republican cause in the Spanish Civil War and was 
wounded in action. On his return home and still precluded from Catholic controlled 
schools, he eventually found employment at the Jewish Zion National School, South 
Circular Road, Dublin and taught there until his retirement thirty years later.
87
 
Edwards’s appointment to the school was assisted by the influence of its principal, 
fellow Waterford man Joseph Barron, who was elected a Clann na Poblachta T.D. in 
1961 for Dublin South Central.
88
 A Russian scholar, with a good command of the 
language and possessed of an ability to involve leading academics, politicians, and 
personalities with his ongoing initiatives, Edwards persisted with his life’s mission, and 
remained the Ireland-U.S.S.R. Society’s principal activist and secretary until his death 
in 1983. Shortly before his death his son Seán acted as secretary until 1985, and 
continued thereafter as an active and influential member of the society’s committee. 
Nora Harkin, nee McGinley, came from the republican movement. She was born 
in 1910 into a radical republican family in Donegal, which took the anti-treaty side. 
Following a move to Dublin to take up a post with the Irish Hospitals’ Sweepstake, she 
became active in support of Republican Spain on an aid committee. She recalled that 
this helped lead her away from a militarist position in Ireland as: ‘it was a time when 
you either stuck with the gun or you read and read and developed the political 
argument’.89  In 1939 she married Charlie Harkin from County Tyrone, a former I.R.A. 
man who had helped establish the Republican Congress. They had three children, one of 
whom died very young.  Her surviving sons recalled that they grew up beneath the gaze 
of portraits of Marx, Lenin and ‘Uncle Joe’ Stalin.  She became a working actress, 
appearing in the Peacock Theatre and singing on Radió Éireann. She was also an 
activist with the Irish Family Planning Association and the Irish anti-apartheid 
movement. But of all the causes that she espoused, the Ireland-U.S.S.R. Society grew to 
be the one with which she was most associated. After John Swift became the society’s 
honorary president in the 1980s, Harkin became the chairman and travelled regularly to 
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the Soviet Union.
90
  She made her home, The Lodge, Monkstown, County Dublin, 
available for annual fundraising garden parties and as a place of welcome for the 
constant stream of Soviet visitors.
91
  She died on 7 June 2012, aged 101 years. 
Bobbie Edwards (nee Walsh), born in Waterford in 1910, had been treasurer of 
the Spanish Republican Aid Committee. Like her close friend Nora Harkin, she worked 
in the Irish Hospitals’ Sweepstake, where she was canteen manager of the sweepstake’s 
associated company, the Ballsbridge Luncheon Club. Alongside her husband Frank, the 
society’s secretary, she attended to a great deal of the practical work of the society, 
including the hosting of a succession of Soviet visitors to Ireland at the Edwards’s 
family home. 
What was it that made these responsible and prominent people so determined to 
promote closer relations with the Soviet Union - a proposition which was still an 
anathema to many people in 1960s Irish society? Crucially, their formative years were 
the nineteen-thirties. Because of their activism as left-republicans and labour movement 
militants, they had lost faith with the militarism of the I.R.A. while at the same time 
rejecting the politics of de Valera’s Fianna Fáil and the reformist Labour party.  Further, 
their involvement in the Irish contribution to international brigades fighting in Spain 
was decisive. They considered that of the major powers in Europe, it was the Soviet 
Union alone, which actively supported the Spanish republic in its attempts to stave off 
the assault of General Francisco Franco and his German and Italian fascist allies.  In this 
Edwards, Harkin and co. had been part of a European-wide anti-fascist movement that 
drew support from liberal intellectuals and working class militants – a phenomenon 
which Hobsbawm describes:  
When the reality of the U.S.S.R. might have been expected to repel them at the 
time of the Stalinist terror... but it was the time of earthquakes for the bourgeois-
liberal societies of the West, of the triple trauma of slump, fascist triumph and 
approaching world war. The ‘U.S.S.R. in Construction’ could appear as a 
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society built in the image of reason, science and progress, the lineal descendants 
of the great French Revolution.
92
 
Furthermore, the recording of Swift’s own views is testament to the founders’ ongoing 
motivational drive:  
Since the Bolshevik Revolution...the U.S.S.R. was virtually under siege. Civil 
war, and the associated military interventions by the main capitalist powers; the 
Nazi invasion during the Second World War,  resulting in the destruction of 
much of the Soviet economy...the deaths of twenty million citizens; in the Cold 
War the U.S.S.R. was a target for vilification by the West. Notwithstanding... 
the Union had advanced from little more than a feudal state in 1917 to a socialist 
superpower in the 1960s.
93
  
One of the remaining founders was George Lawlor, a Bakers’ Union colleague of Swift. 
He worked in Gateaux Ltd. of Finglas, Dublin, then one of Ireland’s leading cake 
manufacturers, in a middle management position for approximately thirty years. He was 
a Labour party member and a peace commissioner. A stalwart member of the society, 
Lawlor was a stickler for proper committee procedures, and remained an active member 
until the society’s dissolution.94 
Finally, Brendan Scott can be seen as representative of the radicalised 1960s 
generation. A secondary school teacher at the multi-denominational Sutton Park School, 
Dublin, he was the vice-chair of the society. At just thirty-three years of age in 1966 he 
brought not only youth, but as an active member of the Labour party and founder 
member of the Irish anti-apartheid movement, a broader appeal to the society.
95
 While a 
prominent activist for friendship with the Soviet Union, he was not uncritical of Soviet 
policy, and joined with some members of the Irish Workers’ Party, the forerunner 
organisation of the C.P.I., in a public protest in Dublin against the Warsaw Pact 
intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. This was in contrast to John Swift, who called 
to the Irish Workers’ Party bookshop to privately criticise Michael O’Riordan and his 
comrades for not supporting the Warsaw Pact action.
96
   Revealing on the matter of 
personal relations in the committee, ‘he sometimes acted as peacemaker between Frank 
Edwards and Swift…in their turbulent personal relationship’.97 Scott’s death at the age 
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of forty in September 1973 (just as diplomatic relations between Ireland and the Soviet 
Union were finally established) was regarded as ‘a severe loss for the left.’98  
Scott’s place on the committee was taken up for many years by Mártain Ó 
Siadhail (Martin Sheil), a manager with Gael Linn of Irish language courses for young 
people and Slógadh music festivals. A founding secretary of the Gael Linn section of 
the I.T.G.W.U., he was also prominent in classical and traditional music circles.
99
 Like 
Scott before him, Ó Siadhail’s contribution to the society’s committee also involved the 
smoothing of personal relations between Edwards and Swift.
100
  
Angela McQuillan, from County Roscommon, was among the early students at 
T.C.D.’s new Russian department (founded in 1963) from 1964 to 1968. She had 
previously taken some Russian classes at University College, Dublin (U.C.D.), where 
Martin Bates, an intelligence officer in the Irish Defence forces, taught Russian on a 
part-time basis.
101
 While studying French at T.C.D. under Professor Owen (Skeff) 
Sheehy-Skeffington (son of Hanna Sheehy-Skeffington), she was advised by him to 
resume her studies in the Russian language.
102
 Her attendance at T.C.D. was noteworthy, 
not just that she immersed herself in the Russian language, but as a young, newly-
married woman from a Catholic background, she was among the first students to break 
taboos relating to gender and marital status still in place in early 1960s Ireland.
103
 
Further, at that time in many dioceses Catholics still required special dispensation to 
enrol at T.C.D. Joe Joyce, in his ‘From the archives’ column in the Irish Times, 
reproduced this instruction in a list of regulations read at masses in the diocese of Dr 
Charles McQuaid, archbishop of Dublin, in February 1950: 
No Catholic may enter the Protestant University of Trinity College, without 
having previously submitted his [sic] case to the ordinary of the diocese, whose 
right it is to decide whether attendance may be tolerated. Any Catholic who 
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deliberately disobeys this law is guilty of mortal sin and is unworthy to receive 
the sacraments.
104
    
McQuillan had been a supporter of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (C.N.D.) 
when she lived in England earlier in the 1960s, but she was attracted to the Ireland-
U.S.S.R. Society initially because of the Russian language. She became one of the first 
new members when she responded to a ‘notice in a newspaper which Frank Edwards 
managed to get published.’105 She was to put her linguistic skills to good use as the 
society set about organising Russian language classes. The classes were offered from 
1974 and were held under the auspices of the society in the premises of the Language 
Centre of Ireland at Wilton Place, Dublin, with McQuillan as the sole tutor.
106
 One of 
her first pupils was the seventy-eight years old John Swift, anxious to keep his Russian 
up to date. She became a central member and secretary of the society from 1985. 
The novelty of the society’s early Soviet visitors to Ireland attracted 
considerable publicity and lent an air of ‘respectability’ to its cause. A 1970 reception in 
Dublin for visitors, one of whom was a Russian Catholic priest, was attended by a 
unique gathering of Irish V.I.P.s, including the then chief justice and later president of 
Ireland, Cearbhall Ó Dálaigh;
107
 Roddy Connolly, son of James and founder member of 
the first C.P.I. in 1922; and poet and author, Austin Clarke.
108
 Clarke (1896-1974), an 
active supporter of the society until his death,
109
 was appreciated in Soviet literary 
circles – as shown by the following extract from the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia: 
‘Many of the poems in the collection Flight to Africa (1963) and Old-fashioned 
pilgrimage (1967) by A. Clarke satirically depict life in Ireland.’110  
                                                          
104
 Irish Times, 20 Feb. 2012. 
105
 Interview with Angela McQuillan (15 Apr. 2010). 
106
 McQuillan taught English as a foreign language at the language centre after graduating from T.C.D. 
The proprietor of the centre, Mary Towers, was a consistent member of the Ireland-U.S.S.R. society. 
Angela McQuillan interview (7 Oct. 2010).   
107
 O’Dálaigh and Frank Edwards had known one another as young students of Irish. They met on Great 
Blasket island, Co. Kerry, in the company of Peig Sayers. Mártain Ó Siadhail used to remark at Ireland-
U.S.S.R. meetings that the two had the ‘Blasket blas’ (Irish accent). Interview with Seán Edwards (21 
Sept. 2010). 
108
 Report and photograph, Sunday Press, 19 July 1970.  
109
 Interview with Angela McQuillan, 7 Oct. 2010. 
110
 A.P. Sarukhanian, ‘Ireland – Literature’, in G.S.E. (3rd ed., Moscow, 1979), x, p. 424. 
148 
 
The U.S.S.R. - Ireland Friendship Society 
When the foundation of the U.S.S.R.-Ireland Society took place in Moscow in 1966,
111
 
the same year as its counterpart organisation in Dublin, the Soviet Union can be 
described as then being at a political and economic crossroads. Having gone through a 
period of de-Stalinisation under Khrushchev, a new collective leadership of Aleksei 
Nikolayevich Kosygin, Nikolai Viktorovich Podgorny and Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev had 
been in place for two years. A critical feature of this leadership’s programme was an 
attempt to come to terms with a challenging economic reality: the traditional heavy 
industries and kolkhozes (state farms) were failing to meet the needs of an increasingly 
well-educated and sophisticated populace. The centrally planned Soviet economy had 
overcome the devastation of World War II, and provided full employment, education 
and health services and access to culture and sports opportunities for its citizens. 
Nevertheless, by the early 1960s it was clear to planners that if they wished to keep in 
touch with the advanced capitalist countries of the West, the union needed to reduce 
bureaucracy and expand participation and control at enterprise levels. To this end the 
Kosygin-Liberman reforms of 1965 were brought forward
 
to empower enterprises to 
better match production to consumer needs, and boost quality standards.
 112
  As part of 
this modernisation it was decided to access western technology by means of selective 
imports to upgrade and augment economic production. To further complement and 
facilitate this process, international friendship societies were established under the 
auspices of the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendly and Cultural Relations with 
Foreign Countries (as discussed above).  In line with Friendship House policy, its aim 
was to secure: 
mass membership, and this is achieved by corporate affiliations…the choice of 
affiliation to a particular society is made by the committee of the factory or other 
work-place or institute following a vote of those engaged in it. 
113
  
The prestige of the U.S.S.R.-Ireland Society can be gauged from the prominent position 
of its president in 1972, Professor Nickolai Kuzin, rector of the First Medical Institute 
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and chief surgeon of the Soviet Union’s health ministry.114 Members of the Moscow 
branch of the society included an Irish speaker from a Celtic languages institute, and 
Alexandra Zereva, a representative from a high school of 600 students whose interest in 
Ireland arose from the 1967 tercentenary celebrations of the birth of Dean Swift.  
Significant for a comment upon the then-stalled negotiation on the establishment of 
diplomatic relations with Ireland, another member of the Moscow committee was Boris 
Kudryavtsev, first secretary in the ministry of foreign affairs. In 1972 he advised John 
Swift in Friendship House that ‘it is not the fault of his ministry’ that relations had not 
yet been established.
115
 Accordingly, it can be seen that a degree of coordination was 
taking place between the two societies, with a particular stress on the establishment of 
diplomatic relations. 
Towards establishment of formal diplomatic relations 
Meantime back in Dublin in early 1973, the Irish society’s activities were in full spate, 
as is clear from detailed reports for the year’s first seven months.116 Before the formal 
announcement of 5 July by the minister for foreign affairs, Garret FitzGerald, that he 
had agreed with Andrei Gromyko to exchange diplomatic missions, the society had 
successfully hosted or been associated with a series of high profile events and 
receptions. These began in January with a lecture in Jury’s Hotel, Dublin on the subject 
of ‘The actor and national culture in the U.S.S.R.’, which was delivered by Gerry 
Alexander, president of the Irish Actors’ Equity Association - the trade union for Irish 
entertainers. Alexander and a fellow officer of the association, Dermot Doolin, had 
attended an international symposium held in October 1972 in Tashkent, Uzbekistan on 
issues relating to theatre. Alexander reported on conditions in the theatrical professions 
in the Soviet Union and ‘contrasted Soviet theatrical life with the uncertain fortunes of 
cultural workers and artists in Ireland and Britain, subject as these are to the vagaries of 
private promotion and speculation.’117 In February a gramophone recital was held under 
the society’s auspices at the Language Society of Ireland where recordings of Russian 
folk and classical music were introduced by two respected musical artists on the Dublin 
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musical scene: Gerry Murphy, composer and music teacher, and Patricia Cahill, a 
popular singer of stage and television.
118
  
The next meeting was to herald the introduction to a popular activity that was to 
last for nearly twenty years – the society’s holiday tours to the Soviet Union. ‘About 
three hundred persons’ were present in the Hibernian Hotel, Dublin to hear particulars 
of the tours on offer from Olga Doudina of the London office of Intourist, the Soviet 
tourist agency.
119
 The meeting was also addressed by a Mr Mulligan, manager of Lep 
Travel, with whose company the society was to develop a close business relationship.  
The March meeting featured a report on Soviet architectural and town planning 
matters. It was presented by Uinseann Mac Eoin,
120
 who had travelled in the previous 
year to Tashkent, Alma Ata and other cities in Soviet Central Asia with Frank Edwards 
and Victor Romashkin, secretary of the U.S.S.R.-Ireland Society. Mac Eoin, a long-time 
public critic of Dublin city’s planning policy which had resulted in an outcome, he 
claimed, whereby ‘the poor and marginalised are cast into working class suburbs to the 
west and north west’.121 Included in Mac Eoin’s written account of his impressions of 
his Soviet visit, was: 
western perception of public housing in Russia is simply that it consists of many 
hundreds of Ballymun towers...I can only say that their society does not appear 
to be so fractured...so obviously ghettoised as ours...one must remember that 
following 1945 they had to hastily throw up millions of house units...we found a 
normally furnished flat opening off a rather drab elevator/stair...were it in 
Dublin, it might be covered in litter and graffiti. Not so here. To the assistant 
planner of Tashkent, I shot the question: ‘who lives in the apartment next to you’? 
‘A butcher’. ‘Who lives over you’? ‘A vehicle mechanic’, and so on. A notable 
feature of Soviet civic planning has been the creation of great wide 
boulevards...accompanied by a superb system of underground metro trains, 
assisted by surface public transport.
122
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In this fashion Mac Eoin recorded his professional and candid opinion of the status of 
Soviet housing and planning in the 1970s.
123
  
The format for the April 1973 meeting was another gramophone recital, with 
Patricia Cahill again introducing the music. On this occasion the programme was more 
challenging, both artistically and politically. Held at Carroll’s Theatre, Dublin, the 
principal musical piece was Dmitri Shostakovich’s Symphony no. 13. Associated with 
the recital was a reading of some poetry from the prominent Soviet poet, Yevgeny 
Aleksandrovich Yevtushenko, by Gerry Alexander of Actors’ Equity. 124   As the 
composer had visited Ireland in July of the previous year (as discussed in chapter two), 
the selection of Shostakovich’s music was topical. More importantly, the symphony - 
subtitled ‘Babi Yar’ – raised a number of issues of political interest and debate. Based 
upon Yevtushenko’s poems, the symphony is divided into five movements. In the first 
instance, it commemorates the infamous massacre by the Nazis during their occupation 
of the Soviet Union from 1941, at Babi Yar, a ravine outside of Kiev. There over 
100,000 victims, including ‘over 33,000 Jews…[and] similar numbers of Ukrainians 
and Russians were shot and buried in mass graves.
125
 The relevant poem’s emphasis is 
on the killing of the Jews. It bemoans the absence of a monument at Babi Yar, and 
raises the continued existence of anti-Semitism in Soviet society. This is starkly put in 
the poem:  
...O my Russian people! 
              I know  you  
are international to the core.  
But those with unclean hands  
have often made a jingle of your purest name.  
I know the goodness of my land.  
How vile these anti-Semites- 
Without a qualm  
They pompously called themselves  
“The Union of the Russian People”!126  
 
Although published in Literaturnaya Gazeta, the official organ of the Union of Soviet 
Writers, the poem came in for strong criticism. The poet was ‘accused of trying to drive 
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a wedge between nationalities, of inciting ethnic hatred by elevating the wartime 
suffering of Jews above that of Russians’.127 But Shostakovich had been so impressed 
with its sentiments and content that he phoned a startled Yevtushenko and requested 
permission to set the poem to music. The symphony, which was first performed in 1962 
during the Khrushchev period, featured other negative aspects of Soviet life, such as: 
the endurance of women as they were regularly required to queue for hours for food, 
and the ongoing impact of stifling bureaucracy. At the same time, the symphony paid 
tribute to the creativity of the Soviet peoples. It is noteworthy that while Yevtushenko 
and Shostakovich were critical of aspects of Soviet society, they were also both 
supportive of, and prominent in, the Soviet system. Yevtushenko had risen to 
prominence in 1958 as a new voice in Russian literature with his love poetry, but most 
notably with his poem Stantsiia Zima (Zima Junction). This gave an expression for 
many Soviet people of their sense of reassessment in the wake of Khrushchev’s 
denunciation of Stalin at the Twentieth Party Congress, with ‘its reaffirmation of faith 
in the essential goodness of the nation, in spite of the terrible revelations’. 128   No 
mention is made in the society’s record of the event regarding interpretations of the 
symphony or of the Yevtushenko poem offered by the artists. As the report does 
confirm that John Swift chaired the event, it is to be expected that he would have 
ensured that a portrayal of a positive image of the Soviet Union prevailed. Nevertheless, 
the content of the programme does indicate that the society was not averse to hosting an 
event that revealed that the Soviet Union was not a socialist paradise, but rather a 
society wherein artists and others were engaged in exposing and articulating failures and 
injustices with a view to improving the system. Evidence of this sentiment is contained 
in the closing lines of Babi Yar:  
...The Internationale, let it thunder 
When the last anti-semite on earth 
Is buried forever. 
In my blood there is no Jewish blood. 
In their callous rage, all anti-semites 
Must hate me now as a Jew. 
For that reason 
I am a true Russian!
129
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May of 1973 brought a two-week visit of the Georgian State Dance Company, a group 
of over seventy dancers and musicians, to Dublin. They were enthusiastically received 
by the city’s audiences at sixteen separate performances and were received at the 
parliamentary chambers of the dáil and senate by the tánaiste, Brendan Corish. The 
society also hosted a reception in the dancers’ honour in the Mansion House, the official 
residence of the lord mayor of Dublin. A previous lord mayor had been Frank Cluskey, 
who was now an up-and-coming junior government minister, and the society was 
careful to record his involvement in the welcomes for the Georgian visitors.
130
  
Nonetheless, of all the guests present in the Mansion House, it was Foreign Minister 
Garret FitzGerald whose presence was most significant – within a month he would 
successfully submit a memorandum to cabinet for the opening of diplomatic relations 
with the Soviet Union.  
Reaction of the society to the establishment of diplomatic relations 
In the afterglow of the announcement by Garret FitzGerald that he had agreed 
with Andrei Gromyko for the exchange of diplomatic missions, a special meeting of the 
society’s committee was convened on 15 July 1973 to consider an appropriate reaction. 
Unsurprisingly, members declared their ‘enthusiastic welcome [for the]  realisation of 
one of the society’s principal aims’,131 but they also decided to enter into their records – 
not a self-congratulatory résumé – but rather two principal declarations. First, in the 
light of the recent changes that had taken place in public opinion in Ireland to the point 
where formal relations could be enacted, it was recorded that the U.S.S.R.-Ireland 
Society had made a telling contribution in recent years by sending to Ireland a 
succession of leading representatives who had ‘shown themselves as not only worthy 
citizens of a great world power rich in cultural heritage, but emissaries of peace and 
friendship.
132
 In this regard, it was agreed to dispatch a letter of appreciation to the 
general secretary of the Soviet society in Moscow. Second, the Irish officers pledged to 
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re-dedicate themselves to their work by availing of the new opportunities arising from 
diplomatic recognition. To do so it was agreed to undertake whatever was deemed 
necessary to expand the society’s membership and strengthen its administration. No 
attempt was made in the report, however, to go beyond the joint efforts of the Irish and 
Soviet societies, that is, to address the impact of trade and E.E.C. considerations upon 
the Irish government’s decision. The officers were content to inform their colleagues in 
Moscow that their joint labours from 1966 had helped to deliver formal diplomatic 
relations between their two states, and to prepare themselves for new opportunities that 
surely lay ahead.   
After the opening of the Soviet embassy in Dublin, the society focused upon its 
next major objective: an Irish-Soviet cultural agreement. As a first step, an agreement 
between the Irish and Soviet societies was enacted. It was formally signed in March 
1976 at Liberty Hall, Dublin, by the two societies’ presidents, John Swift and Professor 
Kuzin, with the Soviet ambassador, Anatoli Kaplin in attendance.
133
 The agreement 
sought to develop ties in the areas of culture, economy, science, language appreciation 
and tourism, and to promote link ups between individual trade unions and towns from 
each country.  While this was an important public occasion for the two societies and the 
Soviet embassy, it was not a cultural agreement between the two countries, or one that 
was acknowledged by the Irish state. This was indicated by the absence of any mention 
of Irish diplomats or government ministers in the records of the event. 
Soon after the signing, however, the Irish society attempted to convince the Irish 
government of the value of a state-to-state cultural agreement. It chose to do so in a 
public way, in an effort to both inform and seek public support for such a formal 
agreement. The Irish Times carried the society’s open letter to the government, which 
began by pointing to obligations in the Helsinki Agreement on European Security 
(C.S.C.E.), signed by Ireland in 1975, to ‘increase substantially their cultural 
exchanges …both at the bilateral and multilateral level in all fields’.134   The letter 
continued by listing the cultural opportunities for exchanges of theatre, ballet, etc. In 
further compliance with the Helsinki Agreement in the area of the promotion of foreign 
language studies and the sharing of scientific knowledge, it articulated the need for a 
supply of teachers, interpreters and translators of Soviet literature and Russian classical 
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works. The letter concluded by saying that as the Soviet system operated on a planned 
basis, a formal agreement would ‘impose the obligation on both sides to fulfil expressed 
intentions, and facilitate satisfactory arrangements’.135 Society officers sought to add 
extra clout to the letter with the inclusion of the signatures of prominent cultural and 
academic personalities, including John Behan, sculptor;
136
 Aloys Fleischmann, director 
of the Cork International Choral and Folk Dance Festival; Fintan Kennedy, president of 
I.T.G.W.U.; Tomás MacAnna, resident director of the Abbey Theatre; Uinseann Mac 
Eoin, architect and author; and Roger McHugh, professor of Anglo-Irish literature at 
U.C.D.  
Evidence of the government’s position on this matter in 1976 is contained in an 
internal Department of Foreign Affairs record of a meeting between Ambassador Kaplin 
and Irish diplomat, Noel Dorr, to organise details of Dr FitzGerald’s visit to the Soviet 
Union. Dorr’s minute of the meeting states: 
If we agree... on the desirability of concluding a cultural agreement at some time 
in the very remote future – I had made the point that while, in principle, we are 
ready to develop cultural relations it may not be immediately practicable for us 
for financial and other reasons to move too fast in the development of a 
framework of agreements for this purpose.
137
  
By 1980 an agreement had still not been enacted, and it seems according to an internal 
D.F.A. review of Irish-Soviet relations that the government felt under no particular 
pressure to revisit the issue. The relevant reference in the report read: ‘The absence of 
such an agreement does not hinder cultural exchanges between Ireland and the Soviet 
Union.’138 For the Ireland-U.S.S.R. Society there was a tangible outcome to the refusal. 
It meant that the ‘soft power’ arising from organised Irish-Soviet cultural exchanges 
was left in the hands of the society. 
Irish campaign groups for emigration rights for Soviet Jewry 
The above Liberty Hall meeting to witness the signing of the societies’ cultural 
agreement also serves to introduce to this study two other groups of Irish people who 
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had an active, but decidedly unfriendly, interest in the Soviet Union: the Dublin 35s 
Women’s Campaign for Soviet Jewry; and the Irish Soviet Jewry Committee. Between 
the two groups, about twenty-five people participated in a picket outside the Liberty 
Hall meeting. The Irish Times’ report of the event stated that the Soviet ambassador was 
singled out for particular attention by the picketers with placards and shouted 
injunctions that read ‘let Soviet Jews go’.139 However, while the article gave details of 
the picketing groups’ titles and aims, it failed to give any background on the issue from 
the Soviet Union’s position.   
The Dublin 35s group was part of a campaign, principally based in Britain, 
Canada, and the United States, which agitated for increased emigration rights for Jews 
living in the Soviet Union.
140
  The campaign, which began in London in 1971, was 
prompted by the trial of a thirty-five year old librarian, Raiza Palatnik, on the charge of 
spreading ‘malicious slander against the Soviet government and social order’ in the city 
of Odessa, Ukraine, and her subsequent sentencing to two years imprisonment.
141
 This 
campaign claimed that Palatnik was an activist among Soviet Jews, some of whom, 
emboldened by Israel’s victory in the Six Day War of 1967, wanted to ‘leave the land of 
their persecution and to find new roots in Israel, the land of their forefathers’.142 The 
campaign’s first activity was initiated by Ijo Rager, councillor in charge of Soviet-
Jewish affairs at the Israeli embassy in London, when he called a number of Jewish 
women to his office and suggested to them that they organise a group of thirty-five 
females from their north west London Jewish community to mount a picket on the 
Soviet embassy in London. This they duly did, on first of May 1971, when, dressed in 
black, the women focused their protest on Madame Lyudmila Smirnovskaya, wife of 
the ambassador. Their action attracted considerable media attention, and the sobriquet 
‘the 35s’ was attached to their movement.  
With the aid not only of the Israeli embassy but with funding from British 
businessman Cyril Stein,
143
 the 35s’ campaign attracted considerable support in Jewish 
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communities throughout Britain.  Many branches in the British provinces were 
subsequently established, including the Dublin group, as it ‘was always included in the 
provincial section of the 35s.’144 These branches championed the causes of individual 
Soviet ‘refusniks’ (from the Russian otkaznik, ‘one who is refused’), and a hallmark of 
the 35s’ activities was their ability to mount inventive protests at Soviet embassies, 
meetings of the British-U.S.S.R. and Ireland-U.S.S.R. societies, and cultural events 
featuring high-profile Soviet visitors, as was confirmed by the following samples from 
the résumé of the work of the Dublin 35s: 
1977 demonstration outside the Soviet embassy, dressed 
in prison garb. 
1979 picketed the international stand at the travel fair. 
35s’ banners were ripped up by Russians. 
1980 a Moscow Olympics protest at the Royal Dublin 
Society government-sponsored sports exhibition. 
1983 demonstration during the visit of the Soviet State 
Symphony Orchestra. 
 Demonstration outside a Soviet trade show at the 
Royal Dublin Society. Sold Chanukkah cards 
(these cards celebrate the Jewish festival of lights, 
which is related to the reclaiming by the Jews of 
the Holy Temple in Jerusalem from the control of 
the Seleucid Empire, c. 100 B.C.).  
1985 at the National Concert Hall, bouquets were 
thrown on the stage during a performance by the 
Georgian State Dancers.
145
 
A joint meeting with Amnesty International in 1977, and a prayer vigil with a Christian 
and other Jewish organisations in 1978 outside the Soviet embassy in Dublin, are also 
listed.  
According to Ray Rivlin in Jewish Ireland (2011), Jewish men were more to the 
fore in the second campaign group, the Irish Soviet Jewry Committee. It grew out of 
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Ruach, a Jewish community newssheet, published from 1969 to 1973 by a group of 
young activists, among whom Alan Shatter was the most prominent.
146
 In 1984, Shatter, 
having become a Fíne Gael T.D., secured backing for an all-party motion in the dáil 
demanding emigration rights for Soviet Jews, and this was followed by a similar motion, 
sponsored by senators David Norris and Mary Robinson, in the seanad. Shatter’s group 
also engaged in developing telephone contacts with Jews in Moscow and Leningrad to 
gather and disseminate information concerning refusniks.
147
   
The anti-Soviet stance of the above Irish-Jewish groups was in contrast to a pro-
Soviet tradition that had existed among some members of the Jewish community in 
Ireland, and to a mutual respect between Irish communists and Irish Jews. Among these 
had been the notable painter-artist Harry Kernoff, who had gone to Soviet Russia with 
Hanna Sheehy-Skeffington in 1930, and who had collaborated with the publication of 
Hilda Allberry’s booklet relating her visit to Russia in 1950, Approach pattern (as 
discussed above). And there was Irish Jewish involvement in the Spanish Civil War 
against Franco’s forces, with the participation of Morris ‘Morry’ Levitas, of Warren 
Street, Dublin.  Levitas was a communist, and like Michael O’Riordan of the C.P.I., he 
too was a member of the Connolly Column. Levitas fought on the Aragon front before 
being captured in 1938, after which he endured imprisonment for a year in the Francoist 
concentration camp of San Pedro de Cardea.
148
  Michael O’Riordan had a particular 
commitment to the Jewish community, as indicated in Lawrence White’s recent 
biographical essay on O’Riordan (2011).  White recounts that the C.P.I. leader had 
defended the solicitor and future lord mayor of Cork, Gerald Yael Goldberg, from anti-
semitic attacks in the 1940s, and that: 
Forthright opposition to anti-semitism was a constant throughout O'Riordan's 
career; after taking up residence in Dublin's Portobello district, he was actively 
involved in cultural activities of the sizeable Jewish population of the area. 
149
 
Furthermore, as mentioned above, Frank Edwards of the Ireland-U.S.S.R. Society had 
been employed by the Jewish Zion National School in Dublin in the 1940s – when he 
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was barred for his radical views from teaching in Catholic schools – and taught at the 
Zion school until his retirement. 
A contemporary and official Soviet booklet, Soviet Jews: our motherland is the 
U.S.S.R. (1976) gives the Soviet side to the Soviet Jewry question. Published by 
Novosti Press (the Soviet public information service for international affairs) the 
booklet was an account of a press conference held in Moscow in that year, at the Central 
Journalists’ Club.150 The conference was hosted jointly by Novosti Press and the Soviet 
ministry of foreign affairs to present the Soviet state’s case on the topic to a corps of 
domestic and international press correspondents. The presentation took the form of a 
mixture  of statistical information on Jewish emigration, details of an organised Israeli 
campaign directed at Soviet citizens of Jewish nationality, and verbal statements from a 
number of disenchanted emigrants who had returned to the Soviet Union from Israel.  
The total immigration to Israel from the Soviet Union in the period 1945-75 was 
given as 120,000 (five per cent of Soviet Jews) - the 1970 census total for Soviet 
citizens of Jewish nationality then being 2,150,000. It was claimed that the rules applied 
to emigration applications were in line with the rules of the United Nations, which 
allowed for refusals to be applied to applicants working in security-related jobs, and that 
only 1.6 per cent of applicants were so refused.  
The conference was informed that Soviet Jews were targeted by propaganda 
from the radio station, Voice of Israel, and that individuals were receiving official 
letters of invitation to come to Israel.  
Many returnees from Israel gave personal accounts of their experiences. The 
following two selections represent the principal reasons for returning home: Valeri 
Nusimovich Kuvent from the Kabardino-Balkar Republic, had emigrated with his wife, 
mother and three young children. He complained that Russians Jews were only wanted 
as ‘unskilled manpower’, and that he refused to become ‘cannon fodder’ for the Israeli 
military. He asked: 
what would you feel if you live on the lands from which hundreds of thousands 
of people had been driven away and forced to live in refugee camps and slums 
being bombed  by Israeli planes.
151
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Boris Iosifovich Bravstein, a civil engineer with higher education from Kiev, had gone 
to Israel with his two children, wife and mother. He was disillusioned to discover 
antagonisms between immigrants from Europe and others from Africa, Asia and the 
Soviet Union, whom he felt were regarded as ‘second-rate’ and subjected to ‘Zionist 
and religious dogmatism’. 152  The conference concluded with an assertion by the 
organisers that there was no social basis for emigration (i.e. unemployment, lack of 
social services, etc.); that Jews occupied important posts in all spheres of politics, the 
economy, education and the arts; that with less than one per cent of the population, they 
were very favourably represented in the professions (e.g. fourteen per cent of all doctors 
of science, and six per cent in literature); that for 1971-2, 106,000 Jews were at Soviet 
higher education establishments, a considerably higher percentage than among other 
Soviet nationalities, and a greater number than in Israel where only 50,400 students 
attended higher education in the same academic year.
153
 And in an attempt to counter 
the strongest attractions of the Israelis – a sense of faith and family unity – the 
organisers insisted that for Soviet Jews, their familial ties remained strongest with their 
socialist homelands in the Soviet Union.  
To the above official Soviet source this writer can add the personal testimony of 
former (non-Jewish) Soviet citizen, Oksana Pattison, née Оksаnа Bоrisоvnа 
Оnishchеhkо, a native of Kiev, the capital of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.154 
She applied to emigrate to Ireland after she had married Irishman, Joe Pattison, in Kiev 
in 1981. Despite initial disapproval of her family and plenty of bureaucratic obstruction, 
she was cleared to travel to Ireland in 1982. Following her marriage and application to 
leave, Pattison was expelled from the local branch of Komsomol (the Young 
Communist League) at a formal assembly of members. There were approximately 150 
members present in the hall. She recalls that she ‘did not feel crucified’ with the 
proceedings and felt that ‘it was harsher’ for those members of the Jewish community in 
Kiev who were then leaving in some numbers for Israel.
155
 ‘I was leaving to be with my 
husband, they were leaving the Soviet Union to live in another country with a different 
social and religious outlook’, she said.156  
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To conclude this account, it can be stated at this stage that the Dublin 35s 
Women’s Campaign for Soviet Jewry, and the Irish Soviet Jewry Committee were 
active in presenting a contrary view of Soviet life than that promoted by the Ireland-
U.S.S.R. Society. However, written and oral sources indicate that the society did not 
seek to confront the views of those groups, but rather it concentrated upon its own 
agenda to develop Irish-Soviet friendship relations. 
Growth of the Ireland-U.S.S.R. Society 
As discussed above concerning the Irish government’s refusal to enter into a state-to-
state cultural agreement with the Soviet Union, one of the benefits for the society was 
that it could continue to perform the role as the official body – as far as the Soviet state 
was concerned – for organised cultural contacts between the two countries. This hands-
on responsibility was highlighted in September 1977 by the arrival of the first ever 
Soviet cruise ship to visit Dublin port, the Estonia. An onboard photograph of Edwards 
and Swift with Ambassador Kaplin and the ship’s captain alongside a half-column 
report records that Ireland had been added by Intourist to its list of international 
destinations ranging from the Baltic and the Mediterranean to Vietnam.
157
 The 
Estonia’s itinerary of twenty-four days included ports of call in England, France, 
Denmark and Finland. Its 299 passengers, described by cruise director Gundogdiev as 
‘workers and collective farmers, doctors and teachers, engineers and representatives of 
Soviet intellectuals’ had each paid approximately £600 for this cruise – one of many 
organised to mark the ‘sixtieth jubilee of the Great October Socialist Revolution.’158  
Two sightseeing tours of Dublin were organised by members of the society for the 
passengers. 
In this period the Soviet Union formally marked its appreciation for the work of 
the founders of the Irish society by awarding the Order of Peace and Friendship – a 
prestigious award from the Supreme Soviet - to both John Swift, on the occasion of his 
eightieth birthday,
159
 and Frank Edwards on his seventieth.
160
 The discovery of a D.F.A. 
file on this topic promised to give a meaningful official Irish state reaction. However, it 
turned out to consist of a single page – a photocopy of an Irish Press article of 27 
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August 1976 on Swift’s award - with the following caustic remark penned by an official: 
‘as far as I know, the Soviets did not seek our advance approval of the award’.161   
Nevertheless, Swift and Edwards had been very gratified to have their contribution to 
Irish-Soviet relations ‘graciously acknowledged’ by the Irish foreign affairs minister, 
Garret FitzGerald, on a formal occasion marking the establishment of diplomatic 
relations back in September 1973.
162
  
An annual pattern of activities for the society developed with groups of Soviet 
visitors being hosted in Dublin and around the country, and Irish visitors travelling to 
Moscow and diverse locations throughout the republics of the Soviet Union. The 
activities of the 1979-1980 period, fifteen years after the societies’ foundations, reflects 
an increasing level of sophistication and diversity in the two-way traffic. Ireland’s 
national day, 17 March, was marked in Moscow with a delegation of leading Irish 
cultural personalities, including artist-painter Thomas Ryan, president of the Royal 
Hibernian Academy for Arts for 1982-1992; Pádraig Ó Snodaigh, poet, and president of 
Conradh na Gaeilge; Tomás MacAnna, Abbey Theatre director; and Vincent 
McLoughlin, professor of veterinary  science at T.C.D.  The Soviet delegations to 
Ireland were particularly high-powered: in May 1979 the deputy-chairman of the 
U.S.S.R. supreme court, Yevgeni A. Smolentsev, arrived in Cork and met the lord 
mayor, Jim Corr, and Dr Tadgh Carey, president of University College Cork (U.C.C.); 
and in the Soviet ambassador’s residence on Ailesbury Road, the Irish chief justice and 
members of the supreme court.
163
 Attendance at these diplomatic occasions, and the 
associated public meetings, tended to be dominated by guests drawn principally from 
broad left-academic and artistic backgrounds, together with members of the dáil and 
seanad – indicating that the society had achieved its objective of spreading its appeal 
beyond political activists. At the same time, however, the Soviet Union privately 
expressed its appreciation to society activists following a difficult time for Soviet 
diplomacy in the wake of the Soviet intervention into Afghanistan and the subsequent 
U.S.-led reaction from western countries. One such gesture came in November 1980 
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with the hosting at the Soviet embassy on Orwell Road, Dublin, of a reception and film 
show of that year’s summer Moscow Olympic games.   
The society’s 1983-4 report commenced with a paragraph recording the death 
during the year of its founding secretary, Frank Edwards, noting that ‘our work is built 
on the foundation he laid’.164 Evidence for the society’s ability to build on Edwards’ 
policies was the inclusion in the report of the involvement of respected Irish political 
figures in welcoming Soviet visitors to Dublin. In May 1983 a Soviet group was 
welcomed to Dáil Éireann by T.D.s Niall Andrews (Fianna Fáil),
165
 and Michael D. 
Higgins (Labour). Niall Andrews (1937-2006) was a son of C.S. (Todd) Andrews, a 
prominent figure in Irish-Soviet trade connections as head of Bord na Móna in the 
1930-50s.
166
  Deputy Andrews was very supportive in his dealings with the Ireland-
U.S.S.R. society, and was on good personal terms with the society’s officers, Angela 
McQuillan and John Swift.
167
 Andrews and Higgins had visited the Soviet Union in 
1982 as part of the first inter-party group of Irish parliamentarians to travel to meet their 
counterparts in the Soviet capital, along with Jim Corr, then Fine Gael T.D. for the Cork 
South Central constituency. Corr had been a trade unionist and secondary school teacher, 
and was described by journalist Olivia O’Leary as being on the ‘social democratic’ 
wing of his party.
168
 
Deputy Higgins,
169
 a member for the Galway West constituency, was in the 
1980s a prominent member on the left of his party, with a strong profile as a campaigner 
on social justice in central and south America – often in opposition to U.S. foreign 
policy. And it was Deputy Higgins who was to articulate his impressions of the three 
T.D.s’ visit to Moscow and his views on the value of developing friendship with the 
Soviet Union in his article in the society’s twenty-first anniversary publication.170 (All 
quotations to the end of this paragraph are taken directly from that article.) Therein he 
recalled that the highlights for him of the T.D.s’ visit were not so much the ‘grandeur of 
Leningrad with its galleries and restored palaces’ but the ‘language’ about the Second 
World War and the defeat of fascism which invoked in him ‘a sense of anger at the 
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exclusion from my early education in history of the contribution of the twenty million 
Soviet citizens who died while defeating Hitler in the snow’. The article asserted that 
the visitors asked ‘hard questions’ (the visit pre-dated the period of glasnost) that were 
replied to with ‘candour’; and while ‘we did not always agree with the answers…the 
questions were welcomed, be they about dissent, foreign policy and the economy.’ 
Higgins acknowledged that the basic societal needs of ‘all its [Soviet Union’s] people in 
housing, health and education’ had been met but wondered whether that equality had 
been attained ‘at a price’, and continued: ‘If only we could, in a civilised world, try to 
reconcile the genuine meaning of critical freedom and true equality.’ However, Deputy 
Higgins was more forthright about his opposition to the policies then being promoted by 
the U.S. president, Ronald Reagan (characterising the Soviet Union as an ‘evil empire’) 
and predicted that the achievements of the Soviets: 
...cannot be defeated by the crude abuse about freedom being curtailed when 
such freedom in much of capitalist society is the freedom to starve, to be 
homeless, to be deprived of education.
171
 
Michael D. Higgins had also been forthright about his support some years before when 
he linked his University College Galway (U.C.G.) colleagues with a group of visiting 
Soviet academics, artists, farmers, and miners. He had arranged for the then acting 
college president and archaeologist, Professor Michael Duignan, to host them in the 
university’s staffroom, and stated that such visits continued to ‘be treasured’ at U.C.G. 
His account of these visits ties in with the society’s annual report for 1982 that recorded 
the visit to Galway by a Soviet group, led by Yuri Ustimenko – the former Tass 
journalist who had been accredited to Ireland in the 1960s (see chapter two) – where 
they met ‘Michael and Sabina Higgins’.172 Furthermore, Higgins’ article in the society’s 
anniversary publication paid tribute by revealing his sympathy for all those in the early 
days of the ‘Soviet Friendship Society’, who were dismissed from their jobs and 
endured harassment from the 1930s through to the 1960s. He conceded – in an apparent 
salute to communists and other left wing activists during that period – ‘Theirs was the 
harder task.’ Deputy Higgins’s article concluded by stressing the value of ongoing 
exchanges of parliamentary and technical visits with the Soviet Union and congratulated 
the society:  
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On its twenty-one years of contributing to that universal understanding and 
common humanity which could release us from being a planet threatened with 
destruction to being a world community of mutual interdependence, respect and 
joy...now we are, I hope, opening our minds to what should be our common 
well-spring of hope for peace and the deflection of spending from armaments to 
development and famine relief.
173
  
The society’s 1983-4 report also states that the group of Soviets who had been 
received in the dáil by Deputies Andrews and Higgins proceeded to Cork city where, ‘as 
is now traditional’, they were greeted by the lord mayor, John Dennehy.174 There is 
further evidence that Cork was especially amenable to Soviet friendship. Councillor 
John Kelleher of the Labour party wrote to the society to say that it was:  
a possibility that City Council here will consider establishing a sister-city 
relationship with a city in the U.S.S.R. I would be grateful if you could send me 
more brochures...on Tallinn, in the Republic of Estonia. It is a city with which 
Cork has certain similarities; being a seaport, about the same size....I need as 
much information as possible to push the proposal in City Hall.
175
  
To this pattern of Cork-Soviet friendship can be added the ongoing participation (from 
1971) of Russian dance teams in the annual Cork International Choral and Folk Dance 
Festival. This was confirmed by the secretary of the festival, Vivienne Ryan, in 1980, 
when the festival organisers defied the U.S.-led international boycott in the wake of 
Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, and confirmed that Russian dancers would again be 
invited. She said they would certainly be welcome and added ‘in the past our organisers 
had been very grateful for the fact that they had sent dance teams’.176 However, Cork 
was not without its objectors to Soviet generosity: a couple of weeks before the Choral 
and Folk Dance Festival decided to go ahead with their invitation, the president of 
U.C.C., Dr Tadgh Carey (who had received the deputy-chairman of the U.S.S.R. 
supreme court, Yevgeni A. Smolentsev back in 1979) and the college’s governing body 
decided not to accept a presentation of eighty books from the chargé d’affaires of the 
Soviet embassy, Vladimir Khorev.
177
 The collection included English language 
publications on geography, history, sociology and works by Marx, Lenin and Stalin. 
Despite the decision of his superiors, Senator John A. Murphy, professor of Irish history 
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at the college, lamented the refusal as ‘political’ and he personally accepted the 
collection from the chargé d’affaires. He did so on the basis that the governing body’s 
decision was a ‘postponement’, and he hoped the college would eventually accept the 
books from him.
178
   
In December 1983 a delegation arrived from the Lithuanian Society of 
Friendship and its members too were received by Deputies Andrews and Higgins, and 
on this occasion they were joined by Monica Barnes, T.D. (Fíne Gael).
179
   Professor 
Kuzin, the president of the U.S.S.R.-Ireland Society was conferred with an honorary 
doctorate by the College of Surgeons, and a Soviet Peace Committee visited the Irish 
C.N.D. A highlight of the cultural exchanges was the attendance by prominent Irish 
poets, Anthony Cronin,
180
 and Paul Durcan, at a congress of the Soviet Writers’ Union.  
Paul Durcan was especially taken with his Soviet experience. He published a 
positive account of the visit, stressing his admiration for the high status and social 
security afforded to Soviet writers.
181
 He continued to develop his keen interest in 
Soviet affairs, and published the following poem:  
The kindergarten archipelago 
And as wet dusk filters into a remote Russian town 
I am aware of being watched as I scurry 
Down Marx Prospekt towards my room – watched 
By a schoolgirl with a hamster in her hand. 
Suddenly as I sway there standing 
With an umbrella spilling black ink above my head 
I see that what is strange about the Soviet Union 
Is that it cherishes all the children of the union equally. 
Surely a fellow needs help who does not see that nothing 
Is of consequence except the children of the Union. 
And so, while Alexander Solzhenitsyn tramps the marches 
Of his walled-off home-in-exile in Vermont, U.S.A., 
Under the flying black skies of Ryazan 
I am sailing the streets of the Kindergarten Archipelago.
182
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It is revealing that Durcan chose to closely echo in line eight of the poem the Irish 
republican ideal contained in the Proclamation of the 1916 Rising, ‘cherishing all the 
children of the nation equally’, to comment on his perception of equality in the Soviet 
Union, in contrast to the status of Irish children. It is also interesting to read that the 
poem contrasts the lot of Soviet children with the dreary prospects for Soviet dissidents, 
as exemplified by Solzhenitsyn’s isolation in America.  
Finally, the secretary’s report deserves a final focus as it was accompanied by a 
statement signed by the treasurer Nora Harkin, which reflected the sound financial 
position of the society: 
Financial statement, 1 May 1983 to 30 June 1984.
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INCOME 
   
EXPENSES 
  
   
£ 
   
£ 
Opening balance 
 
3,804.23 Receptions 
 
374.16 
Membership subscriptions 
 
Rooms for meetings 265.00 
and 
   
Books: presentation to 
 Subscriptions from: 
  
Soviet guests 
 
116.53 
    
Printing and stationery 430.24 
Film shows ) 
 
Advertising 
 
1,002.74 
Lectures 
 
) 
 
Postage 
  
468.84 
Donations ) 665.77 Telephone and cables 200.00 
Socials 
 
) 
 
Travelling 
 
20.00 
    
bank charges 
 
8.75 
Lep Travel commission 
 
Sundries 
  
8.50 
on tours to Soviet Union 
 
Cash on hand (includes interest 
booked through 
 
1,478.70 of £274 on deposit account 
 society and for 
  
up to 1 Nov. 1983) 
 
3,053.94 
organising assistance 
     in 1983 
       
        
   
5,948.70 
   
5,948.70 
        
    
Signed: 
   
     
Nora Harkin 
 
     
Treasurer 
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                 Not displayed in the statement, however, is the extent to which the business of the 
society was aided by the Soviet Union. As discussed above, there were two general 
types of visitors to both countries: firstly, official representatives and/or accredited   
guests of the Irish and Soviet societies; and secondly, holiday groups organised by the 
two societies. Expenses for official Irish delegations to the Soviet Union and for Soviet 
delegations visiting Ireland were borne by Friendship House, Moscow. However, their 
generosity was not unlimited: members of Irish holiday groups to the Soviet Union paid 
an amount in line with the going rate for holiday packages (often to the company, LEP 
Travel, whose accountant, Adrian Tinkler, was a member of the society); and Soviet 
visitors indicated to Irish society members that they made a significant payment to 
Soviet travel authorities.
 184
 
The 1986-7 report reflected an important change of the leadership of the society. 
John Swift became honorary president. Nora Harkin and Angela McQuillan were 
established as chair and secretary, and Mártain Ó Siadhail, a manager with Gael Linn’s 
Irish language courses, was also prominent – none of whom was a member of the C.P.I.  
Seán Edwards remained influential, but Harkin and McQuillan became the principal 
officers.  McQuillan’s proficiency in Russian meant that she was an invaluable asset for 
communications with the embassy (she helped successive ambassadors ‘polish’ their 
speeches for public occasions), with Friendship House, and the stream of Soviet visitors. 
The Soviet authorities showed their support for these changes, in a practical way, with 
the opening of the society’s Dublin office in Dame House, 24-6, Dame Street in 1987: 
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they paid for the full costs of the rent and administration.
185
 However, other activities in 
these offices were self-financing, especially Russian language classes. As demand for 
these grew, McQuillan shared the burden with a native Russian speaker, Lidia Clancy, 
nee Samsonova, a Soviet citizen from the village of Kelteyi, near the city of Sverdlovsk 
in the autonomous republic of Bashkiria. Clancy had settled in Ireland after she met her 
Irish husband-to-be, Eamon Clancy from County Donegal, in Cuba in 1979.
186
 The 
courses were funded from fees paid by attendees. McQuillan also participated in a 
number of courses in Moscow State University in the teaching of Russian.  
More fundamentally, the international political climate – following the 
instalment of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev as general secretary of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union in 1985 – was undergoing rapid change. The initial period of 
the policies of perestroika and glasnost, with its promise of re-energising the Soviet 
economy and opening up its society, had the effect of attracting more interest and 
support for the society in Ireland. A sense of the hopes and fears for these developments 
in the Soviet Union was encapsulated in this extract by the prominent British Labour 
M.P., Tony Benn in his introduction to Andrei Gromyko’s memoir (1989): 
But it may well be that perestroika, far from being an epitaph on the gravestone 
of Marxism, will turn out to be the beginning of a process of renewal which will 
refresh socialism with democracy, and hence offer a far stronger challenge to all 
the older social systems.
187
 
In this context the secretary’s report could record that membership levels were 
‘continuing to improve’ and new branches at Limerick and Cork had been 
established.
188
 The makeup of visiting Soviet delegations was now expanded to include 
members of church groups. This development was added to by a meeting, at the request 
of the Soviet embassy, between a deputation from the Soviet Peace Committee that 
included Archbishop Makari from the Ukraine, with friends of the society from ‘the 
political and ecclesiastical fields’.189  Fr Tom Stack, then of the Catholic Press and 
Information Office in Dublin and regarded as a ‘progressive’ priest by society members, 
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attended such occasions.
190
 Whether progressive or not, Fr Stack’s presence in the 
Soviet embassy was a telling indication of the extent that official Catholic attitudes had 
softened in the city from 1945 – when Archbishop McQuaid’s  influence could elicit 
written reports from his clergy, and garda assistance to curtail Irish-Soviet friendship 
meetings. 
A symposium on Soviet education was hosted by the society in association with 
Trinity Education Society in January, 1987. The occasion attracted an attendance of 
over 100 people and extensive coverage from R.T.É’s Education forum programme. 
Speakers included Dr Dan Murphy and Sanya Poloniankina of T.C.D., and Gary 
Bannister of the People’s College (he had graduated from T.C.D.’s Russian department 
in 1975 and spent six years in Moscow, where he taught Irish at Moscow State 
University),
191
 and Tatyana Yeleseva of the Soviet embassy. However, it was the 
participation in the symposium of Dr Dennis P. Hainsworth – who had been awarded a 
Masters in Education for research on philosophical approaches to curriculum 
development by St. Patrick’s College, Maynooth in 1982 – that has served to provide 
this study with evidence of academic research on Soviet education being conducted in 
Ireland in the 1980s.  
Originally from Chicago, Dr Hainsworth received his doctorate from the 
Pontifical Institute of Oriental Studies in Rome, his dissertation being on the principles 
of spiritual guidance of the Russian monk and staretz (learned church elder), Paisy 
Velichkovsky (1722-94).
192
 Hainsworth lived in the Russian college in Rome, where he 
was influenced by Gustav Wetter, Jesuit priest and professor of Russian and Marxist 
philosophy at the Pontifical Gregorian University. After Dr Hainsworth met and 
married an Irish woman, a school principal, they moved to Ireland in 1977. Dr 
Hainsworth completed a Higher Diploma and Master of Education at St. Patrick’s 
College, and taught English, religious studies and French at Coolmine Community 
School until his retirement. He took part in the school’s adult education programme, 
teaching Russian, German, Latin, Italian and philosophy. He also participated in 
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Maynooth College’s outreach adult education programme in Naas, where he lectured on 
western philosophy.  
Dr Hainsworth made three visits to the Soviet Union, two in the Brezhnev 
period and the third in the Gorbachev era when he and his wife conducted a party of 
second-level schoolgirls from the Marymount International School of Rome to Moscow 
and Leningrad. While Dr Hainsworth’s interest in Soviet affairs in general commenced 
during in his time in Rome, it was in Ireland that he began to cultivate a particular 
interest in Soviet education viewed from a philosophical perspective. He sourced Soviet 
pedagogical publications at the Soviet-Italian bookstore in Rome and was on the 
mailing list of the monthly educational review Sovietskaya Pedagogika. He joined the 
Irish Slavists’ Association, where he made the acquaintance of Drs Ronald Hill and 
Patrick O’Meara of T.C.D., and recalls delivering a paper at the association’s 
conference in Slane, County Meath. Prior to the symposium on Soviet education, his 
article, ‘Educating Soviet man’, had already been published in a leading educational 
journal, and he went on to author three further articles on theoretical and 
methodological aspects of Soviet education in Irish academic journals over the next 
three years.
193
 He participated in two RTÉ radio programmes on the topic of Soviet 
education, one being a panel discussion. For the other, he was interviewed in his home. 
He felt that in Ireland at that time little was generally known about Soviet education, but 
that people, when informed, seemed to respond with interest. Dr Hainsworth still holds 
the view that: 
The greatest achievements of the Soviet Union, lay in the field of education: to 
mention but a few, the speedy elimination of widespread illiteracy and semi-
literacy even before the commencement of the Second World War; the 
mushrooming of educational institutions and the implementation of ambitious 
plans for curriculum development at the primary, secondary and university 
levels (temporarily crippled by the Nazi invasion); the provision for on-going 
educational opportunities within the workplace; the creation of a pervasive 
readership culture and the outstanding productivity of the Soviet press; and the 
translation into written form of the many merely oral languages and literatures 
spread throughout the vast expanse of the Soviet Union.
194
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To return to the work of the Ireland-U.S.S.R. Society, a symbolic and topical 
event was recorded for April 1987, entitled ‘The Soviet Union today is an open-air 
debating society’ delivered by Dr. Declan Kiberd,195 following his visit there. The event 
took place in Buswell’s Hotel, Dublin and was attended by an audience anxious to 
receive a first-hand account of the unfolding events. On foot of all this interest, the 
society was in a position to advertise ‘memorable holidays in the Soviet Union’ with a 
choice of tours in June, July and August.
196
  
The society rounded off 1987, its twenty-first anniversary, by publishing a 
commemorative booklet, Ireland-U.S.S.R. society 21
st
 anniversary. In addition to items 
already cited, the booklet included short but reflective pieces by Reverend S.G. Poyntz, 
Church of Ireland bishop of Connor, on an organised visit of representatives of Irish 
churches in 1987; poet Theo Dorgan on his nine days in Moscow; Lewis Rhatigan, 
managing director of Bord na Móna, on his close ties with the Russian peat industry; 
Noel Browne, former minister for health, and his wife Phyllis, on their participation in a 
‘Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War’ conference in Moscow. Further, there 
were contributions by Lord Killanin, former president of the International Olympic 
Committee, on the 1980 Moscow Games; Garret FitzGerald, on his role in establishing 
diplomatic relations as minister for foreign affairs in 1973; Seán MacBride, Nobel and 
Lenin peace laureate, who praised Gorbachev for his decisive action on the Chernobyl 
nuclear accident in 1986; Robert Ballagh, painter, who wrote of his award-winning 
exhibition in Moscow at an international peace poster event;  and the Irish and Soviet 
ambassadors, Tadhg O’Sullivan and  Gennadi Uranov who, in turn, contributed 
diplomatic accounts of  political and economic progress in the Soviet Union and made 
predictions for growing warmth and respect between the two countries.
197
  
The last annual report of the society, covering the period July 1990 to August 
1991,
198
 coincided with a critical phase in the lead up to the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union. The period included the secession of many republics from the Union, the brief 
coup leading to the house arrest of President Gorbachev, the subsequent rise to 
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prominence of Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, and an increase in economic hardship for 
many Soviet citizens. Yet, the Irish society’s report began in a business-as-usual fashion. 
The August 1990 garden party was attended by more than 130 members and friends, 
plus Ambassador Uranov with his family and many of the embassy staff. In October a 
group of Soviet professionals arrived to meet their Irish counterparts, and a Red Army 
ensemble gave a performance to over 100 people in the Arts Club in Dublin. Afterwards 
the ensemble was entertained by members of the garda band in the Harrington Street 
Garda Recreation Club, Dublin – surely a sign that fraternisation with Soviet authorities, 
even with the Red Army, was now entirely respectable.
199
  In November, the U.S.S.R.-
Ireland society hosted an Irish parliamentary delegation in Moscow and Kiev, and in 
December a young baritone from the Tartar Soviet Republic, Eduard Treskin, gave a 
cameo concert in the National Concert Hall, Dublin. 
But society proceedings in early 1991 took on a new feature: benefit concerts for 
the society’s medical aid for children’s hospitals in Moscow and Kiev fund were held in 
the Spa Hotel, Lucan and the Harcourt Hotel, Dublin. These events were in response to 
an approach made to the society by a doctor in County Cork, who had become aware of 
the collapse in the availability of drugs and other essential items within the Russian 
hospital system.
200
 The society agreed to support his initiative by raising finance and 
providing advice and contacts. Angela McQuillan also travelled with the doctor to 
Moscow and Kiev to help him negotiate a myriad of bureaucratic procedures to deliver 
the aid. 
On Saint Patrick’s Day 1991 Moscow television showed a documentary film 
about the Aran Islands, which had been made by Kira Annenkova with the help of 
society members. The documentary caught the glasnost spirit, for following the 
documentary the society received many letters from viewers across the Soviet Union 
seeking more information about Ireland.  
In June the society presented Ambassador Uranov with a copy of the Book of 
Kells to mark the end of his four-year tenure in Ireland and at the August 1991 garden 
party it welcomed the new, and final, Soviet ambassador to Ireland, Guermann 
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Gventzadze. The secretary’s report contains the following remark, perhaps conscious 
that the days of the Soviet Union were now numbered: 
We were delighted to meet the new ambassador and his wife, Tanya, who 
attended and charmed everybody. If his term in Ireland is to be of short duration, 
at least he will have a pleasant memory of a lovely afternoon with friends on an 
August Saturday.
201
 
The latest course of events in the Soviet Union had a demoralising effect on the Irish 
membership. The secretary found it necessary to include in a circular letter to members 
concerning the society’s ‘coming events’, a note to advise members who had not paid 
their £10 subscription for the last two years that they would no longer receive any 
notices.
202
 Attendances at meetings began to drop off, notably by the more ‘political’ 
members.
203
  
As the final acts were played out in the Soviet Union, the Irish society – urged 
on by Nora Harkin and Angela McQuillan – carried on with its activities. In October 
1991 it was involved with the ‘Kremlin Gold Exhibition’ at the Royal Hospital, 
Kilmainham and committee member Dr Patrick O’Meara, head of the Russian 
Department at T.C.D., gave a talk to members on the exhibits. The twice-weekly 
Russian classes for beginners and elementary students were again advertised, and 
delegates to a women’s conference in Dagestan were urged to bring toys, clothing and 
medicines with them for local distribution.
204
  
The dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 led to a similar fate for 
the society in the summer of 1992 at a meeting described by the chairman, Nora Harkin, 
as potentially ‘difficult and painful’. Yet she said it proved to have been ‘one of the 
most adult gatherings ever’.205 Two general positions were debated by members. On the 
one hand, communists and others were reluctant to carry on with promoting relations or 
friendship with Yeltsin’s post-communist Russia or with similar governments in the 
other independent states of the former Soviet Union. Furthermore, with Seán Edwards 
giving the lead, those members were anxious for the society to look to develop 
solidarity links with Cuba, whose leadership under Fidel Castro had been highly critical 
of the direction of Gorbachev’s policies for some years. On the other side, Harkin, 
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McQuillan and others expressed a determination not to give up on a ‘heritage of 
understanding’ and the numerous contacts made throughout the states of the former 
Soviet Union during the society’s twenty-six years of existence. Describing herself as 
being beyond anger and disappointment, Harkin articulated the case for carrying on the 
work and adapting to the new situation:  
A lot of dross will be wiped away and out of a bad winter will come a better 
spring…I have great faith in the future of people who survived Stalin, survived 
the Tsars. Seventy years of education, of culture…that just cannot turn to 
dust.
206
 
After a sharp debate a compromise was reached. It was agreed to reform the society as 
the Irish International Friendship Society, with members committing themselves to 
carry on for another year.
207
  
Despite the willingness to compromise, in practice this arrangement failed to 
materialise. Seán Edwards and his comrades devoted their efforts to developing a Cuba 
solidarity movement and Harkin and McQuillan continued in their efforts to maintain 
contacts in the former Soviet Union by forming the Ireland-Russia Society. However, 
Harkin and McQuillan soon discovered that they were operating in a radically altered 
environment. Funding for the Dublin office from Moscow ceased, and the Russian 
embassy distanced itself from the society. It soon became clear that the ambassador and 
his staff associated the society with the old regime and no more invitations to functions 
or requests to host Russian visitors were received. Furthermore, when members of the 
Ireland-Russia Society travelled to Russia and other republics they encountered new 
attitudes and even hostility. McQuillan recalled from her trip to Moscow in 1993 to 
renew acquaintances that at her hotel she was greeted by a queue of old contacts – each 
of whom had come as prospective agents with proposals to develop business 
opportunities for musical promotions in Ireland.  Hostility took the form of rebuffs from 
contacts in the Baltic countries, some of whom now refused to speak Russian, imbued 
with a sense of nationalism by the process of withdrawal from the Soviet Union.  While 
the new society’s members no longer enjoyed the sense of excitement and exploration 
on offer in the Soviet years, they did soldier on for a time. In June 1994 they organised 
an illustrated lecture, Pictures from an exhibition – the Soviet experience, which was 
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presented by Tom Ryan, R.H.A. in the United Arts Club, Dublin.
208
  But in 1995 
Angela McQuillan’s husband, Jack, became seriously ill. She, too, became ill at this 
time with tuberculosis (which she suspects she picked up on her travels in Russia), and 
while her condition was successfully treated in Bray, she could no longer devote time to 
the society. It then ceased to function. 
As for the U.S.S.R. - Ireland society, in line with all the other societies operating 
under the aegis of the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendly and Cultural Relations 
with Foreign Countries, it was disbanded following the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Nonetheless, it was quickly replaced by the ‘Irish Society in Moscow’, launched in June 
1992 at an inaugural meeting in what had been Friendship House, now reverting to its 
pre-1917 name – Morozov House. In line with the Russian proverb, ‘new times, new 
songs’, the society set out to ‘foster cultural, intellectual and business relations with 
Ireland’.209  Present at the meeting were the last two former Soviet ambassadors to 
Dublin, Gennadi Uranov, and Guermann Gventzadze. Professor Kuzin, the long-time 
president of the U.S.S.R.-Ireland society was there too, and he was elected president of 
the new society. But reflective of the changed times and indications for the future was 
the presence of leading Muscovite businessmen, including Professor Svyatoslav 
Nikolaevich Fyodorov, a famous eye micro surgeon who had led the Soviet Union’s 
internationally- acclaimed programme of laser surgery. Fyodorov had now become an 
hotelier, and one of Russia’s first post-communism multi-millionaires.210 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
Ambassador Brennan’s island of Ireland political reports from Moscow, to the 
Department of Foreign Affairs, Dublin, 1974-80 
 
Introduction 
This chapter returns to the mainstream of official Irish-Soviet diplomatic relations. The 
main focus here is on a series of files from the Department of Foreign Affairs (D.F.A.), 
which in accordance with the provisions of the National Archives Act, 1986, were 
recently made available under the thirty-year rule. Nearly all of Ambassador Brennan’s 
reports (519 out of 556) for his seven-year tenure in Moscow are contained in these files, 
and this study is among the first to draw on these documents. Known as ‘P.R.s’ in the 
parlance of Irish diplomacy, it immediately became evident that their content represents 
a key resource in this historical enquiry into Irish-Soviet relations. The reports ranged 
over the full scope of Soviet domestic matters and international political issues that 
concerned the U.S.S.R., which the ambassador judged would be of interest to the 
Department of Foreign Affairs at Iveagh House, Dublin to inform the Irish government 
in the formulation of its policies on the Soviet Union. To facilitate an overview of the 
P.R.s, each file and P.R. has been examined by this author, and seven year-by-year 
spreadsheets have been assembled. The spreadsheets comprise key details of each report, 
principally their subject titles. Also, a summary analysis, under selected 
geographical/political/ideological headings has been included. These compilations and 
analyses are appended to the thesis as Appendix 1, ‘Ambassador Brennan's political 
reports (P.R.s) from Moscow to the Department of Foreign Affairs, Dublin, 1974-80’.  
It is beyond the remit of this present study to discuss the greater number of Dr 
Brennan’s 519 available P.R.s. Rather  the chapter will concentrate on those P.R.s that 
lie closest to the heart of Irish-Soviet relations – to what will be termed the ‘island of 
Ireland’ P.R.s. They have been chosen to form platforms or hooks upon which key 
political elements and issues of Irish-Soviet relations of the 1970s can be examined in 
some depth.  However, before it proceeds to do so, some more general information of 
the purpose, content and distribution of Ambassador Brennan’s P.R.s must be set out.  
178 
 
As noted in chapter two, Barry Brennan recalled from his childhood in the Irish 
embassy in Moscow that his father, Ambassador Edward Brennan, spent a great deal of 
time reading Soviet newspapers and periodicals. Far from being a leisure pursuit, this 
exercise was in fact a central part of his ambassadorial duties. Its principal purpose was 
to research, analyse, compile and dispatch on a regular basis to the D.F.A. political 
reports on a wide range of domestic and international matters of topical concern to 
Soviet society and its institutions of state and party. Ambassador Brennan described the 
essence of this task: ‘its role was mainly monitoring Soviet domestic and foreign 
politics. This was done mostly through the typical Kremlinological method (as I had 
good Russian) by my reading the Soviet press.’1   
For a broader understanding of the role of P.R.s in diplomacy, a recent paper by 
Ambassador Victor Camilleri of Malta (2011) on diplomatic reporting offers insights 
for this chapter. Camilleri’s paper asserts that a diplomat’s report is to ‘deal with facts 
and events, to be objective in recounting these facts and events, and to analyse and 
interpret their cause and effect.’2 Drawing links between the functions of journalists and 
academics, and diplomats, Camilleri continues: 
In this sense the reports that diplomats produce have a lot in common with 
reports produced by journalists and by academics. The challenge for the 
diplomat is to preserve a space where the diplomatic report can be seen as 
adding special depth and foresight to the journalistic narrative, while bringing 
relevance and immediacy to the academic analysis.
3
   
Also, the following observation from Noel Dorr, who had been a senior official in the 
department during Ambassador Brennan’s time in Moscow, is instructive in its 
suggestion that political reports were an informational and therefore a positive element 
in Irish-Soviet affairs. Speaking about meetings that took place between him and 
Ambassador Kaplin in Dublin, Dorr informed: ‘[it is to be] expected that Kaplin would 
have sent home a report of the meeting, such reports would have oiled the wheels of 
diplomacy’.4   
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4
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Chief among Ambassador Brennan’s sources in Moscow were: Pravda (Truth), 
the official newspaper of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (C.P.S.U.) that was 
published in the morning, and Izvestia (News), the official voice of the Soviet 
government that was published in the evening - together they commanded a combined 
daily readership of twenty million;
5
 TASS and Novosti Press agencies, which 
coordinated and published national and international newspapers of the Soviet Union; 
Komsomolskaya Pravda, newspaper of the Komsomol, the youth wing of the C.P.S.U.; 
Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), the Soviet military newspaper; and Sovyetskaya Kultura, 
the biweekly newspaper of the Ministry of Culture of the U.S.S.R., aimed at members 
of the intelligentsia.  
Periodicals also formed part of the ambassador’s reading diet, including:  Za 
Rubezhom (Life Abroad), a review of the foreign press; Literaturnaya Gazeta, the 
literary newspaper founded by Alexander Pushkin in 1830 and continued as the 
influential organ of the Union  of Soviet Writers; Ogonyok (Little Flame), a colourful 
and illustrated magazine;  Krokodil, a weekly satirical magazine that lampooned Soviet 
society’s inefficiencies and bureaucracy, and mocked topical aspects of life in capitalist 
countries (including Northern Ireland);
6
 Problems of Peace and Socialism, the Prague-
based theoretical and ideological journal of the world communist movement (published 
in English as the World Marxist Review), which was published in thirty languages and 
circulated in 145 countries;
7
 Vosprosy Istorii (Issues of History), an academic history 
journal  from the  Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.; 
Kommunist, the theoretical and political journal of the central committee (C.C.) of the 
C.P.S.U.; Trud (Labour), the paper of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions; 
and New Times, another influential international affairs journal. To these sources can be 
added discussions with a cross-section of Soviet officials that he visited by appointment 
for discussions and  interviews (in particular, with Dr G. Arbatov, of ISKRAN, the 
Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies),
8
 diplomatic and ambassadorial colleagues 
(ranging from E.E.C. and western diplomats to an unnamed ‘East European 
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ambassador’), 9  and media operatives (including a B.B.C. correspondent who was 
expelled because of his contacts with Soviet dissidents),
10
 – all of whom were in a 
position to contribute insights to Ambassador Brennan’s store of intelligence on the 
Soviet system. Little wonder, then, that Noel Dorr could inform this writer that Dr 
Brennan had been esteemed by his peers in headquarters as ‘the theologian of the Soviet 
system’.11 
It took some time for the format of transmission of the P.R.s from Moscow to 
Dublin, and their subsequent distribution within the department, to be finalised. The 
P.R.s for 1974, the first year of Dr Brennan’s ambassadorship, were not typed in the 
Moscow embassy, but rather committed to cassette tapes. It appears that this method 
was found necessary due to the unsuitability of the secretarial services provided by the 
U.P.D.K, both for lack of appropriate secretarial services and security of confidentiality. 
The P.R.s were dispatched to Dublin by Dr Brennan ‘regularly by mail delivered 
personally by a member of the diplomatic staff to the purser of a western airline at the 
airport’.12  In the department they were typed on A4 sheets and a file copy was returned 
to Moscow. However, in subsequent years, typed reports on official ‘Embassy of 
Ireland, Moscow’ headed stationery were sent to Dublin, complete with Ambassador 
Brennan’s signature (or, in his absence, with that of the first secretary). The numbering 
system employed for the P.R.s was a simple sequential one – his first and second reports 
for 1974 were numbered P.R.s 1/74 and 2/74, and so forth for each report and each year 
thereafter.  
The value of the reports to the foreign affairs hierarchy was quickly recognised. 
Dr Brennan was informed: ‘the P.R.s from your area are, as you will appreciate, of very 
great interest’ and he was instructed to mark all tapes ‘confidential to the secretary’.13 
Even so, according to notes affixed to the department’s file containing the first year’s 
batch, it was decided (following consultations between senior officials), that the P.R.s 
would be distributed in ‘the usual way’.14 This involved circulation by the parliamentary 
private secretary (P.P.S.) to the minister for foreign affairs to his/her minister; the 
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secretary and assistant secretary of the department; the political division; and to all Irish 
diplomatic missions worldwide. This ensured that all ambassadors and senior staff were 
kept abreast of Dr Brennan’s observations from Moscow. No doubt his reports 
commanded particular relevance for the Irish ambassador to Japan, whose brief 
extended to keeping a watchful eye on Chinese affairs, and who was also sending home 
similarly-themed reports to Dr Brennan on Sino-Soviet relations.
15
  At the same time, it 
appears that Ambassador Brennan retained the right to restrict the circulation of certain 
reports. For example, he marked P.R. 112/77 on the subject matter of the recently-
established West German-owned ORTAG missile firing range in Zaire, ‘not for general 
circulation.’16  He reported that the Soviets were suspicious that this was a surreptitious 
attempt by West Germany to develop space exploration and military capabilities, and he 
deemed that this issue required extra security considerations.   
A standout feature of the summary report attached to Appendix 1 is the relative 
paucity of P.R.s that directly related to the island of Ireland – only twenty-four out of 
the 519 available. Of these only eight related to the state that he represented, the 
Republic, with the significantly larger number of sixteen for Northern Ireland reflecting 
the impact of the Troubles on Irish-Soviet relations. Indeed, such is the cross-border 
nature of the subject matters of the Irish P.R.s that it is difficult to categorise many of 
them to only one jurisdiction. Three factors must be borne in mind here in accounting 
for the low Irish number. First, this was not unique to the Moscow embassy: an 
examination of a batch of 135 P.R.s from Tokyo for the years 1975-7 revealed that not 
one P.R. related to Irish-Japanese affairs, while – much in tune with Dr. Brennan’s brief 
– thirteen had Soviet-related themes. 17  Second, a separate correspondence was 
conducted between Ambassador Brennan and Dublin regarding the day-to-day Irish-
Soviet ambassadorial business. Finally, as a country with a small population located on 
the edge of western Europe, Ireland commanded but sporadic interest in Soviet media 
and diplomatic circles.  Despite their lack of quantity, such is the significance and 
revelatory nature of the themes and content of the Irish P.R.s that they provide a 
succession of readymade stepping stones to follow Soviet interest and interaction with 
the island of Ireland, and by turn, diplomatic Ireland’s interest in the Soviet Union. The 
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twenty-four Irish P.R.s fall into two main fields: Northern Ireland and Eurocommunism. 
The issue of Northern Ireland is the more expansive of the two, and is underpinned by 
twenty-two P.R.s, comprising: two P.R.s that related to implications for Northern 
Ireland at the talks at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (C.S.C.E.) 
in Helsinki; sixteen P.R.s relating to Soviet press coverage of the conflict in the North; 
and four P.R.s relating to Soviet press coverage of the Ireland versus the United 
Kingdom case on the ill-treatment of prisoners in Northern Ireland that was pursued 
during the years 1977-8 at the European Court of Human Rights, Strasbourg. The issue 
of Eurocommunism is underpinned by two P.R.s that related to Michael O’Riordan, the 
general secretary of the Communist Party of Ireland (C.P.I.). Those reports were sent by 
Ambassador Brennan to inform Dublin of the content of O’Riordan’s address to the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union’s (C.P.S.U.) twenty-fifth congress in 1976, and of 
the ‘lauding’ of O’Riordan in the pages of Pravda in 1977. The issue of 
Eurocommunism has been selected for consideration, not just because it highlighted the 
role of the C.P.I. in Irish-Soviet political affairs, but also because it raised Irish interest 
in significant European and international political matters of the 1970s, including the 
strength of the communist parties in western Europe, and the rift between the People’s 
Republic of China and the Soviet Union.  
To support the discussion of these two issues, relevant academic works have 
been consulted. These include: Patrick Keatinge, on the C.S.C.E;
18
 Paul Arthur for an 
introductory paragraph on the political situation in Northern Ireland in the 1970s;
19
 Dr 
Garret FitzGerald on his concerns for Soviet press coverage of the Provisional I.R.A.;
20
 
Hanley and Millar, on the Official I.R.A.’s involvement with the Soviet Union; 21 
Professor Stephen White on Soviet historians’ interest and work on Irish history;22 and 
Yevgeny Yevtushenko’s poems inspired by his experiences in July 1972 while visiting 
Belfast.
23
 The Eurocommunism issue includes a brief biographical sketch of Michael 
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O’Riordan, drawn from a recent publication by this present writer,24 and the work of 
U.S. Professor Joan Barth Urban, a specialist on the Italian Communist Party – the 
largest non-ruling communist party in Europe in the 1970s, with nearly two million 
members and over thirty per cent of votes to the Italian national parliament – is utilised 
for insights into Eurocommunism, and the Sino-Soviet rift.
25
  
 
The issue of Northern Ireland 
It was against the troubled background in Northern Ireland that Ambassador 
Brennan represented the interests of the Republic of Ireland in Moscow. His tenure in 
the Soviet capital, from 1974 to 1980, coincided for the greater part (March 1974 to 
May 1979) with the governorship in Belfast of two successive British Labour party 
secretaries of state for Northern Ireland, Merlyn Rees and Roy Mason.
26
 When Rees 
took up office he was soon faced with the challenge of the Ulster Workers’ Council 
(U.W.C.) to the newly-formed Northern Ireland power-sharing executive and council of 
Ireland, established under the Sunningdale agreement. Faced by widespread U.W.C. 
intimidation and a shutdown of power supplies, together with a wholly inadequate 
response from the security authorities, Rees and Prime Minister Wilson failed to stand 
four-square behind the power-sharing structures. In the aftermath of the collapse of the 
executive and the growth in the self-esteem of the various loyalist organisations, Rees’s 
plans were increasingly centred upon security measures, despite his success in 
facilitating an uneasy Provisional I.R.A. ceasefire for much of 1975. The Provisional 
I.R.A. had come into existence in 1969 as a result of a split within the republican 
movement, owing to political divisions in the movement’s ranks and the rise of violence 
in the North. Historian Joost Augusteijn sums up this development: 
At the [I.R.A.’s] army convention of 1969 the militarists broke away over the 
issue of abstention,
27
 and formed the Provisional I.R.A., which became the 
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dominant grouping, while the remainder became known as the Officials. The 
Official I.R.A. suspended military operations in 1972.
28
  
Rees’s security plans included the cancellation of special-category status for 
political prisoners, which lead to the ‘blanket’ protests in the Maze prison and the 
commencement of the hunger strikes in 1980.  When Rees was succeeded in office in 
September 1976 by Roy Mason, even more emphasis was placed upon security 
initiatives. Apart from a perfunctory and fruitless round of talks with local politicians, 
Mason’s intentions were well signalled when he publically boasted his intent to squeeze 
the Provisional I.R.A. ‘like a tube of toothpaste’. 29   Undercover operations were 
intensified, and the Special Air Services (S.A.S.) unit was deployed. In response the 
Provisional I.R.A. reformed its porous neighbourhood structures into a network of self-
contained active service units. One ray of hope was provided by the emergence of the 
‘Peace people’ in late 1976, which sprang from cross-community revulsion of the 
killing of three Belfast children caught up in an engagement between the British army 
and the Provisional I.R.A. Led by Mairead Corrigan, Betty Williams and Kieran 
McKeown, the movement condemned violence from all quarters, attracted support right 
across the North, and commanded the attention of the international media. While deaths 
as a result of the conflict did decrease from a high in 1976 of 295 to a low in 1978 of 
82,
30
 this was a result of more careful management by the protagonists, rather than any 
serious political attempt to resolve the underlying causes. 
  Mason did attempt to boost the local economy, but despite securing extra funds 
from the British treasury and attracting significant inward American investments, when 
he departed from office he left behind a province with higher unemployment rates than 
before his arrival. Further, because the Labour government was dependent upon 
unionist support in the House of Commons, the prime minister, James Callaghan, 
decided to increase the number of Northern Ireland M.P.s by five – a concession viewed 
by many as an act of appeasement to the unionists, and much resented by the S.D.L.P. 
and the Irish government. In short, the period was characterised by a dearth of 
worthwhile political initiatives and a corresponding increase in repressive security 
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measures;  divisions within, and a growth of the personalisation of political unionism 
(chiefly, Ian Paisley’s Democratic Unionist Party – the D.U.P.); marginalisation of 
moderate unionist, nationalist and democratic forces, including the Northern Ireland 
Civil Rights Association (NICRA); consolidation in the offensive capabilities of loyalist 
and republican paramilitaries; deep alienation between Protestant and Catholic 
communities; and growing levels of unemployment and emigration, especially in 
loyalist and republican strongholds. 
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (C.S.C.E.) has already 
been briefly discussed in chapter two, in the context of Dr FitzGerald’s early realisation 
in 1973 of the pressing need to establish diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. 
Accordingly, it is not surprising to discover that two of Ambassador Brennan’s opening 
reports to Dublin, shortly after his arrival into Moscow in the summer of 1974, related 
to this subject. His first report was a Europe-wide assessment of Soviet sentiment 
regarding progress on the talks at Helsinki, and it concluded: 
[They feel] they are well on their way to achieving their main aim which is a 
pan-European recognition of the frontiers of eastern Europe, and trade and 
technology from the first, while at the same time making only nominal 
concessions as regards the free movement of people and ideas.
31
  
However, it was Dr Brennan’s second report that had more significance for Irish-Soviet 
relations.
32
 It was an account of an exchange that Dr Brennan had with an unnamed 
Soviet vice minister for foreign affairs (his name is left blank throughout the report – he 
may have been Vice Minister Kozyrev, visited by Brennan on the same date and with 
whom matters relating to Cyprus and West Berlin were discussed),
33
 in connection with 
an issue with possible constitutional implications for Ireland.  Dr Brennan wrote that the 
vice minister raised, on his own initiative, the ‘peaceful changes’ proposal for future 
alterations to existing national borders in Europe. The vice minister made clear the 
Soviet desire that current borders, which emerged in the aftermath of the Second World 
War, be agreed as ‘inviolable’, and that any changes would be minor modifications. 
Brennan quizzed him on this:  
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I asked how this would square with our long-term aspirations in regard to 
Northern Ireland. As he knew it was part of long-term policy to seek 
reunification with the North of Ireland. It was not an aspect which we were at 
present pressing for right now or indeed wish to talk about in the view of the 
very tense situation in the North, as it has always been our point that unity could 
come about only by consent. However unity remained our long-term aim and if 
at any time in the future, however far away, the question became topical, we for 
our part would not wish to be limited by such an interpretation as seems to be 
emerging here right now.
34
 
And he summed up the Soviet minister’s response: 
[His] reply was interesting. The case of Northern Ireland was an “osobyi 
vopros” (special problem). It derived from the situation of ‘colonialism’ 
[Brennan’s inflection] and did not venture into the range of other territorial 
changes which the Soviet Union would have in mind. Anytime the British 
decided to give up Northern Ireland to us, that would be acceptable to the Soviet 
Union.
35
 
  This exchange was to find a resonance in the outcome to the C.S.C.E. negotiations – the 
Helsinki Final Act of July 1975. Patrick Keatinge’s A place among the nations (1978), 
when considering Ireland’s role at Helsinki, concluded: ‘the major Irish contribution to 
this exercise in détente was to insist, along with the Federal Republic of Germany 
(F.R.G. – West Germany) and Spain (regarding its claim to Gibraltar), that frontiers 
should be described as “inviolable” (adapted from Latin, violare ‘treat violently’),36 but 
not as “immutable”’.37 
It is notable that the Soviet Union agreed to the softer of the two options that 
emerged at Helsinki (i.e. supportive of the Irish position). This was despite a major 
issue at the heart of Europe for the Soviet Union – the claim of the F.R.G. in relation to 
the territory of the socialist state of the German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.). It is 
unlikely that the Soviet Union adopted this position solely to suit Ireland’s then de jure 
constitutional claim that the state comprised ‘the whole island of Ireland, its islands and 
the territorial seas’.38 Nevertheless, the exchange between the two diplomats made clear 
that the Soviets had a principled appreciation of Irish aspirations for national unity. The 
essential point for the Soviet negotiators was that agreement should be secured for 
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borders arising from the Second World War. As that did not apply to Ireland, they 
would be supportive of a united Ireland, albeit one that would need to be agreed with 
the British government in the future. In that regard it can be concluded that Ambassador 
Brennan had received indications from a representative of a major player at Helsinki an 
understanding that the C.S.C.E. would not interfere with Ireland’s constitutional claim 
to national unity.  
However, neither the tone nor the tenor of the Irishman’s report supported any 
sense of achievement. As he indicated above, it was the Soviet official who had raised 
the matter in the first place. Perhaps Brennan tactically sat back to let the vice minister 
reveal his hand? What is clear, however, is that the report concluded with Dr Brennan 
stating that his government was not encouraging British disengagement or advocating 
national unity at this time:  
I pointed out that while the British had a special responsibility – and it was 
known from our public statements – that a mere act of applicating (sic) 
responsibility would not ensure reunification; it could indeed lead to very dark 
consequences. The only basis of reunification would be unity by consent and 
this involves a relationship between all the people in Northern Ireland and 
ourselves.
39
 
In this way it can be seen that Ambassador Brennan was further indicating that the new 
Irish mission to Moscow was not seeking Soviet support for Irish unity, and – by 
extension – that Soviet officials should be wary with their support for forces in Northern 
Ireland pressing for unity. In so far as his own mission to Moscow was concerned, Dr 
Brennan’s early message was taken on board by his Soviet hosts. He informed this 
present writer: ‘events in Northern Ireland were not an issue for the embassy. The 
Soviets never raised them with us.’40 
The monitoring of Soviet media coverage of the conflict in Northern Ireland was 
to constitute an important element of Ambassador Brennan’s duties.  The terms of this 
exercise were indicated in September 1973 by Minister for Foreign Affairs Garret 
FitzGerald, when he met his Soviet counterpart, Andrei Gromyko, to organise 
diplomatic relations between their two states. According to his autobiography, 
FitzGerald did not request any support or understanding from Gromyko on Irish efforts 
with the British to resolve the problems in the North, other than to say that he was: 
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disturbed at times to see that opinion in the Soviet Union – a polite reference to 
their press – appeared to view the Provisional I.R.A. as a left-wing socialist 
group with which the Soviet people might sympathise, whereas in our view they 
were a dangerous right-wing group, who had in fact broken away from the 
official Sinn Féin and the [Official] I.R.A. on the grounds that the latter were 
unduly socialist and too friendly with communists.
41
 
That Dr FitzGerald, a senior figure in the conservative Fíne Gael party, should base his 
complaint about the Provisional I.R.A. to the foreign minister of the Soviet Union upon 
its anti-communist attitudes may appear to have been somewhat paradoxical. However, 
FitzGerald had taken a keen interest in ideological tensions in the Irish republican 
movement for some time, and contributed an article on such tensions to the Irish Times 
in 1970. Having acknowledged a left-wing tradition in the republican movement, Dr 
FitzGerald’s article continued:  
Whatever may have been the ideological stance of republican leaders on the left 
wing of the movement, the rank and file have throughout the last half-century 
been inspired by nationalism, by traditional xenophobia rather than by any 
aspiration to see workers of the world uniting.
42
 
Clearly, then, Dr FitzGerald was equating the Provisional I.R.A. of 1973 with that 
nationalist tendency, and his desire to undermine support for them in any quarter was 
very real. This determination was further heightened by the Provisional I.R.A.’s 
opposition to the power-sharing Sunningdale process of which FitzGerald was a chief 
architect. According to Paul Arthur, FitzGerald (along with John Hume) was one of the 
most effective negotiators in putting together the Sunningdale agreement – an initiative 
that ‘the provisional republican movement rejected...as early as March 1973.’ 43 
Gromyko responded to FitzGerald by saying that the Soviet press simply reported the 
facts, and that the Soviet people sympathised with Ireland over the Northern Ireland 
problem. Dr FitzGerald replied that such sympathy was misdirected towards the 
Provisional I.R.A., rather than being placed behind the Irish people and government. It 
appears that the foreign ministers let the matter rest at that, but the exchange indicated 
that Dr FitzGerald intended to have subsequent Soviet coverage monitored by officials 
at the Irish embassy in Moscow.  Accordingly, it is no surprise to discover that as 
Ambassador Brennan conducted his Kremlinological exercise on the Soviet media, he 
kept a keen eye open for items relating to Northern Ireland.  
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The first such report related to the appearance of widespread coverage of 
protests in Northern Ireland to mark the third anniversary of the introduction of 
internment.
44
 The ambassador began with a story from one of Pravda’s London 
correspondents, O. Vasilyev, which had featured prominently in the newspaper’s issue 
of 13 August. It stated that while internment was primarily directed against Catholic 
areas, it also extended to Protestants. Vasilyev decried London’s failure to honour its 
declarations to ‘gradually liquidate’ internment and termed the hundreds of internees as 
‘fighters for civil rights…behind barbed wire of a concentration camp’. The Pravda 
report finished with a call for the implementation of a set of demands from ‘progressive 
forces in Great Britain’. Those demands included the: 
Release of political prisoners in Ulster, abolition of internment without trial, 
withdrawal of British troops to barracks, implementation of progressive 
economic reforms, and the granting of democratic rights to the workers of 
Northern Ireland.
45
 
Dr Brennan did not identify the forces that called for these measures, but they were 
most likely British or Northern Irish communists, as is discussed below. 
The same report also included Izvestia’s marking of the fifth anniversary of the 
deployment of British troops with an article by the same journalist.  Vasilyev 
highlighted the exponential rise in the numbers of soldiers, from an initial contingent of 
300 to the current total of 15,000, and that deaths had now exceeded the 1,000 mark.  
Written just two months after the reintroduction of direct rule in the wake of the Ulster 
Workers’ Council’s strike, the article was dismissive of Merlyn Rees’s plan for a 
constitutional convention. Paul Arthur states that the constitutional convention was part 
of Rees’s effort to prevent loyalist paramilitaries moving into the vacuum created by the 
collapse of the executive,
46
 but Vasilyev claimed that Rees was ‘taking half measures 
and in fact playing into the hands of Protestant ultras’ that would result in ‘new 
collisions of the hostile camps and new waves of violence’. The Izvestia piece 
concluded by repeating the need for a programme of democratisation of life in Ulster, 
and for the termination of both emergency legislation and internment. In this regard it is 
interesting to note that no direct reference to the Provisional I.R.A. was made in the 
Soviet press articles, rather the emphasis was on chiding the British Labour government 
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for its unwillingness to stand up to the loyalists. While the Provisional I.R.A had been 
active – most notably with the M62 coach bombing in West Yorkshire in February 1974, 
and the bombing of the houses of parliament in London in June – the immediate 
political and security scene had been dominated by loyalist actions that led to the 
collapse of the Sunningdale agreement, and the Dublin and Monaghan bombings in 
May.  
Ambassador Brennan’s second report was prompted by a feature article by 
Edgar Cheporov, a London-based correspondent of the Novosti Press Agency, which 
appeared in Literaturnaya Gazeta in July 1975.
47
 It was entitled ‘Ulster: days of terror.’ 
(Ulster was the name preferred in the Soviet press to ‘Northern Ireland’, with the use of 
‘the six counties’ not featuring at all). Cheporov’s article represented for the 
ambassador a ‘more mature’ presentation than the traditional press reports that he 
considered to have been characterised by a ‘monolithic Protestant side exercising 
unrestrained violence against the Catholics, with the connivance of British troops, and 
legitimate measures of self-defence exercised by the I.R.A. Provos.’ While Cheporov 
reported that British troops carried out uninterrupted raids in Catholic areas, in contrast 
to ‘neutrality’ in relation to Protestant extremists, a new development in the violence 
was noted: ‘the growing role of paramilitary extremist groups in both camps – 
Protestant and Catholic.’ Focusing first on the Protestant paramilitaries, Cheporov 
highlighted their organisational volatility and internecine tendencies with a reference to 
the killing of Tommy Herron, an Ulster Defence Association leader as a result of an 
internal feud in 1973.
48
  The correspondent revealed that he had known Herron 
personally, and that he had also interviewed Hugh Smyth of the Ulster Volunteer 
Forces.
49
 Displaying his engagement with people and events in Belfast, Cheporov 
reported that Smyth had told him that there were enemies of Ulster everywhere, 
including ‘[Bill] Craig,50 and [Ian] Paisley’.  
The report’s second focus – on the Provisional I.R.A. – was more extensive. 
Ambassador Brennan noted that Cheporov, while ‘carrying out a fine balancing act for 
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the most part’ was as opposed to the Provisional I.R.A. as much as to the loyalists, and 
that Cheporov’s article featured the results of some anecdotal research that he had 
conducted among Catholics in Northern Ireland. His soundings indicated, on one hand, 
that many Catholics felt that Provisional I.R.A. terrorism served as a prompter for the 
Protestant ultras and British army operations; while on the other hand, supporters felt 
that ‘only the most desperate actions can bring nearer the day of liberation for the 
minority’. When Cheporov posed to his interviewees the claim of the Provisional I.R.A. 
that they were the defenders of the Catholics, he described reactions as follows: 
Whenever I put this question there ensued each time a long pause. Seldom did 
anybody decide to answer with an unambiguous ‘yes’ or ‘no’. These desperate 
people do not spare their own lives, it was explained to me, but neither do they 
spare ours.
51
 
Despite such expressions of disquiet, Cheporov rounded off on his soundings on the 
Provisional I.R.A. by observing that it could not have continued to exist without hiding 
places for volunteers and weapons, and a political and propaganda support system. 
Finally, Cheporov informed his Literaturnaya Gazeta audience of the existence of the 
Official I.R.A and Official Sinn Féin, stating that they were concentrating on political 
methods to improve the lot of both Catholic and Protestant workers and for a greater 
measure of independence for Northern Ireland. This information and favourable 
mention is in accord with the findings of Hanley and Millar: 
By 1976 Soviet bloc communism was the dominant ideological influence within 
the Officials. Party delegations frequently travelled beyond the iron curtain, and 
party representatives were in regular contact with eastern bloc diplomats, 
attending receptions at the Bulgarian and Soviet embassies in London.
52
 
Hanley and Millar further note that the Officials extended their ‘bitter competition’ with 
the Provisionals to their relationship with their Soviet contacts, and this influence could 
well have played a part in the appearance of more nuanced articles from Cheporov and 
later commentary. To conclude, Ambassador Brennan’s report gives evidence of a 
measure of hands-on commitment by correspondent Cheporov. His engagement with 
loyalist leaders Herron and Smyth is stated, but he failed to present any account of the 
loyalists’ viewpoint. And the fruits of his research among Catholics, however limited,  
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were reflected in a piece of work that can only have given his Soviet readers improved 
insights into the lives of people on both sides of the divide.     
By September 1975 the Provisional I.R.A.’s ceasefire was under serious threat 
owing to outbreaks of hostilities that had led to many deaths among civilians, soldiers 
and police at the hands of the Provisional I.R.A, the British army, and the loyalist 
paramilitaries.
53
 Ambassador Brennan reported that there had been a recent step up in 
Soviet media coverage, the most authoritative having been in Izvestia.
54
 Its London 
correspondent, O. Vasilyev, had reported that ‘many observers consider that Ulster 
stands on the brink of civil war’, blaming the Protestant ultras, whom he claimed 
wished to bring the truce to an end by inciting a resumption of violence. A notable 
aspect of this report is that it identified the source of Izvestia’s proposed solutions to the 
crisis, James Stewart, the Belfast-based deputy general secretary of the C.P.I. Stewart 
had issued a call for the British government to bring an end to repressive security acts, 
and for the isolation of murderers by means of ‘positive political measures’ such as the 
immediate adoption of a bill of rights for the entire population of Northern Ireland.  
Dr Brennan also picked up on a Tass story from Budapest by summarising an 
interview with the general secretary of the C.P.I., Michael O’Riordan, in Népszabadság, 
the official organ of the ruling Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party. O’Riordan was 
reported to have said that the situation in Northern Ireland was very complicated, and 
that the course of events there were akin to a civil war. In a clear reference to the 
Provisional I.R.A., O’Riordan declared that Irish communists were opposed to 
assassinations and acts of terrorism. However, this was as far as Ambassador Brennan 
was prepared to go in relaying O’Riordan’s interview without qualification. He told the 
department: ‘But while condemning such forms of violence they [Irish communists] 
could not let pass in silence the fact that the cause of the crisis is the policy of British 
imperialism and the presence of British armed forces...moreover, Irish communists 
desire a united Ireland.’  
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To complete his report Dr Brennan focused on a newspaper that was to become 
something of a bête noir for him among Soviet publications – Krasnaya Zvezda, the 
Soviet armed forces’ newspaper. He deprecated an analysis in the newspaper’s 14 
September 1975 edition with this comment: ‘the level of sophistication is even lower 
than that of Izvestia’, and related its view that British reliance on military measures 
would not bring forth a solution. Krasnaya Zvezda had heaped scorn on (Mervin) Rees 
for simply sending more troops, describing them as ‘peace-makers with machine guns’.  
Dr Brennan closed his criticism by noting the paper’s unrealistic call for the withdrawal 
of British troops. To conclude on this report it can be seen for the first time that 
criticism of the Provisional I.R.A, so desired by Dr FitzGerald, was making its way into 
Soviet journalism, with the notable exception of Krasnaya Zvezda. However, as the 
source for this development was C.P.I. promptings, the ambassador flagged this as both 
incomplete and subject to questionable communist analyses.  
Dr Brennan added a splash of colour to his next report, which was based upon 
articles and an accompanying cartoon which featured in the October 1975 edition of the 
illustrated magazine Ogonyok, and the satirical magazine Krokodil.
55
 The Ogonyok 
article was, again, written by Pravda’s London correspondent, O. Vasilyev. It was 
carried beneath a headline ‘The blood and tears of Ulster’ and focused on the 
provocations of the Unionist ultras which Vasilyev claimed were designed to sever the 
thread by which the Provisional I.R.A. truce then hung. He wrote:  
They do not desire peace, for then there will be opened possibilities for the 
uniting of forces of the working class of Ulster, divided today along religious 
grounds. And this would not meet the interests of the owners of the Northern 
Ireland economy and the landed aristocracy. That is why the Protestant ultra acts 
have intensified terror against the fighters for civil rights.  
 
The Krokodil piece was accompanied by the eye-catching and challenging cartoon 
below. It was headed with the words ‘yet another contingent of British forces sent to 
Ulster’. 
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And the lower line read: ‘Key to the solution of the problem of Ulster’, with the 
drawing credited to M. Abramova. The ambassador provided the following pithy 
explanation for the article and cartoon: 
Whereas for Adam Smith the capitalist economy operated under the influence of 
an invisible hand, Krokodil is still at the old simplistic Leninist notion that it is 
the very visible hand of the monopolists which is at the root of the situation. 
A fuller exposition for the Soviet view that economic causes lay behind Northern 
Ireland’s woes was then available in the Soviet Union. Two historians in particular, A.D. 
Kolpakov and L.I. Gol’man, had been publishing on Irish affairs and historiography 
since the 1960s.
56
 Stephen White records that Kolpakov led a group of historians at 
Moscow University to compile the first Russian-language history of Ireland. Drawing 
upon that history White states: 
And for the Soviet history of Ireland, the sources of that conflict were 
unambiguously economic, not religious. There had, they explained, been 
increasing investment in the North from international capital. Small firms and 
rural industries had been marginalised. This gave rise to a growing problem of 
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unemployment, which in turn provided fertile ground for Protestant extremism, 
and...the confrontation of the two communities in the North.
57
  
If Krasnaya Zvezda was Dr Brennan’s least favourite Soviet newspaper in 
relation to Northern Ireland, his next report stands out for identifying a publication on 
the opposite end of his scale of appreciation – Komsomolskaya Pravda.58 Following the 
Camden Hill Square bomb explosion of 23 October 1975 (when an Provisional I.R.A. 
active service unit  attempted to kill a Conservative party M.P., Hugh Frazer, but 
instead killed his neighbour, a  professor of oncology, Gordon Hamilton Fairley),
59
 
Komsomolskaya Pravda  carried the first survey in the Soviet press of the Provisional 
I.R.A.’s recent bombing campaign in  England. Filed by its London correspondent, 
Mikhalyev (full name not supplied), the paper listed all the major explosions and the 
losses of life, including the Birmingham explosion where twenty people died – an 
outrage that the Irish ambassador claimed was marked  ‘virtually in silence here at the 
time’. Mikhalyev quoted Scotland Yard sources for details of the Camden Hill bombing, 
and the Morning Star (the newspaper associated with the Communist Party of Great 
Britain) for a statement that the bombings ‘only play into the hands of reactionary 
forces.’ But the most revealing aspect of the report was contained in the commentary by 
Ambassador Brennan: 
This is the second time that a blanket condemnation of the terrorist tactics of the 
Provos has appeared in Komsomolskaya Pravda. Two aspects, however, should 
be kept in mind. K.P. is the only centrally published newspaper here... that could 
be described as having ‘a liberal’ tinge. western correspondents here find it less 
dull and sometimes more revealing than other centrally published newspapers. 
Secondly, an expression of opinion in this newspaper obviously still carries less 
weight than if it had been published in either of the two leading papers, namely, 
Pravda or Izvestia. Only when this latter event takes place can one regard the 
Soviet leadership as having come out definitely against the Provos.
60
 
Six months later the ambassador sent a report that is notable for its details of a 
visit to Northern Ireland by the prominent Soviet poet, Yevgeny Aleksandrovich 
Yevtushenko (whose work and profile were discussed earlier in chapter three with 
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Shostakovich’s symphony, Babi Yar), and extracts from two poems inspired by his 
visit.
61
 In something of a departure from its usual political format, Pravda, in its edition 
for 13 March, featured Yevtushenko’s poem, Guns in Belfast. The report provided a 
brief interpretation of the poem – its basic theme being the ‘all-pervading feeling of 
terror in the city’ – along with selected extracts translated by Ambassador Brennan. 
Taking a sanguine attitude to a young British soldier who had sworn and waved his sub-
machine-gun at him, Yevtushenko wrote: 
Poor lad...it is not his fault 
Amidst ancient Christian strife 
He was awaiting, in his speckled jacket 
With a trembling diversionist back, 
A bullet from a window... 
Why should I take offence in Belfast at anything 
Amidst terror in its purest form? 
It should be a sin to take an offence 
As long as one is alive.
62
  
 
The poem continued by recalling the poet’s visit to Queen’s University, where he had 
overheard a lecturer speaking to his students about the nineteenth-century Russian poet 
Alexander Pushkin, and the affair between Pushkin’s wife, Natalia Nikolaevna, and her 
French lover, Georges D’Anthès. 
All round, terror was habitual 
 Like everyday life 
The girl students were twittering – 
Who will condemn 
Ignorance of the fact that Pushkin 
On the morrow will be killed? 
 
In this way Yevtushenko linked Pushkin’s violent death (he was killed in 1837 by 
D’Anthès in a duel) with terror on the streets of Northern Ireland. 
Yevtushenko’s second poem, Safari in Ulster, was given pride of place for St. 
Patrick’s day in the Writers’ Union publication, Literaturnaya Gazeta. In what appears 
to be a reference to a visit to the Causeway Safari Park, located between Coleraine and 
Bushmills, which operated between 1970 and 1996,
63
  Yevtushenko was inspired to 
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compose a lengthy poem on the twin themes of violence being organised along religious 
lines, suggesting that the conflict had reduced men’s behaviour below that of wild 
beasts.  First, however, the ambassador selected an extract that recounted the poet’s 
encounter with another British soldier, as he approached Derry. The soldier was taken 
aback to discover that Yevtushenko was a Russian poet, but then mellowed to offer him 
some advice on the local Chinese restaurant: 
Are you mad? 
This is a place for grave-diggers  
Not for poets... 
But the food, o God 
Some kind of toads 
Worms or snakes.
64
   
 
On the religious theme, the poem related a tale told to the poet by an elderly man in 
Derry concerning a Protestant dog that had run away from its master to join a Catholic 
dog, which was howling by the body of its master who had been gunned down: 
Atheist dogs are purer than we 
God is many-faced, 
And if this is so,  
then God is not a person 
but a dog. 
 
This introduced the poem’s theme that the conflict had reduced men below the savagery 
of beasts, telling a lioness that she is better off and better behaved in the lion-park than 
men: 
When a man becomes a beast 
The beast appears to be a man. 
And politely closing their jaws, 
If they are thrown pieces of meat 
From foul-smelling humanity – 
The lions turn away their noses. 
 
And Belfast did not ignore Yevtushenko’s two poems; nearly twenty years later they 
were included in Frank Ormsby’s anthology of 250 poems on the Northern troubles, A 
rage for order (1992), which was published at a time when tentative moves toward 
ceasefires and peace talks were under way. Ormsby organised his anthology into six 
sections, placing the Yevtushenko pair in the section reserved for those poems wherein: 
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‘the predominant subjects are art and politics, the ways in which men of “action” and, 
more especially, men of “words”, make...“things happen”’.65  
Dr Brennan’s second report of the same date is also unique for its inclusion of a 
brief summary of an article on Northern Ireland carried in Krokodil.
66
 Its outstanding 
feature is a cartoon of Dr Ian Paisley. While it is a poor quality photocopy of the 
cartoon that survives in the archives, its depiction of Paisley lighting bombs with his 
fiery cross is clear enough. The caption reads: ‘The head of the Protestant ultras, pastor 
Ian Paisley, blesses detachments of pogrom-makers for violence against Catholic 
workers’; and the halo reads ‘Ian Paisley’:  
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The lower line translates as ‘ultra-pastor’, and the drawing was credited to V. Ginukova. 
The cartoon appeared on the back page of the magazine – a space normally reserved for 
ridiculing major western imperialists.  
In his next report Dr Brennan could register that Komsomolskaya Pravda had 
again condemned the Provisional I.R.A. for its ‘blind terror’, this time for an explosion 
on a London underground train on 15 March 1976.
67
 Komsomolskaya Pravda 
speculated that the explosion was in retaliation for the death of Frank Stagg, a 
Provisional I.R.A. volunteer from Hollywood, County Mayo, who had died on hunger 
strike in Wakefield Prison, West Yorkshire in February. Stagg had embarked upon his 
hunger strike to demand status treatment as a political prisoner. The P.R. reported that 
the Soviet paper put Stagg’s death as ‘suicide’, indicating no sympathy for this tactic of 
protest, or knowledge of its place in Irish republican tradition. 
 It was the article in the October 1976 issue of the theoretical journal World 
Marxist Review by two senior Irish communists, entitled ‘Irish communists and 
terrorism’, that provided the source material for another step towards condemnation of 
the Provisional I.R.A. in the Soviet press. Jointly authored by Michael O’Riordan and a 
Belfast member of the C.P.I.’s national executive committee, Betty Sinclair, the 
significance of the article was described by the ambassador as being: 
The first systematic and ideological condemnation of the Provos in a mass 
circulation publication in the U.S.S.R...it can be taken as a major shift in the 
Soviet attitude to Provos...up to now only isolated press condemnation and 
fudge laying blame exclusively at doors of British  and Unionist ultras [have 
been published].
68
   
Dr Brennan noted that O’Riordan and Sinclair began with an historical analysis of the 
role of terror in the Irish struggle for independence. Their analysis instanced the 
exploding of bombs by the Fenian Brotherhood in Britain in the 1860s, cited Marx and 
Engels’ opposition to such terrorism, and referred to Lenin’s book What is to be done 
for the necessity to forge a link between revolutionary struggle and the working-class 
movement to achieve meaningful change.   The ambassador rather caustically noted:  
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Thus having got the generalised liturgical obeisance to Lenin out of the way they 
[O’Riordan and Sinclair] get down to brass tacks as regards what is really on 
their minds, namely, the rise of the Provisionals.
69
   
They denounced the Provisional I.R.A. as ‘petty bourgeois’, fixated with the power of 
the gun, and lacking any clear political programme. Their terrorist tactics were 
described as causing widespread job losses, thereby adding to the sectarian gulf. The 
effect had been to extend the S.D.L.P.’s influence among workers, and even to boost 
sympathy for the security forces. The authors instanced the recent killing of the British 
ambassador to Dublin, Christopher Ewart-Biggs, whereby sympathy among the public 
in the South for the struggles of the people in the North was transferred to the victims of 
terror and, in the final analysis, to the side of the British administration. Finally, the 
report indicated that the article stated (again citing Lenin’s What is to be done) that 
Marxists ‘do not deny in principle violence and terror in relation to the class enemy 
without which no revolution comes about’, but, it emphasised, that only applied ‘in 
immediate connection with the mass movement’.  
The emergence of the Northern Ireland peace movement in August 1976, and 
the movement’s subsequent rally held in Trafalgar Square, London, was given 
prominence in the pages of Pravda.
70
  The newspaper’s London correspondent, 
Vsevolod Ovchinnikov, declared that the rally was akin to a ‘human sea’ of supporters 
from all parts of Great Britain and both parts of Ireland, which represented ‘a grandiose 
manifestation’ for an appeal to the end of bloodshed in Northern Ireland that had been 
‘born in the hearts of the mothers of Belfast’.  The report gave details of the fatal events 
that had ‘shaken’ even those most de-sensitised by the ongoing violence, wherein a 
‘terrorist’, mortally wounded in a speeding car by British troops, had crashed into and 
killed three children on a west Belfast street. It told how the movements of cross-
community leadership ‘stretched out hands to one another in order to act jointly against 
bloodshed in Ulster....they are against every kind of violence – be it from the British 
Army, the Ulster Police, the terrorists from the Provisional I.R.A. or militarised unionist 
detachments.’ However, Ambassador Brennan’s focus on the newspaper’s article was 
its implications for official Soviet attitudes towards the Provisional I.R.A., and he 
closed his report with the following: 
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The condemnation of terrorists from the [Provisional] I.R.A. may be indirect and 
the culprits only half identified. But it is a major change when one considers that 
up to now Pravda has either portrayed the [Provisional] I.R.A. as heroic 
freedom fighters or, as was happening more recently, fudged the issue of their 
guilt in causing the escalation of violence. It now remains to be seen whether 
Pravda can soon take the final step of naming them openly.
71
 
In this regard it is revealing to note that the Irish government was sufficiently pleased 
with the direction of the evolution of Soviet press coverage on the Provisional I.R.A. 
that Dr FitzGerald acknowledged it to his Soviet counterpart during his official visit to 
Moscow in December 1976. The acknowledgement was included in a F.C.O. report of a 
meeting between Dr FitzGerald and a British counsellor, John Hickman, as follows: 
Dr FitzGerald mentioned to Gromyko that there had been signs recently of some 
improvement in Soviet press coverage. Gromyko replied that he was glad to hear 
this – the British had been complaining about it too. 72  
Nevertheless, at the start of 1977 Dr Brennan reported a setback in the Soviet 
media’s trend towards a less ambiguous condemnation of the Provisional I.R.A.73 This 
report, based upon recent Izvestia and Pravda coverage of the fifth anniversary 
commemorations of Bloody Sunday in Derry, noted that commentary stressed the 
repressive role of the security forces, and collusion between them and the Protestant 
ultras. The ambassador accounted for this reversion to earlier practices by pointing to a 
change in the international political atmosphere. This arose from the stated policy of the 
recently-elected president of the U.S., Jimmy Carter, which placed more weight on the 
issue of human rights in East-West relations. In particular, the Soviet authorities were 
keen to forestall expectations that western representatives intended to raise charges of 
human rights violations in Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Soviet Union itself at the 
upcoming review of the Helsinki agreement to be held in Belgrade.  The Soviet tactic, 
reported Dr Brennan, (he characterised it as a relapse ‘into opportunism’) was to counter 
with the British government’s inability to bring to an end the tragedy of Ulster. 
Accordingly, Izvestia and Pravda condemned Britain for its adherence to a military 
solution to a problem that was essentially one of ‘social-political contradictions, namely 
discrimination against Catholics and the denial of civil rights.’  
                                                          
71
 Ibid. 
72
 This paragraph is informed by R.M. Harris, British embassy, Dublin to R.J.M. Lyne, London, 13 Jan. 
1977 (T.N.A., F.C.O., 87/605, WLE 020/303/1). 
73
 P.R. 19/77, ‘Bloody Sunday commemoration’, 2 Feb. 1977 (N.A.I., D.F.A. 2007/111/221). 
202 
 
Two more articles by Pravda’s Vsevolod Ovchinnikov, one of which had 
appeared in the prestigious journal of the central committee of the C.P.S.U., Kommunist, 
prompted Ambassador Brennan’s first Northern Ireland P.R. of 1977. 74 The articles had 
for their central theme a new aspect in Soviet interpretation of developments in 
Northern Ireland, namely that British military and legal actions and related legislation in 
Ulster could be deployed in the future throughout the rest of the U.K. This prospect 
arose from, reported Ovchinnikov, public concerns in Britain surrounding General 
Frank Kitson’s publication, Low intensity operations (1971).75  The report provided a 
summary of the publication’s contents: 
Violence offers ideal conditions for the testing of military tactics for the quelling 
of civil disturbances in instances where the ordinary police are unable to 
cope...Kitson is of the view that a major drop in living standards in Britain could 
give rise to mass discontent with which the police would be unable to cope and 
this would become a job for the army...on how to deal with strikes, picketing, 
boycotts, occupation of factories...[and the deployment of] new weapons: water 
cannon, C.S. gas, rubber and plastic bullets, nylon nets, etc.
76
 
The report closed with Pravda’s reference to Karl Marx’s warning in 1870 that the 
British government could use agitation in Ireland as a pretext to use the army against 
British workers.  
No coverage in the Soviet press on Northern Ireland was recorded by 
Ambassador Brennan for the next twenty months, until January 1979 when he 
forwarded a five-page report on a feature on the Northern Ireland Civil Rights 
Association (NICRA) by its general secretary, Madge Davison.
77
 The article, entitled 
‘hypocrisy and reality’ had recently featured in Pravda, and an A4-sized photocopy of 
Davison’s article (in Russian) was attached to the report. No personal details of Davison 
were provided in the report, but it is relevant to provide here some brief biographical 
details on this lesser known civil rights leader.  Davison (1949-91), first became an 
activist with the Youth Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and the Communist Youth 
League, the youth section of the Communist Party of Northern Ireland. She joined the 
office staff of NICRA in 1970, when she was promoted to the post of organiser, and as a 
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gifted public speaker she articulated the cause of the movement at local, national and 
international level. This included officiating at an exhibition on the Northern Ireland 
conflict in a Moscow museum in 1974.
78
 Afterwards, she returned to education as a 
mature student of law at Queen’s University, Belfast (Q.U.B.). She was called to the bar 
in 1983 and subsequently qualified as a barrister. Shortly after she had taken up a 
position with the Fair Employment Agency, she was diagnosed with the fatal illness that 
was soon to cut short her contribution to peace and social progress in Northern 
Ireland.
79
  
Davison’s Pravda article recounted the main achievements of NICRA since 
1968: ‘democratic participation in local elections; abolition of the B Specials; and a 
central board for the allocation of housing.’ She identified the major influences on the 
movement to have been the campaign for civil rights in the U.S., and the radicalising 
impact of Catholic graduates from Q.U.B. on their community. Even so, Davison 
maintained ‘that it is no exaggeration to say that we have fewer civil rights now than in 
1968.’ She branded direct rule as ‘direct neglect’ by Westminster; and wrote at length at 
how the British government’s policy from 1976 on the use of force instead of reform 
had led to torture becoming ‘a customary phenomenon of life in Ulster.’ In support of 
this contention, Davison gave an account of the Irish government’s case in 1977 against 
the British at the Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg on the use of torture in jails in 
Northern Ireland.
80
 Her article proceeded to castigate British politicians and newspapers 
for their double-standards in relation to Soviet violations of human rights and the 
practise of torture in Northern Ireland: 
When reading such statements it is necessary to bear in mind that they belong to 
the same newspapers, the pages of which are daily festooned with headlines like 
‘Violation of human rights in the Soviet Union’. There are people working for 
these newspapers who in ostentatious despair wring their hands over reports of 
court trials in the U.S.S.R. of criminals while at the same time they bless tortures 
in Northern Ireland.
81
 
 
The report was brought to a conclusion with Davison’s recognition of the reduced status 
of NICRA, and Dr Brennan’s observation upon a Pravda ‘sting’ for the Provisional 
I.R.A. in the article. Back in the late 1960s, Davison said, the movement had been an 
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‘alliance of uncoordinated forces’ that enabled it to mobilise a broad range of people for 
an agenda confined to demands for equal rights for all the citizens of Northern Ireland 
and a fundamental reform of Stormont. But since then ‘unity has been lost’, because of 
governmental and unionist policy, and ‘lies and violence’. It was an allusion to this 
violence and militarisation of what had been a potent civil rights movement that enabled 
Ambassador Brennan to pick up on a reference to the Provisional I.R.A. in the Pravda 
article.  Davison incorporated a quotation from a British newspaper, The Guardian, that 
included a reference to the Provisional I.R.A., and the editor of Pravda inserted a note 
of clarification on that organisation for his readers.  To report this, the ambassador 
stated: 
Finally, there is an interesting Pravda editorial interpolation in the Madge 
Davison article. A quotation which she cited from The Guardian made reference 
to the Provisional I.R.A. The interpolation was: ‘the “Provisional wing of the 
I.R.A.” in English newspapers means the extremist elements who have broken 
away from the [Official] I.R.A.’ This is the first time, even if only incidentally, 
that Pravda has described the Provos as ‘extremist’. But it still has to bite the 
bullet by naming them the terrorists they are.
82
 
 
It was to take but six more months for Dr Brennan to have his wish for an 
outright condemnation of the Provisional I.R.A. fulfilled in the pages of Pravda.
83
 
Under the heading ‘Troubled Ulster’, this appeared in the 5 June 1979 issue of the 
paper’s ‘at your request’ column. The piece, credited to V. Potapov, was prompted by 
requests from two Pravda readers, A. Bolshakov from the village of Titavo in the 
Kemerovo oblast (administrative region), and R. Belyakov from the village of 
Murmashi in the Murmansk oblast (Dr Brennan suggested that the readers’ names were 
‘presumably fictitious’). Potapov presented a considered Marxist-orientated history of 
the origins of the Ulster conflict. This included an acknowledgement that Protestants 
constituted two thirds of the population of Ulster, most of whom ‘come out for an 
unconditional preservation of ties with Great Britain’. Then, Potapov went on to 
castigate the Provisional I.R.A.: 
Much trouble is being caused to the English [sic] authorities in Northern Ireland 
by the underground organisation, the [Provisional] I.R.A... [this] extremist wing 
has chosen the tactic of terror, which gives the official authorities a reason for 
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intensification of repression and does not bring closer a solution of the Northern 
Ireland problem.
84
  
Ambassador Brennan closed off his report by noting another change: ‘in the old days 
Pravda used to call for the withdrawal of British troops. Later it scaled this down to 
withdrawal to barracks. Now there is not a word about withdrawal in any shape or 
form.’  
Now that Foreign Minister FitzGerald’s aspiration on the Provisional I.R.A. had 
been fulfilled in Pravda, Ambassador Brennan then set about articulating a new thesis 
in his report. He suggested that the Soviets’ conversion to denouncing the Provisional 
I.R.A. now undermined the Soviet Union’s own strategic political interests. He wrote: 
It has been a constant grievance of ours that the Soviet media have been too 
indulgent towards the violence of the Provisional I.R.A.... The major flaw in this 
approach of course has been that the Provo violence has had the effect of 
alienating the Unionists and postponing the day of reunification which, as the 
Soviets would see it, would go a long way towards diminishing the strategic 
position of the U.K. In other words, short-term tactical approval of trouble for 
the British has been at odds with their strategic interests in seeing a united 
Ireland come about.
85
  
However, it should be noted that there is no evidence in any of the island of Ireland 
P.R.s that the Soviet Union made representations to the British in relation to Northern 
Ireland or Irish unity. As discussed above in relation to the C.S.C.E. talks at Helsinki, 
the Soviets were supportive of the ‘special problem’ of Irish unity, but subject to Irish-
British agreement. As will be discussed below, the Soviets did raise the conflict in 
Northern Ireland in international human rights forums, but only to criticise the British 
government for its failure to solve the conflict – and only then in the context of human 
rights charges against the Soviet Union from western powers.  
Dr Brennan was to produce only three more reports dedicated to coverage of the 
conflict in Northern Ireland prior to his departure from Moscow. He had little by way of 
extra original commentary to add, other than on two events: the first concerned an 
internal development within the North – the ‘blanket’ protest by republican prisoners in 
the H-Blocks of Long Kesh prison; the second concerned the external raising of the 
Northern Ireland conflict by the Soviets, for the first time, at the U.N.  An account of 
the prisoners’ blanket protest appeared as a feature item in the ministry of culture’s 
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weekly newspaper Sovyetskaya Kultura.
86
 This was the first time the ambassador 
reported on this organ, whose target audience he rather caustically described as ‘the 
numerous minor minions among the intelligentsia’. Written by Tass correspondent, A. 
Shal’nyev, the report detailed the conditions of filth and squalor that the prisoners 
endured after they had refused to wear prison dress in place of civilian clothes. The 
thrust of the article was sympathetic towards the protest of the prisoners in pursuit of 
political status. This analysis was in contrast to that provided in the above-discussed 
report, wherein the death of hunger striker Frank Stagg was described by 
Komsomolskaya Pravda as ‘suicide’. When the blanket protest escalated on 27 October 
1980 to the first of the hunger strikes,
87
 Ambassador Brennan was in the final weeks of 
his mission to Moscow when he forwarded only three more reports to Dublin – none of 
which featured Northern Ireland.  
Dr Brennan’s last report on Northern Ireland was forwarded in April 1980, and 
was set in the context of western reactions at the U.N.’s Commission on Human Rights 
to the Soviet intervention into Afghanistan.  The report was based upon an article in 
Izvestia by the senior Soviet representative present at the commission session, Valerian 
Alexandrovich Zorin.
88
 (Zorin, a respected veteran among Soviet diplomats, had two 
years earlier been the subject of a report by Dr Brennan to Dublin).
89
 In Zorin’s view, 
the U.S. and other western representatives sought to ‘undermine the policy of détente’ 
and to attempt ‘psychological warfare’ by raising embarrassing issues for the Soviet 
Union, including its activities in support of the government of Afghanistan. By way of 
response at the session, and supported by some Arab and developing states, the Soviets 
listed western support for countries such as Israel, South Africa, and Chile – where 
human rights abuses were regarded as being entrenched. To add to this list Zorin wrote: 
The question was raised...on the initiative of the Soviet delegation, of the mass-
scale and gross human rights violations in Northern Ireland by the British 
government. More than 2,000 people dead  and 22,000 wounded, let alone the 
tens of thousands of people detained — such are the consequences of the 
‘operation to maintain law and order’ London has been conducting in Ulster for 
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more than ten years now. The British delegate was unable to say anything on the 
acute situation in such a major capitalist country as Great Britain, which styles 
itself as a model of western democracy.
90
  
In this context, Ambassador Brennan’s final advice to the D.F.A. on Northern Ireland 
was amplified: should western powers continue to put the U.S.S.R. and other socialist 
countries under pressure at the U.N. on human rights, the Soviets would incorporate the 
conflict of Ulster in their riposte. And nowhere was this amplification to be more 
evident than in Soviet coverage of Ireland’s ‘torture’ court case against Britain at 
Strasbourg.  
The case brought by Ireland against the United Kingdom at the European Court 
of Human Rights regarding ill-treatment of prisoners in Northern Ireland has already 
been briefly discussed in chapter two in the context of the British government’s Parker 
Report of 1972. That report found that the R.U.C. had utilised against certain prisoners 
in Northern Ireland in 1971 the so-called ‘five techniques’ – wall-standing, hooding, 
subjection to noise, deprivation of sleep, and deprivation of food and drink. The report 
went on to conclude that these techniques were ‘secret, illegal, and not morally 
justifiable’,91 and subsequently the British government undertook not to repeat such 
procedures in the future. However, it failed to accede to the Irish government’s request 
to outlaw such practices. Unsatisfied with the findings of the report and the lack of a 
suitable undertaking, the Irish government determined to hold the British authorities 
accountable for actions believed to amount to torture. It made an application on behalf 
of fourteen victims of the techniques to the European Commission of Human Rights 
against the British government. In response, the commission issued a report in support 
of the Irish contention of torture. The government then refused to agree to a ‘friendly 
settlement’ with the British, and applied to the Court of Human Rights.92 Ireland’s legal 
team requested the court to: 
consider the report of the commission and to confirm the opinion of the 
commission that breaches of the Convention [for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms] have occurred and also to consider the 
claims of the applicant government with regard to other alleged breaches and to 
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make a finding of breach of the convention where the court is satisfied that a 
breach has occurred.
93
 
The court had been established in 1959 under articles of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, and its jurisdiction was confined to member countries of western Europe 
until after the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991. In 1977 there were nineteen such 
countries affiliated and each country appointed a judge to the court. Judgements were 
made by majority vote and were binding upon member states.  Attorney-General Declan 
Costello argued the case for Ireland, and his counterpart, Sam Silkin, replied for the 
British.
94
 The case commanded considerable international attention, not least that of the 
Soviet media.   As discussed in chapter two in the context of Dr FitzGerald’s visit to the 
Soviet Union a year earlier and his meeting there with Andrei Gromyko, FitzGerald was 
conscious of and uncomfortable with the political impact of the Irish case against 
Britain in East-West rivalries. These rivalries had since been heightened with renewed 
public emphasis by western powers on the issue of dissidents in socialist countries, led 
by the newly elected U.S. president, Jimmy Carter. It is safe to assume that Ambassador 
Brennan’s reports on Soviet coverage of the case were eagerly awaited at the D.F.A. As 
the case progressed in Strasbourg, he forwarded four reports dedicated to the topic. 
The first report related to the opening of the preliminary hearings of the case, 
and Dr Brennan set the tone that he was to maintain throughout, one of reporting on a 
‘massive build of hostile Soviet comment on British behaviour in N. Ireland...all of it 
denunciatory’ and that the Soviets were making no secret of the fact that this was in 
retaliation for intensified East-West polemics over the issue of dissidents in eastern 
Europe.
95
 He claimed that the Soviets were using the case as ‘a stick to beat the west’ 
because their ‘hackles’ had been raised by ‘Carter’s aggressive stand’. But most of the 
Soviet criticism was reserved for alleged British hypocrisy. He quoted from Izvestia: 
‘official London haughtily lectured morality to others, and now this defendant finds 
himself in the unenviable role of the accused’.  
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The next report referred to coverage of the closing session of the preliminary 
hearings at Strasbourg.
96
 Dr Brennan identified Vsevolod Ovchinnikov, the London-
based correspondent of Pravda, as the source (it was Ovchinnikov who had earlier 
condemned the Provisional I.R.A. when he reported on the emergence of the Peace 
People). Ovchinnikov  headed this piece, ‘Much vaunted English democracy never 
extended itself to Ireland’, recalling examples of English injustices throughout Irish 
history, and stating that Ulster remained outside the framework of bourgeois democracy, 
when ‘in 1938 the only other parallels were the Fascist regimes of Italy and Germany’. 
As was his wont, Ambassador Brennan inserted into his account of Ovchinnikov’s text 
his own observation: ‘he does not mention Stalin’. Next to be identified was O. 
Vasilyev, the London-based correspondent, who had been reporting on Northern Ireland 
since 1974. Vasilyev had focused on Roy Mason’s statement that compensation would 
be paid to the victims to prove that Britain was a ‘first-class example of mature 
democracy’. The ambassador wrote that Vasilyev was permitted by his editor to address 
himself personally to Mason’s ‘haughty’ statement, with: ‘Enough Mr Minister! What 
democracy can there be when basic civil rights of the entire Catholic population are 
being suppressed, [together with] an attempt to stuff money into the mouths of victims 
of inhuman punishments in Ulster...’ But it was Volodin (full name not supplied), 
another Izvestia London correspondent, who was most prominent in the report, and it 
was his work that was to attract most of the attention of the Irish authorities.  Dr 
Brennan credited Volodin with introducing a note of criticism of the court itself. 
Suspicious because the court’s makeup was restricted to capitalist states, Volodin 
queried its need to continue deliberations in secret:  
Why so? Documents record juridically the well-founded facts... [the documents 
are] burning the hands not only of the judges but also of the governments of the 
nineteen countries...to acknowledge judicially that the authorities of one – and 
what a one – are illegally putting behind bars innocent people, inflicting 
interrogations, using torture...means to acknowledge what bourgeois freedoms 
really mean in practice. 
Volodin went on to criticise western press coverage of the case, accusing it of being 
‘silent or distorted’, and singled out the Paris-based Le Monde for special mention. 
Under a headline ‘World of capitalism – world of lawlessness’, Volodin placed the 
plight of the Irish prisoners on par with: 
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…discrimination against Puerto Ricans in the U.S.; the tragic position of Italian 
unemployed; persecution of dissidents in the F.R.G.; violation of human rights 
in Israel; arbitrary dismissal of workers in Sweden; subversive activity by the 
C.I.A. in Honduras; and the throwing of workers of a bankrupt Austrian clothing 
factory on to the streets.
97
 
As noted above, Dr FitzGerald was particularly interested in this issue. The Irish 
foreign minister made good use of the details contained in the P.R.s for his public 
contribution to acrimonious exchanges between western and Soviet spokespersons in 
the run-up to a review of the work of the C.S.C.E., due to be held within a few months’ 
time in Belgrade. President Carter indicated that he wanted to use the review as a 
vehicle for promoting human rights, while the Soviets wished to maintain the spirit of 
Helsinki and focus on practical matters to develop détente and economic cooperation.
98
 
Dick Walsh, political correspondent of the Irish Times, was present when Dr FitzGerald 
took the opportunity of his address to the National Press Club in Washington to accuse 
the Soviet press of using his country’s case against Britain ‘to distract attention from the 
problem of dissidents in the socialist countries’. 99  FitzGerald made the case for 
international bodies with binding supranational powers to act on human rights violations, 
stating that the U.N. commission for human rights was ineffective. Extolling the 
effectiveness of the western European system, he applauded the decision of the 
Commission of Human Rights in Ireland’s favour and expressed his optimism for the 
case before the court at Strasbourg. He then turned his fire on Soviet media, and 
deploying selected extracts from correspondent Volodin’s Izvestia article contained in 
P.R. 25/77 (as quoted above) he revealed: 
Pravda’s London correspondent, and two of Izvestia’s London correspondents, 
have written at length on this subject, adding references to such matters as the 
tragic position of the Italian unemployed, alleged persecution of dissidents in the 
F.R.G., alleged arbitrary dismissals of workers in Sweden and Austria...all this is 
quite evidently part of a preparatory campaign before the Belgrade review of the 
C.S.C.E.
100
     
It is revealing to compare this use of P.R. 25/77 by Dr FitzGerald against the relevant 
text as written by Ambassador Brennan. First, FitzGerald had taken care to excise 
allegations on the role of the C.I.A. in Honduras and the discrimination of Puerto Ricans 
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in the U.S. – no doubt to avoid causing embarrassment to his Washington hosts. Second, 
both the location of Dr FitzGerald’s address and his meeting with the U.S. secretary of 
state, Cyrus Vance, to discuss the topic of human rights in the Soviet Union (as featured 
in chapter two), evidences a level of coordination between Ireland and the U.S. in 
advance of the Belgrade review. Accordingly, these events give a direct link between Dr 
Brennan’s P.R.s and the formulation and delivery of Irish government policy in the 
East-West ideological contest.  
Before considering Ambassador Brennan’s next report, it is also worthwhile to 
cross-check with a report by Conor O’Clery, then the London editor of the Irish Times, 
who was also covering the Strasbourg case. Under a heading, ‘New Russian interest in 
torture case’, he too contended that the Russians were keen to record in detail the 
infringements of human rights in a western country, and penned the following word 
picture of the Soviet team at work inside the courtroom: 
They scribbled away happily under the disapproving stares of the British 
delegation...there are eight of them. The Paris and London TASS and Pravda 
correspondents, two from Novosti news agency, and two from Moscow Radio 
T.V., who have been allowed to wander around the courtroom filming the black-
robed judges, and the British and Irish delegations facing the judges’ semi-
circular bench.
101
   
O’Clery included in his piece a suggestion ‘of international intrigue’ in the courtroom – 
that there were other Russians present, ‘some mysterious gentlemen discreetly watching 
proceedings.’102 He also recorded the British delegation’s increased annoyance at the 
unhappy coincidence of the attendance of the world’s press in the building next door for 
a session of the European parliament. There, a rather diligent official had posted a large 
notice directing journalists to the court hearing.   
Nine weeks later Dr Brennan sent his third report to Dublin regarding 
resumption of the court’s open hearings. 103  The ambassador cited from an Izvestia 
report that Britain’s Attorney-General Samuel Silkin had sought before the court ‘to 
play a trump card by claiming that today these methods of interrogation are not used 
and there is no need to deliver judgement’. To contradict the attorney-general’s claim, 
Soviet sources indicated that news coming from Northern Ireland gave evidence of 
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ongoing use of police and army torture-chambers, citing the belief that ‘every inhabitant 
of Ulster knows that it is so’. Indeed, British media reports were also supportive of such 
Soviet claims, with evidence-based allegations emanating from television and press 
reports. The B.B.C.’s Tonight programme broadcast lengthy interviews with two men 
who claimed they had recently been subjected to wall-standing, beatings, hoodings, and 
threats at an interrogation centre in east Belfast by the R.U.C. The programme led to an 
allegation by NICRA that ‘the government’s pledge in Strasbourg was a lie’. 104   
Whether or not these reports had made an impact on the Strasbourg court, Dr Brennan’s 
report related the Soviet view that Attorney-General Silkin failed in his ploy, and the 
Strasbourg court ‘was obliged to continue’.   A novel aspect in the ambassador’s report 
also came from Izvestia’s London correspondent, O. Vasilyev. He revealed that he had 
been told recently that ‘London put behind-the-scenes pressure on the Irish government’ 
so that the remaining part of the trial would draw a minimum of publicity. No source for 
this revelation was quoted. 
Just one week later Ambassador Brennan began his fourth and final report on the 
topic, with a summary assessment of the latest batch of Soviet commentary: ‘all heavy 
on past offences and polemical abuse, and light on what actually transpired at the 
hearing.’ 105 He did give some recognition to Vsevolod Ovchinnikov of Pravda for a 
more moderate approach: ‘his stories were very short, contained less vituperation’.  But 
he also noted that that his least favourite Soviet correspondent on the case, Izvestia’s 
Vasilyev, had been the one ‘who led the field in abuse’.  Vasilyev focused again on the 
twin themes of the continuation of torture by the British army, and the loss of Britain’s 
credibility as a champion of human rights, stating: ‘London has now ended up in the 
role of the Andersonian naked king deprived of the clothes of the defender of civil 
rights in which it liked so much to attire itself.’ The ambassador left the parting quotes 
to Pravda: ‘Official London which usually speaks out in the toga of defender of civil 
freedoms and human rights found itself in the dock and in the role of a defendant whose 
guilt had been indisputably proven.’ And –linking the Americans to British culpability 
in advance of the impending Belgrade summit of the C.S.C.E. – Pravda cited a U.S. 
refusal to issue visas to Soviet trade union officials, to accuse the U.S. of ‘double 
standards of morality in politics’ and acting contrary to the Helsinki Final Act. 
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The European Court of Human Rights duly adjourned its public hearings in 
April, and having deliberated in private on a number of dates throughout the rest of the 
year, it published its judgement on 18 January 1978. Contrary to widespread 
expectations, the court, by majority vote overturned the verdict of the Commission that 
had held that the five methods amounted to torture, and instead ruled: 
Although the five techniques, as applied in combination, undoubtedly amounted 
to inhuman and degrading treatment, although their object was the extraction of 
confessions, the naming of others and/or information, and although they were 
used systematically, they did not occasion suffering of the particular intensity 
and cruelty implied by the word torture as so understood.
106
  
Unfortunately, any Soviet reaction to the verdict was not the subject of a report after the 
judgement date. While it is to be noted that two P.R.s, 12/78 and 13/78, dated after 25 
January are missing from N.A.I. files, the subject was not again raised by Dr Brennan. 
Northern Secretary Roy Mason expressed satisfaction on behalf of his government that 
Britain had not been found guilty of torture and declared that the chapter was now 
closed. One of the complainants of ill-treatment, Paddy Joe McClean of NICRA, said 
that the verdict had given a ‘green light to a continuation of torture’.107  It was left to the 
Irish Times to give a brief mention from the Soviet media for Irish readers. It quoted 
from TASS’s ‘long commentary’ the claim that contrary to the court’s verdict, the case 
in Strasbourg showed that Britain had applied and continued to apply ‘refined torture to 
hundreds of champions of civil rights in Northern Ireland...with the encouragement of 
the highest authorities.’108  
The issue of Eurocommusism 
Throughout Ambassador Brennan’s tenure in Moscow in the 1970s, he took a particular 
interest in a political phenomenon that was on the rise in western Europe, 
Eurocommunism, and he forwarded thirty-five reports on the subject to Dublin.
109
 
During this decade many western communists were attracted to Eurocommunism, a 
theory and practice that offered a path to a form of democratic socialism, which its 
supporters considered was better suited to advanced capitalist countries than that 
suggested by Soviet-style communism. Such was the impact of this development that 
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some significant communist parties adopted Eurocommunist programmes.
110
 Those 
parties were, predominantly, the Italian (Partito Comunista Italiano, P.C.I.) and Spanish 
(Partido Comunista de España, P.C.E.) parties. Also associated with adhering to 
Eurocommunism were elements within the Communist Party of Great Britain 
(C.P.G.B.), and for a period in the mid-1970s the French party, Parti communiste 
français, (P.C.F.).  
The political fortunes of the Latin members of this group were on the rise: in the 
case of the Italians, their leadership of anti-clerical forces in the 1974 referendum on 
divorce had delivered a fifty-nine per cent majority yes vote; the Spaniards, while still 
proscribed, were confident of their return to popular favour with the expected end of 
Francoism; and the French, because of the electoral power of their Common Programme 
with the socialists, were a major force in French politics. In this regard it was the Italian 
party, under its leader Enrico Berlinguer that led the Eurocommunist way. For the 
Italians, it was to be via italiana – their way to socialism – not the Leninist way. 
Berlinguer, mindful of the coups in pre-war Spain, post-war Greece, and the 1973 
overthrow of President Allende’s Unidad Popular government in Chile, considered that 
a similar outcome could also occur in Italy – owing to a combination of its membership 
of NATO and the E.E.C., and its lingering Fascist heritage. Accordingly, the P.C.I. 
promoted a gradualist approach to socialism, a strategy that included the offer of 
compromesso storico (the historic compromise), whereby it would campaign for and 
lead a broad government to include reformist elements of the principal Italian 
establishment party, the Christian Democratic Party.  
There was, however, considerable disquiet and debate across the communist 
movement on an electoral path to socialism, including in Ireland, where many members 
of the C.P.I. had serious concerns about Eurocommunism. An indication of concerns 
was articulated by an executive committee member of the C.P.I., Eddie Glackin, in his 
review of the book by the general secretary of the P.C.E., Santiago Carrillo, 
Eurocommunism and the state (London, 1977): 
But in many passages he seems to equate political democracy with the once-in-
five-years mark on a ballot paper which passes for democracy in the capitalist 
world, and places undue emphasis on parliamentary forms of struggle...in doing 
so he ignores what [Fredrick] Engels said about universal suffrage – ‘that under 
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conditions of bourgeois democracy it cannot be anything more than a gauge of 
the level of maturity of the working class’.111 
Furthermore, as the debate continued, some commentators – including Ambassador 
Brennan – claimed that a division had arisen in the communist movement between the 
Eurocommunist parties and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (C.P.S.U.).  This 
development was mentioned in a recent obituary article on the prominent English 
historian, Eric Hobsbawm, who had been an early ‘convert’ to Eurocommunism. The 
obituary includes: 
In the 1960s and 70s, he [Hobsbawm] developed links with those in the Italian 
Communist Party who saw themselves as developing a strategy for socialism 
that was quite distinct from, and to a large extent posed against, that of the 
Soviet Union.
112
 
It was against this Eurocommunist background that Ambassador Brennan wrote his two 
‘Michael O’Riordan’ P.R.s. In his first report he identified Michael O’Riordan as the 
delegate from the C.P.I. to the twenty-fifth congress of the C.P.S.U., held in Moscow in 
1976.
113
 As he stood to address the congress, O’Riordan was the pre-eminent Irish 
communist of his time. Born in Cork in 1917, as a youth he joined Na Fianna and later 
the I.R.A., with whom he confronted the Blueshirts in his native city. In 1936 he 
enlisted in the ranks of the Connolly Column within the Fifteenth International Brigade 
that fought for the Republican cause in the Spanish Civil War, where he was wounded 
at the battle of the Ebro.
114
 There he developed his communist convictions under the 
influence of U.S., British and Spanish comrades. After his return to Ireland and the 
commencement of the Second World War, he was interned by the government in the 
Curragh internment camp for three-and-a-half years. There he studied Marxism, took 
Irish and Russian language classes, and developed a communist group in the midst of 
I.R.A. internees. Following his release and an unhappy stint in the Labour Party, he 
founded the Cork Socialist Party, which established him as a party-builder and vote-
getter. Those successes led to an invitation in 1947 from Dublin city – where a few 
dozen communists were scattered between the Labour Party, the Connolly Study Group, 
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and a handful of volunteers running New Books in Pearse Street – to lead the 
reformation of a communist organisation. He subsequently gave unbroken service as the 
secretary of the Irish Workers’ League (1947-62), the Irish Workers’ Party (1962-70) 
and, following the unity congress with the Communist Party of Northern Ireland 
(C.P.N.I.) in 1970, of the C.P.I.
115
 Shortly after the organisation of Irish communists 
into one party, and drawing upon his republican credentials, O’Riordan made a 
determined, but unsuccessful, bid to bring the leaderships of the Official and 
Provisional movements together for a unity meeting in Dublin.
116
   
As the public face and the lone standard-bearer at successive general elections 
for Irish communism, O’Riordan had prevailed through the bitterly anti-communist 
Cold War period. By 1976-7 his party had grown to contain thirteen branches, based in 
Dublin, Belfast, Cork and Waterford,
117
 with many of its members to the fore in trade 
unions. With an influence that reached beyond its circa 300 card-carrying membership, 
the C.P.I. was involved in two promising political developments. In Northern Ireland, 
party members were to the fore in the Irish Congress of Trade Unions’ (I.C.T.U.) ‘better 
life for all’ campaign, which sought popular support against ‘unemployment, 
discrimination, lack of democratic rights, and against the bombers and assassins.’118 
And in the Republic, the C.P.I. was involved in tripartite discussions for the formulation 
of the Left Alternative grouping, with Official Sinn Féin and the Liaison Committee of 
the Labour Left. These discussions led to the publication of an alternative economic 
policy to those of the National Coalition government and the Fianna Fáil opposition. 
Entitled, Go to work Ireland, it proposed a detailed programme for economic 
expansion.
119
 Hopes were high that a long-nurtured strategy of building a left platform 
for policy formation and electoral advance were about to be realised. While both of 
these initiatives failed to survive to the decade’s end, the C.P.I. was showing a capacity 
to give leadership and forge alliances when Ambassador Brennan wrote his report. 
Consequently, O’Riordan could at that time address delegates of the C.P.S.U. congress 
and his fellow foreign representatives from a position of some domestic strength and 
optimism.  
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Ambassador Brennan began his report on O’Riordan’s address to the Soviet 
party congress with an account of O’Riordan’s analysis of the situation in both parts of 
Ireland. O’Riordan laid the blame on successive British policies of divide and rule that 
had lead to the ongoing murders, bomb explosions and widespread imprisonments in 
Northern Ireland.  He went on to identify, reported Brennan, a ‘subjective factor – the 
dominance of bourgeois political personalities...of the two states...[that] had always 
betrayed the national, political and economic interests of the people’.120 Dr Brennan 
continued with O’Riordan’s positive news from the trade union movement that despite 
sectarian pressures in the north, unity of the movement had been maintained on an all-
Ireland basis. Further, O’Riordan could report with some pride that the chairman of his 
party, Andrew Barr of Belfast,
121
 had been recently elected president of the I.C.T.U. But 
Brennan wrote more sharply as he recounted O’Riordan’s three rhetorical questions that 
he had put to the congress delegates: to the first question, ‘Could the divide, engendered 
by imperialism, between people in the North be overcome?’, O’Riordan had simply 
pointed to the example of ethnic harmony in the multi-national union of his hosts;  to 
his second question (a little stranger, in Brennan’s view), ‘Is a small country powerless 
before the face of imperialism?’, O’Riordan pointed to the recent victory of the people 
of Vietnam over the Americans; and finally (and ‘strangest of all’ for Brennan), ‘Can 
the people of Ireland, situated beside a powerful imperialist exploiter, defeat it and 
embark on the building of socialism, despite its remoteness from the socialist camp?’, to 
which O’Riordan had offered the example of socialist Cuba. O’Riordan had gone on to 
assert that positive answers to his questions were possible because of the political and 
practical assistance and leadership of the C.P.S.U. to communist and national liberation 
movements worldwide. Together these alliances had helped to bring about a change in 
the sootnoshenie sil (correlation of forces) – a Soviet term corresponding to a tipping 
point in favour of anti-imperialist and socialist advances. Brennan wrote sceptically 
about O’Riordan’s optimism, yet he related verbatim his words: ‘We are convinced that 
the present congress will provide a further change in the correlation of forces for the 
benefit of humanity’. To make clear his interpretation of O’Riordan’s world analysis, 
the ambassador clarified: ‘in plain English O’Riordan seems to be arguing that the 
                                                          
120
 P.R. 25/76, ‘O'Riordan speaks at Soviet party congress’, 8 Mar. 1976 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 2006/131/238). 
All subsequent quotations in this section are from this P.R., unless otherwise referenced. 
121
 C.P.I., ‘Andy Barr (1913-2003)’(http://www.communistpartyofireland.ie/s-barr.html) (22 July 2013). 
218 
 
growing military might of the Soviet Union would help to establish “socialism” 
[Brennan’s ironic inflection] in Ireland’. 
It is of interest to switch at this point to O’Riordan’s own account of the C.P.S.U. 
congress which appeared in his party’s newspaper, the Irish Socialist. 122  Under a 
heading ‘U.S.S.R. forges ahead’ and writing in a style designed to convey the sense of 
camaraderie that he had experienced at the congress, O’Riordan contrasted recent 
announcements by western leaders President Gerald Ford, British Prime Minister 
Harold Wilson and ‘our own [Taoiseach Liam] Cosgrave’ regarding increases in 
unemployment, prices and inflation, and cutbacks in health provisions, with those 
contained in General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev’s five-hour speech. The Soviet leader 
had spoken of an expanding economy, real increases in wages, services and benefits, 
price and reductions.  
Anxious to profile the ‘decision makers’ at the congress, O’Riordan focused on 
a social profile of the 5,000 Soviet delegates. He noted that seventy-seven per cent of 
them were straight from jobs in industry, 887 were rank-and-file farmers from 
collectives and state farms, 227 represented intellectual workers, and from the armed 
forces there were eleven cosmonauts and 314 servicemen. Just over twenty-five per cent 
of delegates were women, nearly ninety per cent had ‘higher, incomplete higher or 
secondary education’ and they were drawn from the U.S.S.R.’s sixty nationalities. 
Referring to the 103 foreign fraternal parties’ delegates, O’Riordan recounted:  
The Irish delegation was accorded the privilege of speaking in the company with 
outstanding leaders of the international working-class and national liberation 
movements. It would be difficult to indicate which received the most tumultuous 
welcome, but high on the list were Fidel Castro; the Vietnamese leader, Le Duan; 
the representative of Angola, Alves Batista; Alvaro Cunhal of Portugal [the C.P. 
leader]; ‘La Pasionara’ [passion flower] of Spain, [the republican and 
communist leader of the civil war against Franco, exiled in Moscow until 1977] 
and Gus Hall, the steel-worker general secretary of the C.P.U.S.A. Each of them 
spoke eloquently of the selfless solidarity of the Soviet Union.
123
 
The above concluding reference to Soviet solidarity serves as a pointer to the 
C.P.I.’s sense of internationalism and close allegiance to the Soviet Union. This 
allegiance was rooted in its first members who were drawn from Irish republican and 
labour movement activists. They had been attracted by the Bolshevik revolution’s 
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promise of self-determination for smaller countries and its socialist nature.
124
 From 
1917, Irish communists’ faith in these ideals and their concern for the fortunes of the 
Soviets’ attempt to create, defend and develop the world’s first socialist state persisted. 
Being part of a movement with many millions of members worldwide sustained them 
amid the prevailing anti-communist attitudes in their own country. As their own 
domestic road to socialism was much informed by the politics of James Connolly – 
which they summarised as the reconciliation and unity of the twin struggles for national 
independence and socialism in Ireland – they were greatly taken with the philosophical 
and political worldview offered by Marxism and Leninism. An example of such 
attraction was the publication by the C.P.I. in 1970 of a booklet that was widely read 
among left and republican circles, Lenin on Ireland. Edited by A. Raftery, (the penname 
of Paddy Carmody, editor of the Irish Socialist), the booklet contained contemporary 
extracts from writings by Marx and Lenin on critical events in Irish history, including 
Marx’s demand for the separation of Ireland from Britain, and Lenin’s analyses of the 
1913 lockout, and his defence of the strategy of James Connolly and the 1916 
leaders.
125
   
Dr Brennan’s report on Michael O’Riordan’s speech to the C.P.S.U. congress 
also contrasted O’Riordan’s contribution to that of the French and Italian parties’ 
representatives. Brennan noted that those parties had failed to endorse the Soviet view 
of proletarian internationalism – the esoteric communist term for fraternal and 
ideological relations between individual communist parties – which Brennan defined in 
the report as an ‘acceptance of the ideological primacy of the Soviets in the world 
communist movement and uncritical approval of their internal and foreign policies’.  Dr 
Brennan was to put his analysis more expansively in his 1982 address to the Royal Irish 
Academy’s conference on East-West relations. Speaking in a personal capacity, he 
asserted: 
The key concept here is ‘solidarity’, i.e. the need for all anti-imperialist forces to 
fight the common enemy - capitalism...The Soviet Union fulfils its 
internationalist duty by building up its economic and political power to...firstly, 
exert a ‘decisive’ influence on world events...secondly, to render increasingly 
effective aid to all anti-western forces and against any western attempts to 
‘export counter-revolution’, especially in the third world...thirdly, the Soviet 
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Union becomes an increasingly attractive social model for the rest of the world, 
in other words the ‘force of example’.126      
It was in the final chapter of his report that Ambassador Brennan pointed to an 
aspect of O’Riordan’s speech to the C.P.S.U. congress that served to highlight another 
ideological division in international communism, the rift in Sino-Soviet communist 
relations. This was a subject which Ambassador Brennan addressed many times 
throughout his tenure in Moscow.
127
 He recorded that O’Riordan ‘roundly condemned 
the Maoists’. In this matter O’Riordan was following the lead of his predecessor, Seán 
Murray,
128
 who had spoken in 1960 on behalf of both the Irish Workers’ League and the 
C.P.N.I. at a meeting of eighty-one communist parties in Moscow. There, deep 
differences between the Chinese and Soviet parties emerged and were openly debated. 
Focusing on early Soviet moves towards détente, the international peace movement, and 
nuclear disarmament initiatives at the U.N., Murray had asserted: 
Imperialism has not changed its spots but there has been a serious decline in its 
power, while the forces of socialism, headed by the Soviet Union, are constantly 
gathering strength...we believe that peaceful co-existence is possible...on this 
question we find ourselves in disagreement with our comrades in the Chinese 
C.P. It appears to us that they are committed to a pre-destination theory that one 
way or another, war is inevitable... [They] say we should mobilise the masses to 
fight for peace, they...would split the peace movement and drive out its non-
communist allies...
129
  
Robert Service, in his recent biography of Stalin, expresses the view that the root of the 
rift lay with Mao Tse-tung’s belief that Khrushchev’s programme had made too great a 
break with the kind of communism espoused by both Stalin and Mao,
130
 but Joan 
Urban’s comment on the causes and eventual direction of the Sino-Soviet rift is more 
insightful:      
Underlying all the sound and fury of the Maoists’ ideological polemics against 
the C.P.S.U. was their fear that Khrushchev’s push for détente with the West and 
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influence in the third world portended a reduction in Soviet diplomatic support 
and military-economic aid to Peking. In the longer run the Chinese communists 
would compensate for this loss by normalising relations with the West.
131
 
It was this Chinese alignment with the western powers (most notably the Chairman 
Mao-President  Nixon summit of 1972 that extended beyond Sino-American economic 
and cultural relations  to a de facto anti-Soviet alliance) that prompted O’Riordan to 
condemn the Chinese so strongly. Even so, Joan Urban points to a contrary view from 
the Italian Communist party (P.C.I.) on Soviet attempts to orchestrate a collective 
denunciation of Maoism. She concludes that the P.C.I. had advocated ‘reasoned 
dialogue rather than confrontation and anathema in handling interparty disputes’,132 for 
fear that the Sino-Soviet rift would widen. A graphic example of how wide the rift was 
to become was provided to this writer during an interview with Eddie Glackin, the 
above mentioned executive committee member of the C.P.I. During Glackin’s visit to 
Cuba in 2011, he was told by an interpreter – who had served in Angola with the Cuban 
army in the 1970s in defence of the Angolan government – that some of his Cuban 
comrades were killed there by anti-government forces using Chinese-supplied rifles.
133
  
Eighteen months after his address to the C.P.S.U. congress, O’Riordan was the 
subject of prominent coverage in the pages of Pravda on the occasion of his sixtieth 
birthday. Dr Brennan’s report gave details of the coverage and attached photocopies of 
relevant articles. Describing the coverage as an ‘unusual tribute’ and asserting ‘it is not 
every foreign communist party leader who rates an article like this, and certainly at such 
lengths’, Brennan reported that a copy of the congratulatory telegram sent to O’Riordan 
from the central committee of the C.P.S.U. had appeared on the front page of Pravda; 
that Brezhnev had awarded him the Order of the October Revolution (second only in 
ranking to the Order of Lenin); and that an extended ‘laudatory’ article, headed 
‘Glorious son of the Irish people’ was carried in Pravda on the same date, accompanied 
by a photo of O’Riordan.134 Dr Brennan also took the opportunity to forward to Dublin 
copies of other recent articles of O’Riordan’s that had been published in the Soviet 
media. Ambassador Brennan proceeded to put the reasons for O’Riordan’s ‘signal 
honour’ into a political context. He began with the C.P.I. – that ‘miniscule party’ – and 
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explained that similar to small states at the United Nations, a small party could take on a 
larger significance in the internal debate among communist parties. He continued: 
It does not take much imagination to see why the Soviets have chosen to honour 
O’Riordan so demonstratively. Pravda acknowledges in so many words that it is 
the support that he has given the C.P.S.U. against the Eurocommunist parties 
who reject the Soviet brand of communism (Marxism-Leninism) and the claim 
of the C.P.S.U. to dictate their strategy and tactics (proletarian 
internationalism).
135
  
Brennan then provided a translation of a section of Pravda’s profile of O’Riordan: 
He unshakably stressed that the achievements of the U.S.S.R. are the property of 
the world communist movement...that it is the duty of every communist, in 
unmasking the slander of bourgeois propaganda seeking to blacken the 
grandiose achievements of the Soviet Union, to give a decisive rebuff to anti-
Sovietism...to show the erroneousness of theories [that] lead the peoples off the 
path laid by the party of Lenin sixty years ago.
136
 
Brennan extended his comments by referring to a recent article by O’Riordan in a 
Soviet publication to mark the sixtieth anniversary of the October revolution,
137
 
dismissing it as ‘anodyne’ and ‘a paean’ He also passed on extracts from O’Riordan’s 
recent speech in Moscow, wherein O’Riordan contrasted the consequences of British 
direct rule in Northern Ireland and the economic crisis on the whole island with the 
‘solution of the national problems and the complete destruction of unemployment’ in 
the Soviet Union. To complete his report on the speech, the ambassador felt it necessary 
to tell Dublin – without making any allowance for the international ‘Árd Fheis’-type 
spirit surrounding that occasion (one where speeches could reasonably be expected to 
include generous expressions of comradely respect and solidarity) – ‘he [O’Riordan] 
concluded with some slogan-mongering with “long live proletarian internationalism.”’ 
Conclusion 
In his correspondence with this writer, Dr Brennan stressed that ‘all [official Irish] 
policy was initiated in Dublin. The embassy did not play any role in this and simply 
executed it’.138 Mindful of this principle, the ambassador’s first report on his exchange 
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with the Soviet vice-minister in relation to the C.S.C.E. indicates that from the outset 
the approach of the Irish mission towards the Soviet authorities would be one of caution 
and distance. This is evidenced by the reaction of Ambassador Brennan to the Soviet 
minister’s supportive response to Irish fears concerning Irish unity. That Dr Brennan 
was at pains to stress that his government was not actively pursuing Irish unity, 
amounted to a signal to the Soviets that they should keep their distance from this topic – 
and by extension exercise caution in relation to the conflict in Northern Ireland. In this 
regard it is revealing to learn that as far as Ambassador Brennan was concerned, he 
succeeded in keeping Northern Ireland off any possible Soviet agenda for his embassy. 
He informed this writer: ‘events in Northern Ireland were not an issue for the embassy. 
The Soviets never raised them with us’.139  
The overriding feature of the Northern Ireland reports is that they chimed closely 
with Dr FitzGerald’s prime concern: monitoring of the coverage of the Provisional 
I.R.A. in the Soviet media. In this regard the P.R.s display clear evidence that the Soviet 
media coverage did not stand still as events unfolded in the North. FitzGerald’s desire 
that the Provisional I.R.A. be debunked in the Soviet press as a left-wing group worthy 
of Soviet sympathy came to pass, if not quite for the reasons that FitzGerald wished. 
The Provisional I.R.A. was denounced for objectively aiding those British and loyalist 
elements who wanted a purely security solution, in favour of those campaigning for a 
new political arrangement. In this way the trend in the Soviet media was to take its cue 
from Irish communists, as exemplified by O’Riordan and Sinclair’s ‘fixation-with-the-
gun’ condemnation of the Provisional I.R.A. in World Marxist Review.  
A certain amount of variety and inventiveness in Soviet coverage was in 
evidence.  On the Provisional I.R.A. issue Krasnaya Zvezda and Komsomolskaya 
Pravda presented contrasting coverage and comment from Dr Brennan. Moreover, 
Krokodil’s two cartoons represent unique images in Soviet-Northern Irish commentary. 
The ‘key to the solution of the problem of Ulster’ sought to combine imagery with a 
Marxist economic analysis of the conflict, while the ‘ultra pastor Ian Paisley’ cartoon 
harked back to Czarist times for a demagogic figure urging on ‘pogrom-makers’ – a 
powerful image from  Russian history relating to organised massacres of Jews.   
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Evidence has been provided that Soviet interest extended beyond news coverage 
and political comment into cultural expression. Yevtushenko’s poems in Pravda and 
Literaturnaya Gazeta – the foremost of the U.S.S.R.’s political and cultural publications 
– showed a measure of empathy and sophistication in the Soviet media’s engagement 
with the Northern conflict. Yevtushenko had come to experience at first hand the 
Troubles, not as a tourist or a Soviet official, but as a poet willing and able to bear 
independent witness to the conflict. In this regard the incorporation of the Pushkin-in-
Belfast scene in Guns in Belfast was especially symbolic.   
Soviet coverage of Ireland’s case at Strasbourg reflected the U.S.S.R.’s response 
to the internationalisation of the conflict in Northern Ireland, in which the maltreatment 
of prisoners in a British jurisdiction was brought before a global audience.  The Soviet 
media gave considerable attention to the proceedings before the Court of Human Rights, 
and were not slow to heap criticism upon Britain for its responsibility in the issue. 
However, to say that the Soviet attention was merely taking opportunist advantage 
would be going too far.  As has been discussed above, the Soviet media had been 
displaying interest and concern for the conflict by interacting with a range of the 
participants on the ground in Northern Ireland and elsewhere, and it had responded to 
the deterioration of the situation by extending its criticism of the security forces and 
loyalists to include the Provisional I.R.A. Nevertheless, as the timing of the Strasbourg 
case coincided with President Carter’s increased emphasis on human rights issues in the 
socialist countries, it was to be expected that the Soviets would respond in kind on this 
issue.  Irish sensitivity concerning this development can be detected throughout these 
P.R.s, as Ambassador Brennan both updated and forearmed Foreign Minister FitzGerald 
with chapter and verse to enable him to mount a rebuke of the Soviet action – a rebuke 
that FitzGerald tellingly reserved for delivery in Washington. In the event, FitzGerald’s 
rebuke contained an unfounded assumption: that the court in Strasbourg could be relied 
upon to deliver justice to Irish victims of torture in British jails.  
The Michael O’Riordan reports are valuable for placing on the record an 
‘official’ view of the standing of O’Riordan and his party in Irish-Soviet relations. 
Despite the deprecatory and dismissive language that Brennan peppered throughout 
these and earlier P.R.s that included references to the C.P.I., such was the regard that 
O’Riordan commanded in Soviet official circles that the ambassador was obliged to 
acknowledge the Irish communist’s standing in the Soviet Union as a factor of note in 
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the complexity of relations between the two countries. Indeed, the content of the P.R.s, 
and the positions of Ambassador Brennan and General Secretary O’Riordan, combine to 
indicate that the two men personified polar opposites in the complexity of Irish-Soviet 
relations.  Furthermore, it is clear from his reports that Ambassador Brennan placed 
more stock in the prominence of O’Riordan’s role in the European and world 
communist movements than any threat that the pro-Soviet C.P.I. might offer to the 
status quo in Ireland. In that regard the O’Riordan P.R.s bring an added value to this 
present study, for they serve to introduce European and international political issues into 
its ambit. While issues such as Eurocommunism and Sino-Soviet differences may on the 
surface have appeared to have been of little relevance to 1970s Ireland, they were issues 
with which the Irish government was obliged to consider in some detail. In fact, 
structured consideration of these and other geopolitical issues had been ongoing since 
1974 in the context of Ireland’s involvement in an E.E.C. framework on foreign policy 
formulation, which included a focus upon the Soviet Union. Accordingly, it is to that 
E.E.C. framework that this study must now turn.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
Irish-Soviet relations in the context of European Political Cooperation, 1974-80 
 
Introduction 
In his work on Irish international relations, Patrick Keatinge observed that by the 1970s 
a more complex world system had evolved from the decades immediately following the 
Second World War. While the dominance and rivalry between the two superpowers, the 
United States and the Soviet Union, still persisted, Keatinge suggested that they had 
been joined on the world stage by three further power centres: Japan, China, and the 
E.E.C. Together, he wrote, these ‘five centres of influence’ were moving towards a 
‘more complicated’ and even a ‘pentangular relationship’ to manage ‘the search for 
arms control, the persistence of bureaucratised alliance systems and ideological distrust 
[which] are fundamental characteristics of the politics of détente’.1  This global sense of 
pentangularity has already been supported by new evidence referred to above, in the 
form of Ambassador Brennan’s P.R.s, in chapter four and set out in Appendix 1. 
Specifically, the appendix’s summary analysis confirms the predominance of the ‘big 
five’ in the Kremlinological concerns of Ireland’s ambassador to the Soviet Union in the 
period 1974-80, with the E.E.C. to the fore among the five major powers. As the subject 
of a total of 126 of the 519 P.R.s (including the thirty-five ‘ideology of 
Eurocommunism’ P.R.s), European Communities-Soviet affairs commanded the 
greatest amount of attention from Dr Brennan.  
When Ireland, along with Britain and Denmark, joined the European 
Communities on 1 January 1973, it took its place alongside Belgium, the Federal 
Republic of Germany (F.R.G., or West Germany), France, Holland, Italy, and 
Luxembourg in an amalgam of member states often referred to by diplomats and 
journalists as ‘the Nine’. Together the Nine were legally bound into three structured 
treaties and institutional communities that comprised the European Coal and Steel 
Community, the European Atomic Energy Community, and the European Economic 
Community (E.E.C.). Centred at Brussels and Luxembourg, the communities were 
                                                          
1
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governed by the Council of Ministers of the European Communities (Council of 
Ministers), the executive arm of which was the powerful Commission of the European 
Communities (the Commission).
2
 Conventionally the term generally used in Ireland for 
the European Communities in the 1970s was the ‘E.E.C.’, for it was the laws of that 
community which most evidently impacted upon Irish economic, political and social 
affairs. Accordingly, both terms – the E.E.C. and the Nine – will be employed 
throughout this chapter.  
But it is Irish involvement in an additional mechanism that operated alongside 
the E.E.C., a framework for political cooperation among the foreign ministers of the 
Nine, which is more central to the chapter. Within this intergovernmental mechanism 
member states agreed to confer with one another and arrive at common E.E.C. foreign 
policy positions on a consensual basis, whenever possible.  Not governed by an E.E.C. 
treaty, this framework was a looser mechanism, and was accompanied by a set of 
protocols originally known as the Davignon machinery.
3
 In time, the official title of 
European Political Cooperation was applied to the framework, and very soon it was 
universally known as E.P.C. To accommodate a secure exchange of messages relating 
to E.P.C. operations, a communication system between the Nine’s foreign ministries 
and selected embassies was established in 1973. This telex system was known as 
COREU (acronym of CORrespondence EUropéenne).
4
 For the sake of efficiency, 
efforts were made in advance of meetings to build up knowledge of and agreement on 
the topics under consideration by means of the COREU system. 
The impetus for the operation of the E.P.C. framework lay principally with the 
foreign minister of the country holding the presidency of the Council of Ministers, 
which was rotated alphabetically among the Nine every six months. All E.P.C. meetings 
were held in the capital of the presidency, to emphasise their distinction from Council of 
Ministers meetings held in Brussels. In theory, its structures were less formal than those 
of the E.E.C. proper. Most obviously, E.P.C. had no central institutional or compelling 
                                                          
2
 Noel Dorr, ‘Ireland in an independent world: foreign policy since 1973’, in Ben Tonra, Michael 
Kennedy, John Doyle, Noel Dorr (eds) Irish foreign policy (Dublin, 2012), p. 58. 
3
 These protocols were named after the head of the Belgian Foreign Office, Viscount Étinne Davignon, 
who formulated the first report on foreign policy consultation. See Denis Kennedy, Irish Times, 16 
October 1973. 
4
 Bicchi, Frederica and Carta, Caterina, The COREU/CORTESY network and the circulation of 
information within E.U. foreign policy, available at RECON Online Working Paper, 2010/01 
(http://www.reconproject.eu/projectweb/portalproject/AbstractRECONwp1001.html) (23 Nov. 2012) 
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mechanism. However, by 1978 a hierarchical mechanism and operational routines were 
well established. They were headed up by four annual meetings of the Nine’s foreign 
ministers. Those meetings were prepared at monthly meetings of the Political 
Committee, composed of the heads (political directors) of the political divisions of the 
Nine’s foreign ministries. Appointed in April 1974, Noel Dorr served as the Irish 
political director on the committee until 1980.
5
 Furthermore, to inform the Political 
Committee on the main issues of the day – by means of studies – a number of dedicated 
subgroups of experts were established. These working groups focused upon the United 
Nations, Africa, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (C.S.C.E.), the 
Middle East, the Mediterranean,   Latin America, and – of most relevance for Irish-
Soviet relations – the Eastern Europe Working Group (E.E.W.G.).6  
The chapter’s interest in Irish involvement in the E.E.W.G. has been triggered 
by the discovery of a series of E.E.W.G.-related files among those from the Department 
of Foreign Affairs, Central Registry files, for the years 1972-80, which have recently 
been made available at the National Archives, Dublin. As with Ambassador Brennan’s 
P.R.s from Moscow, it is again the privilege of this writer to be among the very first 
beneficiaries of the availability of the E.E.W.G.-related files to researchers.
7
 These files 
are not official/centralised E.E.W.G. files relating to group meetings of all nine member 
states, and indeed it may well be that such files do not exist, in view of the E.P.C. 
framework’s non-treaty status mentioned above. Rather, then, the D.F.A. files contain 
the records of Irish involvement in the E.E.W.G. These records include detailed reports 
on the business conducted at E.E.W.G. meetings for the Department of Foreign Affairs 
from the Irish representatives who attended the meetings (which contain agendas, 
studies under review, and topics raised); briefing documents (speaking notes) provided 
to Irish representatives by the D.F.A. in advance of E.E.W.G. meetings; copies of 
discussion papers submitted by other member states to E.E.W.G. meetings; internal 
D.F.A. discussion/commentary papers on various topics submitted by other member 
states to E.E.W.G. meetings; copies of some of the completed studies by the group; 
copies of telexes received via the COREU, with details of attendances at meetings; and 
                                                          
5
 Interview with Noel Dorr of Clonskeagh, Dublin (16 Apr. 2013). 
6
 This analysis is informed by ‘Background note on European Political Cooperation’, 14 Feb. 1978, in 
Tenth report on developments in the European Communities, Political Division (N.A.I., D.F.A., 
2009/120/625). 
7
 Noel Dorr could confirm to this writer that he is the first researcher to mention the E.E.W.G.-related 
files to him (Interview with Noel Dorr of Clonskeagh, Dublin (16 Apr. 2013). 
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E.E.W.G.-related communications from Ambassador Brennan and other officials in the 
Moscow embassy. As all Davignon/E.P.C. meetings were, by tradition, conducted in 
French, some of the documents in the E.E.W.G. files are in that language and indeed all 
of the E.E.W.G. studies were originally written in French. However, many documents 
are in English, including all the D.F.A speaking notes and reports back to the 
department from the Irish delegations, all the internal D.F.A. discussion papers and 
correspondence, and many other papers generated by Irish involvement in the group. 
Also, some records of Irish involvement relating to the E.E.W.G.’s ‘parent’ body, the 
Political Committee, are contained in these files. Lastly, it should be noted the group 
was also known as the Eastern Europe Experts Group and the Eastern Europe Group of 
Experts, but hereafter it will be referred to in this study as the ‘E.E.W.G.’ 
As with Ambassador Brennan’s P.R.s in chapter four, the E.E.W.G.-related files 
are so extensive that it is not possible in this study to discuss all of the files or all of the 
issues raised therein. However, to facilitate an overview of the group’s work, the file for 
each E.E.W.G. meeting from 1974 to 1980 has been examined, and annual spreadsheets 
assembled. The sheets show key details of each meeting, principally the titles of the 
studies and other topics under consideration by the group. Also, a summary analysis, 
selected under subject headings of studies undertaken by the E.E.W.G., has been 
compiled. These compilations are appended to the thesis as Appendix 2. 
Even though the decisions of E.P.C. and the E.E.W.G. were not binding, and all 
decisions on the formulation of papers and studies required a consensus, Ireland’s 
participation with the other E.E.C. countries, all of whom were members of NATO, 
presented Ireland with a unique challenge. Some observers of Irish politics, concerned 
with the possible loss of Irish sovereignty, considered that the Irish people had only 
approved of joining the E.E.C. in 1972 on the basis of joining an economic community.
8
 
Something of this sense was expressed privately by Eamon de Valera in his final days in 
public office, as recorded by his son, Terry de Valera: 
I remember well speaking to him at the time of entry to the E.E.C. While he 
acknowledged that entry was inevitable, he accepted this with strong reservation 
regarding loss of sovereignty. He agreed fully with the concept of the 
                                                          
8
 See Anthony Coughlan, E.E.C. political union: menace to Irish neutrality and independence (I.S.M. 
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that ‘advocates a Europe of independent, democratic, cooperating nation states.’ See National Platform at 
(http://nationalplatform.org) (19 Feb. 2013). 
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development of trade and commerce and the more desirable aspects of culture 
from the continent of Europe. Political union or the diminution or loss of 
sovereignty was quite a different matter in which he felt the smaller nations 
would fare worst.
9
 
But Dr FitzGerald, who had been one of the seven signatories of the articles of 
association for the foundation of the Irish Council of the European Movement in 1954,
10
 
took a different view. FitzGerald was favourably disposed not just towards Irish 
economic membership of the E.E.C. but also towards the adoption of a wholehearted 
commitment to the process of E.E.C. integration. Accordingly, as the newly appointed 
minister with responsibility for Irish participation in E.P.C. and the E.E.W.G., he set 
about organising his department for that purpose.  
  An indication of Ireland’s immediate commitment to the E.E.W.G. was 
reflected in the standing of its representatives, known as a delegation, sent to meetings. 
After Dr Brennan attended the first two meetings, he was appointed as ambassador to 
Moscow, but thereafter he was briefed on the E.E.W.G.’s ongoing work. His successor 
on the group was A.E. Mannix, the newly-appointed D.F.A.  expert on eastern Europe, 
and more often, counsellor Patrick MacKernan, a senior officer who was to become 
secretary general of the D.F.A. in the 1990s.  Also, James A. Sharkey, who attended 
meetings in 1976-7, had been first secretary in the Moscow embassy from its foundation 
in 1974.
11
 During the later years covered by this study, delegations often comprised two 
new and younger officials, Thelma Doran and Anne Anderson.
12
 As will be shown later 
in the chapter, their reports to the department provided telling observations and clarity.   
As already indicated, Ireland’s relationship with the Soviet Union, as mediated 
through its involvement in European Political Cooperation, has not been the subject of 
scholarly study. However, this study has been informed by aspects of the contributions 
of Noel Dorr, Katy Hayward, Trevor Salmon, Diarmaid Ferriter, and Patrick Keatinge 
in the broader field of Irish participation in E.P.C. For additional and more critical 
analyses, interviews with Roger Cole, formerly of the Irish Campaign for Nuclear 
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 Terry de Valera, A memoir (Dublin, 2004), p. 253, as cited in Ferriter, Judging Dev, p. 353. 
10
 As cited in the obituary of a fellow signatory, Professor Louis Smith (1923-2012), Irish Times, 15 Dec. 
2012.   
11
 V.E. Louis and J.M. Louis (eds), Information Moscow, p. 177, includes Sharkey in its listing of 
members of diplomatic corps for 1975. 
12
 Anderson, who joined the D.F.A. after graduating from U.C.D. at nineteen-years-of-age with a degree 
in history and politics, is currently Ireland’s first female ambassador to the U.S. See her interview with 
Simon Carswell, Irish Times Magazine, 5 Oct. 2013.  
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Disarmament, and Anthony Coughlan, formerly of the Irish Sovereignty Movement, 
have been drawn upon. Aspects of the Soviet and communist view of the topics raised 
in the chapter have been principally sourced from the contents of Ambassador 
Brennan’s P.R.s, from C.P.I. publications, and Joan Barth Urban’s publication on the 
Italian Communist Party.
13
 In relation to economic aspects of the rivalry between the 
E.E.C. and COMECON (the organisation for the promotion of economic cooperation 
between the Soviet Union and [principally] its socialist neighbours in eastern and 
central Europe) Mícheál Ó Corcora’s unpublished thesis, ‘Irish-Soviet trade relations 
and policy’, has been a valuable reference.14 Finally, for sources relating to President 
Patrick Hillery and legal implications of E.P.C., publications by biographer John Walsh 
and from the Supreme Court of Ireland have been consulted.
15
       
In general terms Hayward and Dorr share a common understanding of Irish 
experience within the E.E.C. This commences with, as Hayward put it, the contention 
that the motives behind Ireland’s applications to join the E.E.C. ‘were primarily 
economic’,16 and that even before membership was achieved Ireland felt under pressure 
to assuage the anxieties of the existing six member states about Irish foreign policy and 
military neutrality. Hayward sums up this view: 
The Irish government felt obliged to launch something of a diplomatic offensive 
to reassure Ireland’s putative partners that Irish neutrality and its non-
membership of NATO did not represent any basic ambivalence towards 
European political integration. Statements reassured those partners that Ireland 
supported and would participate constructively in that integration without 
reservation or precondition.
17
  
And following Irish admission to membership of the E.E.C., Hayward accounts for the 
strategies adopted by Ireland within E.P.C over the past forty years: 
The traditional Irish foreign policy approach to Europe has been to build 
political capital within the E.E.C and bilaterally with partners  and then to 
deploy this – with adroit diplomacy – to the many short and medium term 
strategic objectives of the state. From an E.U. [E.E.C.] point of view, if not a 
                                                          
13
 Urban, Moscow and the Italian communist party (London, 1986). 
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Tonra, et al (eds), Irish foreign policy, pp 131-52, p. 132.   
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domestic political one, there was never any difficulty in accommodating either 
Irish neutrality or Ireland’s difficulty with the justice or home affairs portfolio.18 
Noel Dorr, now a prominent authority on Irish foreign policy history, previously 
enjoyed a long and distinguished career in the Irish diplomatic service. During the 
1970s he was closely involved in the formulation and exercise of Irish policy in the 
country’s relations with the Soviet Union. While he has made little comment on the 
details of Irish involvement in E.P.C., Dorr expresses a similar assessment to Hayward, 
and indicates how the Irish strategy paid off in terms of delivering for the country’s 
economic interests: 
It tried where possible to show willingness in principle while seeking 
accommodation for its particular difficulty...but it always tried to confine ‘opt-
outs’ to a minimum. This helped to create the impression that Ireland, in contrast 
to Britain, had a committed and wholehearted approach to European integration. 
This worked to its benefit in later decades in the allocation of structural 
funds...
19
 
Trevor Salmon’s Unneutral Ireland offered a more comprehensive view on Irish 
involvement in E.P.C. Drawing on interviews he had conducted with officials of the 
Irish Department of Foreign Affairs in 1981 and 1983, he wrote: ‘despite some initial 
fears that E.P.C. might be the “thin edge of the wedge”, Ireland settled into it “fairly 
quickly”, finding it was “very tolerant [of non membership of NATO]”’.20 In taking a 
different perspective, and quoting from other sources presenting more critical analyses, 
Salmon also noted: ‘it [E.P.C.] has occasionally been regarded as exhibiting a tendency 
towards “groupthink”’,21 possibly leading to a European impulse and involvement in a 
framework of collectivism and consensus-building  from which it could become 
difficult to depart.  
Patrick Keatinge’s work has been an insightful source throughout this thesis. His 
A place among the nations (1978) noted that by 1975 the E.E.C. Nine had already 
increased the number of times that they voted as a bloc in the United Nations to sixty-
one per cent on contested issues, up from forty-three per cent in 1973.
22
 He has updated 
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that early observation more recently to assert that the E.E.C. has ‘replaced the U.N. as 
the backbone of Irish foreign policy.’23 However, it is Keatinge’s assessment that the 
consultative E.P.C. framework was evolving with the ‘maximum of pragmatism and the 
minimum of publicity,’24 which is to be tested with evidence contained in the E.E.W.G. 
files and discussed below. 
Apart from the political parties of the left, the independent voices that raised 
concerns about Irish involvement in E.P.C. in the 1970s were organised into two main 
advocacy groups: the Irish Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (C.N.D.), and the Irish 
Sovereignty Movement (I.S.M.) – as was indicated to this author by two leading 
activists, Roger Cole and Anthony Coughlan. Irish C.N.D. was part of the British and 
international campaign for unilateral nuclear disarmament that attracted popular support 
from the 1960s. Irish C.N.D. was opposed to E.P.C., in so far as its members were 
aware of its operations, on the basis that it had the potential to draw Ireland into the 
NATO and ‘nuclear club’ of western Europe.25 Irish C.N.D.’s main claim to success at 
this time was keeping Ireland a nuclear-free country following its gatherings at Carnsore 
Point, County Wexford from 1978 – the site that had been earmarked for Ireland’s first 
nuclear power station. Following the gatherings the government abandoned its plan to 
build such a power station. However, it was a publication by the Irish Sovereignty 
Movement – an organisation that grew directly out of the Common Market Defence 
Campaign that opposed Ireland’s entry into the E.E.C. in 1972 – that articulated the case 
against E.E.C. integration, and its likely impact upon the Soviet Union: 
A politically united E.E.C., integrated with NATO and dominated economically 
by West Germany, would alarm the Russians and add to East-West tension, the 
lessening of which is the most urgent task facing humanity today.
26
 
And specifically upon E.P.C., it stated: 
[E.P.C.] has no legal basis...there is no obligation on Ireland to take part...it 
gives endless opportunities to civil servants for foreign junkets and it increases 
the self-importance of Irish politicians to be consulting with their opposite 
numbers in the larger states about foreign issues that are at best marginally 
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relevant to this country...if we meant what we say about our neutrality...[our 
efforts should be] channelled through the U.N., the non-aligned movement or 
joint action with the west European neutrals.
27
 
The chapter is divided into three sections, commencing with an examination of a 
number of key E.E.W.G. meetings and decisions, as reflected in the records of Irish 
participation in those meetings and contained in the D.F.A. files. This section considers 
E.E.W.G.-related files covering the first eighteen months of E.E.W.G. operations and 
studies, which range from the first meeting attended by Ireland in January 1974 to the 
last meeting of the Irish presidency of the E.E.C., in June 1975. These files are 
examined for the purpose of discovering the aims and modus operandi of the group and 
its members, especially that of the Irish representatives. It goes on to shed some light on 
ethical concerns relating to Irish involvement in studies conducted by the group on 
communist parties of the E.E.C. Here the chapter expands its discussion into the 
strengths and prospects for communism across Europe, including the relationship 
between Soviet communism and Eurocommunism in western Europe, and an Irish 
involvement in that relationship. It then looks at those E.E.W.G. files that contained 
studies relating to the military affairs of the Soviet Union and its allies – with a view to 
considering the implications of those studies for Irish neutrality. It will also consider 
Ireland’s response to a British proposal that the group be empowered to share certain 
studies with NATO. 
The second section proceeds to examine newspaper and archival sources to 
discuss whether the change of government in 1977, which resulted in the replacement of 
Fíne Gael’s Garret FitzGerald with Fianna Fáil’s Michael O’Kennedy, brought about a 
change in Irish policy within E.P.C. towards the Soviet Union.  
The chapter’s final section – in the form of a postscript – focuses upon sources 
that include the judgement of Justice Seamus Henchy as part of the supreme court’s 
ruling on the constitutionality of Ireland’s adoption of the Single European Act (Single 
Act, or S.E.A.) in 1987. That ruling expressed the majority opinion of the court’s judges 
that the ratification of the Single Act, which contained a provision for the incorporation 
into E.E.C. law of E.P.C., was impermissible under the constitution without the 
approval of the Irish people by means of a referendum.  
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E.E.W.G-related  files: January 1974-June 1975 
The first meeting of the E.E.W.G. with the participation of the Irish delegation 
of Dr Edward Brennan (not yet the Irish ambassador to Moscow) and A.E. Mannix took 
place on 28 January 1974 in Bonn.
28
 The German presidency identified three major 
pillars to support the group’s future work:  foreign ministries of the Nine’s member 
states, E.E.C. embassies in Moscow and other east European capital cities, and the 
current delegation assigned to C.S.C.E. work. However, after ‘considerable discussion’, 
it was agreed for consensus and security reasons that the Moscow embassies should not 
combine to produce studies, but rather they would be informed in general terms of the 
ongoing work of the group. Furthermore, it was agreed that the E.E.W.G. could, where 
appropriate, put questions to embassies, via their head offices. In this way a vibrant 
network was established between the Nine’s missions to Moscow, their various home 
ministries, and the E.P.C. framework.  
The question of privacy for the group was carefully considered. It was agreed 
that the E.E.W.G.’s work and existence would be regarded as ‘particularly confidential.’ 
The following set of words for release to the press, as a guideline, was made available to 
delegations by the presidency: ‘it is a matter of common knowledge that the Nine are 
interested in the development of common foreign policy...only natural that the future 
relations between the Nine and eastern Europe are one of the subjects.’29 However, 
(needless to say) the closing words of the guideline were not for publication: ‘the group 
hopes to avoid telling the press that a working group on this topic has been...specially 
created.’ In this regard the hopes of the first meeting have been remarkably fulfilled – 
the E.E.W.G. did not feature in scholarly or newspaper sources accessed during the 
research for this study. Indeed, the above mentioned interviewees, Roger Cole and 
Anthony Coughlan, each of whom has been a vigilant observer of all matters relating to 
the E.E.C. and E.P.C. for over forty years, insisted they had never previously heard of 
the E.E.W.G.
30
 Finally, Noel Dorr’s information to this writer is revealing: he recalled 
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that the group was ‘confidential, but not a secret. If the issue came up in the dáil (it did 
not) the minister would deal with it. [It was] political, not legal.’31 
Having dispensed with administrative and confidentiality issues, the January 
1974 meeting proceeded to the task of assembling studies.  To set the scene, Herr 
Meyer-Landrut, the West Germans’ expert representative, gave an exposition of the 
presidency’s view of the Soviet Union’s position vis-á-vis the E.E.C. under a number of 
headings. The following extracts have been selected from the summary (provided to the 
D.F.A. by A.E. Mannix after the meeting) of Herr Meyer-Landrut’s paper to recreate the 
tone and tenor of the German’s introduction to E.E.W.G. business: 
1. Maximum objectives of the Soviet Union in its Westpolitik: 
 Maintenance of its own sphere of domination 
 Politically guaranteed access to western Europe’s economy 
 Block progress of European integration 
 Expulsion of U.S. influence followed by a power vacuum which 
would both reduce west European political options and increase 
Soviet influence 
2. Soviet attitude towards west European unification: 
 A unified Europe could defend its interests more effectively than 
its individual component-states. It might even realise its proper 
weight in the security field 
 The success of this process would be contrary to the dogma of 
inherent contradictions between irreconcilable capitalist states. 
 It would exercise an attraction for the East Europeans as a unified 
group not based on hegemony 
3. Soviet tactical measures to block European integration: 
 There will be no military intervention as long as the risk of 
American reaction remains. This is true even if U.S. troops leave 
Europe 
 Soviet political pressure can be exercised by press campaigns and 
diplomatic means. The Soviet Union could accuse the E.E.C. of 
conducting itself in an anti-détente manner by pressing ahead 
with its policy of integration and especially to the extent that this 
involves the security area. [underlining in original] 
 The Soviets could create internal difficulties for western 
governments both by legal means – through communist parties – 
and illegal means by subversion [and] exploitation of social 
problems.
 32
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In some contrast, however, Herr Meyer-Landrut’s statement ended upon a less strident 
note, which made allowance for the Soviet Union’s favourable response to Chancellor 
Willy Brandt’s policy of cooperation with eastern Europe, Ostpolitik: ‘while the above 
should not be underestimated, it must be remembered that the Soviets have themselves a 
real interest in détente.’33 Only one comment in A.E. Mannix’s report was made on 
Meyer-Landrut’s exposition. He drew attention to the underlined words above, putting 
the D.F.A. on notice that Ireland’s position on military alliances could be caught up in 
E.E.C.-Soviet rivalry.  
Two key procedural issues were also considered at the E.E.W.G. meeting. The 
first issue was its terms of reference, which had been set by the Nine’s Political 
Committee (the group’s superior body) earlier that month. Those terms read:  
The group of experts will study the future relations of the Nine with the 
countries of eastern Europe after the C.S.C.E [at Helsinki, which did not publish 
its Final Act until August, 1975], and [it] will report to the Political 
Committee.’34 
Despite this, two papers were before the meeting regarding the group’s mandate, one 
each from the German presidency and Britain. It emerged that the group felt that rather 
than studying the Nine’s views on the East, they should look at the relationship from the 
opposite direction, i.e. a perception of COMECON’s view of the Nine, or, indeed, to 
update and build upon aspects of Herr Meyer-Landrut’s exposition, as listed above. 
Consequently, to begin the work, it was agreed on the proposal of the presidency that in 
the short-term the group should ‘deal generally with Eastern attitudes towards the 
European [E.E.C.’s] integration process. This would require an analysis of eastern 
attitudes and of the possible effects of eastern reactions to the attitudes of the Nine.’35  
The second fundamental issue under consideration was the format to be adopted 
by the group for its future studies. Two polar views emerged: France contended that the 
content of papers should be confined to analyses; whereas the British held that papers 
should also contain policy recommendations for the Political Committee – a position 
which was more likely to lead to a collective and proactive E.E.C. foreign policy 
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towards the Soviet Union. A.E. Mannix’s report back to the D.F.A. recorded the 
contribution of the Irish delegation consisting of Mannix and Dr Brennan: 
Ireland agreed that [some of the British paper was] outside the mandate. 
However, there were elements in both papers which could be combined...As he 
saw it, the group was called to provide factual analysis of Soviet strategy and 
tactics. Therefore, it would be difficult to provide such analysis of the problems 
which would not in one way or another imply policy recommendations as the 
group would have to consider the Soviet reaction to western initiatives and the 
complications of these reactions for the West. The analysis would inevitably lay 
bare policy implications and opinions.
36
   
In essence, this contribution was supportive of the British position, and as seen 
in chapter four, it was much in line with the comprehensive Kremlinological format – 
with policy recommendations – that Ambassador Brennan was soon to deploy in his 
P.R.s from Moscow to Dublin. The group agreed to combine the German and British 
drafts, and adopted a two-stage compromise: first, to commence with analytical studies, 
and second, to seek clarification from the Political Committee as to whether the group 
should furnish policy recommendations for the future.  The Irish delegation’s report 
back to the D.F.A. on the February meeting of the E.E.W.G. confirmed both the 
Political Committee’s approval for the change of direction for its work, and its approval 
that some time in the future studies should go beyond analyses and towards the 
inclusion of policy recommendations. It stated: 
...the Political Committee agreed on 6-7 February 1974 that the object of the 
studies of the group shall be in the first place, the present and potential reactions 
of the countries of the East with regard to the process of European construction... 
They should equally permit later the evaluation of the political consequences 
which will result from this for the Nine.
37
  
The report then proceeded to itemise the Political Committee’s ambitions on an 
expansive programme of studies of a more intrusive nature, including studies: ‘on 
political and military developments within the Warsaw Pact; on efforts towards 
economic integration within COMECON; and on internal development of member 
states of the Warsaw Pact’.38 According to the Irish report, no objections to the actual 
plan of work were raised by delegations present, but when the presidency proposed that 
a representative of the European Commission should attend and participate when 
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economic matters were being discussed, France did raise a procedural objection. 
‘Although most delegations [including Ireland] were in favour’, read the D.F.A. report, 
‘France immediately entered reservations.’39  It was agreed that this reservation – a key 
indicator of France’s view on the question of keeping the treaty-based E.E.C. separate 
from the voluntary E.P.C. – would need to be resolved by the Political Committee for 
the group’s next meeting. The decision of the Political Committee was revealed after the 
June 1974 meeting when the Irish representative’s subsequent report stated that a 
Commission representative had been ‘present and participated in the discussion’ on a 
Belgian paper on the Soviet economy.
40
 This development signalled that even a country 
as powerful as France had been prevailed upon to drop its stance (temporarily, as it 
turned out) on the future direction of the E.E.C. for the purposes of compiling 
information on the Soviet Union.  
             Also arising from the January E.E.W.G. meeting, A.E. Mannix provided an 
internal critique for the department of the paper that the British had submitted. His 
critique was anxious to stress that the basic British analysis – that Soviet policies of 
détente and involvement in the C.S.C.E. were an attempt to ‘Finlandise’ [that is, 
neutralise] Europe – should only be seen as a possible scenario. Mannix argued that the 
U.K. went: 
...much too far in its [negative] assumption...Furthermore, the [British] concept 
that the ‘first task of western governments should be to defend their own 
national interests against Soviet encroachment even on very small points’ is 
contrary to the declared policy of the Nine to contribute to cooperation and 
détente in Europe.
41
     
This makes available valuable evidence, from the outset of the E.E.W.G., that the Irish 
were evaluating papers, and arriving at an informed opinion of their own. In a practical 
sense, this was a considerable achievement – the group’s work was largely in French, 
and all the D.F.A.’s departments were then undergoing rapid expansion.42 Finally, while 
Mannix expressed support for the switch in direction of E.E.W.G. studies to studying 
COMECON’s views on the E.E.C., he did so with hints of mild disapproval: 
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I agree with the statement that our policy should be based upon an analysis of 
communist motives to the extent that the group had not been permitted to 
discuss the Nine’s objectives...the political directors have directed the group to 
study Soviet reactions...Obviously, Soviet objectives in Europe must be included, 
but this should not provide the entire spirit of the inquiry.
43
   
The June 1974 meeting of the group was the last during the German presidency. 
Its main business was to finalise discussions on a lengthy report, summarising the 
group’s work to date for the Political Committee. The Irish report back to Dublin 
indicated that the meeting was far from an exercise in unanimity.  Papers presented on 
economic topics, and on the attitude of the U.S.S.R. and the Warsaw Pact to E.E.C. 
construction were subjected to ‘a good deal of criticism all round’, and ‘certain 
revisions and excisions’.44 The principal objections were that aspects of the papers were 
inclined to exceed the group’s current mandate by making proposals on what the Nine 
ought to adopt as policy vis-à-vis COMECON into the future. In other words, once the 
papers went beyond analyses of the COMECON countries to proposals for the Nine to 
take up, representatives became much more cautious and reluctant to commit their 
countries to policy positions. This was an early indication that even as E.E.C. member 
states were willing to cooperate to a varying extent at the E.E.W.G., they remained 
conscious of their own state-to-state relationships, principally on trade, with the Soviet 
Union. This observation was supported by Noel Dorr who informed this writer that 
member states could on occasions ‘hold back on information with a view to promoting 
their own separate relations with the Soviets.’45 In this context it is of interest to note 
from the memoir of Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko that the French, West German, 
Italian, French, Belgian and Dutch governments had all entered into bilateral trade, 
political and cultural agreements in the 1970s with the Soviet Union.
46
  Furthermore, 
even as the British delegations to the group were taking a strong line for Kremlinologist 
studies, British-Soviet relations were also entering a period of active cooperation. 
Gromyko recorded that in February 1975 Prime Minister Harold Wilson’s visit to 
Moscow led to the signing of a Soviet-British protocol to deepen consultations on 
international problems. Gromyko further stated: 
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Also signed was a joint declaration on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons 
and two long-term programmes, one on the development of economic and 
industrial cooperation and the other on scientific and technical cooperation. In 
the joint declaration, both sides asserted their intention to work together to 
extend détente to all regions of the world.
47
  
Gromyko also recalled that Wilson was ‘well disposed towards the Soviet Union’, that 
the Englishman was a frequent visitor to Moscow, and after his retirement as prime 
minister in 1976 that he was chosen as the honorary president of the Great Britain-
U.S.S.R. Association – the British government funded organisation founded in 1959 to 
promote non-political contacts between the two states.
48
 Nevertheless, as indicated in 
the Irish files, British delegations continued to adopt forceful positions at the E.E.W.G., 
a factor which may suggest that those F.C.O. officials who were keen to pursue an anti-
Soviet course were afforded a role at the group.   In this regard a sense of disconnection 
between the group’s studies on the Soviet Union, one the one hand, and the prevailing 
climate of détente that existed between all the members of the Nine and the Soviet 
Union on the other, has become apparent.  This disconnection may well be be accounted 
for by the character of the E.E.W.G., in that it was made up of influential delegations 
with strong Kremlinological inclinations. However, it should also be borne in mind that 
the E.E.W.G. was a subgroup within the E.P.C. framework and its agendas and studies 
were decided upon and made available to all of the Nine’s foreign ministries in the 
formulation of a common understanding of the Soviet Union.  
Following the expiry of the German presidency of the E.E.C. on 1 July 1974, the 
French presidency was next in line to facilitate the group’s work.  In an escalation of the 
reluctance shown by its delegations at the January-June meetings, France convened only 
one meeting during its term of office. Even there, the business was mostly devoted to 
tidying up the previous Germans’ report (‘a report not circulated to any missions abroad 
because of the highly confidential nature of the document’).49 If the French ‘Non’ to 
E.E.W.G. meetings prompted some re-evaluation among other member states of the 
group’s value, the following information from the Moscow embassy at this time left no 
doubt as to the Irish ambassador’s view. Then in situ for six months at the Irish embassy, 
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Ambassador Brennan expressed his regard for the quality of E.E.W.G. representatives, 
the need for an ongoing Irish commitment to the group, and proposed some key 
economic and ideological areas for future studies: 
The group are specialists with access to a wider range of information that would 
not be available here... [they have] results of...intelligence, research work, 
etc. ...the group should be as active as possible. Suggested group work: 
Mediterranean and Middle East; what are Soviet goals, including oil? The state 
and prospects for COMECON integration; how badly does the Soviet Union 
need technology and to what extent will this influence their foreign policy? How 
do they really feel about the deepening crisis of capitalism?
50
   
But the D.F.A. added another ingredient to Dr Brennan’s enthusiasm – a sense of 
pragmatism. This was expressed by the Irish delegation to the October 1974 meeting of 
the Political Committee, which informed the meeting: ‘Ireland felt that the emphasis 
should be on matters of specific relevance to E.P.C. activities rather than academic 
studies; consequences for the Nine should be the watchword.’51 It appears that the Irish 
approach found some favour, for after consultations in October and November the 
directors of the Political Committee redefined the group’s mandate with scaled-back 
instructions for medium-term examinations of just four business-like topics.  
Commencing with an investigation into the Soviet Union and the current oil and energy 
crisis, the group was also tasked with compiling studies on the visa position for east 
European citizens travelling to E.E.C. states; on the position in Romania (where the 
leadership under Nicolae Ceausescu had embarked upon an autonomist position in its 
relations with the Soviet Union and the world communist movement),
52
 and on a 
Europe-wide congress of communist parties scheduled to take place in 1975. However, 
the French still failed to act, and it would fall to Ireland – during its first presidency of 
the E.E.C. – to get E.E.W.G. operations back on track.  
 It was to take until 26 March 1975 for the Irish presidency to assemble the first 
of three E.E.W.G. meetings. The business of the meetings was dominated by three 
topics: visas for east European citizens, the prevalence of the term ‘peaceful 
coexistence’ (a generic Soviet term for the improvement of East-West relations that was 
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becoming increasingly popular in the West), and the energy crisis. Again, it should be 
noted that the following discussion draws upon documents relating to Irish involvement 
in these meetings. Even though Ireland held the E.E.C. presidency and was responsible 
for assembling and preparing for the meetings, only Irish accounts of the group’s 
meetings have been located by this study. 
The discussions in Dublin on visas for Eastern Europeans were of an 
introductory nature, and it appears that it soon emerged that member states were 
determined to maintain the status quo for issuing such visas. This was later confirmed in 
an internal D.F.A. report:  
The August meeting [in Rome] will probably focus on whether a common Nine 
position on visas for east European citizens can, or should, be elaborated. It is 
unlikely that such agreement will emerge on this as most countries regard visa 
policy and procedure as falling primarily within their own sovereign competence 
because of its relation to their national security.
53
 
Nevertheless, the records of the meetings do indicate that the Nine shared information 
on visa procedures in place in their respective states for east European countries, and the 
number of visas issued in recent years. A report submitted by Ireland with details of a 
sixteen-month period revealed the number of eastern European citizens coming into the 
state: ‘Bulgaria, 25; the G.D.R, 65; Hungary, 165; Poland, 310; Romania, 40; 
Czechoslovakia, 200; and the Soviet Union,  295.’54 Britain’s report stated that visas 
granted had increased from 5,588 in 1970, to 8,258 in 1974. Despite the increase in 
traffic, Britain made it clear ‘we do not believe the time has arrived when we could 
contemplate a visa abolition agreement with any Warsaw Pact country.’55 The Irish 
report indicated that it had abolished visa requirements for Yugoslavia only.  
Reports of the June meeting reveal that the question of the Soviet use of the term, 
‘peaceful coexistence’, was the main business for the day’s proceedings.  The group’s 
concerns were encapsulated in this extract from the discussion document: ‘the Soviet 
Union has been increasing its efforts to gain acceptance in the West for the principle of 
peaceful coexistence between states of different social systems, as defined and 
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proclaimed by the Soviet Union.’ 56  This definition, it was felt, was deceptively 
presented by the U.S.S.R. to western audiences as an expression of its peace policies 
and its desire for warmer relations based upon increased East-West trade and cultural 
contacts. However, the E.E.W.G. was anxious to expose the political ambitions of the 
Soviet Union accruing from peaceful coexistence. This had been highlighted in the 
study of the European communist parties’ conference considered at the April 1975 
meeting. Quoting Soviet sources, the study recorded that high volume Soviet contracts 
to purchase western goods would make employment safer for workers in the West, 
demonstrate through constant exchanges the superiority of the socialist system, and 
underline the sincerity of Soviet peace policy – thus facilitating the political struggle of 
progressive forces (principally the communist parties) in the West.
57
 Moreover, it was 
contended, Soviet adherence to peaceful coexistence did not compromise Soviet 
political support for ongoing class struggle in capitalist societies. Referring to an article 
in Izvestia, it was noted that a political analysis therein had specifically denied that the 
principles of ‘peaceful coexistence apply to the inter-social space’ in the West.58  
Drawing upon such concerns, the group noted with some alarm that the term 
‘peaceful coexistence’ had been incorporated into a number of bilateral documents, 
including the American-Soviet joint statement on basic principles of May 1972; Soviet-
Italian communiqué of July 1974; the above mentioned Anglo-Soviet joint statement of 
February 1975 following Harold Wilson’s visit; and the charter of economic rights and 
duties of states adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in December 1974.  Accordingly, 
the group agreed to determine that the ‘Nine might therefore seek a common attitude 
that it [the term peaceful coexistence] will not be included in [further] treaties or 
multilateral documents’, and ‘where necessary, the term “peaceful cooperation” may be 
used...as a western alternative’. In this way it can be seen that the terminology of the 
1970s détente period was subjected to the E.E.W.G.’s efforts to coordinate an E.E.C.-
wide response to thwart a perceived Soviet propagandist advantage.  
The third of the major topics discussed at the E.E.W.G. meetings during the 
Dublin presidency – eastern Europe and the energy problem – was set against the 
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background of the world energy crisis of the 1970s. Just two years previously, the crisis 
had been dramatically demonstrated by an oil embargo proclaimed by Arab member 
states of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in response to U.S. 
support for Israel during the Yom Kippur war.  Increasingly, the U.S.S.R. was seen as 
an alternative supplier of oil to western Europe. Mícheál Ó Corcora’s thesis captures the 
growing importance of Soviet oil imports for Ireland in this period: ‘1973, £1.4m.; 1974, 
£10m.; 1975, £14.7m.; 1976, £14.9m.; 1977, £20.5m.’59 The June meeting in Dublin 
focused on the ramifications of what it viewed as limited or underdeveloped Soviet oil 
reserves and a developing financial and political dilemma for the Soviet Union and its 
COMECON allies. In its summary sheet the Dublin document held: 
The Soviet Union is at present a net exporter of oil and coal, whilst an importer 
of gas. However, given the rate of industrial expansion there, unless something 
drastic is done...it is likely that it will be a net importer in the 1980s.
60
 
The report noted that the Soviet Union was the main supplier of COMECON’s oil needs. 
It claimed that the Soviets were both passing on some of the recent world price 
increases, and indicating to those states that it could no longer supply their rising 
demands for oil. At the same time, the Soviets were increasing exports to the West via 
new gas pipelines and trans-shipment complexes. The report concluded: 
The main reasoning behind all this [higher exports to the West] appears to be 
scarcity – the scarcity of hard currencies [the Soviet rouble was not a convertible 
currency in the West] to pay for its industrial needs and expansion. Thus as long 
as these exist it will be an exporter to the West – even if it is a net importer – in 
order to pay for its future.
61
 
However, evidence for a Soviet view of the Soviet and COMECON economies is also 
contained in these E.E.W.G. files. An article from Soviet Weekly, headed ‘A Europe-
wide perspective’, recorded in February 1976 that COMECON had proposed to the 
E.E.C. the signing of an agreement for all-round European economic cooperation.
62
 In 
doing so the article made the case for COMECON’s economic progress to date and 
industrial potential for the future. In 1974 COMECON’s output of steel and electricity 
had exceeded that of the E.E.C. by 29 per cent; gas by 80 per cent; coal by 220 per cent; 
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mineral fertilisers by 60 per cent; and meat and milk by 20 per cent. The article noted 
the ‘springing up’ of united Europe movements in the West, but proposed that the 
visionary scope of cooperation should be extended beyond the River Elbe by means of 
mutually beneficial trade arrangements between the two economic bodies. In doing so, 
it accepted that there were ‘unsolved problems’ on the COMECON side, including: 
‘objective obstacles determined by the different forms of ownership and various 
economic methods...the prolonged isolation of the world’s socialist markets from 
capitalist ones.’ Also, it was noted, there was a need to expand COMECON exports 
beyond those that currently predominated – raw materials, oil and agricultural products 
– to value-added products. To assist this, Soviet Weekly noted, new five year plans were 
under way to enhance exports by raising quality and technical supports for machinery 
exports to western Europe. The article concluded with some practical suggestions for 
European cooperation: 
for example, by the carrying out of worldwide projects and the protection of the 
environment on a continental scale, or by the creation of a single electric power 
grid, a Europe-wide network of gas and oil supply and an all-Europe system of 
roads and river routes.
63
 
However, in opposition to this optimistic Soviet proposal for pan-European 
cooperation were E.E.C. plans for its own internal market. These plans had Irish 
support, a record of which is also contained in the E.E.W.G. files. Among the files is a 
report dating back to 1973, entitled ‘COMECON approach to the Communities’. The 
report contained details of a briefing from the Danish presidency of an early proposal 
from the secretary-general of COMECON to the E.E.C. for discussions on future trade 
arrangements.
64
 An Irish response to this suggestion was pointedly discussed in an 
accompanying D.F.A. document: 
The logical consequence of this development would be that in a short time the 
member states of the Community and of COMECON would deal with each 
other on a multilateral basis through those bodies. We must consider to what 
extent we are prepared to see the status of COMECON thus enhanced or if 
COMECON is capable of this.
65
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The advice to Minister Garret FitzGerald was for opposition to acceptance of any 
COMECON proposal for multilateral trade arrangements, on the basis that it was 
‘undesirable for political reasons...it would restrict bargaining of the satellite countries 
and tie them more into the Soviet sphere of influence than they are at the moment.
66
 
This formulaic expression of concern for the independence of the Soviet Union’s 
partners within COMECON was much used by diplomats and experts in the documents 
of the E.E.W.G. files, on the basis that: 
We are aware that many of the states of eastern Europe regard a development 
such as this with great misgiving. They are rightly concerned to preserve their 
freedom to negotiate bilaterally with the E.E.C. ... One of our major concerns is 
that détente should also find expression in free contacts at all levels between the 
countries of eastern and western Europe. To this end we should do whatever we 
can to contribute to a loosening of the rigid structures in eastern Europe.
67
  
 
However, the reports made no reference to the inherent contradiction between an E.E.C. 
policy position that sought to maintain economic independence for certain states within 
COMECON, while at the same time the process of integration was under way towards a 
single market for E.E.C. member states. Needless to say, the Soviet Union and its allies 
were keenly aware of the E.E.C. policy, as was reported to Dublin by Ambassador 
Brennan in his June 1976 in a report entitled: ‘Soviets warn E.E.C. against exploiting 
trade ties with COMECON’.68 In his report Dr Brennan provided an apposite citation 
from an article in the international communist journal, Problems of Peace and 
Socialism, by Professor V. Iskra of the Polish United Workers’ Party:  
The problem is clear. What is involved is an attempt to weaken the unity of the 
member countries of COMECON, to pit the united economic strength of the 
E.E.C. against individual countries of COMECON with the aim of receiving 
corresponding economic and political advantage. Such an approach would open 
to the corresponding economic circles in the countries of western Europe the 
possibility of maximising profits, influence the formation in the COMECON 
countries of incomplete industrial structures, put a brake on their economic 
integration and also differentiate them from the economic, political and 
ideological point of view.
69
 
 
A record of Dr Brennan’s own suspicions towards Soviet attitudes to the E.E.C. dated 
back to the time of his role as a senior member of Ireland’s permanent representation to 
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the E.E.C. at Brussels. On the eve of his departure to his new post in Moscow, he wrote 
to the D.F.A.: 
‘It [the E.E.C.] was in itself a significant and unique achievement in western 
Europe, and it was a powerful economic force in the world. We all knew that the 
Russians intensely disliked it and we further knew from their public statements 
that it was their objective, if at all possible, to break up the Community. This 
objective would have to be reckoned as high on their list of priorities for their 
policy in western Europe.’70 
And after the E.E.C. had decided against joint E.E.C.-COMECON cooperation, 
Ambassador Brennan wrote to further counsel the department against ongoing Soviet 
efforts to overturn stated E.E.C. policy: 
The Soviets naturally have a strong wish for very thorough discussions. We for 
our part should rule this out completely and abide by the E.E.C. Council of 
Ministers’ decision not to get involved in bilateral discussion on the Community 
question. The predictable Soviet tactic is to drive a wedge between the E.E.C. 
member states to push the E.E.C. Commission out of the picture and conduct 
negotiations as far as possible at intergovernmental level.
71
 
It is against the backdrop of such forthright policy analysis from Dr Brennan that it can 
be suggested that the ideas of the German-American international relations theorist, 
Hans Morgenthau, were having an ongoing influence upon the ambassador. As 
mentioned in chapter two, Morgenthau had been Brennan’s PhD supervisor at the 
University of Chicago in the 1950s. Morgenthau’s prominence as ‘perhaps the critical 
figure’ in the emergence in the mid-1940s in the U.S. of the discipline of the ‘infant 
social science of international relations’, has recently been highlighted by the professor 
of world order studies at Columbia University, Mark Mazower (2012).
72
 Mazower 
argues that: 
Morgenthau developed his opposition to the old internationalist certainties [i.e. 
to overreliance upon the ideals of the defunct League of Nations and the newly 
established U.N.]...and depicting the pursuit of national interest as the motor of 
international politics... Morgenthau’s chief goal was to get policy makers in 
Washington to think clearly about the national interest and to understand the 
Cold War not as a moral crusade but as a power struggle...Supporting the U.N. 
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was all very well, but it was important not to lose sight of the basic importance 
of the balance of power, especially in Europe.
73
        
Accordingly, it can be suggested that in his analyses for the Irish government, Dr 
Brennan was updating and adapting Morgenthau’s Cold War theories from the late 
1940s for the 1970s’ period of détente, in order to establish and maintain the economic 
and political advantages accruing to the E.E.C. from its policy of bilateral trade relations 
with individual members of COMECON.  
E.E.W.G. –related files: studies on west European communist parties 
At the close of the first E.E.W.G. meeting of January 1974 in Bonn, the Italian 
delegation volunteered to bring forward a report on the attitude of communist parties of 
western Europe towards the E.E.C.
74
 This proposal was in line with the fears expressed 
in the last point in Herr Meyer-Landrut’s introductory exposition listed above75 – a 
suggestion that western communist parties would be used by the Soviet Union to hinder 
progress towards E.E.C. integration. If so, this was, at best, a problematic presumption, 
as neither the Soviet state nor the C.P.S.U. had the executive authority in the world 
communist movement to order such directions in the 1970s.  Such powers, to the extent 
that they did effectively exist, were directed through the efforts of the Communist 
International, or the Comintern, in the 1920s and 1930s. However, during the Second 
World War – at the request of the American government – Joseph Stalin and the 
presidium of the Comintern dissolved that organisation. Emmet O’Connor has 
concluded regarding the demise of the Comintern and the prospects of its revival: 
But there would be no return to the central direction or conformity of the 
Comintern era, or the dream of a world party building a global revolution under 
the guidance of a general staff in Moscow.
76
 
Fraternal communist relations were thereafter maintained through one-on-one 
relationships between parties, often by the exchange of delegates to national party 
congresses, and at intermittent international and European congresses. More pertinently, 
however, by 1974 some of the most powerful west European communist parties were 
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pursuing policies quite independent of Moscow, as discussed in chapter four in relation 
to Eurocommunism and the Italian (P.C.I.) and Spanish parties.  
               Joan Urban relates that the P.C.I.’s strategy for socialism included support for 
Italy’s membership of the E.E.C., but that it was ‘couched in terms of an adaption to 
national conditions, not a dissent from the Soviet position’.77 Likewise for those western 
parties that continued in their principled opposition to the E.E.C., including the 
Portuguese and Irish parties, it was their analysis of their own country’s needs and 
strategies for socialism that was fundamental. Michael O’Riordan was critical of the 
Eurocommunists’ line on the E.E.C.  when he wrote in the C.P.I.’s theoretical journal: 
‘The very term “Euro” smacks heavily of the Common Market, the instrument of west 
European monopoly capitalist integration’, and castigating the E.E.C. as ‘Little Europe’, 
he continued: ‘We belong in Europe, by that I mean western Europe. It is difficult to 
escape the impression that in the last analysis Eurocommunism is no more or less than 
‘Common Marketcommunism’.78  And his final point of critique was for those who 
would propose the Eurocommunist model for Ireland. He listed conditions in Ireland 
that were absent in Italy, France and Spain:  
None of them have a national independence question; ... [they are not] situated 
beside an imperial aggressor [Britain], both historical and current, that 
dominates Ireland economically and portioned the island into two states; [they 
do not have] a northern state in which side by side with imperial repression there 
is a mini-sectarian war; [they do not have a neighbouring] imperial power with 
reserves of counter-revolution in the form of a big bourgeoisie in the two Irish 
states to call on.
79
  
Included in those who had proposed the Eurocommunist model for Ireland was Sam 
Nolan. Nolan had been a longstanding Dublin communist but he and twenty-one other 
members of the C.P.I. who agreed with the Eurocommunist approach to socialism 
resigned from the party in 1976 after losing an internal ideological battle. Those who 
resigned formed the Irish Marxist Society.
80
 But the society only lasted for about a year, 
and thereafter most of its members joined the Labour party, where some took up 
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prominent positions, including Nolan. Asked by this writer if the resignations from the 
C.P.I. could have been avoided, Nolan replied: 
It could have been held together [the C.P.I.] but the main goal for O’Riordan 
was to be politically correct for the Soviets, to aim for the Soviet model of 
Leninism, rather than strive for Gramscian hegemony.
81
  O’Riordan had a 
mindset: only the Soviet model. O’Riordan was a sincere guy, but the Soviet 
Union did his thinking for him, he believed the Soviets had an answer to 
everything, on the national question, etc.
82
 
However, O’Riordan’s reputation as a Sovietist 83 can perhaps be more fully appreciated 
in the longer run and in the context that his allegiance had been predicated on the basis 
of Soviet Union’s own adherence to socialism. This was indicated when the Soviet 
system approached its collapse in 1990. O’Riordan branded Gorbachev and Yeltsin as 
betrayers of socialism, and declared: ‘our [his party’s] flag stays red’.84  
             To return to the January 1974 E.E.W.G. meeting, it seems safe to assume that 
the Italian foreign ministry’s proposal to the E.E.W.G. to initiate a study on communist 
parties of the Nine was motivated by domestic considerations (the P.C.I. then had a 
membership of nearly two million), and that this found favour with other delegates to 
the group who were keen to learn of the complexities of the policies of the various 
communist parties throughout the Nine.  
Further revelatory Irish comment on the decisions of the January 1974 meeting 
is contained in a D.F.A. briefing paper for the next meeting of the Political Committee, 
set for early February. It seems that the Irish were having some reservations about the 
Italians’ study of west European communist parties. The briefing observed: 
Unusual for the Davignon machinery...to discuss a legitimate political 
party...France could return a socialist-communist government at the next 
election [The French and Italian communist parties secured in excess of twenty 
per cent and thirty per cent, respectively, at elections to their national 
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parliaments throughout the 1970s]
85
...an embarrassing P.Q. [parliamentary 
question] as to whether the Nine had a droit de regard into internal political 
matters [could be asked]. On the other hand, our partners seem keen to have this 
subject included.
86
 
It is noteworthy that this Irish expression of diplomatic reservations about the prospect 
of empowering the clandestine E.E.W.G. to pry into western political parties failed to 
extend to a sense of duty of care concerning the C.P.I. While it was to take until 1976 
for the C.P.I. to secure its ratification as a political party at Dáil Éireann (it successfully 
appealed before Justice Liam Hamilton of the supreme court the refusal of the registrar 
to place it on the dáil register twelve years beforehand), it had never been a proscribed 
organisation in Ireland.
87
 Tellingly, the greatest deterrent for the department seems not 
to have been the principle involved, but rather the fear of an ‘embarrassing’ leak. But 
even here, it had prepared a contingency plan to: ‘deal with it with a formal response 
drawn from the appropriate Davignon documents.’88 It seems that the protocols of E.P.C. 
were very flexible indeed! In the event, the Irish chose not to exercise their right to veto 
the study, and the Italians proceeded to forward a report for the February meeting of the 
E.E.W.G. 
 Such was the extent of business on the agenda at the February meeting that the 
group failed to reach the communist parties item, and further Irish comment on the topic 
was contained in a D.F.A. report of the June 1974 meeting.
89
 First, the report observed 
that the C.P.I. was not actually named in the Italian document, but rather ‘by 
implication’ the C.P.I.’s  policy towards the E.E.C. was contained in a section that read: 
‘In the countries which have recently joined the Community [Britain, Denmark and 
Ireland] the communist parties campaign for the total withdrawal from the E.E.C.’ The 
report counselled the D.F.A. that the above sentence was ‘probably accurate’, and that 
there was no need to submit any revision to the presidency.
90
 However, a concluding 
paragraph again articulated the unease of the report’s writer: 
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In any event one has hesitations about the propriety of the exercise 
undertaken...in view of the fact that communist parties...are legal 
organisations...concentration on the communists alone and 
neglecting...conservative right-wing groups or anti-E.E.C. elements in political 
parties (some of them in government) gives a rather sectarian political cast to the 
work of the group which seems somewhat at variance with the conception of the 
E.E.C. as a union of member countries and not of particular governments and 
political systems. Moreover...[if it ever] became public it could be rather 
embarrassing.
91
 
These were fine words, and an eloquent expression of liberal-democratic values within 
the Irish diplomatic corps. But the die had been cast, and Ireland again kept its counsel. 
The Italian paper was adopted by the E.E.W.G. and sent forward to the Political 
Committee for adoption as E.P.C. policy.  
Two further studies on communist parties were undertaken by the group, both of 
which focused on a forthcoming Europe-wide conference, originally expected to take 
place in 1975.  The conference, which had been initiated by the Italian and Polish 
parties in 1974, eventually took place in east Berlin, the capital of the G.D.R. on 29-30 
June 1976, with Michael O’Riordan chairing the final session of the proceedings.92  
Ambassador Brennan, too, was well aware of this conference – it had been the subject 
of four of his P.R.s.,
93
 but he was either unaware of O’Riordan’s role or failed to report 
it. However, O’Riordan’s participation is noted in an attendance listing attached to the 
E.E.W.G.’s study that was considered at the November 1976 meeting in The Hague.94 
The ideological issues under debate at the Berlin congress – principally those of 
Eurocommunism and the C.P.S.U’s leadership of the world communist movement – 
have already been discussed. Suffice it to add here that the E.E.W.G. was concerned to 
ascertain the points of difference between those parties adhering to Eurocommunism 
and those taking a more pro-Moscow line, and to identify possible fault lines between 
them. In the event, the D.F.A.’s worry – that these E.E.W.G. papers would become 
public – did not come to pass. Nevertheless as member states’ involvement in E.P.C. 
was not governed by a treaty, the legal status of Irish government officials being party 
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to such studies (and indeed all E.P.C. studies) remained to be tested.  We shall consider 
this issue later in the chapter’s postscript on the Single European Act. 
E.E.W.G.-related files: studies with military aspects 
With five completed studies concerned partly or wholly with Soviet military and 
defence matters, as listed in Appendix 2, this was a significant area of work for the 
E.E.W.G. If Ireland expressed some reservations in relation to studies on communist 
parties, it was careful to ensure that the formulation of words contained in a study 
dealing with future defence talks among the Nine would not prejudice Irish military 
non-alignment.  The appropriate section in the Irish delegation’s report to the D.F.A. of 
the February 1974 meeting read: 
The draft programme of work of the expert group in its study of the Soviet 
Union’s and Warsaw Pact states’ reactions to the process of European 
integration proposed to study their reactions to ‘the discussion on the subject of 
eventual cooperation in the realm of defence’. In the event this was rephrased so 
as to read equally innocuously, reaction to ‘une discussion au sujet d’une 
eventuelle cooperation en matiere de defense’. Our [Irish] interest lay in 
avoiding any formulation which might suggest current involvement on our part 
in defence discussions among the Nine – and thus in ensuring that a qualification 
such as ‘eventual’ [sic] was maintained, as in fact it was.95  
Hardly a ringing declaration of Irish neutrality, this formulation nevertheless had the 
value of putting off the ‘evil day’ of reckoning for discussions of Irish involvement in 
any new military arrangements. Of relevance here is the insight given to this writer by 
Noel Dorr on what he indicated was the then common use in diplomatic documents of 
the adjective ‘eventuelle’.96 This translates as ‘possible’,97 rather than in the English 
‘eventual’, as contained in the last sentence of the above extract. Accordingly, in the 
original French sense its use represented no concession by Ireland, beyond the bounds 
of ‘possible’. In that regard, it is of interest to note the information in Trevor Salmon’s 
Unneutral Ireland (1989), gained from his sources among Irish diplomats, that 
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‘Ireland’s “special position” was accepted...no division of the eight in NATO against 
Ireland...it [E.P.C.] operated “pragmatically and by consensus.”’98  
It would appear that when it came to participating in studies relating to Soviet 
and Warsaw Pact military matters, the Irish did not raise objections.  While there is 
some evidence of Irish unease regarding the British contribution to the paper on the 
efforts of the U.S.S.R. and other socialist countries (including Cuba) to influence young 
people in the Third World, it was confined to a proposal that the study should not repeat 
lengthy intelligence material.
99
 The most revealing evidence for Irish cooperation with 
its E.E.W.G. partners’ wishes in this area is contained in the D.F.A.’s steering note 
raised after the January 1978 meeting in Copenhagen. This confirmed that Ireland was 
agreeable to a formal decision to share military studies with NATO, and at a time when 
another member state, France, had procedural objections. The steering note read: 
The U.K. proposed that the final version of the group’s study on ‘The role of the 
Soviet armed forces in the conduct of domestic and foreign policy’ be circulated 
to members of NATO. The U.K. had previously consulted the Irish delegation, 
who, having sought instructions from Dublin, confirmed that we had no 
objection of principle to this course. The French delegation however objected to 
the proposal on procedural grounds, arguing that a decision of this nature could 
only be made by the Political Committee.
100
  
The steering note went on to state that the Political Committee had failed to agree on the 
issue and that the presidency had been instructed to prepare a report for the March 
meeting on the distribution of the group’s report. This debate, with France alone holding 
out for the E.E.C.’s independence from NATO and the U.S., had been ongoing for some 
years. Noel Dorr has alluded to debates of this nature in a recent article, wherein he 
included the issue with a number of other items that Ireland had ‘dealt with’ during the 
Irish presidency in 1975, as follows: 
...and the sensitive issue of briefing the United States appropriately on emerging 
E.E.C. policy decisions without offending strong French susceptibilities about 
admitting a tenth state to the table.
101
 
Further investigation is required to ascertain whether the Political Committee resolved 
the debate at the March meeting, but evidence for a positive decision in NATO’s favour 
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is contained in a letter sent from the Irish embassy in Bonn to Dublin in December of 
the same year.
102
 Attached to the letter was a copy of a recent communication from the 
Canadian delegation to NATO, which had as its subject heading, ‘European Community 
paper on the situation in Hungary.’ The opening paragraph read:   
The European Community paper...provides useful background and an informed 
perspective for assessing developments in Hungary. As we concur with it in 
general, we have only a few specific comments to offer, beyond those which 
were already provided by the U.S.A. delegation on 3 Oct. 1978.
103
 
It seems reasonable to assume that the study on Hungary referred to above is the same 
as the E.E.W.G. study, ‘Situation in Hungary’, listed on the sheet of 1978 (May 
meeting), in Appendix 2, and the likelihood was that other studies deemed appropriate 
were also shared with NATO. 
When asked by this writer about the principle of Ireland sharing its studies with 
NATO in the context of the E.E.W.G., Noel Dorr indicated that such decisions were a 
judgement call, part of ‘managing the relationship.’104  
The above E.E.W.G.-NATO development must be seen in conjunction with the 
level of coordination among the Nine’s embassies in Moscow, where clandestine 
meetings of E.E.C.’s diplomatic officials were taking place. These commenced shortly 
after Ambassador Brennan’s arrival. He is recorded as having attended a meeting of the 
Nine’s ambassadors hosted by the West German ambassador in April, 1974.105 Further 
evidence for such meetings was contained in P.R. 36/78, signed – in the place of Dr 
Brennan – by another official at the Irish embassy, M. Barrington. Belying its rather 
innocuous subject matter of British-Soviet consultations, the P.R. frankly disclosed that 
Irish officials were meeting with their E.E.C. counterparts in a structured format, and on 
an ongoing basis. The confirming extract read: ‘attached briefing from British 
counsellor for minister-counsellors [representatives from the other eight E.E.C. member 
states]...meet here every two weeks in special bugging-free rooms to exchange 
information and views’.106 Taken alongside similar information supplied by the Irish 
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export board representative, Reggie McHugh (as discussed in chapter two), this 
communication furnishes written confirmation of E.P.C. information sharing. 
 As indicated in chapter two, this study has adopted a neutral attitude to reports 
of real, exaggerated or imaginary matters of spying, surveillance, etc. Such practices – 
especially among those larger states with generously-endowed intelligence 
organisations – undoubtedly existed on both sides of the divide in the pursuit of East-
West rivalries. However, by virtue of the decision to enter into the ‘bugging-free’ 
environments (located in the larger embassies) in which the Moscow meetings were 
held, Irish diplomats were knowingly upping the stakes for Ireland in this area. The 
import of this outcome was spelt out for Ambassador Brennan at his first such meeting 
in Moscow. In a report to Dublin, a member of the ambassador’s staff captured the 
security lesson delivered by the West German ambassador:  
The German presidency cautioned his colleagues against dictating [in their own 
embassies] the information that has emerged when reporting to capitals. He 
pointed out that the listening-device-free cage in which the meeting was held 
would not serve a purpose if colleagues did not take the necessary precautions 
afterward. Whether the advice was proffered to all or only some or one of those 
present I cannot judge. I have not in any event kept a copy of this letter.
107
    
Consequently, it can be assumed that this security advice from the ambassador of a 
powerful member of the Nine could only have served to heighten a sense of suspicion 
towards the Soviet Union, and one of togetherness among the diplomatic corps of E.E.C. 
diplomats in Moscow. Indeed, it can be seen that by 1979 an esprit de corps had 
evolved to the extent that Ambassador Brennan could inform Dublin: 
Political cooperation among the Nine is very intensive here. The Soviets are 
very secretive about their policies and the Nine embassies find it advantageous 
to meet frequently to compare notes. The ambassadors meet every two weeks, 
and so do their deputies which means there is a consultation nearly every 
week.
108
 
Finally, in terms of providing evidence of a network between the Department of Foreign 
Affairs, the Moscow embassy, the E.E.W.G., and NATO, the following extract from a 
communication between Ambassador Brennan and the department is felicitous: ‘I 
should be glad to receive copies of the recent U.S. C.I.A. reports on (a) the Soviet 
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economy, and (b) Soviet civil defence’.109 A reply to the ambassador’s request is not 
contained in the file, but a file copy of an earlier item of correspondence from Dublin to 
Moscow indicates that a transfer of classified documentation from the U.S., via Dublin, 
to Ambassador Brennan did take place: 
Please find enclosed copy of report received in the Department [of Foreign 
Affairs] from the [Irish] embassy [to] Washington concerning prospects for the 
current Soviet five year plan. As you will appreciate the document is for 
destruction after perusal.
110
 
Notwithstanding the above evidence for Irish and E.P.C. cooperation with NATO, it is 
appropriate to close this discussion of the E.E.W.G.-related files in the D.F.A. with a 
more nuanced view of Ireland’s role at the group. The need for such a view is indicated 
by reports generated by those Irish delegations (delegates) who attended on a regular 
basis during 1979-80 – Thelma Doran and Anne Anderson. The style and content of 
their reports perhaps best reflected the spirit in which Ireland attended to its 
commitment to the E.E.W.G., and lifted the lid on the atmosphere that prevailed at the 
group’s meetings. The following extracts are but two that are indicative of a sense of 
some mild despondency and distance from the proceedings. The first is from Thelma 
Doran’s report on a meeting held in Rome, at which a draft study on the C.P.S.U. was 
considered: 
All delegations were lavish in their praise of the twenty-two page draft but there 
were requests for a covering summary for busy ministers and political directors 
which the presidency agreed to prepare. There was a lengthy discussion on small 
rather esoteric points between the French, German and U.K. ‘Kremlinologists’ 
[critics of the Soviet Union] in the light of which the presidency will revise the 
text.
111
 
And from Anne Anderson, following another meeting in Rome that deliberated on 
Soviet influence south of the Sahara: 
Ireland sought to avoid references in the paper which appeared to exaggerate 
Soviet influence in Africa. There was little or no support for this approach as the 
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group – composed largely of representatives who have spent some time in 
eastern Europe – tends to have a rather hard-line anti-Soviet character.112 
The arrival of Michael O’Kennedy – a new departure in policy? 
 The replacement of Garret FitzGerald by Michael O’Kennedy of Fianna Fáil as 
Irish foreign minister in the aftermath of the 1977 general election suggested that Irish 
foreign policy might be about to undergo a shift away from wholehearted commitment 
to E.P.C. in its early years. Like his Fíne Gael predecessor, O’Kennedy too had been an 
officer of the Irish Council of the European Movement.
113
 However, that affiliation did 
not hinder him from taking a different political stance. Four months prior to the election 
that was to sweep the national coalition out of office, O’Kennedy put forward a more 
independent Fianna Fáil vision of Irish involvement in the E.E.C. Addressing his party’s 
árd fheis, he told delegates that his party’s leadership was not happy with the manner in 
which the economic terms of the treaty of accession were being applied, and on E.P.C. 
matters, he continued: 
That Fianna Fáil was committed to the ideal of European unity – a Europe 
committed to peace and independence, which would stand aside from the 
military blocs and be neither anti-American nor anti-Soviet...[the E.E.C.] must 
forge new links with eastern Europe...
114
  
Immediately after his appointment Minister O’Kennedy gave indications that he 
planned a shift towards a more neutral position in foreign policy, and that he even 
harboured an understanding of the Soviet Union’s approach to human rights. In the 
course of an interview with the Irish Times, he responded to a question on President 
Jimmy Carter’s heightened emphasis on the role of human rights in East-West détente. 
Aware of the first C.S.C.E. follow-up conference (held from October 1977 to March 
1978) in Belgrade and the expected clash on human rights, O’Kennedy acknowledged 
that progress had been made in all countries, and said: 
There are concepts which are deeply held in the West and the East...but both 
sides are going to have to understand each other’s commitment...it is probably 
fair to say that the Soviet commitment would be to equal distribution of wealth 
and the safeguard of people’s minimum right to employment and 
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opportunity...the West say the same but also do not want to achieve these at the 
expense of individual liberties.
115
 
In line with expectations, the Belgrade meeting was dominated by human rights 
differences. The Soviet Union accused the U.S.’s chief representative, Arthur Goldberg, 
of trying to wreck the conference by interfering in its internal affairs. A press report 
included a concession from Irish and other western sources that Mr Goldberg’s tactics 
were ‘not all that helpful...But they deny any split between the U.S. and other western 
states.’116 In the event, the conference ended with no mention of human rights in its 
four-page final report. Furthermore, Foreign Minister O’Kennedy seemed to push the 
neutrality boat out even further when he went out of his way in Belgrade to refer twice 
to Ireland’s special interest in the non-aligned movement in world affairs, and to stress 
that ‘this interest had in no way slackened since Irish membership of the E.E.C.’117 As a 
follow-up, the minister attempted to ‘establish close contacts with states such as 
Yugoslavia’, and exchanged visits with his counterpart in Belgrade.118 At the same time, 
however, O’Kennedy was careful to make public his adherence to E.P.C., and he chose 
the next Fianna Fáil árd fheis to dampen down suggestions that his assertions on 
neutrality were at variance with Ireland’s role in E.P.C. A draft copy of his address is 
extant in the Department of Foreign Affairs, and the following extract sums up the 
minister’s message: 
In the 1970s, while maintaining these aims [disarmament, etc. at the U.N.] 
Ireland has undertaken a new commitment and accepted a new opportunity in 
foreign policy matters. As a necessary and important consequence of our 
commitment to work with our partners towards economic and political 
integration in the E.E.C., we have accepted the commitment involved in what 
has become to be called E. P. C. Our commitment to the E.E.C., endorsed here 
overwhelmingly by our people in a referendum, necessarily involved also a 
commitment to this process of foreign policy coordination.
119
 
According to the traditionally pro-Fianna Fáil newspaper, the Sunday Press, 
O’Kennedy’s árd fheis message failed to dispel unease among certain diplomatic and 
media circles concerning the minister’s independent stance. The Sunday Press claimed 
that ambassadors of the E.E.C. countries in Dublin were pleased with a press campaign 
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against O’Kennedy, saying that Robin Haydon, the British ambassador, had canvassed 
opinions about O’Kennedy’s speech in favour of neutrality. The report claimed: 
‘O’Kennedy’s neutrality policy contrasts with that of Garret FitzGerald’s line which 
was highly regarded by E.E.C. ambassadors and is still the line favoured at Iveagh 
House.’120 That analysis had been articulated earlier in the year by the Irish Socialist: 
Dr FitzGerald pursued a behind the scenes policy of actively encouraging Irish 
support for NATO...to be found echoing every NATO policy line...there is a 
serious lobby of civil servants within the Department of Foreign Affairs 
campaigning for Irish membership of NATO whose zeal for membership 
involves subversion of the present minister (Michael O’Kennedy) who has 
remained firm in his commitment to oppose Irish membership of NATO.
121
 
Seven months later, another article by the Sunday Press’s diplomatic 
correspondent headed, ‘Iveagh House split on neutrality’, pointed to a new neutral 
group that had been formed at the Belgrade conference.
122
 Consisting of Austria, 
Cyprus, Finland, Liechtenstein, Malta, San Marino, Sweden, Switzerland and 
Yugoslavia, the group was united by its concern at the lack of progress on halting the 
arms race. The article claimed that Ireland was unaware of the moves to form this group, 
and that the minister was embarrassed to discover that there were four blocs at Belgrade: 
the NATO group,   the Warsaw Pact, the neutral group, and Ireland. It further claimed 
that Mr O’Kennedy favoured positive neutrality, but that he was encountering stiff 
resistance in his department.  
Alongside his determination to follow an independent line, during the second 
Irish presidency of the E.E.C. (July-December 1979) O’Kennedy continued to fulfil all 
his duties, including speaking to the U.N. General Assembly ‘on behalf of the E.E.C. 
and   its nine member states and as foreign minister of Ireland.’123 Even so, and against 
the background of this alleged battle of wills, O’Kennedy failed to see out the 
government’s full term in office at the Department of Foreign Affairs. Charles Haughey, 
who succeeded Jack Lynch as taoiseach in December 1979, replaced O’Kennedy at 
foreign affairs with Brian Lenihan, and O’Kennedy was redeployed to the Department 
of Economic Planning and Development.  
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As far as Irish-Soviet relations within E.P.C. were concerned, however, the Irish 
archival record indicates that it was ‘business as usual’ under O’Kennedy as it had been 
in Garret FitzGerald’s time. This is best reflected in the instruction to the Irish 
delegation to the January 1978 E.E.W.G. meeting which confirmed that Ireland had no 
objection of principle to sharing a report on the Soviet armed forces with NATO, as 
discussed above. In short, while O’Kennedy was willing to look favourably towards the 
non-aligned movement, it appears he was not prepared to interfere with the established 
course of activities at E.E.W.G. meetings. 
Postscript: the Single European Act 
While the adoption by Ireland in 1987 of the Single European Act lies outside 
the timeframe of this thesis, such is the relevance of the Single Act to E.P.C. that it 
requires some salient comment in relation to Irish-Soviet affairs.  Under the 
chairmanship of a close colleague of Garret FitzGerald’s, Professor Jim Dooge,124 an 
E.E.C. committee was empowered to facilitate a process to overhaul and expand the 
Rome Treaty of 1957, by bringing forward the Single European Act as an international 
treaty between the E.E.C. member states.
125
 The act provided not just for a ‘great leap 
forward’ towards deeper economic and legal integration among member states, but also 
– for the first time – incorporation into E.E.C. law of the operations of E.P.C. The E.P.C. 
element of the act was contained in a section entitled ‘Title III’.  
By 1 January 1987 all the other eleven of the then twelve members of the E.E.C. 
had ratified the Single European Act, but it could not come into force until it had been 
ratified by all member states. Ratification in Ireland had been delayed by the June 1986 
referendum on divorce, and so the Single European Act was left in abeyance until later 
in the year. Taoiseach Garret FitzGerald decided upon a course to ratify the new treaty 
in full by a simple vote of the oireachtas, maintaining that a referendum was not 
required for it to be constitutionally adopted into Irish domestic law – despite the 
insistence of the leader of the opposition, Charles Haughey, that a ‘constitutional issue 
hung over the entire ratification process like a cloud.’126  Tánaiste Dick Spring, the 
leader of the Labour party, was also supportive of this approach, and enlisted the help of 
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the taoiseach to overcome opposition in his own party. Dr FitzGerald recorded how this 
was achieved: 
I was asked by Dick Spring to postpone introducing the necessary legislation 
until after a Labour party conference in the autumn of that year...I agreed with 
his request in order to minimise problems the Labour party might face in 
mobilising support by its deputies for ratification in the dáil.
127
  
Thereafter, the ratification process was completed by both houses of the oireachtas in 
mid-December. Only a possible referral to the supreme court by President Patrick 
Hillery to test the act’s constitutionality could halt the deposit of the instrument of 
ratification with the Italian presidency on 1 January 1987.  
During his terms as president Dr Hillery summoned the Council of State into 
session on four occasions, and subsequently forwarded three items of legislation to the 
supreme court for judgement on their conformity with the constitution.
128
 Indeed, a 
team of legal experts, assembled by the government, was standing by in some 
expectation that the president would send the act to the court.
129
 But Dr Hillery, who as 
foreign minister had negotiated Ireland’s accession to the E.E.C. in the early 1970s, and 
subsequently served for three years as an E.E.C. commissioner, chose not to do so. On 
Christmas Eve, he signed the Single European Act and affixed the seal of state to its 
instrument of ratification.   
A challenge to the president’s move was quickly made by the T.C.D. lecturer 
and campaigner against Irish entry into the E.E.C., the economist Raymond Crotty. 
Crotty contended that the Single European Act entailed a further surrender of Ireland’s 
sovereignty, and that only the people could agree to that surrender. Therefore, he held, 
ratification of the act in Ireland required a referendum.  His academic colleague and 
fellow activist against Ireland’s integration into a federalist Europe, Anthony Coughlan, 
later recorded the urgency and effect of Crotty’s legal initiative: 
At 5 p.m. that Christmas Eve, High Court Justice Mr Donal Barrington injuncted 
the state from ratifying the Single European Act pending trial of Raymond 
Crotty’s contention. Judge Barrington gave his judgement in the funereal gloom 
of a darkened Four Courts, with the judge and the lawyers in civvies because it 
was outside official law term, and a couple of bored policemen standing around 
wondering when they would get home. News of the Crotty injunction was the 
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first item on the radio news the Christmas morning following, and it was widely 
reported internationally.
130
 
Eventually, the supreme court ruled in Crotty’s favour, not in relation to the act’s 
economic and other provisions, but rather in relation to its Title III – which covered 
E.P.C. The court’s majority ruling by three of the five-man court was best expressed in 
the ‘swing’ judgement of Justice Seamus Henchy. Renowned for the clarity and 
readability of his judgements at the supreme court, Henchy noted that he had tested the 
act’s articles against article one of the Irish constitution. That article declared that the 
Irish nation affirmed ‘its inalienable, indefeasible and sovereign right to determine its 
relations with other nations...in accordance with its own genius and traditions.’131  
For the purposes of this study, three further extracts from the Henchy judgement 
have been selected. First, in rejecting the government’s submission that the conduct of 
foreign policy was the exclusive concern of the executive, and not amenable to control 
by the courts, the judgement referred to articles 28 and 29 of the constitution and stated: 
It follows, therefore, that in the conduct of the state's external relations, as in the 
exercise of the executive power in other respects, the government is not immune 
from judicial control if it acts in a manner or for a purpose which is inconsistent 
with the constitution.
132
  
This extract takes on a special significance with regard to the legal standards and 
safeguards that governed the conduct of Ireland’s ministers and diplomats generally 
within E.P.C. and, specifically, the E.E.W.G. As the existence and operations of the 
E.E.W.G. were effectively a state secret, the minister did not have to account for its 
operations to the dáil. Reference was made earlier in this chapter to the Davignon 
machinery as a controlling guide for E.P.C., but was that machinery vetted by the Irish 
state’s law officer, the attorney-general, for its constitutionality?   It is not possible for 
this study to enquire further at this stage, but suffice it to say that the involvement of 
Ireland in the study of the communist parties of the Nine may well have been an 
unwarranted extension of executive power at the time and therefore arguably also 
inconsistent with the constitution.   
                                                          
130
 See Anthony Coughlan, on the twenty-fifth anniversary of Raymond Crotty’s injunction, in the Irish 
Democrat, 22 Dec. 2012, available at (http://www.irishdemocrat.co.uk/window-on-the-eu/25th-
anniversary-of-the-late-raymond-crottys-s/) (2 Jan. 2013).  
131
 See The Supreme Court of Ireland, ‘Raymond Crotty, plaintiff  v. An taoiseach and others, defendants, 
no. 12036P, 9 Apr. 1987’, available at (http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IESC/1987/4.html) (2 Jan. 2013), p. 
787.  
132
 Ibid., p. 786. 
265 
 
The second extract has been chosen for its clarity in stating the essence of the 
significance of the ratification of the S.E.A. for Irish foreign policy: 
Each member [state] will immediately cede a portion of its sovereignty and 
freedom of action in matters of foreign policy [emphasis added by the present 
writer]. National objectives and ideological positions must defer to the aims and 
decisions of an institution known as E.P.C., which is to work in tandem with the 
E.E.C. A purely national approach to foreign policy is incompatible with the 
accession to this treaty. The methods of cooperation between the member states, 
which hitherto has been informal, aspirational...now pass into the realm of 
solemnly covenanted commitment...in a way that will lead to European political 
union...in the sphere of foreign policy.
133
  
Thirdly, Justice Henchy brought his judgement to its logical conclusion: 
For the foregoing reasons I am of the opinion that, without the appropriate 
constitutional amendment, the ratification of the Single European Act (insofar as 
it contains Title III [of E.P.C.]) would be impermissible under the constitution. I 
would declare accordingly.
134
 
The supreme court’s decision ensured that a referendum would have to be held 
to ratify the Single European Act, and indeed all subsequent treaties to transfer further 
powers to E.E.C. institutions were also submitted for popular approval to the electorate. 
But for this thesis the court’s findings include evidence to suggest that the conduct of 
Irish foreign policy within E.P.C. from 1974 in effect lay outside the provisions of the 
Irish constitution. While Justice Henchy’s judgement was concerned with the 
constitutional position in the event of the adoption of the Single European Act., and 
while he noted that E.P.C. had hitherto been voluntarily entered into, in practice the 
work of the E.E.W.G., etc. amounted to a de facto yielding up of elements of Irish   
sovereignty over its foreign policy. Indeed, it was the very practice of E.P.C. from 1974 
onwards that made the formulation of Title III of the Act possible in the first place. This 
is confirmed by Noel Dorr: ‘On E.P.C. the Single European Act did little more than 
codify existing foreign policy coordination procedures but the supreme court in the 
“Crotty Case” held that Ireland could not ratify without a referendum’.135  
The Single European Act was duly put before the electorate in May 1987. In a 
referendum campaign dominated by economic matters, it was approved by voters, with 
seventy per cent for and thirty per cent against the act, on a forty-four per cent turnout. 
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However, there was to be a further, if delayed, constitutional sting in the tail: during the 
campaign the government used considerable sums of public money to promote its Yes-
side case, a practice that was in due time found to be unconstitutional by the supreme 
court in the 1995 McKenna case. In her contribution to the four-to-one ruling on that 
occasion, Justice Susan Denham concluded: 
My decision in this case does not infringe upon the right and duty of the 
government to give information, to clarify situations, or to give explanations and 
deal with unforeseen matters and emergencies. However, the government is not 
entitled to expend public monies for the purpose of promoting a campaign for a 
particular outcome to a proposed referendum to amend the terms of the 
constitution. I would allow the appeal.
136
 
 
Accordingly, it can be concluded that the passage of the Single European Act and the 
provisions relating for E.P.C. into Irish law was assisted, to some extent at least, by a 
means of funding later judged to have been unconstitutional. That having been said, 
however, in all probability it was the impact of another kind of funding – E.E.C. 
funding – which had been more decisive not just for the Yes-side in the Single 
European Act referendum, but also for Irish commitment to E.P.C. in pursuit of the 
state’s economic policies in the 1970s and subsequently. In his study on the 1970s, 
Diarmaid Ferriter (2012) sets out the extent to which Ireland benefited from an E.E.C. 
fund, the Regional Fund: ‘In 1975 the commitment was £8.3 million and increased 
thereafter in 1976 (£14.4 million), 1977 (£12.6 million), 1978 (£23.6 million) and up to 
the summer of 1979 (£31.9 million)’.137  
Conclusion 
From the outset Ireland sided with the procedural decisions that ensured that the 
E.E.W.G.’s studies would inform the E.E.C.’s efforts to maximise the strength of its 
position in its economic, political and security relations with the Soviet Union. Chief 
among these was the proposal to switch the direction of E.E.W.G. studies from the 
original terms of reference (to study the Nine’s relations with the East) – which could 
have challenged E.E.C. member states to think creatively and collectively in terms of 
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progressing détente – to the opposite direction. The effect of the decision was to 
strengthen the hands of Kremlinological agenda-setters, and the E.E.W.G. was quickly 
set to become a vehicle for the commissioning of agreed papers on the external relations 
and internal affairs of the Soviet Union and other member states of COMECON.  
Coupled to that strengthening of Kremlinological hands was the British proposal 
for the group’s studies to move beyond factual analyses of current Soviet policies to 
include recommendations for collective E.E.C. stances to counter possible Soviet 
reaction to the processus européen. That proposal was designed to prejudge Soviet 
policies on the E.E.C., and to achieve in advance E.P.C. consensuses on the basis of 
Kremlinological studies. And while A.E. Mannix offered some mild internal criticism 
indicating that ‘but this [focus on Soviet objectives] should not provide the entire spirit 
of the enquiry’, Dr Brennan’s more assertive prompting in support of the British 
proposal was to find most favour in the D.F.A., as was to become manifest during the 
Irish presidency.  
Ireland’s first presidency of the E.E.W.G. in 1975 was notable for Dublin’s 
success in re-establishing regular group meetings after France had effectively suspended 
operations during its term of presidency. Moreover, the Irish presidency was marked by 
its diplomats’ ability to achieve group consensuses of understanding on the control of 
visas for Soviet and COMECON travellers to E.E.C. countries, on Soviet oil and energy 
reserves in the overall context of COMECON, and on the non-use of certain phrases in 
the language of diplomacy in members’ future relations with the Soviet Union. The 
basis of those consensuses represented a continuation of the strategy of maximisation of 
the E.E.C.’s position in its relations with the Soviet Union. Any consideration of an 
easing in members’ strict controls on visas to encourage greater East-West travel by 
business people and tourists was noticeable by its absence. The adoption of a common 
policy to exclude the use of ‘peaceful coexistence’ in members’ future documents with 
the Soviets was soon to become instructive for Ireland. As discussed in chapter two in 
relation to Garret FitzGerald’s visit to the Soviet Union – just one year later – the Irish 
can only have felt honour-bound to avoid the incorporation of any such Soviet 
terminology in the joint communiqué issued at the end of the visit. The pessimistic 
contents and downbeat tenor of the group’s studies on the status of Soviet oil production 
and the wider COMECON economy was indicative of the E.E.C.’s policy approach to 
trade relations with those countries. In this context we have seen that the advice from 
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Ambassador Brennan urging the maintenance of the E.E.C.’s bilateral trade policy with 
individual members of COMECON was much in line with the content of E.E.W.G. 
studies.  
Irish acquiescence in 1974 in the commissioning of ethically and legally-
questionable studies of west European communist parties – an undertaking that added a 
self-serving (especially for Italy and France) domestic and ideological ingredient to the 
group’s work – did produce some expressions of distaste within the confines of the 
D.F.A. However, such was the evolutionary and encompassing nature of the E.E.W.G.’s 
Kremlinological course for Ireland that its delegations not only engaged in the 
compilation of studies on the Soviet Union containing military matters, but by 1978 
Ireland could agree in principle with the proposal that certain E.E.W.G. studies could be 
circulated to NATO. That Ireland found it expedient to comply with Britain’s request in 
this matter is at variance with the already cited assurances given to Trevor Salmon by 
his sources among Irish diplomats that ‘Ireland’s “special position” was accepted’ by 
NATO members in E.P.C.
138
 Rather, it appears more plausible that the decision was 
taken in the broader context of ‘managing the relationship’, as mentioned to this writer 
by Noel Dorr. The broader context of Ireland’s relationship with the E.E.C. from the 
mid-1970s included the allocation of regional funds to Ireland, as detailed above. In any 
event, Ireland’s decisions in relation to studies on the communist parties and military 
studies can but remain on the record as two further examples of the phenomenon 
encountered throughout this study whereby a country’s official public values could take 
second place to its perceived national interests. Patrick Keatinge articulated the 
occurrence of such phenomena throughout the practice of international relations: ‘But 
the expression of a value is one thing in the form of a statement of principle; in the form 
of policy leading to government action it is something yet again.’139  
 Such was Dr FitzGerald’s energy and commitment to European integration that 
his Fianna Fáil successor was faced with a daunting political challenge. To surmount 
this Minister Michael O’Kennedy attempted to ‘do a Frank Aiken’ on FitzGerald 
(Aiken had achieved a respected international status for Ireland at the U.N. in the late 
1950s by adopting a more independent line than his Fíne Gael predecessor, Liam 
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Cosgrave).
140
 O’Kennedy sought to assert himself by stressing Irish neutrality and 
engaging in talks with Yugoslavia, the leading nation in the non-aligned movement. 
Nevertheless, without an  Eamon de Valera behind him and faced by a combination of 
the legacy of the state’s  immersion in  three years’ support for E.P.C. cooperation in the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and a supportive E.E.C. lobby,  O’Kennedy’s tenure in 
the department was short-lived. His two-year period in office can be summarised as one 
that was more overtly demonstrative about Irish neutrality and more assiduous in its 
contacts with the non-aligned states – to an extent that was uncomfortable for those 
diplomatic and political forces in and around the D.F.A. which were more politically 
committed to E.P.C.  Nevertheless, his outspoken commitment to Ireland’s neutrality 
contrasted with his department’s agreement in principle to share E.E.W.G. studies with 
NATO.  
 The supreme court’s ruling that the ratification of the Single European Act 
required the electorate’s approval to comply with the constitution casts a retrospective 
cloud over Ireland’s early involvement in E.P.C. As already suggested, Irish 
participation in E.E.W.G. policy formation on the Soviet Union arguably took place 
outside the boundaries of constitutional legitimacy between 1974 and 1987. However, 
there is a further conclusion to be drawn from an assessment of the Crotty case. Such 
was the extent of the commitment by key figures in the Irish political and diplomatic 
elite to the process of E.E.C. integration and E.P.C., that it overcame their obligation to 
ensure that their proposal to introduce the Single European Act treaty into Irish law 
followed a prudent and constitutional course. It appears that their commitment to and 
immersion in the process of European integration combined to prompt members of that 
elite to fast-track the act into Irish law. That fast-tracking chimes with Christopher 
Hill’s assertion already cited in the introduction to this chapter, that E.P.C. had a 
tendency to foster ‘groupthink’.141  Part and parcel of that tendency, no matter how large 
or small, was Irish involvement in the formulation of common E.P.C. positions on the 
Soviet Union.  
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 See, for example, Keatinge, A place among the nations, p. 161, regarding the greater emphasis placed 
upon the pursuit of disarmament measures at the U.N. during Aiken’s tenure of office than in Cosgrave’s.  
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Thesis Conclusion 
Six major issues stand out in this study of Irish-Soviet relations, the first of which was 
the influence of the policies of Eamon de Valera. Beginning in New York in 1919-20 
when de Valera recognised the value of linking the nascent Irish republic with the 
promises of the Russian revolution and Soviet Russia on the basis of a common 
opposition to imperialism, his influence continued beyond the tenure of his able 
lieutenant in external affairs, Frank Aiken, which came to an end in 1969, down to Dr 
Patrick Hillery’s time as foreign affairs minister until 3 January 1973. During those 
decades de Valera was prepared to work within the limits of the prevailing international 
and domestic political climate (which was customarily anti-Soviet in character) to 
engage with the Soviet Union whenever he considered that to do so was in the interests 
of Irish sovereignty, and of other small states seeking to establish a secure place in a 
world dominated by the major powers.  
The opening chapter of this thesis has charted a series of such engagements, 
including de Valera’s management of relations with the Soviet representatives, Martens 
and Nuorteva in New York, and his sanctioning of substantial cash loans to them; his 
sending of Dr McCartan to Moscow to have the draft treaty of joint recognition signed 
after it became clear that U.S. recognition for an Irish republic was not going to be 
granted by President Wilson; and his support for Soviet membership of the League of 
Nations. That such support was not reciprocated by the Soviet Union for Irish 
membership of the United Nations in 1946 (because of East-West rivalries at the world 
body) was much resented by de Valera, as was demonstrated by his undiplomatic 
outburst against the Soviets in his interview with the Irish Times in 1947. Nevertheless, 
when Ireland was admitted under the Soviet ‘package-deal’ to the U.N. in 1955 the 
opportunity for a resumption of Irish-Soviet cooperation was re-established. Of 
relevance here were Aiken’s various initiatives at the U.N. on the admission of the 
People’s Republic of China, and on disarmament that involved Soviet cooperation. Such 
policies bore fruit in 1969 with Soviet support for Dr Hillery’s quest for a peacekeeping 
force for Northern Ireland at the U.N. All of those actions were part of de Valera’s 
commitment to the building up of the Irish state, in which his ability to maximise the 
international impact of independent Ireland’s sovereignty gained for him and his 
country a unique respect on the world stage – a respect that was acknowledged by the 
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Soviet Union when it honoured his stalwart devotee in foreign affairs, Frank Aiken, by 
inviting him to ratify the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in Moscow in 1968. 
But the parameters of de Valera’s willingness to work with the Soviet Union 
were strictly limited. No efforts were made by him or Aiken to establish relations with 
the U.S.S.R. – they were content to confine the conduct of such affairs to international 
forums. De Valera’s support did not extend beyond the U.S.S.R.’s right to be part of the 
League of Nations – as demonstrated by the evidence presented in chapter one of the 
Free State’s decision in 1935 at the prompting of the Vatican to block possible Soviet 
influence on the League’s policy on birth control – and by the above cited summary 
from Patrick Keatinge of the voting record on Cold War-related topics which showed 
that Ireland voted with the U.S. at least three times as often as against it at the United 
Nations. At home, de Valera’s actions were even frostier. He demonstrated his 
disapproval of the Irish-U.S.S.R. Friendship Society in 1947 by his warning to Dr 
Kostal, the chargé d’affaires of Czechoslovakia, to be wary of the society. This example 
of de Valera’s frostiness was but a milder expression of a succession of negative reports, 
analyses and actions undertaken by Irish diplomats towards the Soviet Union in the 
wider de Valera era. Such undertakings included Dr McCartan’s negative reports 
containing political scepticism and ideological opposition to efforts in Soviet Russia in 
1921 to begin the process of building a socialist society; the ‘debt collection’ approach 
of Ambassador John Dulanty to the Soviet ambassador in London in 1949 to finalise the 
republican loan-for-czarist-jewels saga; and the inclusion of the analogy in Frederick 
Boland’s report on Nikita Khrushchev’s behaviour in 1960 at the U.N. that drew a 
comparison between the Soviet leader and Hitler.    
Nevertheless, the record of Irish foreign policy in the de Valera period is notable 
for those occasions when Ireland either supported or worked in unison with the Soviet 
Union in the interests of small nations, world peace and nuclear disarmament. Finally, 
Dmitri Shostakovich’s reception in Áras an Úachtaráin in 1972 can be seen as de 
Valera’s belated imprimatur for the establishment of formal diplomatic relations with 
the Soviet Union.   
The second major issue in this study was the sensitive three-way relationship 
between Ireland, the Soviet Union and Britain. During the establishment of the formal 
diplomatic relations process, astute interventions and representations made to the Irish 
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government by the British ambassador to Dublin, Sir John Peck, were highly effective. 
Peck was successful in delaying the implementation date for diplomatic relations, and in 
achieving the imposition of travel restrictions on Soviet officials in Ireland to the extent 
that F.C.O. authorities could internally express their satisfaction for the cooperation 
secured from their Irish counterparts. Moreover, Ireland’s request for British help in 
establishing its embassy in Moscow, Ambassador Brennan’s high regard for the British 
ambassador to Moscow (Sir Terence W. Garvey) and most of all Ireland’s full 
participation in E.P.C. and the E.E.W.G. (including Ireland’s agreement in principle to 
share the group’s study on the Soviet armed forces with NATO, at Britain’s request) can 
only have combined to allay British fears concerning an independent Irish relationship 
with the Soviet Union.  Even the one cloud on the horizon – the prosecution of Ireland’s 
‘torture’ case against Britain before the European Court of Human Rights during 1977-8 
– could not have unduly disturbed British sensitivities. As has been discussed, Dr 
FitzGerald went out of his way to attempt to ‘ring-fence’ the Irish case from Soviet 
criticisms of Britain on the matter. Armed with chapter and verse supplied by 
Ambassador Brennan’s P.R.s from Moscow, the Irish minister stated in Washington that 
Soviet expressions of support for the Irish case were simply a Soviet tactic to embarrass 
Britain internationally and to distract attention from the plight of dissidents in the Soviet 
Union.  However, the credibility of Dr FitzGerald’s decision to publicly join in 
President Carter’s human rights campaign against the Soviet Union in this way – at a 
time when Ireland’s quest for justice against Britain had not yet been resolved – was 
undermined by the Strasbourg court’s failure to uphold the earlier verdict of the 
European Commission for Human Rights that the R.U.C.’s techniques against certain 
prisoners had amounted to torture. 
The third major issue in this study was the impact of the E.E.C. on the 
relationship between the two states. Ireland’s entry into the E.E.C. on 1 January 1973 
was a complementary factor in establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. 
Thereafter, E.E.C. membership determined that Ireland would have two overlapping 
relationships with the U.S.S.R. The first and most obvious relationship was on a direct 
nation-to-nation basis; while the second and less well known relationship was mediated 
through the institutions of the Community. As indicated by his founding membership of 
the Irish Council of the European Movement in the 1950s, Dr FitzGerald was 
favourably disposed not just towards Irish membership of the E.E.C. but also to the 
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adoption of a wholehearted commitment to the process of E.E.C. integration. Following 
his appointment as foreign minister in 1973 FitzGerald was anxious to ensure that 
Ireland’s participation in the E.P.C. framework, as it related to the Soviet Union, would 
be an informed one. In this regard he had the good fortune to have available Dr Brennan 
as Ireland’s first ambassador to Moscow, a man whose skills fulfilled all the 
requirements for the post, not least of which was his appreciation for the processus 
européen. Ambassador Brennan’s skills were put to an early test in Moscow when he 
was obliged by E.E.C. trade obligations to inform the Soviet foreign trade ministry in 
1974 that Ireland would have to terminate the Irish-Soviet trade agreement that had 
formed part of the establishment of official relations process. As former Commercial 
Attaché McHugh indicated, Dr Brennan could withstand the ensuing Soviet frustration, 
as expressed by trade ministry official Manzhulo’s ‘you Irish are more Catholic than the 
pope’ retort, and a level of Irish imports was maintained in place until Dr FitzGerald’s 
official visit in 1976 led to the signing of a replacement cooperation agreement. E.E.C. 
connections were also in evidence surrounding FitzGerald’s visit, as was shown by the 
minister’s briefing of the Nine’s ambassadors in Moscow, and subsequently to a 
representative of the British presidency of the E.P.C. in Dublin. The content of the joint 
communiqué agreed at the end of the official visit, devoid as it was of Soviet-style 
terminology such as ‘peaceful coexistence’, was also influenced by an E.E.W.G. resolve 
to neutralise any perceived Soviet propagandist gain. E.E.C. considerations for the Irish 
embassy to Moscow further involved Irish officials in an ongoing information gathering 
and sharing exercise, often in ‘listening-device-free cages’ in the larger embassies, as 
has been attested to from oral and archival sources presented in the chapters of this 
thesis.  
Further evidence of the influence of the E.E.C. in Irish-Soviet affairs arises from 
the level of cross-fertilisation that existed between Ambassador Brennan’s political 
reports from Moscow and the work of the E.E.W.G. While the study of these areas in 
this thesis has been ordered into two separate chapters, the full import of the evidence 
gleaned from those sources can be further appreciated when they are viewed together. 
This can be done by cross-referencing the P.R. titles listed in Appendix 1 against the 
subject matters of E.E.W.G. meetings listed in Appendix 2 (or vice versa). Just one brief 
example, arising from the topic of E.E.W.G. reports with military aspects discussed in 
chapter five, is indicative of the value of such a cross-referencing exercise. On 16 
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November 1977 Dr Brennan sent from Moscow to the D.F.A. a political report entitled, 
‘The role of Soviet armed forces in elaboration of Soviet domestic and foreign 
policy’,142  – just twelve days in advance of the Irish delegation’s attendance at an 
E.E.W.G. meeting in Brussels where a study entitled, 'The role of the Soviet armed 
forces in the conduct of Soviet domestic and foreign policy', was considered.
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Accordingly, it can be seen that Ireland’s political reporting mechanism from Moscow 
to Dublin was available, when the D.F.A. deemed it appropriate to inform Irish 
representatives at the E.E.W.G. 
Furthermore, the evidence presented regarding the commissioning of ethically 
and legally-questionable studies of west European communist parties, Ambassador 
Brennan’s requests for C.I.A. reports from America through the D.F.A., and the 
department’s decision to share E.E.W.G. studies with military aspects with NATO, has 
shown that these actions were not Irish initiatives but rather arose in response to 
requests from other member states. In particular, that the request to share studies with 
NATO should have been made is all the more questionable in that it might have been 
expected that the contents of E.E.W.G. studies would have been unofficially available to 
NATO from one or other of its members. The answer to that question may lie in inter-
member rivalries, perhaps with the British delegation attempting to put pressure on 
France’s anti-NATO stance? Whatever the reason, and mindful of Noel Dorr’s 
observation that such decisions were made in the context of Ireland managing its 
relationship with the E.E.C. – which from 1975 included generous transfers from the 
Regional Fund – it is clear that Ireland’s decision was one of pragmatism. Accordingly, 
it can be concluded that the country’s commitment to the E.E.W.G. corresponded to 
Patrick Keatinge’s prescient assessment from 1978, cited above, that the consultative 
E.P.C framework was evolving with the ‘maximum of pragmatism and the minimum of 
publicity.’  
At the same time, evidence presented in chapter five shows that Irish 
involvement in the E.E.W.G. was not unconditional. This was at its most evident and 
effective at the group’s February 1974 discussions on its study on the Soviet 
Union/COMECON’S reaction to E.C.C. members’ cooperation in the realm of defence. 
Ireland had no difficulty in postponing the implications of that eventuality for Irish 
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neutrality to another day, with the retention of the adjective ‘eventuelle’ in the study.  
Also, the first E.E.W.G.-related files indicate that Ireland took serious account of draft 
papers being presented by the larger states. This was shown in January 1974 by A.E. 
Mannix’s debunking for the D.F.A. of the British characterisation of Soviet policy 
towards western Europe as one of ‘Finlandisation’.  Further, Ireland seems to have 
played the role of seeking to restrict the inclusion of the extent, if not the essence, of 
British intelligence studies dealing with Soviet influence in the Third World.  
Yet a much more effective brake on the operations of the E.E.W.G. than any 
Irish reservations was the expression by France of its determination to maintain the 
voluntary E.P.C. separate from the treaty-based economic framework of the E.E.C. By 
its initial resistance to allow the European Commission’s representative to attend the 
group’s meetings, and by effectively suspending E.E.W.G operations during its 
presidency term in 1974, France showed an early determination to keep the E.E.W.G.’s 
work to a minimum. In contrast, as Ireland had adopted a wholehearted approach to 
European integration under the direction of Dr FitzGerald, Ireland was drawn into the 
orbit of the British-German alliance that led the way in the production of 
Kremlinological studies. The return of France – after the Irish presidency had ensured a 
resumption of E.E.W.G. meetings and studies – and French acceptance of the 
Commission’s representative at the E.E.W.G. table, revealed that it had conceded 
ground to its more federalist-minded opponents, at least in relation to E.E.C. attitudes 
towards the Soviet Union. At the same time, however, the E.E.W.G.-related files have 
also shown that it was possible for a member state with an aversion to a federalist 
Europe to be a committed player at the E.E.W.G. In this regard Britain was regarded as 
the most anti-federalist member of the E.E.C., but it was also a dominant force in 
proposing and compiling papers for the group. Clearly, Britain’s reluctance to embrace 
the processus européen did not apply when it came to an opportunity to continue with 
its traditional penchant for anti-Sovietism.  
To say that the extent of pragmatism shown by Ireland at E.E.W.G. meetings in 
relation to the Soviet Union was at total variance with Liam Cosgrave’s principles 
declared before the U.N. in 1955 which included, ‘The adoption of an independent line 
on all issues of foreign policy and non-association with any blocs’ (as cited in chapter 
two) would be an oversimplification. After all, not only did Cosgrave’s principles 
include a commitment to support ‘those powers principally responsible for the defence 
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of the free world in their resistance to the spread of communist power and influence’, 
but even Frank Aiken more often sided with the Americans on Cold War issues than he 
did with the U.S.S.R.  However, the pragmatism displayed by Cosgrave and Aiken was 
of a fundamentally different order than that displayed at the E.E.W.G. under ministers 
Garret FitzGerald and Michael O’Kennedy. As has been shown in chapter five, with 
evidence and extracts drawn from the judgement of Justice Henchy of the supreme court 
in relation to the S.E.A., Ireland in effect had ceded ‘a portion of its sovereignty and 
freedom of action in matters of foreign policy’ by its structured involvement in E.P.C. 
without the prior approval of the Irish people at a constitutional referendum.  
It is against the background of its new evidence from the Moscow P.R.s and the 
E.E.W.G.-related sources, together with the implications arising from the Supreme 
Court’s ruling, that this thesis can suggest that questions arise in relation to the 
conclusions on the impact of E.E.C. membership on Irish foreign policy in Diarmaid 
Ferriter’s Ambiguous republic: Ireland in the 1970s (2012). While Ferriter does allow 
for ambiguity in the E.E.C.’s impact,144 he underestimates the degree of surrender by 
Irish governments of their control over foreign policy. In this regard the present writer 
notes that Ferriter’s work does not only not include a mention of political reports from 
Moscow or the Irish E.E.W.G. files (understandable for a general history), but that its 
endnotes for its section on foreign affairs rely on the Department of the Taoiseach – and 
do not include references to files from the Department of Foreign Affairs.
145
   
The fourth major issue in the study was the reception afforded to the Soviet 
embassy to Ireland. Before the arrival of Ambassador Anatoli Kaplin’s mission in 1974, 
his two unofficial predecessors, Lev Sedin of Novoe Vremya in the early 1960s, and 
Yuri Ustimenko of TASS during the early détente years from 1970, had been 
favourably received in Ireland. Sedin’s public engagements were confined to speaking 
at information meetings of the Ireland-U.S.S.R. Friendship Society and personal 
engagements with the society’s officers and members of the Irish Workers’ Party, 
among whom he made a lasting impression. Ustimenko’s presence was much more high 
profile. He took advantage of the more advantageous political conditions and of his own 
communication skills to gain access to prominent social groups and the Irish media, 
ranging from the Dundalk Debating Society to The late late show and the Irish Times. 
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In support of the favourable impact that Ireland made upon the two Soviet emissaries, 
and of the contention of the specialist on Soviet education, Dr Hainsworth, concerning 
the ‘pervasive readership culture in the Soviet Union’, both Sedin and Ustimenko 
published accounts of Ireland upon returning to their homeland. Accordingly, Sedin’s 
small volume, The many shades of green, and Ustimenko’s book, Get to know Ireland, 
can be added to the historical record of Irish-Soviet relations.   
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. can only have been satisfied by 
the achievements of Ambassador Kaplin’s mission to Ireland. These included securing 
diplomatic premises in keeping with the U.S.S.R.’s world status; overcoming 
politically-biased planning objections to the Orwell Road embassy with a level of 
cooperation with Dublin City Council that impressed Senator Ruairi Quinn; the honour 
of presenting Seán MacBride with a Lenin Peace Prize; and the ambassador’s success – 
despite his reputed reserved manner – in reaching out to a cross-section of Irish society. 
This latter success was in no small measure due to the friendship and guidance of the 
officers of the Ireland-U.S.S.R. Society, Frank Edwards and John Swift. Edwards and 
Swift could identify appropriate guests for ambassadorial occasions in Kaplin’s ongoing 
series of embassy receptions. But beyond the confines of his embassy, Ambassador 
Kaplin was also a noted attendee at Gaelic games at Croke Park, and he interacted with 
a range of social bodies, including the Christian Brothers’ school in Carrick-on-Suir. 
Accordingly it can be seen that Kaplin’s societal involvement was in some contrast to 
that of his counterpart in Moscow, where Ambassador Brennan’s social circle was 
largely restricted to the western diplomatic and media community and with Soviet 
officials in the conduct of his duties and the collection of research materials for his 
political reports. Needless to say, it is to be expected that Ambassador Kaplin was also 
involved in regular reports to his home ministry, details of which are beyond this 
present study.   
Ambassador Kaplin did have to contend with protests and pickets by groups 
concerned about dissidents and charges of human rights abuses in the Soviet Union. In 
this regard the thesis has focused upon two Irish Jewish groups and their campaigns to 
highlight the issue of Jewish emigration to Israel, together with an account of the Soviet 
view of the issue. Accordingly, it can be concluded that the question of Jewish 
emigration to Israel became embroiled in East-West rivalries, and that an international 
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debate for the hearts and minds of Soviet Jews was being fought out across the globe, 
including in Ireland. That debate featured in the Irish media, but in an uneven manner, 
as typified in an Irish Times’ report which carried details of only the Jewish groups’ 
claims.
146
 However, no evidence has come to light of Ambassador Kaplin attempting to 
present his state’s view on the matter – an omission that may well have added to the 
Irish Jewish organisations’ successes in promoting their particular view on this issue.  
 Ambassador Kaplin’s death in office in 1979 resulted in expressions of 
condolence which showed signs of being sincerely meant, especially from Taoiseach 
Jack Lynch, trade unionists, Irish communists, as well as from Garret and Joan 
FitzGerald. In that regard it was perhaps the condolences of the FitzGeralds which were 
the most notable. Those condolences can be seen as a reflection of the mutually-
respectful working relationship that had developed between the Irish minister (and his 
officials in the D.F.A.) with Kaplin in the course of occasions such as Dr FitzGerald’s 
official visit to the Soviet Union in 1976. However, it was details in the review 
conducted by the D.F.A. of the state of Irish-Soviet relations in 1980 that best presented 
a realistic assessment of the achievements of the first Soviet mission to Ireland. The 
principal focus of the assessment was on the growth in trade, and improvements in Irish 
export levels following implementation of the economic cooperation agreement signed 
by Dr FitzGerald in Moscow in 1976. As discussed in chapter two, the assessment 
included the security of reliable oil supplies to meet the increasing needs of the E.S.B. 
and C.I.É. at a time of the oil crises of the 1970s, and the benefits from dairy and meat 
exports for Irish agriculture. To that official stocktaking can be added the growth of the 
activities and membership of a close supporter of the embassy, the Ireland-U.S.S.R. 
Society.   
 The fifth major area in this study was the role of various Irish-Soviet friendship 
organisations.  General conclusions can be made here: for the societies to be effective, 
two interconnected political conditions were required: first, a domestic scene that was, 
at a minimum, tolerant of Irish-Soviet contacts; and secondly, an international relations 
climate that provided for East-West cooperation. Also, it can be seen that the course of 
the Soviet Union’s historical development – from initial construction, emergence from 
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the Second World War, détente, and through the perestroika and glasnost period to the 
dismantlement of the U.S.S.R. – were the chief determinants for the societies’ agendas.   
It was the Ireland-USSR Society in Dublin that took centre stage in relations 
after the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1974. The society took advantage of 
the complementary domestic and international conditions that arose in the 1960s. It 
quickly established itself as a focused group, with a dedicated leadership that became 
adept at building up a membership and contacts well beyond its wellspring in the Irish 
Workers’ Party. As the society’s officers were careful to keep a considerable distance 
between the two organisations it did not encounter significant societal animosity. It set 
out unashamedly to influence the ‘makers and shakers’ in Ireland, and many notables 
travelled at the society’s invitation to experience Soviet life, and report back on their 
experiences. That their involvement did not result in them being labelled as communist 
sympathisers is a mark of how Irish society from 1966 was increasingly prepared to 
accept engagement with the Soviet Union.  
To say that the society was a major factor in establishing diplomatic relations 
between the two countries would be an overstatement. Even so, the society’s successes, 
such as the reestablishment of connections between Irish and Soviet trade unions, and 
the launch of its annual holiday tours in the Soviet Union, all point to the society’s role 
in the breaking down of previous taboos. In these practical ways the society helped 
build a social consensus that eased the way forward for commercial and political 
considerations to compel the establishment of formal relations. In this regard this thesis 
has added to Ó Corcora and Hill’s assessment of the society’s role in Irish-Soviet affairs: 
that its main importance had been ‘an informational one’.147   
The society failed in its attempt to have the Irish government adopt its proposal 
for a state-to-state cultural agreement, indicating the limits of its reach. However, the 
consequence of this was that the society continued to benefit from the ‘soft power’ that 
went with its role as the principal non-governmental link between the two countries – a 
unique organisation located at a conjunction of cultural, informational, academic, trade 
union and tourist affairs in Irish-Soviet relations.  
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While the main focus of this thesis has been on Irish-Soviet diplomatic and 
friendship relations, aspects of those relations have frequently touched upon another 
relationship that existed throughout the short Soviet twentieth-century – connections 
between Irish and Soviet communism. This topic represents the sixth and final major 
subject to emerge from the thesis. Until the Second World War such connections were 
mediated through the Comintern, and thereafter as Irish communist organisations north 
and south united into the all-island C.P.I. in 1970, connections were conducted between 
the C.P.I. and the C.P.S.U. Even though Ambassador Brennan described the C.P.I. in 
1977 as ‘that miniscule party’, the 1970s represented the party’s zenith in terms of its 
influence in both parts of Ireland. This was evidenced by its prominent role in the 
I.C.T.U.’s ‘better life for all’ campaign in the North, and its tripartite Left Alternative 
discussions with Official Sinn Féin and Labour Left in the South (as discussed in 
chapter four). But as was indicated by Dr Brennan to Dublin, it was the ability of the 
C.P.I.’s general secretary, Michael O’Riordan, to play a prominent role in the world 
communist movement that has commanded most significance in this study. This has 
been shown by O’Riordan’s role in the Eurocommunist debate that was a major issue at 
political and theoretical levels within the communist parties of western Europe, and for 
their ruling counterparts in the Soviet Union and eastern Europe. In this context the 
C.P.I.’s support for the leading role of the C.P.S.U., as highlighted by the content of 
O’Riordan’s address to the twenty-fifth congress of the C.P.S.U., his organisational role 
at the Europe-wide conference of communist parties in east Berlin in 1976, and his 
subsequent acclamation in Pravda, confirmed that the Irish party did play a notable part 
in the Eurocommunist debate.  While this thesis has brought new evidence from its oral 
and state archival sources to bear on the historical record of Eurocommunism, it was 
beyond its scope to attempt a full assessment of this significant topic in 1970s European 
history. Nevertheless, it is hoped that the thesis will help reignite an interest among 
historians on this neglected topic.  
It is also the hope of the writer that this present thesis will help elevate the status 
and awareness of the subject area of Irish-Soviet relations onto a higher plain within 
Irish historiography, and that other researchers and historians will further engage with 
the topic. It is in this spirit that the writer has appended his registers of Ambassador 
Brennan’s P.R.s from Moscow and of the records of Irish attendances at the E.E.W.G. 
meetings to the thesis. With the emergence of these and other the new sources it is 
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perhaps now timely that Janet Hartley’s, Guide to documents and manuscripts in the 
Irish Republic relating to Russia and the Soviet Union (1994), be updated accordingly. 
Also, the writer is keen to collaborate with Angela McQuillan and John P. Swift to 
assemble the surviving archival materials of the Ireland-U.S.S.R. Society, and with 
Barry Bruton of Belfast for materials relating to the Northern Ireland-U.S.S.R. Society, 
with a view to depositing these records of Irish-Soviet friendship in appropriate archives.   
As a possible area of further research in a wider European context into the 
E.E.W.G., it is the writer’s ambition (perhaps in a collaborative project with European 
colleagues) to engage with the records of other E.E.C. member states’ involvement in 
the E.E.W.G. and E.P.C.  In this regard he notes from preliminary searches on the 
website of the National Archives, Kew, that records relating to British involvement in 
E.P.C. appear to be available to researchers. 
 In the first instance, however, it is the ambition of the writer to continue with his 
labours beyond the end date of this present thesis of 1980 to 1991, so that that he may 
be in a position to present in the form of a monograph a comprehensive account of 
Irish-Soviet relations for the full span of the ‘short Soviet twentieth-century’.  
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APPENDIX 1
A  register of Ambassador Brennan's 
political reports (P.R.s) from Moscow 
to the Department of Foreign Affairs, 
Dublin, 1974-80
Source: National Archives of Ireland, Department of Foreign Affairs, Central 
Registry files, 2006-2013 releases
Island Euro- Sino-
Total N/A of Soviet COM- comm- Soviet
Rest 
of
Year P.R.s P.R.s P.R.s Ireland Union ECON E.E.C. unism U.S. rift Japan world
1974 41 -2 39 3 6 1 12 0 1 0 16
1975 80 -2 78 4 15 5 18 4 3 4 3 22
1976 118 -3 115 5 16 17 18 10 9 5 1 34
1977 130 -4 126 7 29 4 14 16 18 8 3 27
1978 92 -13 79 26 7 10 4 11 1 3 16
1979 46 -3 43 4 9 4 7 1 6 5 1 6
1980 49 -10 39 1 6 2 11 3 2 0 14
Totals 556 -37 519 24 107 40 91 35 50 26 11 135
Summary analysis, by geopolitical topics, of political reports from Moscow, 1974-80
2
N.A.I., 
D.F.A. file 
ref.
P.R. 
No. Date Report title
PP (+ 
encls)
2005/4/75 1/74 20-May
Meeting of F.R.G. ambassador, Moscow, 
with Fadeyev, secretary general of 
COMECON - opener on E.E.C. contacts 3
2005/4/75 2 20-May
Soviet-British relations: meeting of 
British ambassador with Prime Minister 
Kosygin 2
2005/4/75 3 20-May
Cancellation of invitations to foreign 
scientists by the Soviet Academy of 
Sciences 2
4 missing
5 missing
2005/4/75 6 31-Jul
Soviet assessment of present state of 
Conference for Security and co-operation 
in Europe (C.S.C.E.) 3
2005/4/75 7 31-Jul
Cyprus (re Ambassador's interview with 
Vice Minister Kozyrev on solution to 
Cypriot crisis) 2
2005/4/75 8 31-Jul
F.R.G. Environment office in West Berlin 
(interview with Kozyrev) 2
2005/4/75 9 31-Jul
 'Peaceful change' (interesting exchange 
with Kozyrev on the possibility of Irish 
unity in C.S.C.E. talks) 2
2005/4/75 10 01-Aug
Cyprus: Ambassador's meeting with 
Cypriot ambassador, a Greek Cypriot 3
2005/4/75 11 31-Jul
Establishment of F.R.G. Environment 
office in West Berlin 3
2005/4/75 12 06-Aug Cyprus: Soviet newspaper views 3
2005/4/75 13 03-Aug
Arab-Israel conflict: Syrian view 
(Ambassador Brennan's meeting with 
Syrian ambassador) 2
2005/4/75 14 08-Aug
The Soviet leadership (ambassador's 
analysis of state and C.P.S.U. structures 
and personalities) 4
2005/4/75 15 08-Aug
Recognition of Palestinian Liberation 
Organisation (P.L.O.) by the Soviet Union 4
2005/4/75 16 08-Aug
Cyprus (Soviets feel problem is being 
solved in a NATO framework) 3
2005/4/75 17 08-Aug
Views of a representative of the Soviet 
military-industrial complex 4
2005/4/75 18 13-Aug
Cyprus (Ambassador's meeting with 
Turkish ambassador) 2
Political reports from Moscow, 1974
N.A.I., 
D.F.A. file 
ref.
P.R. 
No. Date Report title
PP (+ 
encls)
Political reports from Moscow, 1974
2005/4/75 19 12-Aug
Cyprus (Ambassador's meeting with 
Greek ambassador) 2
2005/4/75 20 14-Aug
N. Ireland (comments on Pravda and 
Izvestia articles by reporter, Vasilyev 2
2005/4/75 21 14-Aug
F.R.G. Environment office in West 
Berlin: further Soviet views 3
2005/4/75 22 14-Aug
F.R.G. Environment office in West 
Berlin: U.S. attitude (and resolution of 
issue) 1
2005/4/75 23 14-Aug
Cyprus: another Soviet signal of 
reassurance to the U.S.? (from Za 
Rubezhom , weekly from foreign press 4
2005/4/75 24 15-Aug Cyprus: further Soviet statement 2
2005/4/75 25 21-Aug law of the Sea: Soviet preoccupations 2
2005/4/75 26 01-Sep
Relations between COMECON and 
E.E.C. 2
2005/4/75 27 01-Sep
Visit of Foreign Minister Gromyko to 
Bonn, with description of Gromyko's 
personality and abilities 2
2005/4/75 28 15-Oct
Relations between COMECON and 
E.E.C. 3
2005/4/75 29 17-Oct
Watergate in the Soviet Union (dissident 
Marxist historian, Roy Medvedev,  draws 
parallels in Soviet society) 6
2005/4/75 30 14-Oct
October revolution celebrations, with 
letter of instruction from Dáithí Ó 
Ceallaigh, Iveagh House, to J. Sharkey, 
Moscow re P.R.s 2
2005/4/75 31 14-Nov
The October (revolution) celebrations (2) 
speeches 6
2005/4/75 32 20-Nov
Inflation in the capitalist world: Soviet 
recipe for cure 4
2005/4/75 33 21-Nov Greek election results: Soviet assessment 2
2005/4/75 34 21-Nov
Why are the (Soviet) trade unions not 
standing up for workers' rights? 4
2005/4/75 35 25-Nov A cooling in Franco-Soviet relations 4
2005/4/75 36 25-Nov
French and Yugoslav communist 
polemics 2
2005/4/75 37 28-Nov
Sino-Soviet border dispute: (1) Chinese 
version (Ambassador's briefing from 
Chinese ambassador) 8
N.A.I., 
D.F.A. file 
ref.
P.R. 
No. Date Report title
PP (+ 
encls)
Political reports from Moscow, 1974
2005/4/75 38 02-Dec
Negotiations between Norway and Soviet 
Union on delimitation of Continental 
Shelf 5
2005/4/75 39 03-Dec
Soviet-Albanian relations: a Soviet olive 
branch 6
2005/4/75 40 05-Dec
Middle East: latest Soviet pronouncement 
and visit of P.L.O. delegation to Moscow 5
2005/4/75 41 06-Dec
P.L.O. interview (in New Times) in 
Moscow 3
N.A.I., D.F.A. 
file ref. P.R. No. Date Report title
PP (+ 
encls)
2005/145/1798 P.R.1/75 03-Jan
Postponement of Brezhnev visit to Middle 
East 5
2005/145/1798 2 09-Jan
Kissinger threat on military intervention 
in Middle East: Soviet reaction 4
2005/145/1798 3 21-Feb
Visit of British prime minister, Harold 
Wilson  to the Soviet Union 9+20
2005/145/1798 4 20-Feb Brezhnev's health 2
2005/145/1798 5 05-Mar
(Ambassador Brennan's) visit to M. 
Zamyatin, head of TASS 2
2005/145/1798 6 missing
2005/145/1798 7 07-Mar The succession question (II) (to Brezhnev) 4
2005/145/1798 8 13-Mar Western credits to the Soviet Union 2
2005/145/1798 9 14-Mar
Sino-Japanese negotiations on a peace 
treaty: Soviet reaction 7
2005/145/1798 10 21-Mar
law of the sea conference: latest Soviet 
assessment 6
2005/145/1798 11 27-Mar
Failure of Kissinger's Middle East peace 
mission: initial Soviet reaction 6
2005/145/1798 12 26-Mar
Non-proliferation treaty review 
conference: Soviet démarche 6
2005/145/1798 13 27-Mar
Visit of Prime Minister Jacques Chirac  to 
the Soviet Union, 19-24 March 4+12
2005/145/1798 14 04-Apr
Chirac in Moscow: a latter day Laval 
(Pierre, French foreign minister, 1935) 6
2005/145/1798 15 10-Apr
Apology to Tito (re slight over war-time 
achievements of Yugoslav partisans) 6
2005/145/1798 16 11-Apr
Soviet reaction to events in Vietnam 
(collapse of the Saigon army) 6
2005/145/1798 17 17-Apr
Ambassador Brennan's call on Mr 
Inozemtsyev, head of Institute of World 
Economy 6
2005/145/1798 18 18-Apr
The Middle East: latest Soviet 
pronouncements 4
2005/145/1798 19 18-Apr
Soviet-Iraq relations (following visit of 
Vice-President Saddam Hussein) 3
2005/145/1798 20 20-Apr
Ouster of Shelepin (thought to be an 
opponent of Brezhnev's in the politburo) 3
2005/145/1798 21 18-Apr
Foreign policy review by the Central 
Committee 3
2005/145/1798 22 25-Apr
Middle East: new Soviet policy 
pronouncements 7
2005/145/1798 23 05-May Soviet reaction to elections in Portugal 2
Political reports from Moscow, 1975
6
N.A.I., D.F.A. 
file ref. P.R. No. Date Report title
PP (+ 
encls)
Political reports from Moscow, 1975
2005/145/1798 24 19-May
Soviet reaction to communist takeover of 
South Vietnam 8
2005/145/1798 25 30-May Economic reform under discussion? 6
2005/145/1798 26 02-Jun
Middle East: moderation of Soviet 
position 6
2005/145/1798 27 02-Jun
Ambassador of Thailand's  view of 
situation in Indo-China (post unification 
of Vietnam) 5
2005/145/1798 28 05-Jun
Meeting of Danish foreign minister with 
Gromyko 6
2005/145/1798 29 05-Jun
Middle East (rights and tactics of the 
Palestinians) 3
2005/145/1798 30 09-Jun
Reopening of Suez canal and Israeli 
withdrawal 2
2005/145/1798 31 09-Jun British referendum (on E.E.C.) result 3
2005/145/1798 32 13-Jun
Dampening down excessive consumer 
expectations 4
2005/145/1798 33 16-Jun
Greek application for membership 
(Izvestia  doubts E.E.C. membership 
would help economy) 2
2005/145/1798 34 16-Jun Soviet denial of military base in Somalia 3
2005/145/1798 35 16-Jun Brezhnev on detente and control 4
2005/145/1798 36 23-Jun
Sino-Japanese peace treaty: Soviet 
warning to Japan 7
2005/145/1798 37 23-Jun The Israeli map: initial Soviet response 6
2005/145/1798 38 25-Jun
Belgian briefing on discussions with 
Soviets: Kosygin 'fed up' with E.E.C., 
claims it wants to exercise a 'monopoly' 
and 'brake'  on E. Europe 4+10
2005/145/1798 39 30-Jun
Secret Kremlin instructions (to Western 
C.P.s to seize power): Soviet denial 4
2005/145/1798 40 07-Jul
Literaturnaya Gazeta on violence in N. 
Ireland 4
2005/145/1798 42 (41) 07-Jul
Visit of U.S. Senators (discussions on 
trade, arms control and emigration of 
Soviet Jews) 6
2005/145/1798 42 21-Jul Soviet-Iranian relations 5
2005/145/1798 43 01-Aug
Anglo-Soviet political consultations 
(report on policy discussions) 4
2005/145/1798 44 01-Aug
Soviet-Egyptian relations: 'coolness' is the 
key note 5
7
N.A.I., D.F.A. 
file ref. P.R. No. Date Report title
PP (+ 
encls)
Political reports from Moscow, 1975
2005/145/1798 45 06-Aug
trouble in Azerbaijan (need to counter 
'remnants of private property psychology) 4
2005/145/1798 46 08-Aug Soviet policy on Portugal 4
2005/145/1798 47 08-Aug
Two tactics of social democracy' (Pravda 
anniversary article on Lenin's treatise of 
1905) 6
2005/145/1798 48 08-Aug
Soviet attack on avant-garde artists in 
Ogonyok magazine 7
2005/145/1798 49 15-Sep
Soviet press on N. Ireland (reaction to 
wave of sectarian killings) 3
2005/145/1798 50 01-Oct 26th anniversary of Chinese revolution 5
2005/145/1798 51 06-Oct
Danger of Japanese surrender to Chinese 
on anti-hegemony clause 5
2005/145/1798 52 13-Oct Award of Nobel peace prize to Sakharov 4
2005/145/1798 53 13-Oct Soviet - G.D.R. Treaty 6
2005/145/1798 54 15-Oct
Soviet feelings on eve of visit of President 
Giscard d'Estaing (1) economic 3
2005/145/1798 55 15-Oct
Soviet feelings on eve of visit of President 
Giscard d'Estaing (2) political 5
2005/145/1798 56 missing
2005/145/1798 57 22-Oct Visit of French president, 14-18 Oct. 1975 7+10
2005/145/1798 58 23-Oct
Soviet press, Ogonyok , on N. Ireland ('the 
blood and tears of Ulster'), with cartoon 
from Krokodil 3+2
2005/145/1798 59 27-Oct
Visit of French president to Soviet Union: 
Soviet evaluation 6
2005/145/1798 60 27-Oct
Soviet attack against Sadat (president of 
Egypt) 6
2005/145/1798 61 31-Oct
Condemnation of I.R.A. bombings in 
England 3
2005/145/1798 62 31-Oct
Cancellation of visit of Soviet mayors to 
West Berlin 2
2005/145/1798 63 03-Nov
Visit on Le Duan (Vietnamese vice-prime 
minister and C.P. secretary) to Moscow 9
2005/145/1798 64 10-Nov October revolution celebrations 8
2005/145/1798 65 17-Nov
Visit of President Scheel (of F.R.G) to 
Moscow 10+10
8
N.A.I., D.F.A. 
file ref. P.R. No. Date Report title
PP (+ 
encls)
Political reports from Moscow, 1975
2005/145/1798 66 19-Nov
Carpeting of a deputy-minister (for 
inefficiency in research institutes) 5
2005/145/1798 67 20-Nov
Publicising the Final Act of Helsinki: a 
'first' obligation - Pravda and Izvestia have 
combined readership of twenty million 4
2005/145/1798 68 21-Nov
Political line-up in Spain: Soviet 
assessment 5
2005/145/1798 69 24-Nov
Visit of Italian president, Leone, 18-21 
Nov. 1975 6+14
2005/145/1798 70 01-Dec
Visit by President Husak to Moscow, 25-9 
Nov. 1975 6
2005/145/1798 71 08-Dec
Soviet economic setbacks: political 
implications 4
2005/145/1798 72 15-Dec
Conference of European C.P.s : first 
public comment by Soviets on the 
problems 5
2005/145/1798 73 15-Dec
Kremlin debate on revolutionary strategy 
towards the West: the Soviets answer 'no' 8
2005/145/1798 74 10-Dec
Angola: Soviet policy (détente for the 
Soviets does not mean 'freezing of status 
quo') 7
2005/145/1798 75 15-Dec
The third basket (human rights provision 
of the Helsinki Final Act): current Soviet 
position 10
2005/145/1798 76 17-Dec
Soviet proposal for ban on new types of 
weapons: some clarification by Pravda 4
2005/145/1798 77 17-Dec
Meeting of east European foreign 
ministers in Moscow 6
2005/145/1798 78 22-Dec
Visit of Yugoslav deputy prime minister, 
Munich, 8-11 Dec. 1975 4
2005/145/1798 79 22-Dec Franco-Soviet relations 6
2005/145/1798 80 22-Dec
Opposition to Soviet economic 
dependence on the West? 5
9
N.A.I., 
D.F.A. file 
ref. P.R. No. Date Report title
PP (+ 
encls)
2006/131/238 P.R. 1/76 05-Jan
No 'liberalisation' in the Soviet Union 
(re Helsinki Final Act) 7
2006/131/238 2 09-Jan
Détente and social progress (re 
advantages for Soviet policy objectives) 6
2006/131/238 3 05-Jan
Pravda  editorial calling for end of 
foreign intervention in Angola 5
2006/131/238 4 05-Jan Izvestia comment on Angola 4
2006/131/238 5 08-Jan Angola: Soviets rebuff U.S. Overtures 4
2006/131/238 6 12-Jan SALT 2 negotiations: Soviet position 5
2006/131/238 7 12-Jan
Soviet involvement in Angola and 
détente 5
2006/131/238 8 12-Jan
E.E.C.-COMECON relations: Soviets do 
not want E.E.C. to have relations with 
individual E. European countries 8
2006/131/238 9 16-Jan
A painful up-coming anniversary: 20th 
Party congress (Khrushchev's 
denunciation of Stalin in 1956) 6
2006/131/238 10 19-Jan
Sino-Soviet relations in new year: no 
improvement 5
2006/131/238 11 19-Jan
The Tindemanns report (proposal for 
E.E.C. to expand beyond economic 
unity) 4
2006/131/238 12 19-Jan
The dictatorship of the proletariat: 
(Soviet concern of French 
Eurocommunism) 9
2006/131/238 13 19-Jan
New Brezhnev proposals on pan-
European cooperation 4
2006/131/238 14 23-Jan
Tops-turvy commemoration of 
Khrushchev's de-Stalinisation 4
2006/131/238 15 23-Feb
Soviets warn Japan against supplying 
weaponry to China 3
2006/131/238 16 23-Feb
Soviet comment on COMECON 
initiative (on trade with E.E.C.) 4
2006/131/238 17 23-Feb
Soviets keep up pressure on new 
weapons of mass destruction 4
2006/131/238 18 27-Feb
F.R.G. soundings on draft COMECON 
agreement 5
2006/131/238 19 27-Feb
Soviets lay down political limits to 
COMECON foreign ties 4
2006/131/238 20 27-Feb Brezhnev on Middle East initiative 5
2006/131/238 21 27-Feb
Brezhnev unexpectedly modest on the 
Helsinki Final Act 5
2006/131/238 22 01-Mar Brezhnev on détente 5
Political reports from Moscow, 1976
N.A.I., 
D.F.A. file 
ref. P.R. No. Date Report title
PP (+ 
encls)
Political reports from Moscow, 1976
2006/131/238 23 08-Mar
Soviet clarification of proposal for world 
treaty on non-use of force 5
2006/131/238 24 08-Mar
Soviets acknowledge their Asian 
collective security idea as impractical 5
2006/131/238 25 08-Mar
Michael O'Riordan (C.P.I. secretary) 
speaks at Soviet Party congress 3
2006/131/238 26 22-Mar
Courcel (French foreign minister) visit 
to Moscow 7
2006/131/238 27 22-Mar
Soviet press coverage of N. Ireland 
features poetry of Yevtushenko, includes 
text and cartoon from Krokodil
2006/131/238 28 22-Mar
I.R.A. condemned for West Ham 
explosion 3
2006/131/238 29 24-Mar
Pravda  attack on ASEAN (Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the 
Philippines) 4
2006/131/238 30 29-Mar
Soviet attack on Sadat's economic 
policies 4
2006/131/238 31 05-Apr
Soviets reject (Israeli-U.S.) proposal for 
'end to state of war' 3
2006/131/238 32 05-Apr
Soviet review of post-Helsinki 
initiatives 5
2006/131/238 33 05-Apr
Soviet analysis of main post-Helsinki 
trends in W. Europe 4
2006/131/238 34 05-Apr
Soviet assessment of stiffening U.S. 
attitude on strategic arms talks 8
2006/131/238 35 12-Apr
Political aspects of COMECON 
proposals (attitude of E.E.C. Nine) 5
2006/131/238 36 12-Apr
Pravda  warning to (President) Ford 
administration 4
2006/131/238 37 12-Apr Brezhnev cult endorsed by Pravda 6
2006/131/238 38 26-Apr
COMECON proposal aired by 
Literaturnaya Gazeta 8
2006/131/238 39 26-Apr
Soviets insist on proletarian 
internationalism (re Eurocommunism) 7
2006/131/238 40 03-May
Surprised appointment of Ustinov (a 
civilian) as minister for defence 4
2006/131/238 41 03-May
A rare happening: Brezhnev appears 
among the people 4
2006/131/238 42 03-May Formal Soviet statement on Middle East 5
2006/131/238 43 07-May
Brezhnev snubs Laotian communist 
leader 5
N.A.I., 
D.F.A. file 
ref. P.R. No. Date Report title
PP (+ 
encls)
Political reports from Moscow, 1976
2006/131/238 44 06-May
First direct clarification of Soviet new 
weapons and systems 4
2006/131/238 45 10-May Cult of Brezhnev reaches new heights 5
2006/131/238 46 14-May
Soviet pronouncement on Brezhnev's 
proposal for pan-European congresses 5
2006/131/238 47 17-May
Soviet comment on COMECON 
proposals (concedes need for western 
technology) 4
2006/131/238 48 21-May
Yugoslavia rejects proletarian 
internationalism 7
2006/131/238 49 24-May
Re-enter Zarodov (editor of World 
Marxist Review, and opponent of 
Eurocommunism) 11
2006/131/238 50 24-May Significance of Zarodov's re-emergence 6
2006/131/238 51 31-May
Soviet statement on FRG relations on 
détente and peaceful co-existence 8+4
2006/131/238 52 07-Jun
Kosygin (Soviet prime minister) visit to 
Iraq 3
2006/131/238 53 07-Jun
Visit to the Soviet Union of the prime 
minister of Angola 5
2006/131/238 54 07-Jun
Kosygin (Soviet prime minister) visit to 
Syria 6
2006/131/238 55 07-Jun
Soviet-Rumanian relations: Rumanians 
push too far (raise a territorial claim on 
Moldova) 4
2006/131/238 56 07-Jun
Soviet-Rumanian relations: Ceausescu 
backs down 4
2006/131/238 57 07-Jun
Conference of European C.P.s: 
unresolved problems (Ambassador 
Brennan indicates that he quotes from 
'an east European ambassador') 5
2006/131/238 58 14-Jun
Germans seek clarification from Soviets 
on declaration on relations with FRG 5
2006/131/238 59 14-Jun
Soviets condemn French strategic 
doctrine (re-integration into NATO) 5
2006/131/238 60 14-Jun
Soviet echo of polemics on Rumanian 
territorial claims 4
2006/131/238 61 14-Jun
Soviets warn E.E.C. against exploiting 
trade ties to split COMECON 5
2006/131/238 62 14-Jun
Soviet-Portuguese relations 1: visit of 
Foreign Minister Melu Antunes 5
N.A.I., 
D.F.A. file 
ref. P.R. No. Date Report title
PP (+ 
encls)
Political reports from Moscow, 1976
2006/131/238 63 14-Jun
Soviet-Portuguese relations II: more 
modest Soviet expectations and aims 6
2006/131/238 64 14-Jun TASS  statement on Lebanon crisis 4
2006/131/238 65 17-Jun
Palliser (British foreign office under-
secretary) visit 4
2006/131/238 66 21-Jun
European C.P.s conference: Yugoslav 
problems solved 3
2006/131/238 67 21-Jun
Visit to the Soviet Union of Indira 
Ghandi, prime minister of India 5
2006/131/238 68 21-Jun
U.S. Presidential elections: Soviets 
uncertain as to outcome 6
2006/131/238 69 28-Jun Soviets assess events in Lebanon 5
2006/131/238 70 28-Jun
Soviets criticise French president over 
Petain's (head of Vichy government) 
'rehabilitation' 6
2006/131/238 71 05-Jul
West Berlin: F.R.G. see increasing 
Soviet pressure 4
2006/131/238 72 12-Jul
Berlin European C.P.s conference I: 
Western parties reject proletarian 
internationalism 9
2006/131/238 73 12-Jul
Berlin European C.P.s conference II: 
balance sheet for the Soviets 6
2006/131/238 74 12-Jul Pravda  attacks Eurocommunists 4
2006/131/238 75 19-Jul
Soviet assessment of U.S. Policy in 
Southern Africa 5
2006/131/238 76 missing
2006/131/238 77 missing
2006/131/238 78 missing
2006/131/238 79 10-Aug
Visit of President Ceausescu of Romania 
to the Soviet Union 6
2006/131/238 80 06-Sep
Spanish official reports Saharan people 
betrayed 3
2006/131/238 81 06-Sep
Soviet-Spanish relations: stalled by ban 
on the Spanish C.P. (interesting details 
on leasing of embassy buildings in 
USSR) 4
2006/131/238 82 06-Sep
Soviets' strategy for C.S.C.E. Belgrade 
meeting: attack the best form of defence 11+4
2006/131/238 83 08-Sep
Soviets explain rationale of emigration 
restrictions (re Jewish emigration) 5
2006/131/238 84 08-Sep Soviet claims on Lebanon 7
2006/131/238 85 13-Sep
Soviets declare preference for F.R.G. 
coalition parties 5
N.A.I., 
D.F.A. file 
ref. P.R. No. Date Report title
PP (+ 
encls)
Political reports from Moscow, 1976
2006/131/238 86 14-Sep Soviets condemn F.R.G. defence policy 5
2006/131/238 87 13-Sep Soviet reaction to Mao's death 5
2006/131/238 88 20-Sep
Rumanians set strict limits to proletarian 
internationalism 10
2006/131/238 89 21-Sep
Soviets re-assert 'socialist 
internationalism' for eastern Europe 8
2006/131/238 90 21-Sep
P.L.O. foreign affairs spokesman meets 
Gromyko 5
2006/131/238 91 22-Sep
Suslov (politburo member and 
ideological eminence grise ) visits 
Leningrad 4
2006/131/238 92 27-Sep
Governor Harriman (advisor to 
President Carter) meets Brezhnev 6
2006/131/238 93 27-Sep
Vienna negotiations: Pravda  rejects 
principle of unequal reductions in arms 6
2006/131/238 94 29-Sep
Soviets intervene again in F.R.G. 
election campaign 5
2006/131/238 95 29-Sep
Soviet policy in wake of Lusaka summit 
(to determine future of southern Africa) 6
2006/131/238 96 04-Oct
Soviets condemn latest Syrian military 
operations 3
2006/131/238 97 04-Oct
Middle East: Soviets call for the re-
convening of Geneva peace conference 6
2006/131/238 98 05-Oct Conciliatory Soviet signal to Peking 11
2006/131/238 99 12-Oct
Soviets condemn Provisional I.R.A., 
with Michael O'Riordan and B. Sinclair, 
'Irish communists and terrorism' in 
World Marxist Review 10+3
2006/131/238 100 13-Oct Rhodesia: more moderate Soviet stand 5
2006/131/238 101 18-Oct
Visit of Foreign Minister Gromyko to 
Denmark, 5-6 October 5+2
2006/131/238 102 19-Oct
Kirilenko's (politburo member) 70th 
birthday and Kremlin politics 9
2006/131/238 103 19-Oct
Lebanon: Soviets condemn Syrian 
intervention 5
2006/131/238 104 20-Oct
Mongolian party leader, Tsedenbal, 
espouses 'drawing together' 5
2006/131/238 105 26-Oct
90th anniversary of Ordzhonikidzhe's 
(Stalin victim) birth 6
2006/131/238 106 26-Oct
Soviets discount U.S. presidential 
election rhetoric 5
N.A.I., 
D.F.A. file 
ref. P.R. No. Date Report title
PP (+ 
encls)
Political reports from Moscow, 1976
2006/131/238 107 02-Nov
C.P.S.U. central committee meeting 
announces only minor leadership 
changes 5
2006/131/238 108 03-Nov
Sino-Soviet relations: Brezhnev sends a 
congratulations message to Hua Kuo-
feng. (Ambassador Brennan claims that 
the Soviets were ready to launch a 
nuclear strike in 1969) 7
2006/131/238 109 03-Nov
New five year plan, 1976-80, finally 
approved 10
2006/131/238 110 10-Nov October revolution celebrations 9
2006/131/238 111 10-Nov
Soviet warning (in Red Star ) to Austria 
against arms deal with Israel 5
2006/131/238 112 16-Nov
C.P.S.U. central committee decrees 
wider opportunities for young 
intellectuals 9
2006/131/238 113 24-Nov
Changes in Soviet attitude towards 
E.E.C. commission? 5
2006/131/238 114 23-Nov
Soviets seeking foreign policy 
coordination organ for East bloc 
countries? 7+3
2006/131/238 115 24-Nov
Brezhnev visit to Belgrade and Tito 
(84), with 'Circulated to all missions' - 
Ambassador Brennan anxious not to 
upset Yugoslav ambassador! 10
2006/131/238 116 30-Nov
Pravda  endorses N. Ireland peace 
movement, and condemns 'terrorists 
from the I.R.A.' 4
2006/131/238 117 30-Nov
Warsaw Pact summit, Bucharest 
(consideration of communiqué) 13
2006/131/238 118 07-Dec
Sino-Soviet relations: strange repeat 
performance of Victor Louis 11+5
N.A.I., D.F.A. 
file ref.
P.R. 
No. Date Report title
PP (+ 
encls)
2007/111/221 1/77 11-Jan
Belgian ambassador lured to symposium at 
Serbsky Institute (alleged to be run by K.G.B.) 6+1
2007/111/221 2 11-Jan
Soviets call for more effective safeguards on 
exports of nuclear materials 6
2007/111/221 3 12-Jan
Soviet arms build-up 1: unconvincing Soviet 
disclaimers 7
2007/111/221 4 12-Jan
Soviet arms build-up II: unconvincing Soviet 
disclaimers 6
2007/111/221 5 18-Jan The Middle East: more flexible Soviet position 6
2007/111/221 6 18-Jan Visit of Italian foreign minister 6+2
2007/111/221 7 18-Jan
Non-first use of nuclear weapons: Gromyko 
proposes preliminary conference 4
2007/111/221 8 19-Jan
Pravda  bids good riddance to Ford (U.S. 
President) 7
2007/111/221 9 19-Jan Brezhnev speech on foreign policy 6
2007/111/221 10 26-Jan
Renewed Soviet calls to prevent nuclear 
proliferation 4
2007/111/221 11 26-Jan
Cyprus: Pravda  attack on Clerides (ex-
president of the Cyprus parliament) 6
2007/111/221 12 25-Jan
Civil defence programme: Soviet rejoinder to 
General Keegan (U.S. Air force chief) 8
2007/111/221 13 25-Jan
Soviet reaction to President Carter's inaugural 
speech 5
2007/111/221 14 25-Jan COMECON meeting in Havana 5
2007/111/221 15 26-Jan
Pravda  assesses breakdown of negotiations on 
Rhodesia 3
2007/111/221 16 01-Feb Intourist head extols Soviet tourism record 4
2007/111/221 17 01-Feb COMECON meeting in Havana II 2
2007/111/221 18 01-Feb
Non-first use of nuclear weapons: Soviets seek 
to answer objections 5
2007/111/221 19 02-Feb
Northern Ireland: Bloody Sunday 
commemoration 5
2007/111/221 20 08-Feb
Soviet arms build-up II: Arbatov (foreign 
affairs advisor to Brezhnev) enters the fray 11
2007/111/221 21 08-Feb
Sharp Soviet reaction to Carter's espousal of 
dissidents 9
2007/111/221 22 09-Feb
N. Ireland gets caught up in East-West 
polemics (Strasbourg  Court hearings) 4
2007/111/221 23 04-Feb The Soviet drug scene 6
2007/111/221 24 07-Feb Visit of Iraqi vice-president 5
2007/111/221 25 16-Feb Soviet press sum up Strasbourg Court hearing 5
2007/111/221 26 14-Feb
Soviet physicist condemns existing (Soviet) 
nuclear reactors as unsafe 7
Political reports from Moscow, 1977
N.A.I., D.F.A. 
file ref.
P.R. 
No. Date Report title
PP (+ 
encls)
Political reports from Moscow, 1977
2007/111/221 27 15-Feb
Berlin conference of European C.P.s: concept 
of party independence re-defined 4
2007/111/221 28 15-Feb
Direct elections to European parliament: 
Soviets voice concern 4
2007/111/221 29 15-Feb West Berlin: Soviet retort to western Europe 5
2007/111/221 30 23-Feb Soviet condemnation of President Sadat 4
2007/111/221 31 08-Mar
Sino-Soviet relations: Soviets ready to resume 
polemics? 6
2007/111/221 32 09-Mar Eurocommunists lectured by Pravda 10
2007/111/221 33 15-Mar Sino-Soviet relations: Soviets resume polemics 4
2007/111/221 34 16-Mar
Carter administration's human rights policy: 
Soviet reaction 11
2007/111/221 35 22-Mar
Brezhnev speech to Soviet trade union 
congress 8
2007/111/221 36 25-Mar
Visit of Turkish foreign minister to the Soviet 
Union 5
2007/111/221 37 06-Apr Soviets give new twist to N. Ireland situation 7
2007/111/221 38 13-Apr Soviet American SALT negotiations 13
2007/111/221 39 13-Apr Soviet statement on Zaire 5
2007/111/221 40 20-Apr
Pravda  scorns Owen's (British foreign 
minister) peace effort on Rhodesia problem 3
2007/111/221 41 20-Apr
Soviets exploit resumed Strasbourg Court 
hearing I 5
2007/111/221 42 19-Apr Soviets continue public diplomacy on SALT 18
2007/111/221 43 27-Apr
Soviets exploit resumed Strasbourg Court 
hearing - II 5
2007/111/221 44 27-Apr
E.E.C.-COMECON negotiations: Rumanian 
view 2
2007/111/221 45 27-Apr
Zaire: Soviets express concern over threat to 
Angola 5
2007/111/221 46 27-Apr
TASS commentary on Belgrade meeting 
(follow up to Helsinki agreement) 3+4
2007/111/221 47 11-May
Pravda  on Prague editorial meeting of 
Problems of Peace and Socialism 10
2007/111/221 48 11-May
Angola: Soviets publicise Cuban resolve to 
remain 5
2007/111/221 49 11-May
SALT: Soviets show readiness for 
compromise? 6
2007/111/221 50/77 13-May
Soviets renege on Berlin conference 
concessions 9
2007/111/221 51 15-May
Literaturnaya Gazeta rejects western plea for 
release of Rudolf Hess 4
2007/111/221 52 17-May
Pravda  intervenes in internal affairs of Italian 
C.P. 7
2008/79/1975 53 20-May
Ethiopian leader's visit to the S.U., 4-8 May 
1977 2
N.A.I., D.F.A. 
file ref.
P.R. 
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PP (+ 
encls)
Political reports from Moscow, 1977
2008/79/1975 54 25-May Institute of Marxism Leninism censures book 7
2008/79/1975 55/77 25-May
Literaturnaya Gazeta  assesses developments 
in China 5
2008/79/1975 56 25-May Soviets warn West against China 8
2007/111/221 57 30-May
Belgrade  meeting: statement by Brezhnev and 
Warsaw Pact foreign minister 6
2007/111/221 58 31-May
Helsinki humanitarian provisions rejected as 
subversive 7
2007/111/221 59 01-Jun
Podgorny's (Soviet president) departure from 
politburo 4
2007/111/221 60 01-Jun Keeping the military technocrats in their place 5
2007/111/221 61 08-Jun Scandal at the Agricultural Institute 2
2007/111/221 62 08-Jun Capitalism: life in the 'old dog' yet 7
2007/111/221 63 13-Jun Visit of French  foreign minister 4
2007/111/221 64 14-Jun
Pravda  denounces Japanese Communist Party 
(re: territorial claims) 7+7
2007/111/221 65 14-Jun
Soviets close door on Japanese territorial 
claims 5+21
2007/111/221 66 10-Jun Australian-Soviet political relations 4
2007/111/221 67 15-Jun Visit of Egyptian foreign minister to Moscow 5+13
2007/111/221 68 21-Jun Genscher visit to Moscow 7+11
2007/111/221 69 21-Jun Un-pardoning of President Podgorny 8
2007/111/221 70 21-Jun Brezhnev as president 7
2007/111/221 71 22-Jun
Sino-Soviet relations: Pravda  acknowledges 
period of self-restraint 3
2007/111/221 72 28-Jun
Human rights: Soviet dissident,  Roy 
Medvedev, advocates quiet diplomacy by West 8+14
2007/111/221 73 05-Jul
Sino-Soviet relations: commentary by 
Kommunist 6+5
2007/111/221 74 05-Jul
Soviets charge Carter with new round in arms 
race 8
2007/111/221 75 12-Jul President Brezhnev receives diplomatic corps 4+4
2007/111/221 76 13-Jun
Soviet think-tank analyses real motives behind 
Carter's human rights policy 7
2007/111/221 77 13-Jun
Pravda  comment on Carter's decisions on B-1 
bomber and Cruise missile 5
2007/111/221 78 20-Jul
Two Soviet tactics in war of nerves with U.S. 
(re arms control and human rights) 7+2
2007/111/221 79 19-Jul Dissidents under new constitution 6
2007/111/221 80 19-Jul
Views of the new Portuguese ambassador on 
the 'Stalinist' Portuguese C.P. 5
2007/111/221 81 20-Jul
K.G.B. official warns against ideological 
dangers from the West 5
2007/111/221 82 27-Jul
Soviet olive branch to U.S. in weekly 
international affairs journal, New Times 5
2007/111/221 83 27-Jul Soviets caution F.R.G. on W. Berlin status 4
N.A.I., D.F.A. 
file ref.
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PP (+ 
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Political reports from Moscow, 1977
2007/111/221 84 02-Aug
Pravda  evaluates Soviet preparations for 
Olympics 4+1
2007/111/221 85 02-Aug
Private agricultural plots: policy differences in 
Moscow 5+2
2007/111/221 86 03-Aug
Artistic creative work under the new 
constitution 5
2007/111/221 87 03-Aug
U.S.-Soviet relations: Arbatov article in 
Pravda 11
2007/111/221 88 08-Aug
Sino-Soviet relations: conciliatory Soviet 
signal to Peking 8
2007/111/221 89 09-Aug
New Soviet constitution: behind-the-scenes 
debate on state rights 7
2007/111/221 90 11-Aug
Pravda  on direct elections to the European 
parliament (N.B.: Ambassador Brennan wrote 
to the editor complaining of its description of 
Ireland as a NATO member)
2007/111/221 91 19-Aug President Brezhnev on U.S.-Soviet relations 3+5
2007/111/221 92 22-Aug
Recent changes in Soviet policy in the Horn of 
Africa 3+1
2007/111/221 93 23-Aug
Soviet views on the situation between Egypt 
and Libya (armed border clashes) 5
2007/111/221 94 25-Aug Visit of president Tito to Moscow 8+8
2007/111/221 95 02-Sep
Soviet view on the path to power for the West 
European C.P.s 6
2008/79/1975 96 20-Sep
Rehabilitation on the sly: 90th anniversary of 
P. Postyshev (Stalin victim) 4
2008/79/1975 97 20-Sep Soviets protest F.R.G. rocket range in Zaire 6+2
2008/79/1975 98 21-Sep Pravda  comment on the Middle East 6+2
2008/79/1975 99 27-Oct
Revolutionary violence: Soviets put French 
C.P. on the spot 12
2008/79/1975 100 28-Oct Israel at the Olympics: Soviets give assurance 2+1
2008/79/1975 101 27-Sep Visit of Icelandic prime minister 7
2008/79/1975 102 05-Oct
French elections: Pravda  rejects western 
speculation 6+2
2008/79/1975 103 04-Oct Visit of president Neto (Angola) to Moscow 4
2007/111/221 104 05-Oct Brezhnev presents the new constitution 17
2007/111/221 105 10-Oct
Visit of the French prime minister to the Soviet 
Union, 28 Sep.-2 Oct. 1977 4
2008/79/1975 106 12-Oct New Soviet constitution adopted 7
2008/79/1975 107 12-Oct
Problems of Georgian nationalism aired at 
supreme soviet 5
2008/79/1975 108 18-Oct Visit of Dr Owen, British foreign minister 10+11
2008/79/1975 109 26-Oct Visit of French  defence minister 4
2008/79/1975 110 25-Oct
Yuri Krasin on revolution I (critique on 
Eurocommunism) 7+3
N.A.I., D.F.A. 
file ref.
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2008/79/1975 111 26-Oct
Yuri Krasin on revolution II (Eurocommunism) 
- the Protean concept of the "majority", with 
incisive cartoons from Krokodil)
2009/120/1030 112 26-Oct
ORTAG missile range in Zaire: German 
briefing 3
2009/120/1030 113 01-Nov West Berlin - new Soviet statement 4
2009/120/1030 
114/7
7 1 Nov. 77
Pravda  article violates truce with Santiago 
Carrillo, the Spanish Eurocommunists C.P. 
leader 6
2009/120/1030 115 02-Nov Portuguese C.P. affirms loyalty to Moscow 4
2008/79/1975 116 15-Nov
Ideological conference in Moscow 1: Brezhnev 
sets the tone 11
2008/79/1975 117 15-Nov
Pravda  lauds O'Riordan on his 60th birthday  - 
Ambassador Brennan's critique 5+7
2008/79/1975 118 16-Nov
Pravda  taxes Georgian press with ideological 
laxity 4+2
2008/79/1975 119 16-Nov
Role of Soviet armed forces in elaboration of 
Soviet domestic and foreign policy 9
2009/120/1030  120 * 23-Nov Improving the economic mechanism 7
2009/120/1030  121* 22-Nov
Moscow ideological conference (COMECON 
countries)II: Suslov and Ponomaryov speeches 6
2009/120/1030  122 * 22-Nov
Moscow ideological conference I: 
disappointing results for the Soviets 5
2009/120/1030  123* 23-Nov Sadat's journey  to Israel: Soviet reaction 5
2009/120/1030  124 missing
2009/120/1030  125 missing
2009/120/1030  126 missing
2009/120/1030  127 missing
2009/120/1030  128* 06-Dec
Soviets warn Japanese against friendship treaty 
with China 5
2009/120/1030  129* 06-Dec Soviets start open criticism of Sadat 7
2009/120/1030  130* 07-Dec
Artists' Congress: policy statement by 
Ponomaryov 5
* P.R.s not in correct number sequence in file!
N.A.I., D.F.A. 
file ref.
P.R. 
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PP (+ 
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2009/120/1030 1/78 04-Jan
Ismailia meeting: Soviet evaluation 
(Israeli-Egyptian talks) 5+2
2009/120/1030 2 11-Jan
Private agricultural plots 1: a plea 
for an end to harassment 6
2009/120/1030 3 11-Jan
Private agricultural plots 11: 
ideological objections answered 8
2008/79/1975 4 18-Jan
Private agricultural plots: fodder 
needs refused by farm heads 5
2008/79/1975 5 18-Jan
Visit of President Roumedienne of 
Algeria 6
2008/79/1975 6 18-Jan
Somali-Ethiopian conflict: Soviets 
reject U.S. overtures 10
2008/79/1975 7 24-Jan Visit of Italian C.P. delegation 4+4
2008/79/1975 8 24-Jan
Long-term economic plan, I: still 
very much alive 5
2008/79/1975 9 24-Jan
Long-term economic plan, II: 
technical stage nearing completion 8
2008/79/1975 10 24-Jan Visit of Japanese foreign minister 8
2008/79/1975 11 25-Jan
Somali-Ethiopian conflict: Soviets 
and U.S. lines 8
12 missing
13 missing
2008/79/1975 14 14-Feb
Pravda  editorial on SALT 
negotiations 14+4
2008/79/1975 15 15-Feb
Europe's leftward swing: Soviets 
puzzled over likely U.S. Reaction 9
2008/79/1975 16 15-Feb Visit of Austrian chancellor 6+3
2008/79/1975 17 21-Feb
SALT negotiations: further Soviet 
commentary 5+10
2008/79/1975 18 21-Feb
Soviet-Japanese relations: Soviet 
comment 6
2009/120/1030 19 22-Feb
Soviet chief of staff expresses 
views on state of Soviet military 
science 9
2009/120/1030 20 28-Feb
Soviet-Japanese relations: a new 
Soviet initiative 5+6
2009/120/1030 21 28-Feb
The Soviet leadership I: Kulakov 
returns to work
2009/120/1030 22 01-Mar
The Soviet leadership II: Kulakov 
moves up 8
2009/120/1030 23 01-Mar
French elections: Tass denies 
hostility to the left 6+2
24 missing
Political reports from Moscow, 1978
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25 missing
26 missing
27 missing
28 missing
2008/79/1975 29 14-Mar
Izvestia  warns against creeping 
Anschluss of Austria 5+3
2009/120/1030 30 14-Mar
Neutron bomb: Tass  statement 
rejects trade off 6+7
2009/120/1030 31 15-Mar
Soviet cultural scene livens up, 1: 
Literaturnaya Gazeta  attacks 
avant-garde theatre director 6
2009/120/1030 32 15-Mar
Soviet cultural scene livens up, II: 
revamping of opera in Paris 
provokes attack by Pravda 7+3
2008/79/1975 33 21-Mar
Expulsion of Soviet intelligence 
agents from Canada, 1 2+6
2008/79/1975 34
12 Apr. 
1978
Expulsion of Soviet intelligence 
agents from Canada, II 2+10
35 missing
2009/120/1030 36 18-Apr
Soviet-British annual consultations, 
1978: exchange of information and 
views 8
2009/120/1030 37 18-Apr Pravda  ponders generation gap 7
2009/120/1030 38 18-Apr
Brezhnev's journey to Siberia (to 
energise economic development) 5
2009/120/1030 39 19-Apr
New Times  interview with Zorin 
(veteran Soviet foreign minister) 5+8
2009/120/1030 40 19-Apr
Visit by U.S. Congressional 
committee ('hawks', concerned 
about Soviet military intentions) 4
2009/120/1030 41 25-Apr
Bahr (F.R.G. politician) visit to 
Moscow 4
2009/120/1030 42 25-Apr
U.S. Secretary, Vance, visit to 
Moscow 6
2009/120/1030 43 26-Apr Africa: current Soviet policy 7+25
2009/120/1030 44 26-Apr Spanish C.P. breaks with Leninism 6
2009/120/1030 45 26-Apr Soviets act against de-Leninisation 7
2009/120/1030 46 03-May
U.S. Secretary, Vance, visit to 
Moscow: a U.S. Evaluation 6
2009/120/1030 47 09-May
Political integration of the Nine: 
Soviet assessment (N.B. File out of 
no. sequence!) 14
22
N.A.I., D.F.A. 
file ref.
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Political reports from Moscow, 1978
2009/120/1030 48 18-May
 'Rebirth': Brezhnev's political 
testament 7+3
2009/120/1030 49 16-May
Soviet ambassador's criticism of 
Pakistani policy 4
2009/120/1030 50 16-May Incident on Sino-Soviet border 4
2009/120/1030 51 16-May
Brezhnev visit to F.R.G.: Gromyko 
reassures G.D.R leadership 8
2009/120/1030 52 17-May
Brezhnev on the military balance: 
'parity is not full equality' 11
2009/120/1030 53 17-May
 'Grey area' weapons: complicating 
problem of U.S. forward bases 6
2009/120/1030 54 24-May Brezhnev criticizes Izvestiya  5
55 missing
56 missing
57 missing
58 missing
2010/19/601 59 05-Jul
Thirty-second session of 
COMECON council meeting 10
2010/19/601 60 07-Jul
Visit of Turkish P.M., Ecevit, 21-5 
June 10
2010/19/601 61 11-Jul
Soviet agriculture considered by the 
central committee of the C.P.S.U. 13 +  c. 50 
2010/19/601 62 12-Jul
COMECON: Pravda rejects 
western press speculation 3
2010/19/601 63 11-Jul
U.S. technology: Soviets 
apprehensive of linkage due to 
curtailments in supply 12
2010/19/601 64 18-Jul
Trials of Shcharansky and 
Ginsburg, Soviet dissidents 8 + c. 50 
2010/19/601 65 19-Jul
Death of Fyodor Kulakov, politburo 
member 5
2010/19/601 66 19-Jul Trials of Shcharansky 6
2010/19/601 67 25-Jul
Pravda  attacks Brzezinski, U.S. 
national security advisor 20
2010/19/601 68 26-Jul
Confrontation and peaceful co-
existence 8
2010/19/601 69 01-Aug Afghanistan: domestic problems 4
2010/19/601 70 02-Aug
Helsinki Final Act: Soviets mark 
third anniversary 9+15
23
N.A.I., D.F.A. 
file ref.
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Political reports from Moscow, 1978
2010/19/601 71 09-Aug
Recent moves in Brezhnev 
succession stakes 6
2010/19/601 72 08-Aug
Soviet academician says industry 
exploiting agriculture 5 + 5
2010/19/601 73 16-Aug
Human rights: Pravda 
acknowledges Soviet vulnerability 4 + 3
2010/19/601 74 11-Oct
COMECON meets in Ulan Bator, 
Mongolia 4 + 3
2010/19/601 75 18-Oct Gromyko visit to Bucharest 5
2010/19/601 76 18-Oct
U.S. - Soviet relations: 
improvement with attacks on U.S. 
Ambassador 5
2010/19/601 77 25-Oct
Death of Mikoyan (Khrushchev 
ally) 6 +2
2010/19/601 78 25-Oct
Soviet retaliation against western 
journalists 5+3
2010/19/601 79 missing 6 + 6
2010/19/601 80 08-Nov
Election of mayor of West Berlin as 
president of the Bundestag 5+3
2010/19/601 81 22-Nov Situation in Iran 8
2010/19/601 82 29-Nov Changes in Soviet leadership 4
2010/19/601 83 29-Nov
Brezhnev address to the central 
committee of C.P.S.U. on the 
economy 8
2010/19/601 84 29-Nov
Brezhnev criticises party 
propaganda 5+2
2010/19/601 85 01-Dec
Soviets assail OTRAG, the F.R.G. 
weather rocket firm's missile range 
in Zaire, again 6
2010/19/601 86 06-Dec Warsaw Pact meeting, 23 Nov. 5
2010/19/601 87 06-Dec
Warsaw Pact meeting, 23 Nov., ll; 
Rumanian challenge to Soviets 13
2010/19/601 88 12-Dec
Soviet leadership changes 
(Gorbachev mentioned!) 5
2010/19/601 89 12-Dec Warning of new ideological danger 5+3
2010/19/601 90 13-Dec
Visit to Moscow of Afghan leader, 
Taraki 8+5
2010/19/601 91 19-Dec Pravda  answers Rumanians 10
2010/19/601 92 19-Dec Iran: Soviets woo the opposition 9
24
N.A.I., 
D.F.A. file 
ref.
P.R. 
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2010/19/601 1/79 30-Jan
Visit of Lord Killanin, president of the 
international olympic committee 6+2
2010/19/601 2/79 31-Jan
Visit of Spanish F.M. (confirmation of 
Nine's ambassadors meetings in Moscow) 4+7
2010/19/601 3 31-Jan
Northern Ireland: renewed interest by 
Pravda, includes comment on Madge 
Davidson's NICRA report 6+2
2010/19/601 4 07-Feb Gromyko visit to Rome, 22-6 January 1979 7+5
2010/19/601 5 12-Mar
Finnish general elections: Pravda  plays 
down limits 8+1
2010/19/601 6 27-Mar Finnish general elections: conservative gain 7
2010/19/601 7 28-Mar
Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty: Soviet 
assessment 11+15
2010/19/601 8 10-Apr
Verification of SALT 2: self-defeating 
Soviet policy 7+7
2010/19/601 9 18-Apr
Central committee secretary assigned to 
Gosplan 5
2010/19/601 10 24-Apr
Sino-Soviet friendship treaty to lapse (adds 
to Soviets' loss of influence in Egypt and 
Somalia) 8+20
2010/19/601 11 02-May
Visit of President Giscard d'Estaing of 
France 10+30
2010/19/601 12 missing
2010/19/601 13 06-Jun
Northern Ireland: Pravda  breaks new 
ground 5+1
2010/19/601 14 07-Jun Sino-Soviet relations: new negotiations 5+2
2010/19/601 15 08-Jun
Warsaw Pact proposes European 
disarmament conference 5+10
2010/19/601 16 08-Jun
European disarmament conference: Soviet 
foreign ministry clarification 3+2
2010/19/601 17 13-Jun
Sino-Soviet relations: Litgazet  (Soviet 
journal) sounds a warning 13
2010/19/601 18 19-Jun
The Vienna summit between Brezhnev and 
U.S. President, Carter, to sign SALT-2 12
2010/19/601 19 20-Jun Izvestiya  condemns Spanish terrorism 3
2010/19/601 20 26-Jun
Gromyko press conference: he wants U.S. 
Senate to ratify SALT-2 10
2010/19/601 21 27-Jun
Schmidt meeting with Kosygin and 
Gromyko, 25 June 1979 3
2010/19/601 22 03-Jul
Soviet-Japanese relations: Pravda  examines 
political relations 6+4
2010/19/601 23 03-Jul SALT-2: tactless Pravda  attack 4
Political reports from Moscow, 1979
25
N.A.I., 
D.F.A. file 
ref.
P.R. 
No. Date Report title
PP (+ 
encls)
Political reports from Moscow, 1979
2010/19/601 24 03-Jul
Northern Ireland: Krasnaya Zvezda  (Red 
Army paper) preaches old line, and report in 
Sovyetskya Kultura  on the I.R.A.'s 'blanket' 
protest in Long Kesh 4+2
2010/19/601 25 10-Jul
Thirty-third COMECON meeting, 26-8 June 
1979 5
2010/19/601 26 11-Jul
Sino-Soviet negotiations: Pravda  warns 
against Chinese preconditions 6
2010/19/601 27 25-Jul
Meeting of E.E.C. Minister-counsellors, 19 
July 1979 6
2010/19/601 28/79 08-Aug
New decree to improve Soviet planning 
system 9
2011/39/1072 29 14-Aug
New economic planning decree: C.P.S.U. 
meeting at Gosplan: a critique of Soviet 
planning/economy 8
2011/39/1072 30 16-Aug
Tenth anniversary of British troops in 
Northern Ireland 4
2011/39/1072 31 03-Oct
Views of first secretary of the Egyptian 
embassy on Middle East 2
2011/39/1072 32 12-Oct Visit of Greek P.M., 1-5 Oct. 1979 4
33 missing
2011/39/1072 34 30-Oct
 'Finlandisation' - the word that will not go 
away 8
2011/39/1072 35 09-Nov Soviet resolution on hegemonism at U.N. 10
2011/39/1072 36 30-Oct Strange Soviet view on Eurocommunism 4
2011/39/1072 37 09-Nov Soviet view on the situation in Cambodia 11
38 missing
2011/39/1072 39 13-Nov
Soviet scientist questions (Soviet) nuclear 
power programme, after shutdown at Three 
Mile Island incident in U.S. 7
2011/39/1072 40 21-Nov
Euro strategic missiles: Pravda  presents the 
Soviet case 11
2011/39/1072 41a 28-Nov
Medium-range missiles: Gromyko's visit to 
Bonn 5
2011/39/1072 41b 28-Nov
Soviet-Chinese talks in Moscow: attempt to 
resolve border and common socialist 
principles 1
2011/39/1072 42 06-Dec
Recent Soviet comment on negotiations with 
E.E.C. 7
2011/39/1072 43 12-Dec
Moscow Olympics: K.G.B. officials warn of 
ideological subversion 3
2011/39/1072 44 12-Dec Pravda  assesses atheistic work 5
26
N.A.I., 
D.F.A. file 
ref.
P.R. 
No. Date Report title
PP (+ 
encls)
Political reports from Moscow, 1979
2011/39/1072 45 12-Dec
Warsaw Pact meeting in Berlin: 
consideration of NATO plan on medium-
range missiles 3
27
N.A.I., D.F.A. 
file ref.
P.R. 
No. Date Report title
PP (+ 
encls)
2011/39/1072 1/80 16-Jan
Afghanistan: the Soviet 
decision to invade 12
2011/39/1072 2 23-Jan
Declaration of Nine on 
Afghanistan 6
2011/39/1072 3 missing
2011/39/1072 4 30-Jan
Visit of Jacques Chaban-
Delmas (president of the 
French national assembly) 2
2011/39/1072 5 26-Feb Kabul disorders 2
2011/39/1072 6 05-Mar
Arbatov (foreign policy 
academician)article in Pravda 
on U.S. relations 5
2011/39/1072 7 26-Mar
Soviet reaction to Rhodesian 
election 4
2011/39/1072 8 missing
2011/39/1072 9 missing
2011/39/1072 10 31-Mar
Moscow Olympics: Soviet 
pronouncements 11
2011/39/1072 11 02-Apr
E.E.C. minister/counsellors 
meeting, 21 Mar. 1980, in 
Moscow 4
2011/39/1072 12 09-Apr
Frank comments from U.S. 
journalist on Afghanistan 2
2011/39/1072 13 09-Apr Afghanistan II - Soviet views 4
2011/39/1072 14 09-Apr
E.E.C. minister/counsellors 
meeting, 3 Apr. 1980, in 
Moscow 3
2011/39/1072 15 09-Apr
Northern Ireland at U.N. 
commission on human rights 7
2011/39/1072 16 16-Apr
Sino-Soviet relations: Soviets 
make renewed bid for 
negotiations 6
2011/39/1072 17 23-Apr
French ambassador's meeting 
with Gromyko 1
2011/39/1072 18 23-Apr Sino-Soviet relations 2
Political reports from Moscow, 1980
N.A.I., D.F.A. 
file ref.
P.R. 
No. Date Report title
PP (+ 
encls)
Political reports from Moscow, 1980
2011/39/1072 19 23-Apr
Afghanistan government 
proposal for political settlement 1
2011/39/1072 20 missing
2011/39/1072 21 30-Apr
Gromyko press conference in 
Paris 15
2011/39/1072 22 07-May Gromyko visit to Paris 2
2011/39/1072 23 06-May
Afghanistan: second 
anniversary of invasion 13
2011/39/1072 24 missing
2011/39/1072 25 missing
2011/39/1072 26 20-May
B.B.C. Moscow correspondent 
edged out 2
2011/39/1072 27 21-May Warsaw Pact summit 8
2011/39/1072 28 23-May The truth about Afghanistan, 1 3
2011/39/1072 29 23-May
The truth about Afghanistan, 
11 1
2011/39/1072 30 27-May Franco-Soviet Warsaw summit 9
2011/39/1072 31 missing
2011/39/1072 32 28-May Afghanistan: Soviet statements 5
2011/39/1072 33 26-Jun
Greek-Soviet C.S.C.E. 
consultations 2
2011/39/1072 34/80 11-Jun
Soviet Muslims and 
nationalities issues 5
2011/39/1072 35 02-Jul
C.P.S.U.  Central committee 
plenum on Soviet foreign 
policy 5
2011/39/1072 36 04-Jul
Chancellor Schmidt's visit to 
Moscow 4
2011/39/1072 37 15-Jul Soviet views on Africa 2
2011/39/1072 38 missing
N.A.I., D.F.A. 
file ref.
P.R. 
No. Date Report title
PP (+ 
encls)
Political reports from Moscow, 1980
2011/39/1072 39 16-Jul
Chancellor Schmidt's visit to 
Moscow 2
2011/39/1072 40 23-Jul
Soviet criticism on U.S. human 
rights 5
2011/39/1072 41 29-Jul
Reagan's nomination: Soviet 
reaction 7
2011/39/1072 42 12-Sep F.R.G. reply to Brezhnev letter 1
2011/39/1072 43 missing
2011/39/1072 44 14-Oct
Soviet-Syrian treaty of 
friendship and co-operation 2
2011/39/1072 45 15-Oct
Stanislaw Kania (Polish C.P. 
Leader) speech on Polish 
situation 2
2011/39/1072 46 missing
2011/39/1072 47 02-Nov
Resignation speech of Prime 
Minister Kosygin 6
2011/39/1072 48 05-Nov
Brezhnev speech to C.P.S.U. 
central committee plenary 7
2011/39/1072 49 19-Nov
Finnish state visit to Soviet 
Union, 7-12 November 4
APPENDIX 2
A register of the records of Irish 
involvement in  meetings of the Eastern 
Europe Working Group (E.E.W.G.), 
1974-80
Source: National Archives of Ireland, Department of Foreign 
Affairs, Central Registry files, 2006-2013 releases
Year
Soviet 
Union
Eastern 
Europe
Relations 
between 
Soviet 
Union and 
E. Europe
Soviet 
response 
to E.E.C. 
integratio
n
Soviet 
oil 
Comm-
unist 
parties
Studies 
with 
military 
aspects Visas
E.E.C. - 
COMECON 
trade
1974 2 1 2 2 2
1975 4 2 2 1 1 1
1976 3 3 1 1 1 1
1977 3 2 1 2 1
1978 5 7 2 1 1
1979 5 5 2 1
1980 8 5 1 1
Totals 30 25 8 3 4 4 5 2 2
Grand 
total 83
* Some, but not all topics considered at meetings were agreed worthy of  formal studies 
N.B. While the group usually considered specific studies over two or more meetings, each study 
is counted only once in this summary
Summary analysis, by subject, of studies (not topics)* undertaken by the E.E.W.G., 1974-
80
N.A.I., D.F.A. 
file no. Date Venue
Studies under review, and other 
topics discussed Irish delegation
2007/111/889 28 Jan. Bonn Study: 'Relations between the 
Soviet Union and eastern Europe'
Dr Brennan and 
A.E. Mannix                   
Study: 'Countries of the East and 
E.E.C. construction'
Topic: Conference of west 
European communist parties, Jan 
1974
2007/111/889     
and 
2007/111/913
15 Feb. Bonn Study: 'Relations between the 
Soviet Union and eastern Europe'
Dr  Brennan 
Study: 'Countries of the East and 
E.E.C. Construction'
Study: 'The role of the communist 
parties of the Nine'
Topic: Arrival of Alexander 
Solzhenitsyn in F.R.G. (human 
rights issue)
Topic: Role of ideology in Soviet 
policy
2007/111/889 26 June Bonn Final meeting of German 
presidency.  Its thirty-page 
summary report included:                 
Ideological attitude and political 
interests of the members states of 
the Warsaw Pact.                     
Effects of processus européen  on 
the  policy of the Warsaw Pact  
towards the Nine.                                          
Effects on processus  européen  on 
member states of the Warsaw Pact 
 A.E. Mannix
Topic: The special case of 
Yugoslavia 
Study: 'The role of the communist 
parties of the Nine'
No. of 
meetings: 3
Irish reports of meetings of the E.E.W.G., 1974
N.B. No meetings convened by the French presidency in second half of 1974
N.A.I., D.F.A. 
file no. Date Venue
Studies under review, and 
other topics discussed 
2007/111/915-6 26 Mar. Dublin Study: 'Peaceful coexistence' 
(dangers of a Soviet 'monopoly' 
over this term)
Study: 'Visas for eastern 
European countries' (with 
statistics of visas issued by 
Ireland to east European 
citizens, Jan. 1974 to Apr. 
1975)
Study: 'Eastern Europe and the 
energy crisis'  
Study: 'Situation in Yugoslavia'
2007/111/921-2 28 Apr. Dublin Study: 'Peaceful coexistence'
Study: 'Eastern Europe and the 
energy crisis'  
Study: 'Visas for eastern 
European countries'
Study: 'Situation in Romania'
Study: 'Conference of European 
communist parties'
2007/111/923 13 June Dublin Study: 'Peaceful coexistence'
Study: 'Eastern Europe and the 
energy crisis'  
Study: 'Visas for eastern 
European countries'
2007/111/924 29 Aug. Rome Study: 'Visas for eastern 
European countries'
Topic: Mr Georgi Vins, Soviet 
Baptist minister (human rights 
issue)
2007/111/925 26 Sept.Rome Study: 'Internal situation in the 
U.S.S.R.'
Study: 'Soviet strategy after the 
C.S.C.E.'
Irish reports of meetings of the E.E.W.G., 1975
N.A.I., D.F.A. 
file no. Date Venue
Studies under review, and 
other topics discussed 
Irish reports of meetings of the E.E.W.G., 1975
Study:  'Report compiled by the 
embassies of E.E.C. member 
countries in Moscow on the 
Soviet oil industry, Apr. 1974.' 
(Includes: oil reserves, 
production, transport facilities, 
domestic consumption, foreign 
trade, and cooperation projects 
with the West.)
2007/111/929 11 Dec. Rome Study: 'Soviet strategy after the 
C.S.C.E.'
Study: 'The politics of détente 
of the U.S.S.R.’ (includes 
chapters on: the politics of 
détente, military aspects, the 
economics of détente, the 
culture of détente, the 
ideological struggle)
No. of meetings: 6
Irish delegation
P. MacKernan
P. MacKernan
P. MacKernan
P. MacKernan
Irish reports of meetings of the E.E.W.G., 1975
Irish delegation
Irish reports of meetings of the E.E.W.G., 1975
A.E. Mannix
N.A.I., 
D.F.A. file 
no. Date Venue
Studies under review, and 
other topics discussed Irish delegation
2007/111/933 14 Apr. Luxembourg Topic: Political implications 
of the recent Soviet draft of a 
COMECON-E.E.C. trade 
accord
P. MacKernan
2007/111/932 10 May Luxembourg Topic: Twenty-fifth C.P.S.U. 
congress (with details of 
politburo membership)
(not stated)
Study: 'Soviet strategy after 
the C.S.C.E.'
2007/111/935 1 Sept. The Hague Study: 'Soviet policy 
regarding the Third World'
J.A. Sharkey 
2007/111/934 18 Oct. The Hague Topic: The role of the  Soviet 
Union and the states of 
eastern Europe in the world 
economy
J.A. Sharkey
Topic: The role of the 
E.E.W.G. in consideration of 
the E.E.C.'s visas regime for 
eastern Europe
2007/111/936 17 Nov. The Hague Topic: The  attitude of the 
Soviet Union and the states of 
eastern Europe towards 
developing countries
J.A. Sharkey
Topic: The conference of 
European communist parties, 
held in East Berlin, 29-30 
June (List of participants 
includes Michael O'Riordan, 
C.P.I.)
2007/111/937 8 Dec. The Hague Topic: The Bucharest 
declaration issued after the 
Warsaw Pact summit meeting,  
Nov. 
P. MacKernan
Study:  'The role of the Soviet 
Union and the states of 
eastern Europe in the world 
economy'
No. of 
meetings: 6
Irish reports of  meetings of the E.E.W.G., 1976
N.A.I., 
D.F.A. file 
no. Date Venue
Studies under review, and other 
topics discussed 
Irish 
delegation
2007/111/938 20 Jan. London Study: 'Warsaw Pact political 
consultative committee meeting, 
Bucharest, Nov.'
P. MacKernan
Topic: Situation in Poland (popular 
dissent after price rises)  and 
relations with U.S.S.R.
2007/111/939 21 Feb. London Study: 'Internal situation in the 
G.D.R.’ 
J.A. Sharkey
Study: Political dissent and the 
human rights movement in eastern 
Europe, Czechoslovakia and the 
Soviet Union
2007/111/940 21 Mar. London Topic: The development of dissent 
in the Soviet Union
J.A. Sharkey
2007/111/941 4 May London Study: Political dissent and human 
rights movements in eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union
P. MacKernan
2007/111/942 9 June Brussels Study: 'Soviet policies in Southern 
Africa'
T.P. Corcoran
2007/111/944 28 Nov. Brussels Topic: Brief assessment of the 
situation in Yugoslavia
Thelma Doran
Study: 'The situation in Albania'
Study: 'The role of the Soviet 
armed forces in the conduct of 
Soviet domestic and foreign policy' 
(Ambassador Brennan asked for an 
input)
Ireland reported that its London 
embassy had received an 
information package from the 
G.D.R. (Indicates the G.D.R. is 
seeking international recognition - 
F.R.G.  delegation took note)
No. of 
meetings: 6
Topic: The internal situation in the 
U.S.S.R. in the light of the new 
Soviet constitution 
Irish reports of  meetings of the E.E.W.G., 1977
N.A.I., 
D.F.A. file 
no. Date Venue
Studies under review, and other 
topics discussed 
2008/79/1477 19 Jan. Copenhagen Study: 'Romanian foreign policy'
Study: 'The situation in Albania'
Study: 'The role of the Soviet 
armed forces in the conduct of 
Soviet domestic and foreign policy' 
2008/79/1478 3 Apr. Copenhagen Study: 'Romanian foreign policy'
Study: 'The Situation on Poland'
Study: 'Centralism and Soviet 
nationalities policy'
2008/79/1479 31 May Copenhagen Finalisation of the study on 
'Centralism and Soviet nationalities 
policy'
Study: 'Situation in Hungary'
Radio Liberty study: 'An 
evaluation of the new (Soviet) 
republics' constitutions'
2008/79/1480 12 July Bonn Topic: Proposed Nine declaration 
on recent trials of Soviet dissidents'
Topic: Likely outcome of a 
possible U.K. withdrawal from the 
C.S.C.E. Scientific Forum  (in 
response to the Soviet human 
rights trials) 
Study: 'East European and Soviet 
motivations re conclusion of 
bilateral agreements'
2008/79/1480 12 July Bonn Study: 'Motives and objectives of 
the east European countries with 
regard to C.S.C.E. process'
U.K. background paper on the 
Soviet and east European role in 
the North-South dialogue
Irish reports of  meetings of the E.E.W.G., 1978
N.A.I., 
D.F.A. file 
no. Date Venue
Studies under review, and other 
topics discussed 
Irish reports of  meetings of the E.E.W.G., 1978
2008/79/1481 11 Sept. Bonn Study: 'East European and Soviet 
motivations re conclusion of 
bilateral agreements'
Study: 'East-West relations after 
the trials of dissidents in the Soviet 
Union'
Study: 'Relations between the 
Soviet Union and China'
Study: 'Motives and objectives of 
the east European countries with 
regard to C.S.C.E. process'
2008/79/1482 30 Oct. Bonn Study: 'Motives and objectives of 
the east European countries with 
regard to C.S.C.E. process'
Study: 'Relations between the 
Soviet Union and China'
Study: 'East-West relations after 
the trials of dissidents in the Soviet 
Union'
2008/79/1483 4 Dec. Bonn Finalised study: 'The nature, 
impact and depth of Soviet 
concerns on China'
Topic: Declaration issued after the  
political committee meeting of the 
Warsaw Pact, Nov. 1978 
Topic: East European educational 
aid to the Third World
No. of 
meetings:
7
Irish 
delegation
Thelma Doran
Thelma Doran
Thelma 
Doran and 
Timothy 
Corcoran
Thelma Doran
G. Davidson
Irish reports of  meetings of the E.E.W.G., 1978
Irish 
delegation
Irish reports of  meetings of the E.E.W.G., 1978
Thelma Doran
Thelma 
Doran and 
Eamon 
Hickey
Eamon Hickey
N.A.I., 
D.F.A. file 
no. Date Venue
Studies under review, and other 
topics discussed 
2009/120/630 15 Feb. Paris Topic: Position regarding Irish 
scholarships for Third World 
students
Study: 'Soviet development aid in 
Africa'
Topic: The attitude of the U.S.S.R. 
and the countries of the East 
towards developing countries
Study: 'Various conceptions of 
détente of the principal 
protagonists in the C.S.C.E.'
Topic: Relations between the 
U.S.S.R. and  the countries of the 
Warsaw Pact
2009/120/631 23 Apr. Paris Study: 'Various conceptions of 
détente of the principal 
protagonists in the C.S.C.E.'
Topic: Activities of eastern 
countries to influence young people 
in the Third World
Study: 'Relations between the 
USSR and other countries of the 
Warsaw Pact'
Topic: Possible death of President 
Brezhnev and the Soviet succession
Topic: Czechoslovakia and Charter 
77 Movement
2009/120/632 29 May Paris Study: 'Activities of eastern 
countries to influence young people 
in the Third World'
Study: 'Relations between the 
U.S.S.R. and other countries of the 
Warsaw Pact' (Re faltering efforts 
on COMECON integration)
Topic: Czechoslovakia and Charter 
77 Movement
Irish reports of  meetings of the E.E.W.G., 1979
N.A.I., 
D.F.A. file 
no. Date Venue
Studies under review, and other 
topics discussed 
Irish reports of  meetings of the E.E.W.G., 1979
Study on Poland
Study on Albania (post break with 
China - how will Albania react to 
its isolation?)
2009/120/633 21 June Paris Study: 'Activities of eastern 
countries to influence young people 
in the Third World'
Study: 'Relations between the 
U.S.S.R. and other countries of the 
Warsaw Pact'
Topic: Czechoslovakia and Charter 
77 Movement (discussion on a joint 
E.E.C. démarche)
Topic: Pope's visit to Poland 
2009/120/634 17 Sept. Dublin Study: 'Situation in Poland 
following the pope's visit' (Focus 
on economic woes - inflation 
exceeds growth)
Topic: Czechoslovakia and Charter 
77 Movement 
Study on Albania 
2009/120/635 5 Nov. Dublin Topic: Situation in Czechoslovakia 
after a crackdown on Charter 77
Study on Albania 
2009/120/636 13 Dec. Dublin Study on Albania 
Study: ' The C.P.S.U. and its 
development during the fifteen 
years of the Brezhnev era' 
The results of the twelfth congress 
of the Romanian Communist Party
Meeting of the committee of 
foreign ministers of the Warsaw 
Pact, Berlin, Dec. 1979
N.A.I., 
D.F.A. file 
no. Date Venue
Studies under review, and other 
topics discussed 
Irish reports of  meetings of the E.E.W.G., 1979
Olympic Games (U.K. objects to   
sea-based events: it does not 
recognise Soviet sovereignty over 
the Baltic states)
No. of 
meetings:
7
Irish 
delegation
A.E. Mannix
A.E. Mannix 
and R.H. 
O'Toole
A.E. Mannix
Irish reports of  meetings of the E.E.W.G., 1979
Irish 
delegation
Irish reports of  meetings of the E.E.W.G., 1979
A.E. Mannix 
and R.H. 
O'Toole
A.E. Mannix
R.H. O'Toole
A.E. Mannix 
and R.H. 
O'Toole
A.E. Mannix
Irish 
delegation
Irish reports of  meetings of the E.E.W.G., 1979
N.A.I., D.F.A. 
file no. Date Venue
Studies under review, and 
other topics discussed 
2010/19/531 28 Jan. Rome Topic: Consequences of the 
Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan - Nine's 
response
Study: 'The C.P.S.U. and its 
development during the 
fifteen years of the 
Brezhnev era' 
Topic: Olympic Games 
(Wait-and-see stance 
adopted, as 'a boycott 
would need a large number 
of non-aligned')
Topic: Soviet attitude to 
Iran
2010/19/532 3 Mar. Rome Afghanistan: (a) U.S.S.R. 
reaction to Afghanistan 
neutrality proposal
Study: ' The C.P.S.U. and 
its development during the 
fifteen years of the 
Brezhnev era' 
Study: 'Relations  between 
the Soviet Union and Iran'
Topic: Exchange of views 
on Poland
2010/19/533 31 Mar. Rome Study: 'Soviet position with 
regard to Western reactions 
to Afghanistan'  
Study: 'The C.P.S.U. and its 
development during the 
fifteen years of the 
Brezhnev era' 
The Soviet Union and Iran 
(U.K. suggests that Soviets 
about to invade Iran)
Irish reports of  meetings of the E.E.W.G., 1980
N.A.I., D.F.A. 
file no. Date Venue
Studies under review, and 
other topics discussed 
Irish reports of  meetings of the E.E.W.G., 1980
Topic: Discussion on E.E.C.-
COMECON trade relations
Topic: Soviet attitude to the 
issue of U.S. hostages held 
in Teheran
2010/19/534 8 May Rome Study: 'Soviet position with 
regard to Western reactions 
to Afghanistan'  (with 
details of Soviet casualties)
Study: 'Relations  between 
the Soviet Union and Iran'
Soviet attitudes in African 
countries south of the 
Sahara (Zimbabwe and 
Namibia)
2010/19/535 12 June Rome Study: 'Soviet attitudes in 
African countries south of 
the Sahara'
Study: 'Soviet position with 
regard to Western reactions 
to Afghanistan'  
2010/19/536 21 Aug. Luxembourg Poland: Italian proposal for 
Nine declaration 
Bulgarian invitations to 
E.E.C. member states to 
attend a conference on 'The 
role of culture in the 
development of society', 
Sofia, Dec. 1980
Invitation by President of 
Madagascar to attend a 
conference on 'The Indian 
ocean as a zone of peace'
N.A.I., D.F.A. 
file no. Date Venue
Studies under review, and 
other topics discussed 
Irish reports of  meetings of the E.E.W.G., 1980
Study: 'Soviet position with 
regard to Western reactions 
to Afghanistan'  
2010/19/537 16 Oct. Luxembourg Soviet policy in the Gulf 
area
Afghanistan: Reports of 
Mujahidin successes
Afghanistan protest: E.E.C. 
ambassadors to boycott 
some official functions in 
Moscow
Discussion on E.E.C. aid for 
Polish economy
No. of meetings: 7
Irish 
delegation
Thelma 
Doran
Anne 
Anderson
Anne 
Anderson
Irish reports of  meetings of the E.E.W.G., 1980
Irish 
delegation
Irish reports of  meetings of the E.E.W.G., 1980
Anne 
Anderson
Anne 
Anderson
Anne 
Anderson 
/Webster
Irish 
delegation
Irish reports of  meetings of the E.E.W.G., 1980
Anne 
Anderson 
/Webster
